Number of legions at Zama

[Spartan JKM]

Indeed, Paul: the foremost ranks Polybius was writing of were that of Hannibal's third line, his only crack one, disposed in what was possibly the first 'true reserve' in military history - close enough to deliver a decisive blow if the opportunity arose, but far enough back to prevent the envelopment of his army. It was this deployment that thwarted Scipio from using any of his reformed tactics which had worked so well before at Baecula, Ilipa, and the Great Plains. Hannibal's plan was sound with what he had at his disposal, but Scipio was able to economize his strength outstandingly, and it was the superior cavalry squadrons that decided a slogfest devoid of any tactical mastery; this usually happens when two very good captians (in this case, two great captains) square off. I believe Scipio could not have wanted Massinissa and Laelius riding off the battlefield, into the desert after a 'defeated ' foe, handing Hannibal the advantage (potentially) in an infantry fight, one which would be compelled head-on due to Hannibal's retention of his veterans (why would Scipio decide to fight head-on, after all his efficacious reforms?); it is quite possible Hannibal tried to sacrifice his cavalry in a running fight, as it takes longer for a simulated flight to turn into an actual defeat, and it is generally believed, unlike at Cannae, that the decisive cavalry blow was somewaht dilatory. I also don't believe the elephants, which Scipio neutralized extremely well, caused the havoc which has been intimated - as if they turned round 160 degres or so and caused Hannibal's horsemen, on both sides, to flee so quickly. Sure, they caused confusion and isorder, but also upon the Italic riders and Massinissa. But we have to keep in mind that the terrain here was not helpful in controlling pursuing cavalry. But, on the flip side, Massinissa and Laelius were by now seasoned and adept cavalry leaders. Conjecture can be as fun as it is inconclusive in such matters!

However, the 'fugitives' Polybius mentions being precluded from entering Hannibal's front of his third line are those from the previously vanquished first two lines; it was perhaps good fortune for Scipip they turned on each other, which didn't require the bringing in of his rear ranks, which is what Hannibal wanted. B.H. Liddell Hart, in his famed biography of Scipio, seemingly makes an error, pg. 182, when discussing Hannibal's 'Old Guard' in the final stages of Zama: he mentions Livy's tribute to the quality of Hannibal's 'Old Guard' as equal to Scipio's men,

"...Livy's tribute is borne out by the fierceness and the for long uncertain issue of the subsequent conflict, which gives the lie to those who pretend that Hannibal's 'Old Guard' was but a shadow of its former power days of Trasimene and Cannae..."

I'm all for pedantry, Paul, and Sir Basil can be questioned with his circumlocution here. The 'Old Guard', (ie, his African troops that had been with him since leaving Spain), were certainly now but a handful, and indeed a shadow of their former days, in terms of quantity. No historian I know of (Hart is brilliant with his strategic narrrative, but condescending upon others with whom he disagrees), writining of this subject, 'pretended' that Hannibal's crack troops were anything less, as great fighters, than they had always been. The Bruttians, which comprised the bulk of his third line, maybe 10,000+, were the best troops that had joined him in Italy in the months ansd years following Cannae, thus they were definitely not with Hannibal at Trasimene and Cannae. Hart's book is invaluable to balance the disproportionate condition of the relative evalutions of Hannibal and Scipio, but can be questioned in not only his denigrating of Hannibal, but of Alexander, Caesar, Frederick, and Napoleon. Despite the positives of his great book, it reads like a handbook of his theories of warfare, imputing its use to Scipio.

Peter Connolly, opining that Hannibal's veterans numbered only 4,000 in all, also makes a mistake, Pg. 205 of his Greece and Rome at War,

"...Polybius implies that Hannibal's veterans were roughly equal in number to the hastati who opposed them, about 5,000 strong..."

Actually, Polybius doesn't imply that, unless I'm reading something different than what Connolly drew from (in the early 1970s?): what Polybius states in Book 15.14 is,

"...after conveying the wounded to the rear and recalling by bugle those of the hastati who were still pursuing the enemy, he stationed the latter in the fore part of the field of battle, opposite the enemy's centre, and making the principes and triarii close up on both wings ordered them to advance over the dead. When these troops had surmounted the obstacles and found themselves in a line with the hastati the two phalanxes closed with the greatest eagerness and ardour. As they were nearly equal in numbers as well as in spirit and bravery, and were equally well armed, the contest was for long doubtful, the men falling where they stood out of determination, and Massanissa and Laelius, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, arrived providentially at the proper moment..."

Perhaps and editor sould have picked this up. It was not Hannibal's veterans who were roughly equal in number to Scipio's hastati, but nearly equal in numbers to Scipio's reformed battle line of the combined hastati, principes, and triarii; Scipio's hastati were opposite Hannibal's center, and the principes and triarii were moved onto the sides of the hastati. This specific maneuver was indicative of Scipio's skill at innovating the Roman war machine to greater flexibility; at this juncture, there was no reason to maintain the intervals between his maniples, as now the best thing to do would be to maximize his missile power upon Hannibal's veterans, in attempt to contain them until the cavalry returned upon the enemy rear. This meant lengthening his line with no intervals. But victory would depend on the return of the cavalry, which was probable but still had not happened, probably because of Hannibal's probable tactic of luring them away for as long as possible (the pro-Roman historians don't even suggest this, but it seems plausible, given his mindset with such things). Massinissa and Laelius would have likely been back by now, if indeed Hannibal's horsemen had been veritably defeated from the get-go (we know they all left the battlefield quickly). Hannibal now had an isolated advantage: his 'Old Guard', who, to reiterate, were roughly equal in numbers to and directly opposite the hastati. The hastati would be outmatched here, though perhaps not considerably, but there were no rear ranks to support them. Hypothetically, Scipio could have been pierced in his center, by troops more seasoned in that spot and with a, presumably, deeper line behind them. Hannibal knew he had no cavalry coming back, so he needed to penetrate as much and quickly as possible. Hannibal's remaining veterans, with, presumably, support from the rekindled fugitives of the first two lines behind them, could probably hold up against the Roman flanks better than the hastati could against Hannibal's 'Old Guard'. But the Roman/Numidian cavalry was surely coming back eventually, and Scipio was fighting in a containing struggle, buying for more time. It must have been very close until the 'providential' return of Massinissa and Laelius.

Sean Manning:

...Geoffrey Parker has noted that the Spanish Army of Flanders suffered about 2% attrition per month, whether in combat or not. There were more nasty diseases in 16th-17th century Flanders than the Roman world, and support for troops was somewhat more primitive (eg. tents were scarce). On the other hand, this was probably the best army in the world of its day, and it was living in fairly easy terrain (except during sieges) and the richest region in Europe...

Indeed. Moreover, and in the broad scope, inadequate support for an army on campaign overseas (or across enemy borders) would lead to mutiny or military collapse. I believe Michael Roberts (or Robert Frost?) also emphasizes the danger of attritional war in the war in Ducal Prussia between Gustavus Adolphus and the Polish army, which was led, after late 1626, by the vastly underrated Stanislaw Koniecpolski (from my view); we are told of the imminent 'melting away' of both armies, as Gustavus would not fight the vaunted Polish cavalry unless fortifications and artillery were favorable, and Koniecpolski wouldn't be lured in. The Poles were bested if caught unawares by Gustavus' cavalry with higher numbers (Battle of Tczew), but the Swedes were beaten if they were caught out in the open (Trcziana). The Poles couldn't levy enough infantry, due to tax problems, which Koniecpolski would soon aid in balancing. Anyway, we read of the terrible effects of attritional war, and the diseases which were suffered by the field forces.

Thanks, James