02-21-2013, 10:40 PM
2nd page
Countless battles and yet very few, if any, and sadly debatable incidents of something that had to be standard tactics, the first option for any general with adequate cavalry. The absence of clear descriptions of such action, coupled with the lack of any (with very few notable exceptions I have mentioned regarding the Byzantine cataphracts) advice or instruction in the many tactical manuals that have survived, manuals depicting the methods and tactics of armies who mostly relied on cavalry rather than on infantry clearly show that for any reason (maybe they just hadn't discovered the method in which a horse should be trained yet) this was not, at least for them, a tactic that was normally used. To be frank, they were much more afraid of cavalry with bows. Not until later, were head on cavalry charges considered a real danger in the descriptions of battles against Latins (Normans/Franks etc), when the Byzantine infantry was of a very low quality, their might resting mainly on their "elite" squads and the mercenaries. Again, descriptions do not give a picture of men being thrown into the air, trampled underfoot, files crushed under the force of a galloping charger but there is contact and usually an immediate general rout of the infantry. As the Byzantines kept saying, only the Norman first charge was deemed "irresistable". Then they were "easy" to deal with. And emperor Alexios Comnenos, after much studying of "the ancient texts" he finally devised a formation that was unbeatable by the Turkish cavalry... some form of plaesion (square) of infantry to protect the cavalry and baggage inside. Anyways, maybe the Normans invented the training that would allow warhorses to charge as suggested, or maybe not, maybe they did charge but their charge, as I proposed, exploited fails in morale and order. Had each charge at Hastings been like that, then soon enough, there would be no Saxon untrampled in this shieldwall or no horse standing. What is proposed is a model in which only two things can happen :
1. The infantry is trampled by the horses as they simply gallop over them, bodies flying around, demolished into the ground. Cavalry totally prevails, no way to deal with this threat effectively unless, maybe by using extra long pikes... (maybe the author of this model somwhere brings weaponry also in as a factor)
2. The first horse someplace along the file (actually in fragments of a second) stops because of the resistance met and not because of the halting attempt of its rider who had to keep urging it on. The horse is also crushed from the collision and its rider will probably just fly over the rest of the files as the cavalry ranks after it each falls on the one in front, like cars crushing in the highway one into another.
So, how does that explain the multiple charges attested by the sources? Either most of the infantry are crushed or most of the horses are injured. How did they turn about, ride to a proper distance, regroup and recharge? How did the infantry stand up, reform and re-experience the same effect, how many would be able to stand up, when they should not be enough left to reform in line? Why would they charge in more than a single line, maybe two just to be sure?
In my opinion, something is very wrong with such models of extreme violence. They do not conform with any account we have regarding battles or tactics thereof, the attested tactical deployment of cavalry, the numbers of casualties reported etc.
However, it would be nice to be confronted with ancient an medieval examples of such debatable instances, preferably before gunpowder changed battle-field tactics, so that we can see how common they were.
And if this "model" is correct, then what use where slow or immobile squares against cavalry? A square uses 4 times more men than a line of the same width with 1/4 the firepower. So, why not just form a line with no gaps, in essence a phalanx and keep full firepower? Or why not make what the ancients called amphistomos lines, half men looking to the front and half to the rear. In this way, the formation is again secure and the firepower only halved. Why would cavalry ride around the squares and not, as a standard tactic, just concentrate on the front part of each square? Once they were past it (sometimes 2 (!!!!), other times 4 deep), they would fall on the rest 3/4 of men from the rear effectively slaughtering them. This model makes absolutely no sense in a tactical sense. Maybe, if the horse was a robot on wheels then it would really explain the physics involved adequately, but they are not, they are animals, they get agitated, they feel fear, pain and once they learned that what they are being taught to do is painful, they are not as eager to do it again. Of course there will be examples of such charges, the question is were they the norm? And if not, why? And if conditionally yes, under what conditions?
Countless battles and yet very few, if any, and sadly debatable incidents of something that had to be standard tactics, the first option for any general with adequate cavalry. The absence of clear descriptions of such action, coupled with the lack of any (with very few notable exceptions I have mentioned regarding the Byzantine cataphracts) advice or instruction in the many tactical manuals that have survived, manuals depicting the methods and tactics of armies who mostly relied on cavalry rather than on infantry clearly show that for any reason (maybe they just hadn't discovered the method in which a horse should be trained yet) this was not, at least for them, a tactic that was normally used. To be frank, they were much more afraid of cavalry with bows. Not until later, were head on cavalry charges considered a real danger in the descriptions of battles against Latins (Normans/Franks etc), when the Byzantine infantry was of a very low quality, their might resting mainly on their "elite" squads and the mercenaries. Again, descriptions do not give a picture of men being thrown into the air, trampled underfoot, files crushed under the force of a galloping charger but there is contact and usually an immediate general rout of the infantry. As the Byzantines kept saying, only the Norman first charge was deemed "irresistable". Then they were "easy" to deal with. And emperor Alexios Comnenos, after much studying of "the ancient texts" he finally devised a formation that was unbeatable by the Turkish cavalry... some form of plaesion (square) of infantry to protect the cavalry and baggage inside. Anyways, maybe the Normans invented the training that would allow warhorses to charge as suggested, or maybe not, maybe they did charge but their charge, as I proposed, exploited fails in morale and order. Had each charge at Hastings been like that, then soon enough, there would be no Saxon untrampled in this shieldwall or no horse standing. What is proposed is a model in which only two things can happen :
1. The infantry is trampled by the horses as they simply gallop over them, bodies flying around, demolished into the ground. Cavalry totally prevails, no way to deal with this threat effectively unless, maybe by using extra long pikes... (maybe the author of this model somwhere brings weaponry also in as a factor)
2. The first horse someplace along the file (actually in fragments of a second) stops because of the resistance met and not because of the halting attempt of its rider who had to keep urging it on. The horse is also crushed from the collision and its rider will probably just fly over the rest of the files as the cavalry ranks after it each falls on the one in front, like cars crushing in the highway one into another.
So, how does that explain the multiple charges attested by the sources? Either most of the infantry are crushed or most of the horses are injured. How did they turn about, ride to a proper distance, regroup and recharge? How did the infantry stand up, reform and re-experience the same effect, how many would be able to stand up, when they should not be enough left to reform in line? Why would they charge in more than a single line, maybe two just to be sure?
In my opinion, something is very wrong with such models of extreme violence. They do not conform with any account we have regarding battles or tactics thereof, the attested tactical deployment of cavalry, the numbers of casualties reported etc.
However, it would be nice to be confronted with ancient an medieval examples of such debatable instances, preferably before gunpowder changed battle-field tactics, so that we can see how common they were.
And if this "model" is correct, then what use where slow or immobile squares against cavalry? A square uses 4 times more men than a line of the same width with 1/4 the firepower. So, why not just form a line with no gaps, in essence a phalanx and keep full firepower? Or why not make what the ancients called amphistomos lines, half men looking to the front and half to the rear. In this way, the formation is again secure and the firepower only halved. Why would cavalry ride around the squares and not, as a standard tactic, just concentrate on the front part of each square? Once they were past it (sometimes 2 (!!!!), other times 4 deep), they would fall on the rest 3/4 of men from the rear effectively slaughtering them. This model makes absolutely no sense in a tactical sense. Maybe, if the horse was a robot on wheels then it would really explain the physics involved adequately, but they are not, they are animals, they get agitated, they feel fear, pain and once they learned that what they are being taught to do is painful, they are not as eager to do it again. Of course there will be examples of such charges, the question is were they the norm? And if not, why? And if conditionally yes, under what conditions?
