04-02-2007, 02:49 AM
Thanks for joining me in the rekindling of this thread you guys!.
Thanks for your note, Byron, as with your help on my question regarding the armor.
Matthew:
...Some authors have not given a figure, and I would prefer to be in their company since the question is moot. While he avoids a precise figure, Coelius still exaggerates and gives the impression of huge numbers. He says that birds fell to the ground when the soldiers' shout went up, and that the numbers boarding the ships were so great that it appeared that no mortal was being left behind in either Italy or Sicily!..."
It's too bad we don't have Antipitar's work (there are fragments), because although he is described as an historian of 'rhetoric', his account of the Second Punic War apparently made use of both Roman and Carthaginian sources. His vivid description cited by Livy of Scipio's established force is obviously one of hyperbole, but probably illustrates that it was indeed a significantly large army, particularly for one ferried across water for two days (they disembarked on the third day). After all, this was perhaps hitherto the most difficult and largest task ever undertaken by a Roman force, led by perhaps the greatest commander ever produced in her history (I would claim 'definitely' if not for the existence of Julius Caesar a century and a half later). True, legions of 6,200 infantry and 300 cavalry were never this large, and not matched again until the Third Macedonian War of 171-167 B.C. But this expedition of Scipio's was perhaps paramount in the military history of Rome, both Republic and Empire (maybe I'm now being a little hyperbolic), against its most dangerous enemy ever; no Roman enemy ever marched or landed an army of their own onto Italian soil and threatened Rome of her very existence, until the fall of Rome in the early 5th century, and by then the political and economic infastructure to support the western army had collapsed, not as a result of any significant military defeat.
Thus, in my opinion, for one to discard the strength of of the 5th and 6th legions as being 13,000 infantry and cavalry is to deny the cardinal ability of the Roman military system to adapt and implement a degree of flexibility, something applied when events necessitated such measures. In terms of augmenting numbers, it was the socii who generally appended the extra numbers, so I feel it is probable the two allied contingents to the 5th and 6th legions were of higher quantity in both horse and foot. Scipio's invading force of roughly 30,000 makes sense, particularly that Scipio could count of Numidian help upon his arrival at the Promonturium Appolinis, which was less than forty miles NW of Carthage itself, and merely 125 miles across from Lilybaeum.
The amount of cavalry Scipio could bring to Africa was indeed limited, quite a bit less than 1/10 of his infantry, a ratio twice as much when he faced Hannibal two years later, as transporting horse by sea was extremely difficult - the reason Hannibal could not bring his horses from Italy in 203 B.C., given his dire situation of limited transports (he had to build some of his own) and the need to bring as many men as possible to Africa in the face of Carthage's greatest peril, following the debacle at the Great Plains.
No Matthew - I do not think the Roman or allied 'cohort' was a staple number in the Republican period. But whatever the contingents were called at the time (I guess it doesn't matter), they were not as varying, in terms of troop quantity, as in later periods. The size of the legion, Roman and/or allied in the Republican period, was increased by simply increasing the number of soldiers in the maniples of the hastati and principes, and increasing the number of velites. But its basic organizational structure didn't change. The term 'cohort' used by Livy is anachronistic, as the term cohort, applying to the tactical sub-unit of the legion we know so well of, was not extant until later, arguably beginning with Gaius Marius. But Polybius uses the term 'cohort' a couple of times; perhaps the translators were also describing the reformed units of the Republican army in hindsight, primarily beginning with Scipio Africanus 'Major', as 'cohorts', though at the time the term wasn't actually applied. But maybe this assessment is wrong, and the term 'cohort' was used as early as Scipio, as he added flexibility to the army with the innovation of a tactical unit of three maniples (about 360-480 men, put into action at Baecula in 208 B.C.), and it was through an evolutionary process throughout the second century B.C., and into the first, that the 'cohort' became the basic tactical unit of the Roman army; the legion of ten cohorts was more flexible than the manipular legion, as its structure allowed it to function more effectively against disjoined tribal brigands etc., as this required smaller scaled fighting. But it could fight in pitched battle easily as well too. The velites ceased to exist, with practically every legionary becoming a heavy infantryman. It reached a point where a citizen militia was unsuitable for long periods of service, which entialed garrisoning in the provinces. But they sure came through in the Second Punic War! They suffered some very painful lessons at the hands of one of history's greatest military leaders, but they began to quickly adapt and adopt - a signature of Roman military greatness. Polybius' account of Scipio's force upon embarkation does not survive, but if Livy had it, he doesn't say so; actually, Livy faintly praises Polybius by name only once in his work of the Second Punic War, amid discussing Scipio's triumph and Syphax's death, at the very end of Book 30,
"...Polybius, who is by no means a source to be disregarded..."
We can guess that one or more of these sources, all used by Livy, was the source for that first number of 12,200 as the invasion force (remember, it wasn't from Lucius Coelius Antipitar):
Gaius Acilius
Marcus Porcius Cato
Lucius Cincius Alimentus
Quintus Quadrigarius Claudius
Quintus Fabius Pictor
Lucius Calpernius Piso 'Frugi'(meaning 'honest')
Aulus Postumius Albinus
Silenos (accompanied Hannibal, and Polybius' source)
Sosylos (accompanied Hannibal, and Polybius' source)
Timagenes of Alexandria (used by the famous ancient geographer Strabo and, possibly, by Livy)
Valerius Antias
Interesting observation on your part of the 600 differential of the 1,600 and 2,200 cavalry, and thinking that may have been a basis for my theory of the second figure from Livy as pertaining to the allies; no, that's a coincidence. The main reson behind my thinking is that Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who would lose to Hannibal on the Trebbia, was commissioned in Sicily at the onset of the war to invade Africa with two legions aboard 160 quinqueremes and 12 cutters: Livy tells us that he had two legions, with the allied contingent bolstered to 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry, but Publius Cornelius Scipio (the great one's father), was given a lesser amount of 14,000 allied infantry and 1,600 allied cavalry to compliment his two legions. Publius was given just 60 quinqueremes, as the Senate believed the enemy could not employ a mode of warfare involving the sea up there. He was to sail for Spain. Now, maybe that meant nothing, but it was an observation that caught my attention. Clearly, unlike with in 204 B.C., Livy tells us with conviction that the Romans would strike at Africa with 26,400 men aboard 172 ships (an average of about 153 men per ship, but 12 were the smaller cutters). The Roman strategy at the onset was practical - a two-pronged attack against Carthaginian power. Hannibal would certainly be serious trouble at first in Spain, they figured, but they would easily (relatively) triumph in Africa; they had already been there and learned what not to do etc. Of course, as we know, Hannibal swiftly unleashed one of military history's most daring and audacious attacks in history, thwarting all their initial plans.
I should have mentioned this, and meant to, but another issue, with all this conjecture, has just hit me: I figured the proportion of 22,000 allied to 13,000 Roman numbers was too much to arrive at the surmised figure of 35,000 for Scipio's invasion force. But I overlooked that in 218 B.C., with these commissions of Scipio the Elder and Longus, the legion was fixed at just 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, giving two Roman legions a total of 8,600. Therefore, the proportion of allied contingents for both consuls in 218 B.C. to their two Roman legions was a differential of 7,000 with Scipio the Elder, and 9,200 with Longus. Mmmmmmmm :roll:
Aryaman2:
If Scipio used seperate transports for the horses as Caesar did, and using the mathematical gauge of 29,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry aboard 400 transports, this means 107 men were on 271 transports, and 17 horses were carried over on 129 transports. My deduction is affected by Caesar's using 18 transports for his approx. 300 cavalry. 'Specialized' transports, presumably larger, did not come until Caesar's second and bigger incursion to Britain in 54 B.C. This may not have been the case at all, as we have no detailed information on the compositional nature of Scipio's boarding measures, but it is not at all implausible that he either put 5 horses amongst 72 soldiers in 400 transports, or had 107 men per transport on 271, and the horses aboard 129 set aside just for them, with 17 each aboard each ship. Remember, they didn't need to travel far in waters not so hostile anymore; the Carthaginian navy was now even beyond a broken reed. I may not be as stubborn with my opinion of approx. 29,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry, if not for the substantial data of 400 transports. That's a huge armada for tis time.
In my opinion, to opine that the figure most believed by the consensus is off by as much as 60%, is to overlook Livy's detailed information about the distribution and resposibilites amongst varied Italian communities for the construction of extra ships needed for Scipio's invasion in 204 B.C. He specifically tells us that the socii navales (probably based out of Naples and/or Peasentum), not the state, beared the expense of providing the extra ships needed for Scipio's expedition. All this for an invading force of 12,000? 12,000 is slightly less a figure than what Gaius Claudius Nero arrived with in 211 B.C.(13,100), sailing from Puteoli, to relieve the beleaguered 9,000 men tenuously holding the Ebro line under Lucius Marcius and Tiberius Fonteius, and 1,000 less than what Scipio sailed to Emporiae with a year later from the mouth of the Tiber ('skirting' the coasts, as Livy says, Book 26.19, aboard 30 quinqueremes).
Moreover, if one believes just 12,000 arrived in Africa under Scipio in 204 B.C., the figure of 400 transports to cross must be discarded, as well as the belief that this was a huge undertaking, rather than a riad, which Gaius Laelius administered earlier. It would also need to be believed that he received reinforcements from Sicily and/or Italy, of which we have no record. He was indeed supplied with grain and clothing from Sardinia, and Livy tells us that 3,000 troops were raised for service in Sicily, as all the crack troops from Sicily had gone to Africa with Scipio (Book 30.2), but not once did a substantial reinforcement reach Scipio, except the invaluable cavalry of Massinissa and Dacamas (always a question mark with the latter), an element on which Scipio's plans in Africa, particularly with the anticipation of facing Hannibal himself, were centered around. But never do we read of any troop reinforcements except from the Numidians. Sure, perhaps a 'few' filled his ranks when receiving supplies etc., but the numbers would have been negligible, without any mention of them.
As for Hannibal, the quantity of his embarking force from Croton is not known with any given figures (surviving ones). But he had a much longer voyage than Scipio had a year earlier, and certainly with a numerically lesser armada. His force he brought to Africa would constitiute his thrid line at Zama, and judging by his dispositions leading up to and in the battle, he came back with about 15,000 men at most, and his 'Old Guard', was by now a handful. Polybius tells us within his account of Zama, the foremost ranks of Hannibal's third line lowered their spears to not allow remmants of the defeated troops of the first two lines to enter their ranks in the front, meaning they were indeed his African pikemen. Peter Connolly suggests it was only them that came back to Africa, and they numbered just 4,000. But Polybius tells us that the final clash between the infantry of Hannibal and Scipio were about the same in numbers, both armies over 30,000, so if Connolly is right, Hannibal's third line must have been substantially augmented by the fugitives of the first two lines, which isn't entirely implausible: if 12,000 men, approx. half of the first two lines combined, joined Hannibal's third line around the flanks, and his third line was merely 4,000 initially, that would give us the final duel of some 16,000 men each - something believable to some. But not by me - that would entail far too many Roman/allied losses, from a theory of 29,000 infantry to begin with.
The fact that the Roman navy was all but absent in Hannibal's route between Croton and Leptis Minor (80 miles SE of Carthage) suggests that the Senate had no intention of obstructing his path or discouraging him from leaving Italian soil. They were thrilled to see him go!
True, the amount of soldiers enumerated for an army did not all fight in a battle, as some were left to guard the camps, and our original sources identify this issue, albeit not every battle: at Cannae, we are told by Polybius and Appian, in isolated comments between them, that 10,000 soldiers were left in the larger camp, and 5,000 in the smaller, but Livy mentions only that 7,000 escaped to the smaller camp, and 10,000 fled to the larger camp (Book 22.39), perhaps confirming Polybius' view of the 10,000, but raising the question whether the smaller camp was substantially guarded at all from the onset. But all this conjecture could mean absolutely nothing.
"Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth."
But, again, our three primary sources, Polybius, Livy, and Appian (Appian in much more nebulous fashion, as he doesn't mention 'Great Plains'), all tell us that the combined forces of Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo, concentrated with the 4,000 Celtiberians, amounted to some 30,000 men. This may be a magnification, as we are told that this force, in the wake of the 'Burning of the Camps' disaster, was mustered up within thirty days. Also, the Carthaginian forces gathered (a troop levy was undertaken in the city of Carthage itself) must have been very low, as Scipio was able to leave a force small enough to merely 'keep up the facade of the blockade' of Utica, as Livy states in Book 30.8, and he himself 'proceeded against the enemy with the main body of his troops' inland towards perhaps what is now the plain of Souk el Kremis (about 80 miles SW of Carthage, 65 miles SW of Utica), near the towns of Bou Salem and Jendouba. But Scipio could also draw soldiers from his crew of 40 ships off Utica. Also, this new area of operations was now closer to Syphax's domain, but Scipio's celerity was primarily to stop the recruiting process of his enemy. Professor H. H. Scullard, following the reconstructive theories of J. Kromayer and Georg Veith, believes the forces of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax amounted to some 20,000, with Scipio's swiftly arriving force into the region numbering 12-15,000 (Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Pg. 129). But others, such as J. F. Lazenby, opine Polybius can be more readily taken at face value, with the Carthaginian force at 30,000 against Scipio's 20,000 (Hannibal's War, Pg. 209). Whatever the truth, Scipio was almost certainly outnumbered and taking a great risk, as a defeat so far inland would be as disastrous as what befell Regulus' 52 years earlier, as the Roman survivors and their allies would have found themselves isolated far from their camp. Polybius and Livy (almost certainly following Polybius) tell us of the normal battle formation of a Roman army, but, yes, don't seem to know where the enemy infantry units stood.
If indeed Scipio's infantry faced only the Celtiberians, this would mean his cavalry alone was confronting 26,000 men or less; if we allocate for units not being at full strength while on campaign, which is certainly tenable, the lesser numbers could not be significantly less, even if we accept more conservatively surmised modern figures. But again, Scipio wouldn't have dared divide his forces if there were significant enemy forces concentrated near Utica and Carthage; clearly, most of the available Carthaginian forces were sent to join the combined forces of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax, evidenced by the distress caused within Carthage by the subsequent defeat of this newly formed force. Remember, probably 2/3 of Hannibal's army at Zama came from abroad. It is also quite conceivable that Polybius, as he seemingly had done before and after, leaves out any deep reference to the allied contingents in Scipio's force, so perhaps the parts of his account that suggest that all of Scipio's infantry were faced by only the Celtiberians should be considered as only the Romans opposed them. Regardless of any omissions with regards to garrisoned or reserve troops, which would have been, presumably, minimal, given the dire straits Carthage was now increasingly facing, it is absolutely incredulous that Gaius Laelius' and Massinissa's cavalry, perhaps 4,000 between them (Massinissa had not yet won his kingdom 'back'), routed 26,000 (or a little less) enemy troops by themselves. Nor could the 4,000 Celtiberians (or whatever the true number) have faced up to the entire Roman infantry, which would have overlapped them considerably. This is all based on the hypothesis that the original sources are close with their enumerations, mainly with the ratio of Scipio's numbers against the enemy, in which he was probably outnumbered by 30% or so.
Being that Polybius provides the detail that Scipio enveloped the Celtiberians with his rear ranks, in Book 14.8, it is quite possible that Scipio actually brought out at least some of his rear ranks of principes and, if the need arose, triarii, to support his cavalry wings from behind. Or perhaps there were indeed infantry units from Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo that were placed on the flanks of the Celtiberians, with the Numidian and Carthaginian cavalry covering the flanks of their respective contingents, meaning they hoped to overwhelm Scipio's cavalry flanks with superior numbers of both their cavalry and infantry units (we are not told by our original sources if they significantly outnumbered Scipio), then surround Scipio's legionairies while they were occupied by the battle-hardened Celtiberians. If so, Scipio's sublime generalship beat them to it, as his horsemen routed the vastly inferior cavalry of the enemy (presumably) on both sides quickly, exposing the flanks of the rest of the army of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax; what is likely is that Scipio now had his hastati hold the Celtiberians, and had some of his principes and triarii, under cover of the hastati, move out to the left and right and fall upon their flanks, which had been stripped by the quick flight of Syphax's and Hasdrubal Gisgo's cavalry. But this would mean that the hastati alone matched the frontage of the Celtiberians, and the rear ranks of Scipio's infantry were needed to be brought up on either flank to envelop the Celtiberians, which means that this action was probably carried out by a single legion of roughly the same numerical strength as the Celtiberians. But almost all of the rest of the army was involved in the battle, so the answer is possibly that Syphax's Numidians, horse and foot, who were on the left (Roman right), were about as numerous as the Celtiberians and Carthaginians combined, horse and foot, to their right (Roman left).
Thus, when Scipio arranged his forces in the routine manner, his right to left, he formed one full legion on the right (opposite the enemy left), with its attached ala to its right, then his second full legion, with its ala to the left (the alae were on the wings of the Roman legions). Gaius Laelius and his cavalry was placed on the right wing of the army, stretched to match Syphax and his numerous Numidians. On the other side of Scipio's army, the left-hand Roman legion was disposed opposite the Celtiberians, and the left ala and Massinissa's Numidians were opposite the Carthaginian foot and horse. So, after the rout of all of Syphax's horse and foot on his left (Roman right) by Gaius Laelius and the entire right legion, and the vanquishing of the Carthaginian horse and foot on the right (Roman left) under Hasdrubal Gisgo by Massinissa and just the ala of the left-sided legion, the Celtiberians, certainly dispirited by the quick flight of their allies, were opposed by the single left-hand legion of approx. the same number of Romans. But Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo, and plenty of their men, got away.
The subsequent destruction of the Celtiberian force was effected by a model of tactical brilliance by Scipio, and is possibly a good answer to the question on another thread I was reading - which Roman victory almost matches Cannae as a great victory? Scipio still used the triple-line format, but broke from tradition by not using the principes and triarii to support the hastati in a way that only included strengthening it and filling its gaps if need be; what he probably did was have each 'cohort' (the sub-unit of three maniples innovated by him) of principes and triarii function as self-dependent units, ready to move up and extend the front line of the hastati, thus the chances of the hastati giving way, before an outflanking maneuver by the remainder of his principes and triarii could be effected, were diminished, as their frontage was increased. It is quite possible that Scipio, in witnessing Hannibal's tactics some 13 and 15 years earlier, saw the efficacy of the elasticity of Hannibal's army, which he re-organized (no details) after Trasimene. A Roman force, Scipio figured, needed to achieve similar things. He basically created offensive reserves from the rear ranks.
Forgive all the conjecture; what basically happened, in my opinion, at the Great Plains was that Scipio, certainly with a much superior army, less so over the Celtiberians, swiftly vanquished the flanks of the enemy, which was composed of all its cavalry and the native infantrymen of Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo with his two cavalry squadrons, one legion and all the alae; then, with his other Roman legion without its ala, he held the Celtiberian with his hastati, perhaps lengthened on each end by 'cohorts' (probably tactical units of three maniples) from his principes (and possibly triarii), then had his remaining (or entire) 'cohorts' of the principes and triarii, under cover of the front line engaged with the Celtiberian front, turn into column, probably half to the right, half to the left, and then march out to encircle the Celtiberians. The Celtiberians fought courageously, but could not break Scipio's lengthened )possibly) hastati before being attacked in flank and rear. The only puzzling issue is how Scipio so quickly vanquished the enemy horsemen, probably more numerous. Hasdrubal Gisgo, apparently a capable adminstrator, was a terrible commander in the field.
Scipio did not merely develop a detached reserve which would be brought in hurriedly for a necessary contingency, but formed an offensive reserve to prolong his lines if need be, and outflank the enemy. He was unable to this when matched against Hannibal, because at Zama Hannibal thwarted this tactic with his own deployment of a 'true' reserve - one large enough and placed perfectly; far back enough to prevent envelopment, but also close enough to deliver a coup de grace, should the opportunity present itself. But Scipio's foresight in procuring superb cavalry, in improving the Roman and acquiring allies who were inherently great horsemen, enabled him to come through. The problem with all this is that Polybius' accounts of Scipio's battles present problems of slight uncertainty. For example, though the victory at Ilipa was seemingly a tremendously impressive win, where were the Carthaginian cavalry units, some 4,000 of them? There is no explanation. Perhaps it is the result of fragmentation, not embroidered bias, which is still a possibility, as he did live and work under the patronage of the Scipionic Circle.
Of course record-taking, correspondence, and tallies etc (all the same, thing really), were much cruder back then, but the armies had sub-units, particularly those of the Roman forces, thus a 120-160 strong maniple could be accurately accounted for, and then ten maniples could be discernibly accounted for after that. Also, a detail such as 400 transport ships can be accurately enumerated. Almost definitely, the exact truth we do not have of the numbers of battle losses, but revisionism has closed the gap of the errors from way off to more closely accurate, hopefully.
I believe in assessing the 'assessments'. For example, at a surfaced glance, it seems incoceivable that Hannibal could surround a Roman army more than twice his numerical strength (approx. 32,000 infantry vs. 65,000) on three sides. It seems he would have had to weaken his lines proportionately to the extent that it would be impossible to withstand the Roman sledgehammer. Thus, the theory that the Romans did not possess the 80,000 total infantry at Cannae, but more like 48,000. But Hannibal's maneuver of an extraordinary 'reverse-refusal' with his Celts and Spaniards would be unintelligible if his infantry on the field had been outnumbered by only a little; with his cavalry, he wouldn't have needed to what he actually did, which carried more risk. His incredible display of battlefield control, in which he enitced the aggressive Romans to attack him, was centered around the two strong blocks of African infantry on the wings, and a little back. This meant that not only would the Romans tend to be sucked into the middle, but if things went amiss, fugitives from the Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they would be compelled to at least bunch and slow the Roman advance, even if they didn't want to. Thus, the Romans were sucked far enough in, becoming more crowded, so their own relentless forward pressure on the stretched infantry of Hannibal's became retarded, and soon totally contained,a due to the attck on their flanks, which was not effected by Hannibal having his Africans march too far out. There is certainly much luck involved, but it was a masterpiece that has resonated beyond its own age.
Thanks, James K MacKinnon
Thanks for your note, Byron, as with your help on my question regarding the armor.
Matthew:
Quote:...Where does the figure of 10,000 Foot and 2,200 Horse come from? (i.e. do we know Livy's source?)Hello Matthew. We do not know from whom that first figure came from, but we know it did not come from one of Livy's primary sources - Lucius Coelius Antipitar, because Livy tells us that Antipitar said of Scipio's invading force upon embarking in Sicily, Book 29.25,
Do you think that an Allied or Roman Cohort is likely to have been a stable number of men in the Roman Republic? I rather suspect the number varied quite a bit from unit to unit, much like the strength of a Legion itself.
The difference between 1,600 and 2,200 Horse is 600, which is, I suspect, the basis of your idea that the second figure Livy gives relates to allies only?
...Some authors have not given a figure, and I would prefer to be in their company since the question is moot. While he avoids a precise figure, Coelius still exaggerates and gives the impression of huge numbers. He says that birds fell to the ground when the soldiers' shout went up, and that the numbers boarding the ships were so great that it appeared that no mortal was being left behind in either Italy or Sicily!..."
It's too bad we don't have Antipitar's work (there are fragments), because although he is described as an historian of 'rhetoric', his account of the Second Punic War apparently made use of both Roman and Carthaginian sources. His vivid description cited by Livy of Scipio's established force is obviously one of hyperbole, but probably illustrates that it was indeed a significantly large army, particularly for one ferried across water for two days (they disembarked on the third day). After all, this was perhaps hitherto the most difficult and largest task ever undertaken by a Roman force, led by perhaps the greatest commander ever produced in her history (I would claim 'definitely' if not for the existence of Julius Caesar a century and a half later). True, legions of 6,200 infantry and 300 cavalry were never this large, and not matched again until the Third Macedonian War of 171-167 B.C. But this expedition of Scipio's was perhaps paramount in the military history of Rome, both Republic and Empire (maybe I'm now being a little hyperbolic), against its most dangerous enemy ever; no Roman enemy ever marched or landed an army of their own onto Italian soil and threatened Rome of her very existence, until the fall of Rome in the early 5th century, and by then the political and economic infastructure to support the western army had collapsed, not as a result of any significant military defeat.
Thus, in my opinion, for one to discard the strength of of the 5th and 6th legions as being 13,000 infantry and cavalry is to deny the cardinal ability of the Roman military system to adapt and implement a degree of flexibility, something applied when events necessitated such measures. In terms of augmenting numbers, it was the socii who generally appended the extra numbers, so I feel it is probable the two allied contingents to the 5th and 6th legions were of higher quantity in both horse and foot. Scipio's invading force of roughly 30,000 makes sense, particularly that Scipio could count of Numidian help upon his arrival at the Promonturium Appolinis, which was less than forty miles NW of Carthage itself, and merely 125 miles across from Lilybaeum.
The amount of cavalry Scipio could bring to Africa was indeed limited, quite a bit less than 1/10 of his infantry, a ratio twice as much when he faced Hannibal two years later, as transporting horse by sea was extremely difficult - the reason Hannibal could not bring his horses from Italy in 203 B.C., given his dire situation of limited transports (he had to build some of his own) and the need to bring as many men as possible to Africa in the face of Carthage's greatest peril, following the debacle at the Great Plains.
No Matthew - I do not think the Roman or allied 'cohort' was a staple number in the Republican period. But whatever the contingents were called at the time (I guess it doesn't matter), they were not as varying, in terms of troop quantity, as in later periods. The size of the legion, Roman and/or allied in the Republican period, was increased by simply increasing the number of soldiers in the maniples of the hastati and principes, and increasing the number of velites. But its basic organizational structure didn't change. The term 'cohort' used by Livy is anachronistic, as the term cohort, applying to the tactical sub-unit of the legion we know so well of, was not extant until later, arguably beginning with Gaius Marius. But Polybius uses the term 'cohort' a couple of times; perhaps the translators were also describing the reformed units of the Republican army in hindsight, primarily beginning with Scipio Africanus 'Major', as 'cohorts', though at the time the term wasn't actually applied. But maybe this assessment is wrong, and the term 'cohort' was used as early as Scipio, as he added flexibility to the army with the innovation of a tactical unit of three maniples (about 360-480 men, put into action at Baecula in 208 B.C.), and it was through an evolutionary process throughout the second century B.C., and into the first, that the 'cohort' became the basic tactical unit of the Roman army; the legion of ten cohorts was more flexible than the manipular legion, as its structure allowed it to function more effectively against disjoined tribal brigands etc., as this required smaller scaled fighting. But it could fight in pitched battle easily as well too. The velites ceased to exist, with practically every legionary becoming a heavy infantryman. It reached a point where a citizen militia was unsuitable for long periods of service, which entialed garrisoning in the provinces. But they sure came through in the Second Punic War! They suffered some very painful lessons at the hands of one of history's greatest military leaders, but they began to quickly adapt and adopt - a signature of Roman military greatness. Polybius' account of Scipio's force upon embarkation does not survive, but if Livy had it, he doesn't say so; actually, Livy faintly praises Polybius by name only once in his work of the Second Punic War, amid discussing Scipio's triumph and Syphax's death, at the very end of Book 30,
"...Polybius, who is by no means a source to be disregarded..."
We can guess that one or more of these sources, all used by Livy, was the source for that first number of 12,200 as the invasion force (remember, it wasn't from Lucius Coelius Antipitar):
Gaius Acilius
Marcus Porcius Cato
Lucius Cincius Alimentus
Quintus Quadrigarius Claudius
Quintus Fabius Pictor
Lucius Calpernius Piso 'Frugi'(meaning 'honest')
Aulus Postumius Albinus
Silenos (accompanied Hannibal, and Polybius' source)
Sosylos (accompanied Hannibal, and Polybius' source)
Timagenes of Alexandria (used by the famous ancient geographer Strabo and, possibly, by Livy)
Valerius Antias
Interesting observation on your part of the 600 differential of the 1,600 and 2,200 cavalry, and thinking that may have been a basis for my theory of the second figure from Livy as pertaining to the allies; no, that's a coincidence. The main reson behind my thinking is that Tiberius Sempronius Longus, who would lose to Hannibal on the Trebbia, was commissioned in Sicily at the onset of the war to invade Africa with two legions aboard 160 quinqueremes and 12 cutters: Livy tells us that he had two legions, with the allied contingent bolstered to 16,000 infantry and 1,800 cavalry, but Publius Cornelius Scipio (the great one's father), was given a lesser amount of 14,000 allied infantry and 1,600 allied cavalry to compliment his two legions. Publius was given just 60 quinqueremes, as the Senate believed the enemy could not employ a mode of warfare involving the sea up there. He was to sail for Spain. Now, maybe that meant nothing, but it was an observation that caught my attention. Clearly, unlike with in 204 B.C., Livy tells us with conviction that the Romans would strike at Africa with 26,400 men aboard 172 ships (an average of about 153 men per ship, but 12 were the smaller cutters). The Roman strategy at the onset was practical - a two-pronged attack against Carthaginian power. Hannibal would certainly be serious trouble at first in Spain, they figured, but they would easily (relatively) triumph in Africa; they had already been there and learned what not to do etc. Of course, as we know, Hannibal swiftly unleashed one of military history's most daring and audacious attacks in history, thwarting all their initial plans.
I should have mentioned this, and meant to, but another issue, with all this conjecture, has just hit me: I figured the proportion of 22,000 allied to 13,000 Roman numbers was too much to arrive at the surmised figure of 35,000 for Scipio's invasion force. But I overlooked that in 218 B.C., with these commissions of Scipio the Elder and Longus, the legion was fixed at just 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, giving two Roman legions a total of 8,600. Therefore, the proportion of allied contingents for both consuls in 218 B.C. to their two Roman legions was a differential of 7,000 with Scipio the Elder, and 9,200 with Longus. Mmmmmmmm :roll:
Aryaman2:
Quote:... 35.000 just ignores the difficulties of transporting troops by sea at the time, and that applies also to Hannibal, how was he supposed to ship 20.000 from Italy?Hi Inaki. I respectfully disagree. The proposed number from me for the landing was about 30,000, but maybe it was 35,000, and maybe Scipio's losses from his arrival in Africa to Zama were more than I figured; 35,000 was what I think Scipio had at the onset of Zama, and still do. 'Difficulty', particularly when faced by the likes of Scipio and Hannibal, was hardly impossible. In times of war, according to Polybius, a quinquereme could carry more than 125 marines (normally 40), excluding the assigned crew. Two groups of 20 warships (certainly quinqueremes) flanked 400 transports (this has never been doubted to my knowledge) for Scipio's crossing to Africa, which was about 125 miles and just two days away (they disembarked on the third day). These transport ships could carry more men than a warship; approx. 80 legionnaires (a little less on average), maybe five horses, and the varied supplies per transport seems reasonable per ship. Perhaps some were integrated with each quinquereme, as one of them could comfortably carry forty men (not including the rowing crew etc.) To cite two famous examples of difficult sea-crossings of antiquity, the Persians crossed the Aegean to invade Attica (the battle of Marathon) in 490 B.C., aboard about 25,000 men aboard at least 200 ships (sources are extremely sweeping with those numbers, with some saying 60,000 men on 600 ships, which is seemingly incredulous). Julius Caesar's first expedition to Britain was composed of, at most, 10,000 men (a legion with Caesar was usually around 4,000, maybe less, and he took two with him) and about 300 cavalry aboard 98 ships (80 for the troops, 18 for the horses), which would be 125 men per transport and 17 horses for each ship. Moreover, Gnaeus Scipio sailed to Emporiae (modern Ampurias), in NE Spain, from Massilia (modern Marseille) with perhaps 20,000 troops ('most of' his brother Publius' double-consular army of 25,000 men, according to Livy, Book 21.32); he certainly sailed along the shoreline, and we are given no amount of ships. But being Publius had been given 60 quinqueremes for his task upon arriving at the mouth of the Rhone, we can assume that Gnaeus sailed to Catalonia with more than 40 of them.
If Scipio used seperate transports for the horses as Caesar did, and using the mathematical gauge of 29,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry aboard 400 transports, this means 107 men were on 271 transports, and 17 horses were carried over on 129 transports. My deduction is affected by Caesar's using 18 transports for his approx. 300 cavalry. 'Specialized' transports, presumably larger, did not come until Caesar's second and bigger incursion to Britain in 54 B.C. This may not have been the case at all, as we have no detailed information on the compositional nature of Scipio's boarding measures, but it is not at all implausible that he either put 5 horses amongst 72 soldiers in 400 transports, or had 107 men per transport on 271, and the horses aboard 129 set aside just for them, with 17 each aboard each ship. Remember, they didn't need to travel far in waters not so hostile anymore; the Carthaginian navy was now even beyond a broken reed. I may not be as stubborn with my opinion of approx. 29,000 infantry and 2,200 cavalry, if not for the substantial data of 400 transports. That's a huge armada for tis time.
In my opinion, to opine that the figure most believed by the consensus is off by as much as 60%, is to overlook Livy's detailed information about the distribution and resposibilites amongst varied Italian communities for the construction of extra ships needed for Scipio's invasion in 204 B.C. He specifically tells us that the socii navales (probably based out of Naples and/or Peasentum), not the state, beared the expense of providing the extra ships needed for Scipio's expedition. All this for an invading force of 12,000? 12,000 is slightly less a figure than what Gaius Claudius Nero arrived with in 211 B.C.(13,100), sailing from Puteoli, to relieve the beleaguered 9,000 men tenuously holding the Ebro line under Lucius Marcius and Tiberius Fonteius, and 1,000 less than what Scipio sailed to Emporiae with a year later from the mouth of the Tiber ('skirting' the coasts, as Livy says, Book 26.19, aboard 30 quinqueremes).
Moreover, if one believes just 12,000 arrived in Africa under Scipio in 204 B.C., the figure of 400 transports to cross must be discarded, as well as the belief that this was a huge undertaking, rather than a riad, which Gaius Laelius administered earlier. It would also need to be believed that he received reinforcements from Sicily and/or Italy, of which we have no record. He was indeed supplied with grain and clothing from Sardinia, and Livy tells us that 3,000 troops were raised for service in Sicily, as all the crack troops from Sicily had gone to Africa with Scipio (Book 30.2), but not once did a substantial reinforcement reach Scipio, except the invaluable cavalry of Massinissa and Dacamas (always a question mark with the latter), an element on which Scipio's plans in Africa, particularly with the anticipation of facing Hannibal himself, were centered around. But never do we read of any troop reinforcements except from the Numidians. Sure, perhaps a 'few' filled his ranks when receiving supplies etc., but the numbers would have been negligible, without any mention of them.
As for Hannibal, the quantity of his embarking force from Croton is not known with any given figures (surviving ones). But he had a much longer voyage than Scipio had a year earlier, and certainly with a numerically lesser armada. His force he brought to Africa would constitiute his thrid line at Zama, and judging by his dispositions leading up to and in the battle, he came back with about 15,000 men at most, and his 'Old Guard', was by now a handful. Polybius tells us within his account of Zama, the foremost ranks of Hannibal's third line lowered their spears to not allow remmants of the defeated troops of the first two lines to enter their ranks in the front, meaning they were indeed his African pikemen. Peter Connolly suggests it was only them that came back to Africa, and they numbered just 4,000. But Polybius tells us that the final clash between the infantry of Hannibal and Scipio were about the same in numbers, both armies over 30,000, so if Connolly is right, Hannibal's third line must have been substantially augmented by the fugitives of the first two lines, which isn't entirely implausible: if 12,000 men, approx. half of the first two lines combined, joined Hannibal's third line around the flanks, and his third line was merely 4,000 initially, that would give us the final duel of some 16,000 men each - something believable to some. But not by me - that would entail far too many Roman/allied losses, from a theory of 29,000 infantry to begin with.
The fact that the Roman navy was all but absent in Hannibal's route between Croton and Leptis Minor (80 miles SE of Carthage) suggests that the Senate had no intention of obstructing his path or discouraging him from leaving Italian soil. They were thrilled to see him go!
True, the amount of soldiers enumerated for an army did not all fight in a battle, as some were left to guard the camps, and our original sources identify this issue, albeit not every battle: at Cannae, we are told by Polybius and Appian, in isolated comments between them, that 10,000 soldiers were left in the larger camp, and 5,000 in the smaller, but Livy mentions only that 7,000 escaped to the smaller camp, and 10,000 fled to the larger camp (Book 22.39), perhaps confirming Polybius' view of the 10,000, but raising the question whether the smaller camp was substantially guarded at all from the onset. But all this conjecture could mean absolutely nothing.
Quote:...Sources report a wide range of numbers, for instance at Great Plains the total force of Roman infantry is opposed by just 4.000 Celtiberian mercenaries. IMO some discrepancies would arise from the fact that sources usually count units at full strength, while in campaign that is never the case...Actually, our main sources concur that the Carthaginian/Numidian force was about 30,000 at the Great Plains, so we have to apply a little deductive logic. True, there was a much scantier ability among analysts to procure information back then; revisionists offer what they feel probably happened, and there is at least an account of the Great Plains battle, rather than a succinct mention, to provide for conjecture without pulling too much out of the air. Though we'll never know for sure, it reaches a point where we have to accept an inconclusive explanation (IMHO, of course). It seems, too, that not everybody will be satisfied by another's 'truth'. As Marcus Aurelius proclaimed,
"Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a perspective, not the truth."
But, again, our three primary sources, Polybius, Livy, and Appian (Appian in much more nebulous fashion, as he doesn't mention 'Great Plains'), all tell us that the combined forces of Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo, concentrated with the 4,000 Celtiberians, amounted to some 30,000 men. This may be a magnification, as we are told that this force, in the wake of the 'Burning of the Camps' disaster, was mustered up within thirty days. Also, the Carthaginian forces gathered (a troop levy was undertaken in the city of Carthage itself) must have been very low, as Scipio was able to leave a force small enough to merely 'keep up the facade of the blockade' of Utica, as Livy states in Book 30.8, and he himself 'proceeded against the enemy with the main body of his troops' inland towards perhaps what is now the plain of Souk el Kremis (about 80 miles SW of Carthage, 65 miles SW of Utica), near the towns of Bou Salem and Jendouba. But Scipio could also draw soldiers from his crew of 40 ships off Utica. Also, this new area of operations was now closer to Syphax's domain, but Scipio's celerity was primarily to stop the recruiting process of his enemy. Professor H. H. Scullard, following the reconstructive theories of J. Kromayer and Georg Veith, believes the forces of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax amounted to some 20,000, with Scipio's swiftly arriving force into the region numbering 12-15,000 (Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician, Pg. 129). But others, such as J. F. Lazenby, opine Polybius can be more readily taken at face value, with the Carthaginian force at 30,000 against Scipio's 20,000 (Hannibal's War, Pg. 209). Whatever the truth, Scipio was almost certainly outnumbered and taking a great risk, as a defeat so far inland would be as disastrous as what befell Regulus' 52 years earlier, as the Roman survivors and their allies would have found themselves isolated far from their camp. Polybius and Livy (almost certainly following Polybius) tell us of the normal battle formation of a Roman army, but, yes, don't seem to know where the enemy infantry units stood.
If indeed Scipio's infantry faced only the Celtiberians, this would mean his cavalry alone was confronting 26,000 men or less; if we allocate for units not being at full strength while on campaign, which is certainly tenable, the lesser numbers could not be significantly less, even if we accept more conservatively surmised modern figures. But again, Scipio wouldn't have dared divide his forces if there were significant enemy forces concentrated near Utica and Carthage; clearly, most of the available Carthaginian forces were sent to join the combined forces of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax, evidenced by the distress caused within Carthage by the subsequent defeat of this newly formed force. Remember, probably 2/3 of Hannibal's army at Zama came from abroad. It is also quite conceivable that Polybius, as he seemingly had done before and after, leaves out any deep reference to the allied contingents in Scipio's force, so perhaps the parts of his account that suggest that all of Scipio's infantry were faced by only the Celtiberians should be considered as only the Romans opposed them. Regardless of any omissions with regards to garrisoned or reserve troops, which would have been, presumably, minimal, given the dire straits Carthage was now increasingly facing, it is absolutely incredulous that Gaius Laelius' and Massinissa's cavalry, perhaps 4,000 between them (Massinissa had not yet won his kingdom 'back'), routed 26,000 (or a little less) enemy troops by themselves. Nor could the 4,000 Celtiberians (or whatever the true number) have faced up to the entire Roman infantry, which would have overlapped them considerably. This is all based on the hypothesis that the original sources are close with their enumerations, mainly with the ratio of Scipio's numbers against the enemy, in which he was probably outnumbered by 30% or so.
Being that Polybius provides the detail that Scipio enveloped the Celtiberians with his rear ranks, in Book 14.8, it is quite possible that Scipio actually brought out at least some of his rear ranks of principes and, if the need arose, triarii, to support his cavalry wings from behind. Or perhaps there were indeed infantry units from Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo that were placed on the flanks of the Celtiberians, with the Numidian and Carthaginian cavalry covering the flanks of their respective contingents, meaning they hoped to overwhelm Scipio's cavalry flanks with superior numbers of both their cavalry and infantry units (we are not told by our original sources if they significantly outnumbered Scipio), then surround Scipio's legionairies while they were occupied by the battle-hardened Celtiberians. If so, Scipio's sublime generalship beat them to it, as his horsemen routed the vastly inferior cavalry of the enemy (presumably) on both sides quickly, exposing the flanks of the rest of the army of Hasdrubal Gisgo and Syphax; what is likely is that Scipio now had his hastati hold the Celtiberians, and had some of his principes and triarii, under cover of the hastati, move out to the left and right and fall upon their flanks, which had been stripped by the quick flight of Syphax's and Hasdrubal Gisgo's cavalry. But this would mean that the hastati alone matched the frontage of the Celtiberians, and the rear ranks of Scipio's infantry were needed to be brought up on either flank to envelop the Celtiberians, which means that this action was probably carried out by a single legion of roughly the same numerical strength as the Celtiberians. But almost all of the rest of the army was involved in the battle, so the answer is possibly that Syphax's Numidians, horse and foot, who were on the left (Roman right), were about as numerous as the Celtiberians and Carthaginians combined, horse and foot, to their right (Roman left).
Thus, when Scipio arranged his forces in the routine manner, his right to left, he formed one full legion on the right (opposite the enemy left), with its attached ala to its right, then his second full legion, with its ala to the left (the alae were on the wings of the Roman legions). Gaius Laelius and his cavalry was placed on the right wing of the army, stretched to match Syphax and his numerous Numidians. On the other side of Scipio's army, the left-hand Roman legion was disposed opposite the Celtiberians, and the left ala and Massinissa's Numidians were opposite the Carthaginian foot and horse. So, after the rout of all of Syphax's horse and foot on his left (Roman right) by Gaius Laelius and the entire right legion, and the vanquishing of the Carthaginian horse and foot on the right (Roman left) under Hasdrubal Gisgo by Massinissa and just the ala of the left-sided legion, the Celtiberians, certainly dispirited by the quick flight of their allies, were opposed by the single left-hand legion of approx. the same number of Romans. But Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo, and plenty of their men, got away.
The subsequent destruction of the Celtiberian force was effected by a model of tactical brilliance by Scipio, and is possibly a good answer to the question on another thread I was reading - which Roman victory almost matches Cannae as a great victory? Scipio still used the triple-line format, but broke from tradition by not using the principes and triarii to support the hastati in a way that only included strengthening it and filling its gaps if need be; what he probably did was have each 'cohort' (the sub-unit of three maniples innovated by him) of principes and triarii function as self-dependent units, ready to move up and extend the front line of the hastati, thus the chances of the hastati giving way, before an outflanking maneuver by the remainder of his principes and triarii could be effected, were diminished, as their frontage was increased. It is quite possible that Scipio, in witnessing Hannibal's tactics some 13 and 15 years earlier, saw the efficacy of the elasticity of Hannibal's army, which he re-organized (no details) after Trasimene. A Roman force, Scipio figured, needed to achieve similar things. He basically created offensive reserves from the rear ranks.
Forgive all the conjecture; what basically happened, in my opinion, at the Great Plains was that Scipio, certainly with a much superior army, less so over the Celtiberians, swiftly vanquished the flanks of the enemy, which was composed of all its cavalry and the native infantrymen of Syphax and Hasdrubal Gisgo with his two cavalry squadrons, one legion and all the alae; then, with his other Roman legion without its ala, he held the Celtiberian with his hastati, perhaps lengthened on each end by 'cohorts' (probably tactical units of three maniples) from his principes (and possibly triarii), then had his remaining (or entire) 'cohorts' of the principes and triarii, under cover of the front line engaged with the Celtiberian front, turn into column, probably half to the right, half to the left, and then march out to encircle the Celtiberians. The Celtiberians fought courageously, but could not break Scipio's lengthened )possibly) hastati before being attacked in flank and rear. The only puzzling issue is how Scipio so quickly vanquished the enemy horsemen, probably more numerous. Hasdrubal Gisgo, apparently a capable adminstrator, was a terrible commander in the field.
Scipio did not merely develop a detached reserve which would be brought in hurriedly for a necessary contingency, but formed an offensive reserve to prolong his lines if need be, and outflank the enemy. He was unable to this when matched against Hannibal, because at Zama Hannibal thwarted this tactic with his own deployment of a 'true' reserve - one large enough and placed perfectly; far back enough to prevent envelopment, but also close enough to deliver a coup de grace, should the opportunity present itself. But Scipio's foresight in procuring superb cavalry, in improving the Roman and acquiring allies who were inherently great horsemen, enabled him to come through. The problem with all this is that Polybius' accounts of Scipio's battles present problems of slight uncertainty. For example, though the victory at Ilipa was seemingly a tremendously impressive win, where were the Carthaginian cavalry units, some 4,000 of them? There is no explanation. Perhaps it is the result of fragmentation, not embroidered bias, which is still a possibility, as he did live and work under the patronage of the Scipionic Circle.
Quote:...In fact, you can get only accurate data mixing reports from both sides. The winner side reports are very accurate with all data regarding his own side (and here the low casualties always reported in Ancient battles for the winner) while they are only estimations, normally highly exagerated, about the enemy casualties...That doesn't strain credibility, but some of the veritable, 'original' sources of the Second Punic War, those I mentioned earlier, and whose works didn't survive, made use of Carthaginian eyewitnesses too; Polybius' research included interviews with important participants, such as Gaius Laelius and Massinissa. Of course, we certainly do not have a balanced view of the Second Punic War, and the patriotic rhetoric is not slightly embroidered. But because it was such an event on a massive scale, far from everything can be colored to fool future generations. I doubt Polybius pulled his estimations out of the air; he spoke to ex-soldiers who might have given him an insight into enemy (Carthaginian) casualties (though possibly very crude information), and we cannot be sure what proportion from Polybius is pro-Roman, though almost certainly above the halfway point. I feel it is a mistake to suppose that our understanding of the Second Punic War is wholly of Roman origin, or to attempt to make a mechanical seperation, so to speak, of the Roman and pro-Carthaginian passages in the texts of Polybius; the truth can still be applicable even if something 'sounds' bias, and each event has to be scrutinized in itself.
Of course record-taking, correspondence, and tallies etc (all the same, thing really), were much cruder back then, but the armies had sub-units, particularly those of the Roman forces, thus a 120-160 strong maniple could be accurately accounted for, and then ten maniples could be discernibly accounted for after that. Also, a detail such as 400 transport ships can be accurately enumerated. Almost definitely, the exact truth we do not have of the numbers of battle losses, but revisionism has closed the gap of the errors from way off to more closely accurate, hopefully.
I believe in assessing the 'assessments'. For example, at a surfaced glance, it seems incoceivable that Hannibal could surround a Roman army more than twice his numerical strength (approx. 32,000 infantry vs. 65,000) on three sides. It seems he would have had to weaken his lines proportionately to the extent that it would be impossible to withstand the Roman sledgehammer. Thus, the theory that the Romans did not possess the 80,000 total infantry at Cannae, but more like 48,000. But Hannibal's maneuver of an extraordinary 'reverse-refusal' with his Celts and Spaniards would be unintelligible if his infantry on the field had been outnumbered by only a little; with his cavalry, he wouldn't have needed to what he actually did, which carried more risk. His incredible display of battlefield control, in which he enitced the aggressive Romans to attack him, was centered around the two strong blocks of African infantry on the wings, and a little back. This meant that not only would the Romans tend to be sucked into the middle, but if things went amiss, fugitives from the Celtic and Iberian units would also be funnelled into the center where they would be compelled to at least bunch and slow the Roman advance, even if they didn't want to. Thus, the Romans were sucked far enough in, becoming more crowded, so their own relentless forward pressure on the stretched infantry of Hannibal's became retarded, and soon totally contained,a due to the attck on their flanks, which was not effected by Hannibal having his Africans march too far out. There is certainly much luck involved, but it was a masterpiece that has resonated beyond its own age.
Thanks, James K MacKinnon
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
