11-22-2013, 07:08 AM
Macedon wrote:
[i]"I would be interested to know how the course of the battle could be explained with the Romans arraying in two or even three lines in your opinions, should you support the multiple lines scenario, especially considering the length of the Roman infantry lines as opposed to that of Hannibal's, the role of the rear lines in the accounts of the three historians and the course of the battle as described by them."[/i]
Although the question is not aimed at me, I have decided to step into the fray.
I am a great supporter of Appian’s claim the Roman infantry were in three lines at Cannae as his description combined with Livy and Polybius are coherent. The first line consisted of the light infantry, the second line the hastati, and the third line, the principes and triarii. At this stage in Rome’s military development, the triarii are combined with the principes so as to give the line sufficient depth. The reason behind this is because by the time of Cannae, the emergency legion or the 5000 man legion had undergone a reform. In its early history, to increase the legion to 5000 men, extra triarii were added, termed by Livy as accensi. This practice was eventually dropped in favour of adding more principes, which accords with Polybius statement of the triarii remaining constant. Although the triarii are formed up with the principes, at Sentinum Livy mentions the last ranks being detached. These are the triarii. It will not be until Scipio’s African campaign that the triarii are once again deployed as a separate body. I believe this could be the result of the principes being rearmed with the pila. It could be that while in Spain, Scipio was influenced by the scutarii, and wanted to model the principes on them.
Macedon wrote:
[i]"When the center of Hannibal's line gave way, the accounts are clear in that the whole Roman infantry followed, funneling into the "gap". Had there been a second or a third line, it would have been possible for the Carthaginians to surround only the Hastati, since the lines of the Principes (and possibly the Triarii) would wait intact behind them. However, the Romans follow en mass and are encircled en mass. Also note that there is no mention of any retreat, relief or other type of interaction with any kind of infantry reserves."[/i]
Polybius does write the maniples were closer than normal and this can lend itself to the principes/triarii being closer to the maniples of hastati. One incident that is overlooked in many modern accounts of Cannae is Livy’s reference that the Africans ‘extended.’ Also during the last stages of the battle a tribune offers Paullus his horse so he can escape. Therefore, the Romans are not encircled en mass as there is still a way of escape. In Appian’s account it is only the last remnants that are encircled en mass and proving the most difficult to eliminate. It is at this point Appian remarks that Hannibal rode around his troops, and while encouraging them, abused them, “calling it shameful if they could not finish off this small group after their victory over the mass.” Appian (The Hannibalic War7 4 24)
There is no way Hannibal’s plan at Cannae was to encircle en mass the whole Roman infantry, especially in light of Frontinus’ comment that at the battle of Lake Trasimene, after the Romans had been enveloped, the Roman fought with greater ferocity. The ferocity of the Romans convinced Hannibal to open up his ranks to give the Romans the opportunity to escape so he could overwhelm them later without loss to his own men. Frontinus (Stratagems 2 6 4) As Livy also mentions bodies of Romans still escaping after his claim they were trapped, this would indicate an opening still remained for the Romans to escape through and take refuge in the Roman camp.
In any reconstruction of Cannae there is as lot of boxes to tick, and I feel confident I have achieved this. Polybius’ statement the maniples were much deeper than their frontage, lends itself to only one mathematical deployment possible for the Romans. Then by taking this I reconstructed the frontage of the Carthaginian line, which then accorded with Polybius’ statement the Carthaginian infantry were over 40,000 men. In fact the numbers and the depth of the Carthaginian infantry at Cannae follows the same mathematical pattern as it does at the Trebia, Illipa and Zama. I originally used the 12,000 mercenaries in Hannibal’s first line in relation to Scipio’s four legions and found a constant pattern throughout the Second Punic war for the Carthaginian infantry. The frontage I have for the Roman army (both infantry and cavalry), is the smallest ever given by a modern historian. The Romans are not doing anything ad hoc at Cannae, they are simply adhering to one of the deployment arrangements the legion is capable of doing in relation to what their organisational mathematics will permit. The frontage of a maniple at Cannae accords with the frontage of a century in the pre-maniple legion, so there is nothing new.
The plan at Cannae is for the Roman and allied cavalry to hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay so the Roman infantry can break through the Carthaginian infantry. The Roman infantry are deployed so they can achieve a break in any section of the Carthaginian line. However, for the Roman cavalry on the right wing to hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay so the infantry can achieve the break through, the Roman cavalry is deployed six squadrons deep. The first three lines of squadrons will work on a time basis in combination with the light armed infantry and the hastati. If the hastati do not make the break through, when they are withdrawn, the first three lines of squadrons are replaced by the remaining three lines of squadrons, who will hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay, while the principes/triarii breaks the Carthaginian line. The allied cavalry on the left wing are also deployed many squadrons deep. However, on this front the allied cavalry and the Carthaginian cavalry seem to have been ordered not to be aggressive. This would have suited Hannibal because there are many references of the Roman and allied cavalry being able to defeat the Numidian cavalry.
If you read Livy and Polybius they have the Roman cavalry being defeated while the Roman light infantry are skirmishing. So much for the Roman cavalry giving the infantry the time they needed. It is at this point when the Roman cavalry are routed that the light infantry are recalled. At this point in time, Paullus knew it was now a race against time. And I believe with the complete collapse of the Roman cavalry in such a short amount of time, Paullus must have been shattered and deeply concerned. In my study of Cannae, even after the Africans extend, they still cannot encircle the Roman infantry. A lot more Roman infantry has to die or flee before the Africans can encircle the remnants.
So in a nutshell, I lay the blame for the defeat of the Romans at Cannae squarely with the Roman cavalry.
Steven
PS: Sorry for not bolding or Italic original questions but the BBC code editor will not load, and the colour of the topic bars are now blue instead of red.
[i]"I would be interested to know how the course of the battle could be explained with the Romans arraying in two or even three lines in your opinions, should you support the multiple lines scenario, especially considering the length of the Roman infantry lines as opposed to that of Hannibal's, the role of the rear lines in the accounts of the three historians and the course of the battle as described by them."[/i]
Although the question is not aimed at me, I have decided to step into the fray.
I am a great supporter of Appian’s claim the Roman infantry were in three lines at Cannae as his description combined with Livy and Polybius are coherent. The first line consisted of the light infantry, the second line the hastati, and the third line, the principes and triarii. At this stage in Rome’s military development, the triarii are combined with the principes so as to give the line sufficient depth. The reason behind this is because by the time of Cannae, the emergency legion or the 5000 man legion had undergone a reform. In its early history, to increase the legion to 5000 men, extra triarii were added, termed by Livy as accensi. This practice was eventually dropped in favour of adding more principes, which accords with Polybius statement of the triarii remaining constant. Although the triarii are formed up with the principes, at Sentinum Livy mentions the last ranks being detached. These are the triarii. It will not be until Scipio’s African campaign that the triarii are once again deployed as a separate body. I believe this could be the result of the principes being rearmed with the pila. It could be that while in Spain, Scipio was influenced by the scutarii, and wanted to model the principes on them.
Macedon wrote:
[i]"When the center of Hannibal's line gave way, the accounts are clear in that the whole Roman infantry followed, funneling into the "gap". Had there been a second or a third line, it would have been possible for the Carthaginians to surround only the Hastati, since the lines of the Principes (and possibly the Triarii) would wait intact behind them. However, the Romans follow en mass and are encircled en mass. Also note that there is no mention of any retreat, relief or other type of interaction with any kind of infantry reserves."[/i]
Polybius does write the maniples were closer than normal and this can lend itself to the principes/triarii being closer to the maniples of hastati. One incident that is overlooked in many modern accounts of Cannae is Livy’s reference that the Africans ‘extended.’ Also during the last stages of the battle a tribune offers Paullus his horse so he can escape. Therefore, the Romans are not encircled en mass as there is still a way of escape. In Appian’s account it is only the last remnants that are encircled en mass and proving the most difficult to eliminate. It is at this point Appian remarks that Hannibal rode around his troops, and while encouraging them, abused them, “calling it shameful if they could not finish off this small group after their victory over the mass.” Appian (The Hannibalic War7 4 24)
There is no way Hannibal’s plan at Cannae was to encircle en mass the whole Roman infantry, especially in light of Frontinus’ comment that at the battle of Lake Trasimene, after the Romans had been enveloped, the Roman fought with greater ferocity. The ferocity of the Romans convinced Hannibal to open up his ranks to give the Romans the opportunity to escape so he could overwhelm them later without loss to his own men. Frontinus (Stratagems 2 6 4) As Livy also mentions bodies of Romans still escaping after his claim they were trapped, this would indicate an opening still remained for the Romans to escape through and take refuge in the Roman camp.
In any reconstruction of Cannae there is as lot of boxes to tick, and I feel confident I have achieved this. Polybius’ statement the maniples were much deeper than their frontage, lends itself to only one mathematical deployment possible for the Romans. Then by taking this I reconstructed the frontage of the Carthaginian line, which then accorded with Polybius’ statement the Carthaginian infantry were over 40,000 men. In fact the numbers and the depth of the Carthaginian infantry at Cannae follows the same mathematical pattern as it does at the Trebia, Illipa and Zama. I originally used the 12,000 mercenaries in Hannibal’s first line in relation to Scipio’s four legions and found a constant pattern throughout the Second Punic war for the Carthaginian infantry. The frontage I have for the Roman army (both infantry and cavalry), is the smallest ever given by a modern historian. The Romans are not doing anything ad hoc at Cannae, they are simply adhering to one of the deployment arrangements the legion is capable of doing in relation to what their organisational mathematics will permit. The frontage of a maniple at Cannae accords with the frontage of a century in the pre-maniple legion, so there is nothing new.
The plan at Cannae is for the Roman and allied cavalry to hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay so the Roman infantry can break through the Carthaginian infantry. The Roman infantry are deployed so they can achieve a break in any section of the Carthaginian line. However, for the Roman cavalry on the right wing to hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay so the infantry can achieve the break through, the Roman cavalry is deployed six squadrons deep. The first three lines of squadrons will work on a time basis in combination with the light armed infantry and the hastati. If the hastati do not make the break through, when they are withdrawn, the first three lines of squadrons are replaced by the remaining three lines of squadrons, who will hold the Carthaginian cavalry at bay, while the principes/triarii breaks the Carthaginian line. The allied cavalry on the left wing are also deployed many squadrons deep. However, on this front the allied cavalry and the Carthaginian cavalry seem to have been ordered not to be aggressive. This would have suited Hannibal because there are many references of the Roman and allied cavalry being able to defeat the Numidian cavalry.
If you read Livy and Polybius they have the Roman cavalry being defeated while the Roman light infantry are skirmishing. So much for the Roman cavalry giving the infantry the time they needed. It is at this point when the Roman cavalry are routed that the light infantry are recalled. At this point in time, Paullus knew it was now a race against time. And I believe with the complete collapse of the Roman cavalry in such a short amount of time, Paullus must have been shattered and deeply concerned. In my study of Cannae, even after the Africans extend, they still cannot encircle the Roman infantry. A lot more Roman infantry has to die or flee before the Africans can encircle the remnants.
So in a nutshell, I lay the blame for the defeat of the Romans at Cannae squarely with the Roman cavalry.
Steven
PS: Sorry for not bolding or Italic original questions but the BBC code editor will not load, and the colour of the topic bars are now blue instead of red.
