03-21-2008, 11:44 PM
Hi,
Still catching up with all the posts since joining this board. I came across the debate on the Huns and their siege ability and dug up a bit of my old thesis and thought some of you might find it interesting. If its too long I apolgise. I'm not sure if the footnotes will come out but I can alaways email the relevant chapter to anyone who is interested. Just bear in mind this research was done 15 years ago and I'm sure is quite dated. At the time I did not appreciate the minefield that is ethnohistoriography.
The Huns, linked by some scholars to the Hsiung-nu mentioned in the Chinese sources, were arguably the most terrifying of the nomadic peoples encountered by the Byzantines. When they crossed the Eurasian steppes and first appeared on the imperial horizon c.375, they forced the migration westwards of the Goths, and other barbarians, which ultimately led to the catastrophe of Hadrianople in 378. As with the other steppe nomads, the Huns were heavily reliant on horses and were excellent archers, using a reflex bow. Their rapid movement on campaign and on the battlefield itself were not lost on the Byzantines. In 395 they launched a raid from their home on the Danube and reached as far as Ctesiphon and Edessa, before returning. The Huns would have had to feed their numbers as they moved across the steppes normally so whatever system they used to achieve this should still have been able to fulfil their bodily requirements on campaigns in settled regions, providing there was enough food for their flocks. However, their supply system for arrows and other military equipment may have needed modifying simply because they were likely to have increased contact with hostile forces of greater magnitude than they were familiar with from their travels, and would therefore require more equipment. Still, each group seems to have been well organised and trained and they inflicted some heavy defeats on the empire in the field. Fortified positions were another proposition. The steppe-nomads brought large sturdy wagons with them to move their goods and booty. Hauled into a defensive circle, these provided one form of fortification the Huns are likely to have encountered regularly, but they can have gained little, if any experience, in siege warfare from attacking walls as they moved across the steppe. However, devoid of any form of settled life and its associated military implications as they were, the Huns would have begun to come across protected settlements and towns as they neared the borders of the empire. They may have begun their knowledge of siege warfare as they moved through the areas just north of the Black Sea and the Caucauses and it was not long before the Huns were gaining control of imperial towns.
After 378 the Huns seem to have made an alliance with the Goths and Alans, and the three are mentioned as raiders of the Balkans for the couple of years after Hadrianople, before the Huns disappear from the sources. Although there are very few details describing Hun tactics in detail, it is clear that they were capable of taking cities from an early point in their dealings with the empire, despite Ammianus’ comment that, ‘they are never seen to attack a rampart or pillage an enemy’s camp.’ They apparently were part of the Gothic force that moved against Constantinople in 378. Their first recorded capture of an objective was that of Zijat in Mesopotamia. This was a fortress where people had taken refuge to escape the raiders. By cutting the aqueduct the water supply was cut off and the inhabitants were forced to surrender. A massacre promptly followed. The Huns had gained their first victory in a siege. However, in the west, the first instance we have of an objective being taken was that of Castra Martis in 406, but it fell by treachery. In 441, Constantina suffered the same fate. According to Priscus, our main source for early Hun activity, on this occasion, they entered the fort at market time and took it by a ruse. By the time they besieged the well defended city of Naissus later in the year, they were employing large battering rams and their own mobile elevated firing platforms, from which they shot showers of arrows at the defenders. Indeed Priscus makes it clear that they were deploying these machines in such quantity that the defenders were not able to cope with the sheer number of them.
This passage is crucial to the discussion about the Huns’ poliorcetic capabilities at this stage. It is the first recorded example of them using machines to take an objective, rather than using trickery, treachery or blockade. Thompson argues that this description given by Priscus is useless as a source for Hun siege tactics. He says, ‘...it seems clear that by borrowing Thucydides’ phrases Priscus has endowed the Huns with a military technique which it is quite impossible that they can have possessed.’ His article deals with the text of Priscus and his borrowings from Thucydides, and to a lesser extent from Dexippus, who himself imitated the classical author. However, while Thompson has undoubtedly proved that some of the phraseology employed is borrowed from Thucydides’ account of the siege of Plataea, this does not necessarily invalidate Priscus’ account of the action at Naissus. Thucydides has the Peloponnesians mhcan¦j prosÃ
Still catching up with all the posts since joining this board. I came across the debate on the Huns and their siege ability and dug up a bit of my old thesis and thought some of you might find it interesting. If its too long I apolgise. I'm not sure if the footnotes will come out but I can alaways email the relevant chapter to anyone who is interested. Just bear in mind this research was done 15 years ago and I'm sure is quite dated. At the time I did not appreciate the minefield that is ethnohistoriography.
The Huns, linked by some scholars to the Hsiung-nu mentioned in the Chinese sources, were arguably the most terrifying of the nomadic peoples encountered by the Byzantines. When they crossed the Eurasian steppes and first appeared on the imperial horizon c.375, they forced the migration westwards of the Goths, and other barbarians, which ultimately led to the catastrophe of Hadrianople in 378. As with the other steppe nomads, the Huns were heavily reliant on horses and were excellent archers, using a reflex bow. Their rapid movement on campaign and on the battlefield itself were not lost on the Byzantines. In 395 they launched a raid from their home on the Danube and reached as far as Ctesiphon and Edessa, before returning. The Huns would have had to feed their numbers as they moved across the steppes normally so whatever system they used to achieve this should still have been able to fulfil their bodily requirements on campaigns in settled regions, providing there was enough food for their flocks. However, their supply system for arrows and other military equipment may have needed modifying simply because they were likely to have increased contact with hostile forces of greater magnitude than they were familiar with from their travels, and would therefore require more equipment. Still, each group seems to have been well organised and trained and they inflicted some heavy defeats on the empire in the field. Fortified positions were another proposition. The steppe-nomads brought large sturdy wagons with them to move their goods and booty. Hauled into a defensive circle, these provided one form of fortification the Huns are likely to have encountered regularly, but they can have gained little, if any experience, in siege warfare from attacking walls as they moved across the steppe. However, devoid of any form of settled life and its associated military implications as they were, the Huns would have begun to come across protected settlements and towns as they neared the borders of the empire. They may have begun their knowledge of siege warfare as they moved through the areas just north of the Black Sea and the Caucauses and it was not long before the Huns were gaining control of imperial towns.
After 378 the Huns seem to have made an alliance with the Goths and Alans, and the three are mentioned as raiders of the Balkans for the couple of years after Hadrianople, before the Huns disappear from the sources. Although there are very few details describing Hun tactics in detail, it is clear that they were capable of taking cities from an early point in their dealings with the empire, despite Ammianus’ comment that, ‘they are never seen to attack a rampart or pillage an enemy’s camp.’ They apparently were part of the Gothic force that moved against Constantinople in 378. Their first recorded capture of an objective was that of Zijat in Mesopotamia. This was a fortress where people had taken refuge to escape the raiders. By cutting the aqueduct the water supply was cut off and the inhabitants were forced to surrender. A massacre promptly followed. The Huns had gained their first victory in a siege. However, in the west, the first instance we have of an objective being taken was that of Castra Martis in 406, but it fell by treachery. In 441, Constantina suffered the same fate. According to Priscus, our main source for early Hun activity, on this occasion, they entered the fort at market time and took it by a ruse. By the time they besieged the well defended city of Naissus later in the year, they were employing large battering rams and their own mobile elevated firing platforms, from which they shot showers of arrows at the defenders. Indeed Priscus makes it clear that they were deploying these machines in such quantity that the defenders were not able to cope with the sheer number of them.
This passage is crucial to the discussion about the Huns’ poliorcetic capabilities at this stage. It is the first recorded example of them using machines to take an objective, rather than using trickery, treachery or blockade. Thompson argues that this description given by Priscus is useless as a source for Hun siege tactics. He says, ‘...it seems clear that by borrowing Thucydides’ phrases Priscus has endowed the Huns with a military technique which it is quite impossible that they can have possessed.’ His article deals with the text of Priscus and his borrowings from Thucydides, and to a lesser extent from Dexippus, who himself imitated the classical author. However, while Thompson has undoubtedly proved that some of the phraseology employed is borrowed from Thucydides’ account of the siege of Plataea, this does not necessarily invalidate Priscus’ account of the action at Naissus. Thucydides has the Peloponnesians mhcan¦j prosÃ
Stephen McCotter
