04-16-2007, 01:47 AM
Hello everyone.
My apologies, I just cannot post as much as I would like to.
Matthew:
If Polybius and Livy are both available, Polybius' account of something should generally be accepted over Livy. But Livy, a literary, not analytical, genius of writing, would have provided us with the most detailed account of the war even if we had Polybius' work in full; Livy tells us more about troop dispositions and the political scenes throughout the great conflict with Hannibal. No question there was much scaremongering and glamorizing from the patriotic Livy, but he takes time to mention the problem of the discrepancies among the varying sources, and he perhaps tells us more than any other historian of antiquity of his sources; he barely mentions Polybius by name, but when he does, it is with praise, evidenced by his comment in Book 36.19, when discussing the battle losses between Romans and Macedonians, in the fighting at Thermoplylae in 191 B.C.,
"...is the number I have given, on the authority of Polybius. It would be another a matter if we were to credit Valerias Antias!..."
But most of all, his comment in Book 33.10, when discussing the fighting at Cynocephalae,
"...we have in fact followed Polybius, a reliable authority on all Roman history, but especially to be trusted on affairs in Greece..."
I guess my point is, from my view, we need to nitpick at each isolated situation from the two - when there is some question; there is no 'set-rule'. Polybius is almost certainly correct most of the time, if their works do not concur, and he had the experience in military and political affairs. But Livy fills in many gaps not provided by Polybius (though we have to wonder where Livy arrived at conclusions not provided by Polybius), and unless his details are obviously wrong (eg, stating that there were 57,000 Carthaginian deaths at the Metaurus), I think we should accept his works as, on whole, reliable.
Anyway, let's take a look at the Senate's pragmatic plan for the conduct of the opening phase of the war, at which they knew Hannibal was on the march (though they never could have imagined the war could be carried into Italy itself, by sea or land). Polybius tells us, Book 3.40-41,
"...on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.
While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about 6,000 in number for either city, to be on the spot within 30 days. The one city they founded on one side of the Po, they called it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, was on the far side (northern side). Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no opportunity, became elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at the end of the former war which I described in my last Book. Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them. Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former consul, and two former praetors. On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. When the praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighborhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help. The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis. When the news reached Rome that the 4th Legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enroll other legions from the allies.
The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book. The two Roman consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with 60 ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with 160 quinqueremes..."
Livy provides the same events later with a little more detail (Book 21.25-26); in Book 21.17, he tells us,
"...The seat of the campaigns had already been decided; the consuls were now ordered to proceed to the sortition. Spain fell to Cornelius, Africa to Sempronius. It was resolved that six legions should be raised for that year, the allies were to furnish such contingents as the consuls should deem necessary, and as large a fleet as possible was to be fitted out; 24,000 Roman infantry were called up and 1,800 cavalry; the allies contributed 40,000 infantry and 4,400 cavalry, and a fleet of 220 ships of war and 20 light galleys was launched. The question was then formally submitted to the People whether it was their wish and command that war should be declared against the people of Carthage. When this was decided, a special service of intercession was conducted; the procession marched through the streets of the city offering prayers at the various temples that the gods would grant a happy and prosperous issue to the war which the people of Rome had now ordered.
The forces were divided between the consuls in the following way: to Sempronius two legions were assigned, each consisting of 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry from the allied contingents. He was also provided with 160 warships and 12 light galleys. With this combined land and sea force he was sent to Sicily, with instructions to cross over to Africa if the other consul succeeded in preventing the Carthaginian from invading Italy. Cornelius, on the other hand, was provided with a smaller force, as Lucius Manlius, the praetor, was himself being dispatched to Cisalpine Gaul with a considerable force. Cornelius was weakest in his ships; he had only 60 warships, for it was never supposed that the enemy would come by sea or use his navy for offensive purposes. His land force was made up of two Roman legions, with their complement of cavalry, and 14,000 infantry from the allies with 1,600 cavalry. The province of Cisalpine Gaul also received two Roman legions and 10,000 allied infantry with 600 Roman and 1,000 allied cavalry..."
OK. Between our two primary sources, it is clear that Roman preperations in 218 B.C. were based on the supposition that the war would be waged in Spain and Africa. But a discrepancy arises with Livy stating that six legions had been raised, but Polybius telling us that the 'considerable force', according to Livy, dispatched under the praetor Manlius was the 4th Legion; in this time, a consul would normally be given command of two legions, while a praetor usually led one, often for the purpose of judicial governing, as was the case here. This 4th Legion would normally have been under the command of one of the consuls, but was obviously allocated for the troubling event in Cisalpine Gaul, and they must have deemed it serious enough, with war against Carthage just brewing, to send both Scipio's originally assigned legions to Cisalpine Gaul (under another praetor, Gaius Atilius). Scipio, from Polybius, was ordered to levy two more legions, but Livy seems to think that only one of his legions was sent, as he tells a little later in Book 21.26,
"...When the intelligence of this sudden outbreak reached Rome and the senate became aware that they had a Gallic war to face in addition to the war with Carthage, they ordered Gaius Atilius, the praetor, to go to the relief of Manlius with a Roman legion and 5,000 men who had been recently enlisted by the consul from among the allies. As the enemy, afraid to meet these reinforcements, had retired, Atilius reached Tannetum without any fighting. After raising a fresh legion in place of the one which had been sent away with the praetor, Publiu. Cornelius Scipio set sail with his 60 warships and coasted along by the shores of Etruria and Liguria, and from there past the mountains of the Salyes until he reached Marseilles..."
Both historians are a little addled, but it seems that six legions were indeed the amount of newly formed forces raised for the uncoming ventures in Spain and Africa, and to deal with the uprising on the Po. Once Sempronius was diverted quickly to nothern Italy from Sicily; in the wake of the Senate's astonishment that not only had Hannibal arrived in northern Italy, but had also scattered Scipio at the Ticinus River. Both Polybius and Livy believe there were four Roman legions in the north (two were now under Ganeus Scipio in NE Spain), thus what probably occured was that four legions were initially raised for the two major incursions under Scipio and Longus, but the trouble on the Po compelled the Senate to give Manlius one of Scipio's legions and head to Mutina, and subsequently Scipio's second legion was sent to the area under Atilius, compelling Scipio to raise two new (er) legions.
Indeed, Matthew, the standard strength of the Republican legion during this period consisted of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. But it's a mistake for anyone to say it was 'fixed', or rigidly imposed. If military situations may have demanded, it could be strengthened or depleted, and Aryaman2 and L C Cinna are indeed correct that sickness, casualties, and other tasks for legionaries would erode a legion's numerical strength on campaign. A demanding situation even had legions at this time raised to over five and 6,000. But if legions reached a point of being substantially understrength due to such elements (say, 25% or more), I would be inclined to think we would have been told about it, such as Caesar's mentioning of his seven legions numbering merely 15,000 men when he headed to Greece to face Pompey - substantially understrength, but his total troop strength was equivalent to three 'regular' legions. Basically, the longer a legion remained in service, the smaller it became, as the killed or disabled were not replaced by recruits enrolled in the same legion; when an accession of strength was received, it was usually towards new or different corps. Thus, a legion itslef would be reduced in numbers, but more corps could be formed for the whole army on campaign. This was mainly the case in the later Republican period..
Moreover, we hear of a plague-like condition that seriously sapped the Carthaginian army on the outskirts of Syracuse, one originally composed of, according to Livy, 25,000 foot, 3,000 cavalry and 12 elephants, which had embarked at Heraclea Minoa from Africa in 213 B.C.
I don't know the name Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, Matthew. The velites (originally known possibly as rorarii) were presumably not organized into maniples of their own; we are not told how they were organized or commanded in any detail, but they indeed were the the light troops. What is probable is that they, adminstratively, were attached to the maniples of the heavier infantrymen, but in battle they fought as skirmishers in the open, both in preliminary fighting and in support of the heavier infantry and/or cavalry.
I believe the 800 differential (did you mean the standard 4,200 legion as opposed to an augmented 5,000?) you were asking about would be filled amongst all the hastati, princeps, and velites; the maniples would be enlarged with the first two and the number of velites would be increased. The horsemen (equites) and triarii were the wealthiest and more experienced men, thus they were recruited from a more limited pool.
But you seemed to cover all that very sapiently.
We are not sure, but the tactical units Polybius describes as 'cohorts', were the subdivisions of the alae, the allied wings of primarily Latin troops. They numbered between 400-600, and their size was presumably influenced by the size of the legions they were supporting. The crack troops of the allies were known as the extraordinarii, a seperate force of infantry and cavalry placed at the immediate disposal of the consul. This could have been one or more cohorts. The basic function of the extraordinarii was to head up the column during an advance and bring up the rear upon retreat (or 'retirement').
Actually, Livy tells us of two variants - four new legions, to make a total of eight for the campaign, and the other possibility that 'some authors' record a supplementary mobilization of just 10,000, which, in addition to the existing four legions, we would have some 50,000 foot. He doesn't tell us what he thinks, only that the effort and vigor devoted to this campaign against Hannibal was greater than ever in Rome's history. But his list of Roman dead, prisoners, and escapees, which he tells us in a more decisive style, amounts to over 83,000 men. Despite the clamity that befell the Romans, their tactics of reverting their infantry to bring about superior weight, in a fashion akin to a massive phalanx, upon the enemy are incredulous if they outnumbered Hannibal's infantry by a small proportion (perhaps 40,000 vs. 32,000, allocating for troops left in the respective camps etc.). I think the 6,400 total cavalry is plausible, but a different proportion: Polybius tells us that the cavalry was increased, Book 3.107,
"...They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about 4,000 foot and 200 horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to 5,000 and that of the cavalry to 300. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman..."
Now, on paper, this would mean the Roman cavalry at Cannae would have been 2,400, which was probably accurate, as 1,600 would have been sheer suicide against what they knew Hannibal could counter them with (2,400 was a sure loss anyway, but they wanted to hold up for as long as possible while the infantry won the battle). The allied cavalry would be 7,200, as Polybius tells us the proportion of 3-to-1 was 'as a rule'; according to him, as you said, the whole cavalry force of Rome at Cannae numbered 'rather more' than 6,000, thus the rule could not be applied this time, and the allied cavalry was at least 4,000 horsemen. Earlier in the campaign Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, along with his lieutenant Gaius Centenius, had lost almost all the cavalry attached to the 1st, 2nd, 12th, and 13th legions, losses which would have been very difficult to replace in full. Obviously, if it had been possible, 7,200 allied horsemen would have been raised to compliment the Roman horse. But the Romans had been depleted in cavalry too, thus if they were smaller than 2,400, perhaps the allied horse numbered 'rather more' than 4,000. They knew Hannibal's cavalry was their paramount concern.
However, Livy tells us in Book 22.36,
"...The armies were increased, but as to what additions were made to the infantry and cavalry, the authorities vary so much, both as to the numbers and nature of the forces, that I should hardly venture to assert anything as positively certain. Some say that 10,000 recruits were called out to make up the losses; others, that four new legions were enrolled so that they might carry on the war with eight legions. Some authorities record that both horse and foot in the legions were made stronger by the addition of 1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry to each, so that they contained 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, while the allies furnished double the number of cavalry and an equal number of infantry. Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in the Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought..."
Well, at the risk of too much picking and choosing, segments of Livy can arguably be preferred, particularly that in this case the allies furnished double, not triple (the usual 'rule), the cavalry, and his connotative manner here is one of 'what others tell us' - an honest and professional approach, when one doesn't know for sure (but he clearly follows Polybius more than any other). Following Livy, it is not implausible that the cavalry of the alae numbered 4,800 horsemen at Cannae, presuming this is how many were 'in the camp' when the battle was about to be fought; certainly, not all 87,200 men fought in the battle. However, we have to keep in mind that Hannibal's Numidians, who were used to fight a containment battle with the allied horse of Rome, could not have numbered too much less than the allies opposite them, as they succeeded thoroughly in that very containment. Thus we must ask how many Numidians Hannibal deployed on his right. Hannibal's original number of 6,000 cavalry, upon his arrival in Italy, could not have increased in Numidians yet. But the gauls beared the brunt of the fighting They probably numbered a little less than 4,000, with their counterparts numbering well over 4,000. Against not so vast odds, the more maneuverable Numidians would certainly be able to hold up for a while. But that's just a guess.
I would say Polybius' theory was based on the ingenious battlefield control exercised by Hannibal, particularly with his superior cavalry, and the egregious failure of the Romans at Cannae; even though they pragmatically nullified Hannibal's ability to outflank them, as Varro had disposed his forces so the hilly terrain was on his left, the river on his right, and the sea behind him. Many constantly talk of Hannibal's superiority in cavalry, and the ground that helped him. But given the nature of numbers of the forces at Cannae, infantry also required reasonably level ground, and Varro deserves credit for refusing battle on July 31; we always here of Paullus refusing battle on August 1, as he didn't like the terrain. But Varro made the same decision based on the same situation the day before, on his day to command. The west side of the Aufidus contained terrain which was flatter over a more widespread area, and both consuls saw this. Hannibal may have possessed advantages at Cannae, but as with Alexander, a superior instrument is merely potential when faced against a substantially more numerous opponent. It is the commander's utilization of that instrument is what wins the battle. The east bank (Roman left) was still suitable for cavalry, but provided more hope for infantry against superior cavalry. Hannibal simply came up with the answer. Perhaps Varro could have steadied his cavalry squadrons with some foot, as he had done in an earlier skirmishing success against Hannibal's foragers, but he clearly needed to use his infantry to its maximum potential with what he was trying to achieve, and a wider frontage is less stable. It was indeed a lesson to the posterity of warfare, and Scipio the Younger, who had been here and escaped, surely studied all this to the letter. The very name of Cannae would become a generic noun to soldiers of all ages.
Judging by what happened at the battle, it is not impossible for what Hannibal achieved against so huge a force, being he sucked them in, and his infantry dispositions caused the Roman infantry to funnel in towards the center. Livy's figures of casualites, though piecemeal, add up to Polybius' assessment of what the Romans had at the beginning. Livy tells us that some 10,000 escaped to Canusium, which is entirely consistent with his information that they later were formed into two legions. Polybius' figures do not make sense, as he gives us a higher figure of losses than what he tells us the Romans began with. But Peter Connolly tells us the succeeding part of Polybius' account (that to his casualty list, Book 3.117) is missing, and that his high figures cannot be corroborated by subsequent events (Greece and Rome at War, Pg. 188). We'll never know for sure, and too much extrapolating can be trite. Like I'm doing :? !!
I'll get back to this thread again.
Thanks, James
My apologies, I just cannot post as much as I would like to.
Matthew:
Quote:...Is it Polybius you have in mind when citing the fixed size as 4,000 Foot and 300 Horse, as I have seen that passage read a couple of ways and Evelyn S. Shuckburgh's current translation of Polybius Book 6 puts the fixed number at 4,200 Foot and 300 Horse, which I think makes good sense when trying to divide up the troop types [i.e. 600 Triarii, 1,200 Principes, 1,200 Hastati and 1,200 Velites] into Maniples, though it raises certain questions about the reinforced Legion [i.e. what kind of troops would logically make up the 800 Man differential, just Hastati and Principes or Velites as well?]. If that is not the passage you have in mind, I would be grateful if you could point me in the right direction.My pleasure Matthew; it is from Livy we get those figures for 218 B.C. Polybius mentions a legion, when discussing the events leading up to Cannae (Book 3.107), as being 4,000 infantry and 200 horse for a Roman legion. Upon a second glance, the figure for a Roman legion of 4,000 foot and 300 horse is stated specifically only for Sempronius Longus' expeditionary force. Polybius does not provide a tally for the Roman dispositions of their plans for Spain and Africa in 218 B.C.
If Polybius and Livy are both available, Polybius' account of something should generally be accepted over Livy. But Livy, a literary, not analytical, genius of writing, would have provided us with the most detailed account of the war even if we had Polybius' work in full; Livy tells us more about troop dispositions and the political scenes throughout the great conflict with Hannibal. No question there was much scaremongering and glamorizing from the patriotic Livy, but he takes time to mention the problem of the discrepancies among the varying sources, and he perhaps tells us more than any other historian of antiquity of his sources; he barely mentions Polybius by name, but when he does, it is with praise, evidenced by his comment in Book 36.19, when discussing the battle losses between Romans and Macedonians, in the fighting at Thermoplylae in 191 B.C.,
"...is the number I have given, on the authority of Polybius. It would be another a matter if we were to credit Valerias Antias!..."
But most of all, his comment in Book 33.10, when discussing the fighting at Cynocephalae,
"...we have in fact followed Polybius, a reliable authority on all Roman history, but especially to be trusted on affairs in Greece..."
I guess my point is, from my view, we need to nitpick at each isolated situation from the two - when there is some question; there is no 'set-rule'. Polybius is almost certainly correct most of the time, if their works do not concur, and he had the experience in military and political affairs. But Livy fills in many gaps not provided by Polybius (though we have to wonder where Livy arrived at conclusions not provided by Polybius), and unless his details are obviously wrong (eg, stating that there were 57,000 Carthaginian deaths at the Metaurus), I think we should accept his works as, on whole, reliable.
Anyway, let's take a look at the Senate's pragmatic plan for the conduct of the opening phase of the war, at which they knew Hannibal was on the march (though they never could have imagined the war could be carried into Italy itself, by sea or land). Polybius tells us, Book 3.40-41,
"...on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.
While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided. They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about 6,000 in number for either city, to be on the spot within 30 days. The one city they founded on one side of the Po, they called it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, was on the far side (northern side). Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no opportunity, became elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at the end of the former war which I described in my last Book. Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them. Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former consul, and two former praetors. On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages. When the praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighborhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help. The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans. The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis. When the news reached Rome that the 4th Legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enroll other legions from the allies.
The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book. The two Roman consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with 60 ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with 160 quinqueremes..."
Livy provides the same events later with a little more detail (Book 21.25-26); in Book 21.17, he tells us,
"...The seat of the campaigns had already been decided; the consuls were now ordered to proceed to the sortition. Spain fell to Cornelius, Africa to Sempronius. It was resolved that six legions should be raised for that year, the allies were to furnish such contingents as the consuls should deem necessary, and as large a fleet as possible was to be fitted out; 24,000 Roman infantry were called up and 1,800 cavalry; the allies contributed 40,000 infantry and 4,400 cavalry, and a fleet of 220 ships of war and 20 light galleys was launched. The question was then formally submitted to the People whether it was their wish and command that war should be declared against the people of Carthage. When this was decided, a special service of intercession was conducted; the procession marched through the streets of the city offering prayers at the various temples that the gods would grant a happy and prosperous issue to the war which the people of Rome had now ordered.
The forces were divided between the consuls in the following way: to Sempronius two legions were assigned, each consisting of 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, and 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry from the allied contingents. He was also provided with 160 warships and 12 light galleys. With this combined land and sea force he was sent to Sicily, with instructions to cross over to Africa if the other consul succeeded in preventing the Carthaginian from invading Italy. Cornelius, on the other hand, was provided with a smaller force, as Lucius Manlius, the praetor, was himself being dispatched to Cisalpine Gaul with a considerable force. Cornelius was weakest in his ships; he had only 60 warships, for it was never supposed that the enemy would come by sea or use his navy for offensive purposes. His land force was made up of two Roman legions, with their complement of cavalry, and 14,000 infantry from the allies with 1,600 cavalry. The province of Cisalpine Gaul also received two Roman legions and 10,000 allied infantry with 600 Roman and 1,000 allied cavalry..."
OK. Between our two primary sources, it is clear that Roman preperations in 218 B.C. were based on the supposition that the war would be waged in Spain and Africa. But a discrepancy arises with Livy stating that six legions had been raised, but Polybius telling us that the 'considerable force', according to Livy, dispatched under the praetor Manlius was the 4th Legion; in this time, a consul would normally be given command of two legions, while a praetor usually led one, often for the purpose of judicial governing, as was the case here. This 4th Legion would normally have been under the command of one of the consuls, but was obviously allocated for the troubling event in Cisalpine Gaul, and they must have deemed it serious enough, with war against Carthage just brewing, to send both Scipio's originally assigned legions to Cisalpine Gaul (under another praetor, Gaius Atilius). Scipio, from Polybius, was ordered to levy two more legions, but Livy seems to think that only one of his legions was sent, as he tells a little later in Book 21.26,
"...When the intelligence of this sudden outbreak reached Rome and the senate became aware that they had a Gallic war to face in addition to the war with Carthage, they ordered Gaius Atilius, the praetor, to go to the relief of Manlius with a Roman legion and 5,000 men who had been recently enlisted by the consul from among the allies. As the enemy, afraid to meet these reinforcements, had retired, Atilius reached Tannetum without any fighting. After raising a fresh legion in place of the one which had been sent away with the praetor, Publiu. Cornelius Scipio set sail with his 60 warships and coasted along by the shores of Etruria and Liguria, and from there past the mountains of the Salyes until he reached Marseilles..."
Both historians are a little addled, but it seems that six legions were indeed the amount of newly formed forces raised for the uncoming ventures in Spain and Africa, and to deal with the uprising on the Po. Once Sempronius was diverted quickly to nothern Italy from Sicily; in the wake of the Senate's astonishment that not only had Hannibal arrived in northern Italy, but had also scattered Scipio at the Ticinus River. Both Polybius and Livy believe there were four Roman legions in the north (two were now under Ganeus Scipio in NE Spain), thus what probably occured was that four legions were initially raised for the two major incursions under Scipio and Longus, but the trouble on the Po compelled the Senate to give Manlius one of Scipio's legions and head to Mutina, and subsequently Scipio's second legion was sent to the area under Atilius, compelling Scipio to raise two new (er) legions.
Indeed, Matthew, the standard strength of the Republican legion during this period consisted of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. But it's a mistake for anyone to say it was 'fixed', or rigidly imposed. If military situations may have demanded, it could be strengthened or depleted, and Aryaman2 and L C Cinna are indeed correct that sickness, casualties, and other tasks for legionaries would erode a legion's numerical strength on campaign. A demanding situation even had legions at this time raised to over five and 6,000. But if legions reached a point of being substantially understrength due to such elements (say, 25% or more), I would be inclined to think we would have been told about it, such as Caesar's mentioning of his seven legions numbering merely 15,000 men when he headed to Greece to face Pompey - substantially understrength, but his total troop strength was equivalent to three 'regular' legions. Basically, the longer a legion remained in service, the smaller it became, as the killed or disabled were not replaced by recruits enrolled in the same legion; when an accession of strength was received, it was usually towards new or different corps. Thus, a legion itslef would be reduced in numbers, but more corps could be formed for the whole army on campaign. This was mainly the case in the later Republican period..
Moreover, we hear of a plague-like condition that seriously sapped the Carthaginian army on the outskirts of Syracuse, one originally composed of, according to Livy, 25,000 foot, 3,000 cavalry and 12 elephants, which had embarked at Heraclea Minoa from Africa in 213 B.C.
I don't know the name Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, Matthew. The velites (originally known possibly as rorarii) were presumably not organized into maniples of their own; we are not told how they were organized or commanded in any detail, but they indeed were the the light troops. What is probable is that they, adminstratively, were attached to the maniples of the heavier infantrymen, but in battle they fought as skirmishers in the open, both in preliminary fighting and in support of the heavier infantry and/or cavalry.
I believe the 800 differential (did you mean the standard 4,200 legion as opposed to an augmented 5,000?) you were asking about would be filled amongst all the hastati, princeps, and velites; the maniples would be enlarged with the first two and the number of velites would be increased. The horsemen (equites) and triarii were the wealthiest and more experienced men, thus they were recruited from a more limited pool.
But you seemed to cover all that very sapiently.
We are not sure, but the tactical units Polybius describes as 'cohorts', were the subdivisions of the alae, the allied wings of primarily Latin troops. They numbered between 400-600, and their size was presumably influenced by the size of the legions they were supporting. The crack troops of the allies were known as the extraordinarii, a seperate force of infantry and cavalry placed at the immediate disposal of the consul. This could have been one or more cohorts. The basic function of the extraordinarii was to head up the column during an advance and bring up the rear upon retreat (or 'retirement').
Quote:...Cannae is a good example, as the figure Polybius gives of 80,000 is clearly the result of him calculating 8 Reinforced Legions (5,000 x 8) and an equivalent number of Allies (5,000 x 8) . Taking the reduced Cavalry number of 200 per Legion, we can also account for the 6,000 Horse in relation to this figure, as the Legionary Horse would be 1,600 (200 x 8) and the Allied Horse around 4,800 (three times as many), the total being 6,400, which is very close to the figures Polybius gives (6.113. - 'eighty thousand foot and rather more than six thousand horse').
Livy, though, seems more inclined to talk about 50,000 Foot, though without saying that is the total number in the army. Interestingly, if there were 50,000 Foot, the 6,000 Horse would also be explicable in terms of 1,500 Roman Horse [5 x 300] and 4,500 Allied Horse [5 x 900]. Of course, five Legions wouldn't make much sense, but it is possible. Could Livy have been retroactively reducing the number of Infantry based on the number of Cavalry? Was Polybius inflating the number of Infantry in comparison to Cavalry to prove his thesis: 'a lesson to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both' (3.117.), which he then goes on to demonstrate the significance of at Zama.
This sort of thing always worries me when thinking about numbers, but all the same, I think Scipio's forces must have been closer to 30,000 than 10,000. I do wonder how Legions of 6,200 Foot and 300 Horse were divided up into Maniples (5,000 + 1,200, maybe? A fourth line?)...
Actually, Livy tells us of two variants - four new legions, to make a total of eight for the campaign, and the other possibility that 'some authors' record a supplementary mobilization of just 10,000, which, in addition to the existing four legions, we would have some 50,000 foot. He doesn't tell us what he thinks, only that the effort and vigor devoted to this campaign against Hannibal was greater than ever in Rome's history. But his list of Roman dead, prisoners, and escapees, which he tells us in a more decisive style, amounts to over 83,000 men. Despite the clamity that befell the Romans, their tactics of reverting their infantry to bring about superior weight, in a fashion akin to a massive phalanx, upon the enemy are incredulous if they outnumbered Hannibal's infantry by a small proportion (perhaps 40,000 vs. 32,000, allocating for troops left in the respective camps etc.). I think the 6,400 total cavalry is plausible, but a different proportion: Polybius tells us that the cavalry was increased, Book 3.107,
"...They decided to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men apart from the allies. For, as I previously explained, they invariably employ four legions, each numbering about 4,000 foot and 200 horse, but on occasions of exceptional gravity they raise the number of foot in each legion to 5,000 and that of the cavalry to 300. They make the number of the allied infantry equal to that of the Roman legions, but, as a rule, the allied cavalry are three times as numerous as the Roman..."
Now, on paper, this would mean the Roman cavalry at Cannae would have been 2,400, which was probably accurate, as 1,600 would have been sheer suicide against what they knew Hannibal could counter them with (2,400 was a sure loss anyway, but they wanted to hold up for as long as possible while the infantry won the battle). The allied cavalry would be 7,200, as Polybius tells us the proportion of 3-to-1 was 'as a rule'; according to him, as you said, the whole cavalry force of Rome at Cannae numbered 'rather more' than 6,000, thus the rule could not be applied this time, and the allied cavalry was at least 4,000 horsemen. Earlier in the campaign Gnaeus Servilius Geminus, along with his lieutenant Gaius Centenius, had lost almost all the cavalry attached to the 1st, 2nd, 12th, and 13th legions, losses which would have been very difficult to replace in full. Obviously, if it had been possible, 7,200 allied horsemen would have been raised to compliment the Roman horse. But the Romans had been depleted in cavalry too, thus if they were smaller than 2,400, perhaps the allied horse numbered 'rather more' than 4,000. They knew Hannibal's cavalry was their paramount concern.
However, Livy tells us in Book 22.36,
"...The armies were increased, but as to what additions were made to the infantry and cavalry, the authorities vary so much, both as to the numbers and nature of the forces, that I should hardly venture to assert anything as positively certain. Some say that 10,000 recruits were called out to make up the losses; others, that four new legions were enrolled so that they might carry on the war with eight legions. Some authorities record that both horse and foot in the legions were made stronger by the addition of 1,000 infantry and 100 cavalry to each, so that they contained 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, while the allies furnished double the number of cavalry and an equal number of infantry. Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in the Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought..."
Well, at the risk of too much picking and choosing, segments of Livy can arguably be preferred, particularly that in this case the allies furnished double, not triple (the usual 'rule), the cavalry, and his connotative manner here is one of 'what others tell us' - an honest and professional approach, when one doesn't know for sure (but he clearly follows Polybius more than any other). Following Livy, it is not implausible that the cavalry of the alae numbered 4,800 horsemen at Cannae, presuming this is how many were 'in the camp' when the battle was about to be fought; certainly, not all 87,200 men fought in the battle. However, we have to keep in mind that Hannibal's Numidians, who were used to fight a containment battle with the allied horse of Rome, could not have numbered too much less than the allies opposite them, as they succeeded thoroughly in that very containment. Thus we must ask how many Numidians Hannibal deployed on his right. Hannibal's original number of 6,000 cavalry, upon his arrival in Italy, could not have increased in Numidians yet. But the gauls beared the brunt of the fighting They probably numbered a little less than 4,000, with their counterparts numbering well over 4,000. Against not so vast odds, the more maneuverable Numidians would certainly be able to hold up for a while. But that's just a guess.
I would say Polybius' theory was based on the ingenious battlefield control exercised by Hannibal, particularly with his superior cavalry, and the egregious failure of the Romans at Cannae; even though they pragmatically nullified Hannibal's ability to outflank them, as Varro had disposed his forces so the hilly terrain was on his left, the river on his right, and the sea behind him. Many constantly talk of Hannibal's superiority in cavalry, and the ground that helped him. But given the nature of numbers of the forces at Cannae, infantry also required reasonably level ground, and Varro deserves credit for refusing battle on July 31; we always here of Paullus refusing battle on August 1, as he didn't like the terrain. But Varro made the same decision based on the same situation the day before, on his day to command. The west side of the Aufidus contained terrain which was flatter over a more widespread area, and both consuls saw this. Hannibal may have possessed advantages at Cannae, but as with Alexander, a superior instrument is merely potential when faced against a substantially more numerous opponent. It is the commander's utilization of that instrument is what wins the battle. The east bank (Roman left) was still suitable for cavalry, but provided more hope for infantry against superior cavalry. Hannibal simply came up with the answer. Perhaps Varro could have steadied his cavalry squadrons with some foot, as he had done in an earlier skirmishing success against Hannibal's foragers, but he clearly needed to use his infantry to its maximum potential with what he was trying to achieve, and a wider frontage is less stable. It was indeed a lesson to the posterity of warfare, and Scipio the Younger, who had been here and escaped, surely studied all this to the letter. The very name of Cannae would become a generic noun to soldiers of all ages.
Judging by what happened at the battle, it is not impossible for what Hannibal achieved against so huge a force, being he sucked them in, and his infantry dispositions caused the Roman infantry to funnel in towards the center. Livy's figures of casualites, though piecemeal, add up to Polybius' assessment of what the Romans had at the beginning. Livy tells us that some 10,000 escaped to Canusium, which is entirely consistent with his information that they later were formed into two legions. Polybius' figures do not make sense, as he gives us a higher figure of losses than what he tells us the Romans began with. But Peter Connolly tells us the succeeding part of Polybius' account (that to his casualty list, Book 3.117) is missing, and that his high figures cannot be corroborated by subsequent events (Greece and Rome at War, Pg. 188). We'll never know for sure, and too much extrapolating can be trite. Like I'm doing :? !!
I'll get back to this thread again.
Thanks, James
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
