09-10-2020, 05:49 AM
Michael wrote:
Thanks for bumping this thread Steven, I`ll read it presently!
It is worth reading in order to observe the various research styles, which are mostly based on speculation. Some have entered the discussion with a biased opinion and only present information that they believe substantiates such opinion. Most of it is based on simple comparisons of numbers, and numbers carefully selected from other historical events. This is the road to nowhere.
For me personally, to employ data relating to Julius Caesar’s fleet of 54 BC or the Athenian fleet at Syracuse as given by Thucydides in order to determine the size of Scipio’s fleet in 204 BC is a flawed methodology. What if Caesar’s fleet numbers for 54 BC was incorrect? A faulty premise produces an incorrect answer. The following examples of fleet numbers are contained within a 47 year time period.
Plutarch (Pompey 11 2) has Pompey, with a fleet of 120 warships, and 800 transports conveying six full legions to Africa. Appian (BC 5 98) has Lepidus with a fleet of 70 warships and 1,000 transports, conveying 12 legions and 500 Numidian cavalry. Here we find 6 legions require 120 warships and 800 transports, while 12 legions require 70 warships and 1,000 transports, a disparity of 50 warships and 200 transports. If six legions require 800 transports, then surely 12 legions would require 1,600 transports?
In 54 BC, Caesar has 5 legions and 2,000 cavalry conveyed to over 800 ships including those built by individuals. This would allocate each legion 160 ships. Pompey needs 800 transports for six legions, whereas Caesar needs 800 transports for five legions.
In 55 BC, Caesar (BG 4 22) (BG 4 28) has about 80 ships and 18 horse transports conveying over two legions to Britain. Caesar (BG 4 37) also mentions from two ships about 300 soldiers were drawn. 80 ships multiplied by 300 soldiers per ship would produce 24,000 soldiers. 80 ships multiplied by the lower figure of 200 soldiers per ship would produce 16,000 soldiers. Both figures do not conform to an army of two legions (around 10,000 men). However, to upset the apple cart, in 37 BC, Appian (The Civil War 5 25) has Murcus joined Sextius Pompeius’ with two legions and 80 ships, which concurs with Caesar. Appian (The Civil War 5 26) has Domitius Ahenobarbus with two legions and 70 ships. In 25/26 BC, Strabo (16 4 23) has Aelius Gallus sailed to Arabia Felix with no less than 80 biremes, triremes and phaseloi ships, 130 transports to convey about 10,000 Roman infantry, 500 Jews and 1,000 Nabataeans. The 10,000 Roman infantry would equate to two legions, with the total of 11,500 men requiring 210 vessels.
To explain the disparities, one could use Caesar’s comment that on his return journey from Britain to Gaul in 54 BC, the men were cramped into the ships. So the different ships and legion numbers could mean on some occasions this happened and on other occasions it did not. However, can this be proven? The only way to get direct results is to go after the ship sizes as given above, and to keep the numbers in period. The Roman navy is constantly changing. The Roman fleet of the First Punic War is different to the Roman fleet of the Second Punic War, which again is different to the Roman fleet of Caesar’s day. Keeping the research in period makes it that much easier to expose organizational changes to the fleet. I like to keep the information in intervals of 50 year periods.
Thankfully, Caesar leaves behind a mathematical signature or pattern. If Caesar is outnumbered, he does not exaggerate the enemies’ numbers, but provides accurate accounting, such as the battle of Pharsalus. If he wants to impress his Roman readers, which is the reason for his commentaries, he exaggerates. His 800 ships for 5 legions for 54 BC is one such example of exaggeration, with Caesar imprinting on the minds of his reader his ship building powers. The 80 ships fleet to Britain in 55 BC has been reduced in size by mathematical mistake or design to show with so little, how much he accomplished. Whatever the reason, he had far more than 80 ships. A comparison between the actual number and Caesar’s figures reveal his mathematical approach.
Did Caesar actually have 120 ships with each ship conveying 80 men? Or 80 ships conveying 120 men? Instead of the infantry of each troop type being allocated their own ships (example 20 ships of hastati, 20 ships of princeps), could the 80 infantry per ship consist of 20 auxiliaries (archers and slingers), 20 hastati, 20 princeps and 20 pilani. Caesar does mention arrows and slings being fired from his ships while trying to land in Britain, so can this ship arrangement be ruled out?
If 80 cavalrymen were allocated to a warship, Caesar’s 2,000 cavalry for 54 BC, would require 25 warships, which is getting close to Caesar’s earlier fleet number of 28 warships and 600 transports. The 28 warships multiplied by 80 equals 2,240 cavalry, which can be organised into 70 squadrons each of 32 cavalrymen. While encamped in Britain, Caesar left 10 cohorts and 300 cavalry to guard the ships. Has the 300 cavalry been rounded from 320 cavalry by rounding each of the 10 squadrons of 32 cavalry to 30 cavalry? Did Caesar have 7 alae of 320 cavalry? Afer the removal of the guard cavalry, I found that for Scipio’s army of 204 BC that Scipio had six alae of 320 cavalry.
What if Caesar’s figure of two ships drawing about 300 soldiers was actually 320 soldiers (80 x 4), or 160 soldiers per ships (double 80), which could accord with Caesar’s claim the soldiers were cramped on the ships for the home journey due to losing 40 ships from storms and another 60 blown back to Gaul.
So how safe is it now to use Caesar’s fleet of 80 ships for two legions as a comparison for Scipio’s fleet of 204 BC?
Thanks for bumping this thread Steven, I`ll read it presently!
It is worth reading in order to observe the various research styles, which are mostly based on speculation. Some have entered the discussion with a biased opinion and only present information that they believe substantiates such opinion. Most of it is based on simple comparisons of numbers, and numbers carefully selected from other historical events. This is the road to nowhere.
For me personally, to employ data relating to Julius Caesar’s fleet of 54 BC or the Athenian fleet at Syracuse as given by Thucydides in order to determine the size of Scipio’s fleet in 204 BC is a flawed methodology. What if Caesar’s fleet numbers for 54 BC was incorrect? A faulty premise produces an incorrect answer. The following examples of fleet numbers are contained within a 47 year time period.
Plutarch (Pompey 11 2) has Pompey, with a fleet of 120 warships, and 800 transports conveying six full legions to Africa. Appian (BC 5 98) has Lepidus with a fleet of 70 warships and 1,000 transports, conveying 12 legions and 500 Numidian cavalry. Here we find 6 legions require 120 warships and 800 transports, while 12 legions require 70 warships and 1,000 transports, a disparity of 50 warships and 200 transports. If six legions require 800 transports, then surely 12 legions would require 1,600 transports?
In 54 BC, Caesar has 5 legions and 2,000 cavalry conveyed to over 800 ships including those built by individuals. This would allocate each legion 160 ships. Pompey needs 800 transports for six legions, whereas Caesar needs 800 transports for five legions.
In 55 BC, Caesar (BG 4 22) (BG 4 28) has about 80 ships and 18 horse transports conveying over two legions to Britain. Caesar (BG 4 37) also mentions from two ships about 300 soldiers were drawn. 80 ships multiplied by 300 soldiers per ship would produce 24,000 soldiers. 80 ships multiplied by the lower figure of 200 soldiers per ship would produce 16,000 soldiers. Both figures do not conform to an army of two legions (around 10,000 men). However, to upset the apple cart, in 37 BC, Appian (The Civil War 5 25) has Murcus joined Sextius Pompeius’ with two legions and 80 ships, which concurs with Caesar. Appian (The Civil War 5 26) has Domitius Ahenobarbus with two legions and 70 ships. In 25/26 BC, Strabo (16 4 23) has Aelius Gallus sailed to Arabia Felix with no less than 80 biremes, triremes and phaseloi ships, 130 transports to convey about 10,000 Roman infantry, 500 Jews and 1,000 Nabataeans. The 10,000 Roman infantry would equate to two legions, with the total of 11,500 men requiring 210 vessels.
To explain the disparities, one could use Caesar’s comment that on his return journey from Britain to Gaul in 54 BC, the men were cramped into the ships. So the different ships and legion numbers could mean on some occasions this happened and on other occasions it did not. However, can this be proven? The only way to get direct results is to go after the ship sizes as given above, and to keep the numbers in period. The Roman navy is constantly changing. The Roman fleet of the First Punic War is different to the Roman fleet of the Second Punic War, which again is different to the Roman fleet of Caesar’s day. Keeping the research in period makes it that much easier to expose organizational changes to the fleet. I like to keep the information in intervals of 50 year periods.
Thankfully, Caesar leaves behind a mathematical signature or pattern. If Caesar is outnumbered, he does not exaggerate the enemies’ numbers, but provides accurate accounting, such as the battle of Pharsalus. If he wants to impress his Roman readers, which is the reason for his commentaries, he exaggerates. His 800 ships for 5 legions for 54 BC is one such example of exaggeration, with Caesar imprinting on the minds of his reader his ship building powers. The 80 ships fleet to Britain in 55 BC has been reduced in size by mathematical mistake or design to show with so little, how much he accomplished. Whatever the reason, he had far more than 80 ships. A comparison between the actual number and Caesar’s figures reveal his mathematical approach.
Did Caesar actually have 120 ships with each ship conveying 80 men? Or 80 ships conveying 120 men? Instead of the infantry of each troop type being allocated their own ships (example 20 ships of hastati, 20 ships of princeps), could the 80 infantry per ship consist of 20 auxiliaries (archers and slingers), 20 hastati, 20 princeps and 20 pilani. Caesar does mention arrows and slings being fired from his ships while trying to land in Britain, so can this ship arrangement be ruled out?
If 80 cavalrymen were allocated to a warship, Caesar’s 2,000 cavalry for 54 BC, would require 25 warships, which is getting close to Caesar’s earlier fleet number of 28 warships and 600 transports. The 28 warships multiplied by 80 equals 2,240 cavalry, which can be organised into 70 squadrons each of 32 cavalrymen. While encamped in Britain, Caesar left 10 cohorts and 300 cavalry to guard the ships. Has the 300 cavalry been rounded from 320 cavalry by rounding each of the 10 squadrons of 32 cavalry to 30 cavalry? Did Caesar have 7 alae of 320 cavalry? Afer the removal of the guard cavalry, I found that for Scipio’s army of 204 BC that Scipio had six alae of 320 cavalry.
What if Caesar’s figure of two ships drawing about 300 soldiers was actually 320 soldiers (80 x 4), or 160 soldiers per ships (double 80), which could accord with Caesar’s claim the soldiers were cramped on the ships for the home journey due to losing 40 ships from storms and another 60 blown back to Gaul.
So how safe is it now to use Caesar’s fleet of 80 ships for two legions as a comparison for Scipio’s fleet of 204 BC?
