11-25-2013, 06:40 AM
Macedon wrote:
Your colleagues do have a point although for me the probability that they (and a number of other translators) are right is fairly low.
The distance between the lines to me is not really important. Anything anyone, including myself writes about the distances is conjecture. What is not conjecture is Polybius’ description of the maniple deployment that is mathematics, and extremely important mathematics. From it I can determine the frontage of the Roman legions.
Macedon wrote:
If Hannibal had arrayed in one line, then the Romans had to also array in one to make the descriptions fit. If you have Hannibal array in two lines, then the Romans are allowed to also array in two but, again, not in three.
I am finding this a little confusing. I have the Carthaginians deployed in what would resemble a wedge, with a base…. a triangle so to speak. So are you referring to the wedge proportion as the first line, and the base of the triangle as the second line?
Macedon wrote:
How in your model do you explain the fact (with which you agree), namely that the Libyans attacked (flanks and/or rear) the Romans who had funneled into the gap created by the retreating/fleeing Celts? The distance between the two Roman lines was considerable,
How is the distance between the two Roman lines “considerable?” We are not told. Are you are expecting me to defend my theory against your theory, which you believe your theory to be the benchmark?
Macedon wrote:
Even if the interim distance was not that long, they would not have dissolved their order to just run behind the Hastati. How do you support your opinion that "they would not have been able to stop the Africans"? Why wouldn't they? Wasn't it one of their main functions?
My theory does not centre on the Romans not being able to stop the Africans, the ancient sources tell us the Romans were defeated. So their attempt at trying to stop the Africans obviously failed. In the primary sources the triarii are mentioned as being camp guards, ditch diggers and the reserve. It is not recorded if their function was to protect the rear. Why are you of the belief that if the Romans were in two lines (hastati first line, principes/triarii the second line), that the Africans could not encircle them.
At the first battle of Philippi in 42 BC, the Romans are deployed in three lines, yet Brutus’ legions managed to attack Octavian’s flank and defeat him. Brutus praises the valour of his soldiers in defeating Octavian’s famed fourth legion “on which their wing placed its reliance.” Here the third line failed to protect the army. At Pharsalus Pompey’s third line failed to prevent his left flank from being attacked. At the Allia, it would appear the triarii failed to stop the Celts attacking them in the flank and rear.
What do you envisage when the Romans at Cannae are attacked in the flank and rear? Are you expecting my theory of a second line to do some amazing and speedy redeployment? I have no problems with those troops closer to the threat trying to change direction to met the situation, but those in the centre, will they also react with the same speed, ease and orderly manner as miniature wargamers portray ancient warfare? In reality, you now have to factor in confusion, and there are too many accounts in the primary sources of armies being thrown into confusion to ignore. Also we have no idea that after breaking through the apex of the wedge if the hastati were replaced by the principes/triarii. There is absolutely nothing that tells us this, a point I make clear in my book.
No matter how hard I try, no matter how many sheep and bulls I sacrifice to the gods, no matter how many saecular games I perform, when it come to the Roman military I cannot shake of the Pythagorean influence or geometry. At Cannae, because there are only 14 legions facing Hannibal, with the other two attacking Hannibal’s camp, I thought I had a good example of the Romans not adhering to Pythagorean geometry but the Romans proved me wrong. Why? Because the foundations are Pythagorean so it’s pointless trying to get away from it. Stupid me! But in my ignorance I knew the 14 legions at Cannae do not accord with the 3:2 ratio, which is the most defining ratio governing the tribes and the legions. However, when I examined in depth the Roman command structure, only then did I realise the 14 legions conform to the other sacred Pythagorean ratio 4:3, which is the perfect fourth. The perfect fourth represents the 8:6 of the Pythagorean tetrachord 6:8:9:12 which adds up to 35 (termed harmonic 35). So the 8:6 part adds to 14, or the 14 legions. Now I married this with the Roman command structure and deducted of the 14 legions, eight legions can be designated in the centre for a breakthrough and the three legions on each flank are the flank guard legions. So the 8 legions to 6 legions when proportioned to two, equates to 4:3.
Like you I use mathematics to reconstruct what could have transpired. As Hannibal is reacting to the Roman deployment, I based the apex of the Carthaginian wedge to match the frontage of those eight legions.
I have the Romans break the apex of the wedge first (the eight legions), and then the Carthaginian flank guards. The next stage is as Livy writes the Romans:
“following up the Celts (the eight legions) and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line (the base of the triangle or the main body), which was giving way, progressed so far that they (the eight legions) now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks.
The Roman formation is now a wedge, with eight legions forward. The three legions on the flanks of the wedge are breaking through the Carthaginian flank guards and therefore, falling behind the eight legions. I believe Hannibal formed PART of his army into a wedge with the sole purpose of it being defeated and in the process the victorious Romans would end up advancing in a wedge shape. If we take the premise the hastati from the eight legions that did the break through and continued advancing, the principes and triarii of the eight legions would through their standard doctrine, keep in contact with their units of hastati. We see this doctrine not obeyed at Zama, when the principes and triarii were ordered not to advance in support of the hastati through fear of being disordered.
Those eight legions in the centre, because they were forward of the flank guard legions would have realised with the main body engaging them and the Africans now on the flanks of the army, there were in an extremely precarious position. Plutarch has the centre retire, while Appian has the left flank rout first followed by the right flank.
That’s my theory. However, I will add that although I have said the Carthaginian infantry formation was a triangle, the actual formation I have is nothing like what other historians have reconstructed. I like what I have because it makes sense of all the primary sources.
On a side note have you read Goldsworthy’s account of Cannae (Cassell and co)? Goldsworthy states that “The Romans surged forward until they were level with the starting position of the flanks of Hannibal's main line and kept going, for there was nothing to oppose them.” Here the Romans have broken through and there is nothing to stop them. Then suddenly he writes “The Libyan's charge stopped the Roman advance dead, robbing it of all momentum. There were now no organized reserves in the Roman army to feed into the combat and renew the surge forward.”
First is there is nothing to stop them, then why does Goldsworthy believe there now was no reserves to renew the surge forward? I’m really puzzled as to how the Libyan attack on the flank stopped the Roman advance dead. At the Trebia when the Romans broke through, realising they could not help the rest of the army they made their way to Placentia. They did this because there was no one facing them to stop them. But at Cannae, with Goldsworthy declaring there is nothing to stop them, they are stopped by the flank charge. Goldsworthy claims “The two phalanxes of Libyans gripped the Romans like a vice, and around them the surviving Celtic and Spanish troops, joined perhaps after a while by some of the routers, pressed round to add to the fighting line.” So we now have the whole Roman, with nothing in front of them to stop them, locked in a vice. Are they being jammed up shoulder older to shoulder along the line that is the reason they can’t move? In this scenario wouldn’t a centurion order some of his men to turn sideways and step out of this vice and give everyone else some room so they can move forward? Now in order to explain why the Romans don’t move, Goldsworthy wants us to believe those routed Celts and Spanish troops came running back to rejoin the army and add to the Romans misery.
This rather poorly understood scenario has occurred because too many historians fail to acknowledge Hannibal main line formed the base of the wedge and this main line had the same frontage as the Romans. Every time I read about the battle of Cannae by an author following the doctrine the Carthaginians deployed in a hollow lambada (every one’s doing it so it must be right), in order to make it work, they end up producing a scenario devoid of command sense.
Steven
Your colleagues do have a point although for me the probability that they (and a number of other translators) are right is fairly low.
The distance between the lines to me is not really important. Anything anyone, including myself writes about the distances is conjecture. What is not conjecture is Polybius’ description of the maniple deployment that is mathematics, and extremely important mathematics. From it I can determine the frontage of the Roman legions.
Macedon wrote:
If Hannibal had arrayed in one line, then the Romans had to also array in one to make the descriptions fit. If you have Hannibal array in two lines, then the Romans are allowed to also array in two but, again, not in three.
I am finding this a little confusing. I have the Carthaginians deployed in what would resemble a wedge, with a base…. a triangle so to speak. So are you referring to the wedge proportion as the first line, and the base of the triangle as the second line?
Macedon wrote:
How in your model do you explain the fact (with which you agree), namely that the Libyans attacked (flanks and/or rear) the Romans who had funneled into the gap created by the retreating/fleeing Celts? The distance between the two Roman lines was considerable,
How is the distance between the two Roman lines “considerable?” We are not told. Are you are expecting me to defend my theory against your theory, which you believe your theory to be the benchmark?
Macedon wrote:
Even if the interim distance was not that long, they would not have dissolved their order to just run behind the Hastati. How do you support your opinion that "they would not have been able to stop the Africans"? Why wouldn't they? Wasn't it one of their main functions?
My theory does not centre on the Romans not being able to stop the Africans, the ancient sources tell us the Romans were defeated. So their attempt at trying to stop the Africans obviously failed. In the primary sources the triarii are mentioned as being camp guards, ditch diggers and the reserve. It is not recorded if their function was to protect the rear. Why are you of the belief that if the Romans were in two lines (hastati first line, principes/triarii the second line), that the Africans could not encircle them.
At the first battle of Philippi in 42 BC, the Romans are deployed in three lines, yet Brutus’ legions managed to attack Octavian’s flank and defeat him. Brutus praises the valour of his soldiers in defeating Octavian’s famed fourth legion “on which their wing placed its reliance.” Here the third line failed to protect the army. At Pharsalus Pompey’s third line failed to prevent his left flank from being attacked. At the Allia, it would appear the triarii failed to stop the Celts attacking them in the flank and rear.
What do you envisage when the Romans at Cannae are attacked in the flank and rear? Are you expecting my theory of a second line to do some amazing and speedy redeployment? I have no problems with those troops closer to the threat trying to change direction to met the situation, but those in the centre, will they also react with the same speed, ease and orderly manner as miniature wargamers portray ancient warfare? In reality, you now have to factor in confusion, and there are too many accounts in the primary sources of armies being thrown into confusion to ignore. Also we have no idea that after breaking through the apex of the wedge if the hastati were replaced by the principes/triarii. There is absolutely nothing that tells us this, a point I make clear in my book.
No matter how hard I try, no matter how many sheep and bulls I sacrifice to the gods, no matter how many saecular games I perform, when it come to the Roman military I cannot shake of the Pythagorean influence or geometry. At Cannae, because there are only 14 legions facing Hannibal, with the other two attacking Hannibal’s camp, I thought I had a good example of the Romans not adhering to Pythagorean geometry but the Romans proved me wrong. Why? Because the foundations are Pythagorean so it’s pointless trying to get away from it. Stupid me! But in my ignorance I knew the 14 legions at Cannae do not accord with the 3:2 ratio, which is the most defining ratio governing the tribes and the legions. However, when I examined in depth the Roman command structure, only then did I realise the 14 legions conform to the other sacred Pythagorean ratio 4:3, which is the perfect fourth. The perfect fourth represents the 8:6 of the Pythagorean tetrachord 6:8:9:12 which adds up to 35 (termed harmonic 35). So the 8:6 part adds to 14, or the 14 legions. Now I married this with the Roman command structure and deducted of the 14 legions, eight legions can be designated in the centre for a breakthrough and the three legions on each flank are the flank guard legions. So the 8 legions to 6 legions when proportioned to two, equates to 4:3.
Like you I use mathematics to reconstruct what could have transpired. As Hannibal is reacting to the Roman deployment, I based the apex of the Carthaginian wedge to match the frontage of those eight legions.
I have the Romans break the apex of the wedge first (the eight legions), and then the Carthaginian flank guards. The next stage is as Livy writes the Romans:
“following up the Celts (the eight legions) and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line (the base of the triangle or the main body), which was giving way, progressed so far that they (the eight legions) now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks.
The Roman formation is now a wedge, with eight legions forward. The three legions on the flanks of the wedge are breaking through the Carthaginian flank guards and therefore, falling behind the eight legions. I believe Hannibal formed PART of his army into a wedge with the sole purpose of it being defeated and in the process the victorious Romans would end up advancing in a wedge shape. If we take the premise the hastati from the eight legions that did the break through and continued advancing, the principes and triarii of the eight legions would through their standard doctrine, keep in contact with their units of hastati. We see this doctrine not obeyed at Zama, when the principes and triarii were ordered not to advance in support of the hastati through fear of being disordered.
Those eight legions in the centre, because they were forward of the flank guard legions would have realised with the main body engaging them and the Africans now on the flanks of the army, there were in an extremely precarious position. Plutarch has the centre retire, while Appian has the left flank rout first followed by the right flank.
That’s my theory. However, I will add that although I have said the Carthaginian infantry formation was a triangle, the actual formation I have is nothing like what other historians have reconstructed. I like what I have because it makes sense of all the primary sources.
On a side note have you read Goldsworthy’s account of Cannae (Cassell and co)? Goldsworthy states that “The Romans surged forward until they were level with the starting position of the flanks of Hannibal's main line and kept going, for there was nothing to oppose them.” Here the Romans have broken through and there is nothing to stop them. Then suddenly he writes “The Libyan's charge stopped the Roman advance dead, robbing it of all momentum. There were now no organized reserves in the Roman army to feed into the combat and renew the surge forward.”
First is there is nothing to stop them, then why does Goldsworthy believe there now was no reserves to renew the surge forward? I’m really puzzled as to how the Libyan attack on the flank stopped the Roman advance dead. At the Trebia when the Romans broke through, realising they could not help the rest of the army they made their way to Placentia. They did this because there was no one facing them to stop them. But at Cannae, with Goldsworthy declaring there is nothing to stop them, they are stopped by the flank charge. Goldsworthy claims “The two phalanxes of Libyans gripped the Romans like a vice, and around them the surviving Celtic and Spanish troops, joined perhaps after a while by some of the routers, pressed round to add to the fighting line.” So we now have the whole Roman, with nothing in front of them to stop them, locked in a vice. Are they being jammed up shoulder older to shoulder along the line that is the reason they can’t move? In this scenario wouldn’t a centurion order some of his men to turn sideways and step out of this vice and give everyone else some room so they can move forward? Now in order to explain why the Romans don’t move, Goldsworthy wants us to believe those routed Celts and Spanish troops came running back to rejoin the army and add to the Romans misery.
This rather poorly understood scenario has occurred because too many historians fail to acknowledge Hannibal main line formed the base of the wedge and this main line had the same frontage as the Romans. Every time I read about the battle of Cannae by an author following the doctrine the Carthaginians deployed in a hollow lambada (every one’s doing it so it must be right), in order to make it work, they end up producing a scenario devoid of command sense.
Steven
