Cavalry and chariots against infantry

[Domen]

I don't suggest counting a entire battle as one data point, unless it is a small skirmish, instead taking individual actions out of each battle account, and only counting those actions which refer to infantry units against cavalry or cavalry units against infantry, as opposed to the mixed ones.

Even if you take individual actions, they were often carried out by combined arms rather than by just cavalry or just infantry. Often cavalry could not win without infantry support - and inversely.

At Vienna in 1683 it was infantry and engineers who inundated Ottoman trenches, removed anti-cavalry obstacles from the foreground and prepared the ground for the subsequent, decisive shock cavalry charge (spearheaded by Polish husaria). Without hard work of those engineers and infantry, terrain would not be suitable for such a massive cavalry charge (one of the biggest charges in history).

Apart from numbers also terrain (whether favourable for cavalry or for infantry) and presence or lack of field fortifications and anti-cavalry obstacles should be taken into account.

Western historiography often does not bother to mention such conditions. In many battles which are given as textbook examples of infantry beating off cavalry, they were the most important factors:

Bannockburn - swampy terrain + cavalry was attacked by infantry shiltroms while crossing a river (before it could reform into a battle array and carry out an organized charge or fight in an organized way).

Crecy - the English had prepared in advance strong defensive positions, surrounded by palisades, ditches, wires and pitfalls. In front of their positions also Krähenfuß (caltrops) were scattered:

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kr%C3%A4henfu%C3%9F

Caltrop:



Courtrai - infantry formation was protected by 2 streams (Groeninge Beek & Grote Bek) 2,5-3 m wide and 1,5 m deep each, with swampy banks. On eastern banks of both streams infantry digged numerous pitfalls before the battle, which were concealed with branches & ground. Also ditches were digged. Some of them were filled with water from the Lys river (so they turned into moats). Left wing of infantry position was further protected by stone walls of the Groeninge monastery & right flank was covered by Lage Vijver (moat of the town of Courtrai). Behind the Flamand formation was the river, so attack from the rear was impossible (but so was retreat in case of failure).

Infantry was deployed close enough behind Groeninge Beek & Grote Bek so that cavalry - after crossing these streams - was not able to reform and carry out organized charge again (not enough space).

Courtrai was thus hardly an open field, pitched battle (just like Crecy). It was defence in prepared position with numerous both natural & man-made obstacles protecting infantry. Yet cavalry lost only ca. 700 casualties in this battle (while it carried out multiple charges vs a strong force numbering thousands of infantry) - which shows that charging even such a mighty fortification was not suicidal.

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As you can see the above given examples of Crecy or Courtrai, were hardly examples of pitched battles in the open field. In both those battles infantry defences were strengthened by sophisticated and extensive earthworks, field fortifications, obstacles, traps, etc. - prepared in advance before the battles (and it surely took long time and a lot of effort to prepare such defensive works).

And infantry vs cavalry clash at Bannockburn, was also not an example of an organized clash in the open field, but rather an unexpected assault or ambush of infantry against unprepared cavalrymen who were during the process of crossing the river, in swampy terrain unfavourable for cavalry.

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Regarding the tactics of Late Medieval cavalry.

In the 15th century (and also already since at least the 2nd half of the 14th century) cavalry in Central and Eastern Europe was organized in mixed units consisting of both heavy shock cavalry, and missile support cavalry. The former ones were called lancers, the latter ones - shooters.

Those mixed units of lancers and shooters, often fought in wedge-column formations.

Two detailed examples of units (banners) deployed in wedge-column formations are provided by Albrecht Achilles in his "Unterricht" ("Instructions") from 1477 (a Brandenburgian source).

According to Achilles - a 400 strong unit (banner) in a wedge-column formation looked like this - at the front, there was a wedge numbering 5 rows. In the 1st row of a wedge there were just 3 horsemen, in the 2nd row - 5, then 7, 9 and 11. In total a wedge consisted of 35 horsemen. In the last row of a wedge, there was a standard-bearer who carried the unit's flag (aka banner). Behind the wedge the rest of the unit was deployed in a column with 33 rows, 11 horsemen in each row:



Wedge of each banner always consisted of the best lancers with heaviest armor and best close-combat equipment. Column consisted of lighter shooters (in its central part) and remaining heavy lancers (on both sides). So lighter troops were protected from all sides by heavier troops. Shooters could attack enemy from distance using their crossbows even when unit was on the move (shooting above heads of lancers in front of them using the technique of clout shooting aka shower shooting). Best-equipped & armored horsemen from the wedge were the striking power, shock power of a banner in charge and in melee. So units deployed in a wedge-column formation, while charging the enemy, were relying on: a) firepower of crossbows from the center of its formation to "soften" enemy units with their fire before the clash, and on: b) striking power of heavy lancers, mainly those finest ones from the wedge.

Wedge-column formation was most likely used by both Polish and Teutonic armies in the battle of Grunwald 1410. A translated excerpt from the book "Grunwald 1410" by Andrzej Nadolski, page 75:

"(...) We have many sources indicating that a wedge-column formation was indeed applied, both by Teutonic and Polish-Lithuanian army. Jan Dlugosz in his account of the battle of Grunwald mentions on the Polish side so called "ahead-banner" knights ("antesignani"), undoubtedly referring to those elite lancers deployed "in a wedge", so standing in front of a banner ("ante signum"), which was placed in the last row of a wedge or maybe even in the first row of a column. We also know, that in the first line of the Krakow banner there were only 9, of the Goncza banner - 5, and of the Court banner - 4 knights, which proves, that those banners must have been deployed in deep formations and which precisely corresponds to the detailed description of Brandenburgian banners quoted above. Also in Lithuanian banners "in the middle stood warriors on smaller horses and worse armed, who were surrounded by others on better horses and better armed." Individual banners were keeping the density of their formation, but between one and another banner usually considerable interspace was maintained. Finally Teutonic sources describing wartime operations in 1409 mention a knight named Janke Błock, who "died fighting in a Spitz". From other sources we know, that in Medieval German military terminology "spitz" ("Spitz") was a term used to name a wedge preceding a column of a banner. (...)"

Term "banner" was used to describe both a flag (a standard), and a unit (usually few hundred men).

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Coming back to Medieval victories of infantry over cavalry:

Another Medieval example of infantry defeating cavalry - is the forgotten battle of the Rondsen Lake (Polish: Jezioro Rządzkie; German: Rondesner See) in 1243.

In that battle the army of the Polish duchy of Gdansk supported by Prussian-Lithuanian reinforcements, under command of Duke of Gdansk Świętopełk II, defeated the army of the Teutonic Order under Marschall Berlewin von Freiberg.

Świętopełk used light infantry of his Prussian-Lithuanian allies to lure Teutonic cavalry into his hidden main body of infantry. Teutonic cavalry charged & routed his Prussian-Lithuanian allied infantry (it was a faked retreat though) but then fell right into his hidden troops (in a forest) and got defeated.

Order's Marschall Berlewin von Freiberg, former Order's Marschall Dietrich von Bernheim and as many as 400 Teutonic soldiers were killed in this battle.

However - as you can read above - it was also not an open-field, regular battle, but once again surprise effect, deceit, ambush and favourable terrain decided the outcome.

A similar tactics (luring cavalry into hidden infantry) was used by Germanic forces in the battle of Strasbourg in 357 AD against Roman clibanarii. Germanic infantry was hidden in long grass between Germanic cavalry - clibanarii charged Germanic cavalry and were repulsed by that cavalry with support of ambush of Germanic spearmen hidden between the ranks of their cavalry.