09-24-2019, 09:17 AM
The three Spies affair is where Polybius` version of the campaign falls apart.
It is a recycled stratagem from Herodotus and it is a pretext for the court-room drama and summing up that the parley between Scipio and Hannibal really is. It would, no doubt, have appealed to Polybius` readers, (and Livy`s version of it to a later Roman audience), but I can`t see how this makes any kind of sense to us.
I don`t see how Hannibal could have seen Scipio`s position as disadvantageous after Appian`s cavalry battle, or even if we accept Polybius` three spies deception variant, before Polybius` great battle.
I think you have missed out Vermina in all this. Hannibal was at this point still without reinforcement from Vermina in either of the cases above.
I do agree that the Thermus story is hard to believe as Hannibal is operating in home territory. The other translation i`ve found makes it an equipment train (part of Hannibal`s baggage) - but that places Hannibal`s army in a retreating posture. If the action was real, it`s rather more likely that the "supply/equipment train" was in fact a reinforcement from Vermina and this would have been a serious blow indeed to Hannibal`s military capabilities. This would have been a change of situation that made negotiations probable.
But then the importance of Vermina`s forces in this campaign was ignored by Polybius and played down by Livy. For both authors Minucius` action and the cavalry battle at Zama would be seen as diminishing Scipio`s victory.
If the timeline is confused at points in Appian, it is because of his use of multiple sources. Following Polybius and Livy, Appian too includes the three spies episode, but this comes after "Part One"; the cavalry battle, the skirmishes, Minucius and the negotiations/armistice. Appian though treats the spies as something which simply unnerved Hannibal, undermining his confidence (close to the original meaning of the stratagem).
Appian passes over this quickly and it is probably as well he did, because Hannibal already knows the Roman army`s strength and that Massinissa was present (Massinissa acted as mediator in his negotiations with Scipio), so why does he need to send out spies?
At first reading, it seemed to me that essentially Appian had taken two versions of the campaign and glued them together. The first version ends after the armistice starts and a settelment is reached and the second part begins with the pressure for the renewal of hostilities by the Carthaginian public and then comes a jockeying for a good camp site, the 3 spies, the parley etc..
But the three spies story had cropped up before in Roman history (one of those family traditions to which you referred earlier) Appian`s source was probably Alimentus. Alimentus served under Marcus Valerius Laevinus and by this association could have learned of Marcus` grandfather Publius` stratagem against Pyrrhus before the battle of Heraclea in 280 BC., or have used it to flatter a commanding officer`s ancestors?
Please see post #40 at. https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/showth...094&page=3
If you feel like we`re going around in circles, well, we really are going around in a circle and that is because the three spies is the device that Polybius used to obscure the fact that there was an important cavalry battle at Zama and to create a circumstance in which Hannibal would want to risk a major land battle invloving all of his forces.
You say that Hannibal and Scipio both risked battle. I don`t believe that they would have done anything so unprofessional; neither would have entertained the prospect of a major engagement unless they were reasonably sure that they held an advantage. The key here is understanding that local, auxiliary cavalry forces were going to be the decisive factor in an African campaign - Numidian horsemen had proven themselves to be invaluable on campaign and useful in battle.
Hannibal was surprised at a cavalry battle and that surprise was Massinissa tipping the balance in favour of Scipioo`s cavalry, but rather than report a simple ambush, Polybius credits Scipio with a major deception plan. Implying the late arrival of Massinissa may be as close as Polybius gets to the truth.
RE. puffing things up, contrast if you would Polybius` version of the parley before his battle of Zama and that of Appian before his second battle of Zama, which do you think is more credible and which appears to be rather more puffed up?
Polybius 15 Affairs of Italy and Africa
"...3 On the following day both generals came out of their camps accompanied by a few horsemen, and then, leaving their escorts behind, met each other alone, having an interpreter with them. 4 Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows:
4 "Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; 5 for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits. 6 But now that in the first place we went to war with each other for the p479 possession of Sicily and next for that of Spain, now that, finally refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is, 7 what remains but to consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our present contention? 8 I myself am ready to do so as I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. 7 1 But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. 2 Consider things by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from our own. 3 I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. 4 And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. 5 Consider this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the least evil. 6 What man of sense, I ask, would rush into p481 such danger as that which confronts you now? If you conquer you will add but little to the fame of your country and your own, but if you suffer defeat you will utterly efface the memory of all that was grand and glorious in your past. 7 What then is the end I would gain by this interview? 8 I propose that all the countries that were formerly a subject of dispute between us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. 9 Such terms of peace would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most honourable to you and to all the Romans."
8 1 Hannibal having spoken so, Scipio replied. He said that neither for the war about Sicily, nor for that about Spain, were the Romans responsible, 2 but the Carthaginians were evidently the authors of both, as Hannibal himself was well aware. The gods, too, had testified to this by bestowing victory not on the unjust aggressors but on those who had taken up arms to defend themselves. 3 No one, he said, was more awake than himself to the fickleness of Fortune and as far as it was in his power he took into consideration the uncertainty of human affairs. 4 "But as for the conditions you propose," he continued, "if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed. 5 But now that you have been forced reluctantly to leave Italy, and that we, having crossed into Africa, are in command of the open country, the situation is manifestly much changed. 6 And — for this is the most important question — what is the p483 position we have now reached? 7 When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated, in addition to your present proposals, that Carthaginians should give up their prisoners without ransom, that they should surrender their ships of war, and that they should pay us five thousand talents, and finally that they should give hostages for the performance of those conditions. 8 We jointly sent envoys to Rome to submit them to the senate and the people, we Romans stating that we agreed to the terms offered and you Carthaginians entreating that they might be accepted. 9 The senate agreed and the people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. 11 What remains to be done? Put yourself in my place and tell me. Shall we withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed? That would be to reward your countrymen for their treachery and teach them to continue to betray their benefactors. 12 Or shall we grant their present request in the hope of earning their gratitude? But now after obtaining their request by earnest supplication, the moment they conceived the slightest hope from your return, they at once treated us as enemies and foes. 13 If we added some conditions even more onerous we might in that case refer the treaty to our popular assembly, but if we withdraw some of the conditions it would be useless even to make mention of this conference at Rome. 14 Of what further use then is our interview? Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us."
p485 9 1 After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other..."
Appian 8.39
"The latter [Hannibal] deemed it advisable to have a parley with Scipio, and when it was granted he said that the Carthaginians had rejected the former treaty on account of the money indemnity. If he would remit that, and if the Romans would content themselves with Sicily, Spain, and the islands they now held, the agreement would be lasting. "Hannibal's escape from Italy would be a great gain to him," said Scipio, "if he could obtain these terms in addition." He then forbade Hannibal to send any more messages to him. After indulging in some mutual threats they departed, each to his own camp."
It is a recycled stratagem from Herodotus and it is a pretext for the court-room drama and summing up that the parley between Scipio and Hannibal really is. It would, no doubt, have appealed to Polybius` readers, (and Livy`s version of it to a later Roman audience), but I can`t see how this makes any kind of sense to us.
I don`t see how Hannibal could have seen Scipio`s position as disadvantageous after Appian`s cavalry battle, or even if we accept Polybius` three spies deception variant, before Polybius` great battle.
I think you have missed out Vermina in all this. Hannibal was at this point still without reinforcement from Vermina in either of the cases above.
I do agree that the Thermus story is hard to believe as Hannibal is operating in home territory. The other translation i`ve found makes it an equipment train (part of Hannibal`s baggage) - but that places Hannibal`s army in a retreating posture. If the action was real, it`s rather more likely that the "supply/equipment train" was in fact a reinforcement from Vermina and this would have been a serious blow indeed to Hannibal`s military capabilities. This would have been a change of situation that made negotiations probable.
But then the importance of Vermina`s forces in this campaign was ignored by Polybius and played down by Livy. For both authors Minucius` action and the cavalry battle at Zama would be seen as diminishing Scipio`s victory.
If the timeline is confused at points in Appian, it is because of his use of multiple sources. Following Polybius and Livy, Appian too includes the three spies episode, but this comes after "Part One"; the cavalry battle, the skirmishes, Minucius and the negotiations/armistice. Appian though treats the spies as something which simply unnerved Hannibal, undermining his confidence (close to the original meaning of the stratagem).
Appian passes over this quickly and it is probably as well he did, because Hannibal already knows the Roman army`s strength and that Massinissa was present (Massinissa acted as mediator in his negotiations with Scipio), so why does he need to send out spies?
At first reading, it seemed to me that essentially Appian had taken two versions of the campaign and glued them together. The first version ends after the armistice starts and a settelment is reached and the second part begins with the pressure for the renewal of hostilities by the Carthaginian public and then comes a jockeying for a good camp site, the 3 spies, the parley etc..
But the three spies story had cropped up before in Roman history (one of those family traditions to which you referred earlier) Appian`s source was probably Alimentus. Alimentus served under Marcus Valerius Laevinus and by this association could have learned of Marcus` grandfather Publius` stratagem against Pyrrhus before the battle of Heraclea in 280 BC., or have used it to flatter a commanding officer`s ancestors?
Please see post #40 at. https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/showth...094&page=3
If you feel like we`re going around in circles, well, we really are going around in a circle and that is because the three spies is the device that Polybius used to obscure the fact that there was an important cavalry battle at Zama and to create a circumstance in which Hannibal would want to risk a major land battle invloving all of his forces.
You say that Hannibal and Scipio both risked battle. I don`t believe that they would have done anything so unprofessional; neither would have entertained the prospect of a major engagement unless they were reasonably sure that they held an advantage. The key here is understanding that local, auxiliary cavalry forces were going to be the decisive factor in an African campaign - Numidian horsemen had proven themselves to be invaluable on campaign and useful in battle.
Hannibal was surprised at a cavalry battle and that surprise was Massinissa tipping the balance in favour of Scipioo`s cavalry, but rather than report a simple ambush, Polybius credits Scipio with a major deception plan. Implying the late arrival of Massinissa may be as close as Polybius gets to the truth.
RE. puffing things up, contrast if you would Polybius` version of the parley before his battle of Zama and that of Appian before his second battle of Zama, which do you think is more credible and which appears to be rather more puffed up?
Polybius 15 Affairs of Italy and Africa
"...3 On the following day both generals came out of their camps accompanied by a few horsemen, and then, leaving their escorts behind, met each other alone, having an interpreter with them. 4 Hannibal first saluted Scipio and began to speak as follows:
4 "Would that neither the Romans had ever coveted any possessions outside Italy, nor the Carthaginians any outside Africa; 5 for both these were very fine empires and empires of which it might be said on the whole that Nature herself had fixed their limits. 6 But now that in the first place we went to war with each other for the p479 possession of Sicily and next for that of Spain, now that, finally refusing to listen to the admonition of Fortune, we have gone so far that your native soil was once in imminent danger and our own still is, 7 what remains but to consider by what means we can avert the anger of the gods and compose our present contention? 8 I myself am ready to do so as I learnt by actual experience how fickle Fortune is, and how by a slight turn of the scale either way she brings about changes of the greatest moment, as if she were sporting with little children. 7 1 But I fear that you, Publius, both because you are very young and because success has constantly attended you both in Spain and in Africa, and you have never up to now at least fallen into the counter-current of Fortune, will not be convinced by my words, however worthy of credit they may be. 2 Consider things by the light of one example, an example not drawn from remote times, but from our own. 3 I, then, am that Hannibal who after the battle of Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy, who not long afterwards advanced even up to Rome, and encamping at forty stades from the walls deliberated with myself how I should treat you and your native soil. 4 And now here am I in Africa on the point of negotiating with you, a Roman, for the safety of myself and my country. 5 Consider this, I beg you, and be not overproud, but take such counsel at the present juncture as a mere man can take, and that is ever to choose the most good and the least evil. 6 What man of sense, I ask, would rush into p481 such danger as that which confronts you now? If you conquer you will add but little to the fame of your country and your own, but if you suffer defeat you will utterly efface the memory of all that was grand and glorious in your past. 7 What then is the end I would gain by this interview? 8 I propose that all the countries that were formerly a subject of dispute between us, that is Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, shall belong to Rome and that Carthage shall never make war upon Rome on account of them. Likewise that the other islands lying between Italy and Africa shall belong to Rome. 9 Such terms of peace would, I am convinced, be most secure for the Carthaginians and most honourable to you and to all the Romans."
8 1 Hannibal having spoken so, Scipio replied. He said that neither for the war about Sicily, nor for that about Spain, were the Romans responsible, 2 but the Carthaginians were evidently the authors of both, as Hannibal himself was well aware. The gods, too, had testified to this by bestowing victory not on the unjust aggressors but on those who had taken up arms to defend themselves. 3 No one, he said, was more awake than himself to the fickleness of Fortune and as far as it was in his power he took into consideration the uncertainty of human affairs. 4 "But as for the conditions you propose," he continued, "if before the Romans had crossed to Africa you had retired from Italy and then proposed them, I think your expectations would not have been disappointed. 5 But now that you have been forced reluctantly to leave Italy, and that we, having crossed into Africa, are in command of the open country, the situation is manifestly much changed. 6 And — for this is the most important question — what is the p483 position we have now reached? 7 When your countrymen were beaten and begged for peace we framed a treaty in writing in which it was stipulated, in addition to your present proposals, that Carthaginians should give up their prisoners without ransom, that they should surrender their ships of war, and that they should pay us five thousand talents, and finally that they should give hostages for the performance of those conditions. 8 We jointly sent envoys to Rome to submit them to the senate and the people, we Romans stating that we agreed to the terms offered and you Carthaginians entreating that they might be accepted. 9 The senate agreed and the people also gave their consent. The Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, most treacherously violated the peace. 11 What remains to be done? Put yourself in my place and tell me. Shall we withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed? That would be to reward your countrymen for their treachery and teach them to continue to betray their benefactors. 12 Or shall we grant their present request in the hope of earning their gratitude? But now after obtaining their request by earnest supplication, the moment they conceived the slightest hope from your return, they at once treated us as enemies and foes. 13 If we added some conditions even more onerous we might in that case refer the treaty to our popular assembly, but if we withdraw some of the conditions it would be useless even to make mention of this conference at Rome. 14 Of what further use then is our interview? Either put yourselves and your country at our mercy or fight and conquer us."
p485 9 1 After this conversation, which held out no hopes of reconciliation, the two generals parted from each other..."
Appian 8.39
"The latter [Hannibal] deemed it advisable to have a parley with Scipio, and when it was granted he said that the Carthaginians had rejected the former treaty on account of the money indemnity. If he would remit that, and if the Romans would content themselves with Sicily, Spain, and the islands they now held, the agreement would be lasting. "Hannibal's escape from Italy would be a great gain to him," said Scipio, "if he could obtain these terms in addition." He then forbade Hannibal to send any more messages to him. After indulging in some mutual threats they departed, each to his own camp."
