11-15-2013, 07:21 PM
In my opinion, it is not a good approach to easily dismiss the choices of the ancients, even of those we do not appreciate as much as a Scipio. The Ofanto could not have been used as a barrier for many reasons. It is a rather small river, with a low flow and the battle took place in summer, so most probably, the river was everywhere very easily fordable. It also is a classic Mediterranean river, Short and meandering, so it creates pockets that would cause problems should the Roman phalanx try to advance with its right wing resting on it.
I also have to point out the fact that the Romans did not deploy in their regular fashion. Their battle-plan was adapted to fit the situation and this proves that they did try to improvise. They did not fight in three lines as they usually did but in a single deep phalanx. The tactical reason for such a choice is usually that the enemy is considered superior in cavalry and/or light infantry and added depth facilitates a quick advance because it decreases the risk of losing cohesion and order during the charge (that is the approach to the enemy). It is logical that the Romans expected the Carthaginians to place their confidence in their cavalry as they had done before and therefore wished to decide the battle by a quick infantry clash, afraid that the enemy would try the exact opposite, that is to delay the infantry clash as long as possible. Therefore, their greatest fear being that they might lose their cavalry support before their infantry had won the day, they allocated extra depth to the legions which allowed them to rush towards the enemy with a higher probability of retaining their ranks. Hannibal of course expected that and used a counter-plan, which was not something new, he already had defeated the Romans in exact the same manner before, but as already and correctly mentioned by others than me here, he exploited the Roman psychology. Instead of delaying the infantry clash, he drew the Romans into a sham victory. The reason why he did so was that should the Romans despair too soon -Hannibal could have made sure that his infantry had ample space to retreat or could even make for the hills- they would have themselves retreated with losses that would not have been catalytic and at the time, a war of attrition was not to his advantage. So, he needed to pin the Romans, which was only possible with risking it all by allowing his infantry to engage the Romans.
I also have to point out the fact that the Romans did not deploy in their regular fashion. Their battle-plan was adapted to fit the situation and this proves that they did try to improvise. They did not fight in three lines as they usually did but in a single deep phalanx. The tactical reason for such a choice is usually that the enemy is considered superior in cavalry and/or light infantry and added depth facilitates a quick advance because it decreases the risk of losing cohesion and order during the charge (that is the approach to the enemy). It is logical that the Romans expected the Carthaginians to place their confidence in their cavalry as they had done before and therefore wished to decide the battle by a quick infantry clash, afraid that the enemy would try the exact opposite, that is to delay the infantry clash as long as possible. Therefore, their greatest fear being that they might lose their cavalry support before their infantry had won the day, they allocated extra depth to the legions which allowed them to rush towards the enemy with a higher probability of retaining their ranks. Hannibal of course expected that and used a counter-plan, which was not something new, he already had defeated the Romans in exact the same manner before, but as already and correctly mentioned by others than me here, he exploited the Roman psychology. Instead of delaying the infantry clash, he drew the Romans into a sham victory. The reason why he did so was that should the Romans despair too soon -Hannibal could have made sure that his infantry had ample space to retreat or could even make for the hills- they would have themselves retreated with losses that would not have been catalytic and at the time, a war of attrition was not to his advantage. So, he needed to pin the Romans, which was only possible with risking it all by allowing his infantry to engage the Romans.
