05-03-2002, 08:56 AM
Salve,<br>
<br>
Army size and imperial budget were obviously closely linked. Since the military expenses - primarily consisting of pay, donatives and retirement grants rather than acquisition of new weapons systems and munitions as nowadays - formed the largest part of the government's budget, an increase in the number of troops under arms would have required additional sources of income for the treasury to bear the extra costs. Civil wars frequently resulted in frantic expansion of the number of soldiers, but to some extent the effects were alleviated by the losses incurred and the temporary nature of part of these levies. Due to the rather disorganised nature of imperial finances during the principate, increasing revenue was difficult. The major expansion of army strength under Diocletianus was accompanied by a massive reform of the taxation system which involved a more detailed assesment and better organised use of the empire's available resources. Earlier attempts at increasing revenue to pay for increasing army costs had resulted in massive devaluation of the currency and increased reliance on taxation in kind and outright requisitioning. Increased efficiency in extraction of wealth came at a price though with impoverishment of certain areas and segments of the population. Those parts of the empire where barbarian raids were more frequent and which saw more military activity with its accompanying economic damage (requisitioning, extortion, plunder etc) suffered under the increased tax burden while other areas which were safer prospered despite increased taxation. The elite was more succesful at resisting and evading taxation efforts and devolving responsibilities onto others, resulting in the decline of the city decurionate.<br>
<br>
Some related reading material<br>
<br>
Duncan-Jones, R., <i> Money and government in the Roman empire</i> (Cambridge 1994) 300p.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'How big was the Roman Army?' in: <i> Klio</i> 62 (1980), 451- 460.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'The Roman emperor's army costs' in: <i> Latomus</i> 43 (1984), 571-580.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Inschriftenstatistik und die Frage des Rekrutierungsalter römischer Soldaten' in: <i> Chiron</i> 22 (1992), 281-297.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Rekruten und Überlebende: die demographische Struktur der römischen Legionen in der Prinzipatszeit' in: <i> Klio</i> 77 (1995), 232-254.<br>
Scheidel, W., <i> Measuring sex, age and death in the Roman empire: explorations<br>
in Ancient Demography. Journal of Roman Archaeology, Supplementary Series</i> 21 (1996) 184p. Review<br>
Treadgold, W., <i> Byzantium and its army 284-1081</i> (Stanford 1995) 249p.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst<br>
<p></p><i></i>
<br>
Army size and imperial budget were obviously closely linked. Since the military expenses - primarily consisting of pay, donatives and retirement grants rather than acquisition of new weapons systems and munitions as nowadays - formed the largest part of the government's budget, an increase in the number of troops under arms would have required additional sources of income for the treasury to bear the extra costs. Civil wars frequently resulted in frantic expansion of the number of soldiers, but to some extent the effects were alleviated by the losses incurred and the temporary nature of part of these levies. Due to the rather disorganised nature of imperial finances during the principate, increasing revenue was difficult. The major expansion of army strength under Diocletianus was accompanied by a massive reform of the taxation system which involved a more detailed assesment and better organised use of the empire's available resources. Earlier attempts at increasing revenue to pay for increasing army costs had resulted in massive devaluation of the currency and increased reliance on taxation in kind and outright requisitioning. Increased efficiency in extraction of wealth came at a price though with impoverishment of certain areas and segments of the population. Those parts of the empire where barbarian raids were more frequent and which saw more military activity with its accompanying economic damage (requisitioning, extortion, plunder etc) suffered under the increased tax burden while other areas which were safer prospered despite increased taxation. The elite was more succesful at resisting and evading taxation efforts and devolving responsibilities onto others, resulting in the decline of the city decurionate.<br>
<br>
Some related reading material<br>
<br>
Duncan-Jones, R., <i> Money and government in the Roman empire</i> (Cambridge 1994) 300p.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'How big was the Roman Army?' in: <i> Klio</i> 62 (1980), 451- 460.<br>
MacMullen, R., 'The Roman emperor's army costs' in: <i> Latomus</i> 43 (1984), 571-580.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Inschriftenstatistik und die Frage des Rekrutierungsalter römischer Soldaten' in: <i> Chiron</i> 22 (1992), 281-297.<br>
Scheidel, W., 'Rekruten und Überlebende: die demographische Struktur der römischen Legionen in der Prinzipatszeit' in: <i> Klio</i> 77 (1995), 232-254.<br>
Scheidel, W., <i> Measuring sex, age and death in the Roman empire: explorations<br>
in Ancient Demography. Journal of Roman Archaeology, Supplementary Series</i> 21 (1996) 184p. Review<br>
Treadgold, W., <i> Byzantium and its army 284-1081</i> (Stanford 1995) 249p.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst<br>
<p></p><i></i>
