Cavalry and chariots against infantry

[Sean Manning]

Sean Manning wrote:

Not quite. I think that it was usually a bad idea for cavalry to charge into the front of a dense mass of infantry which did not start to run away or part to let them through as they approached. But I believe that this was a regular part of the tactical repertoire of armoured cavalry (or scythed chariots) in many places and times, and that it was not suicidal or doomed. And in the case of scythed chariots, a few dozen dead chariot horses and a dozen dead charioteers would be a good trade for winning a battle between tens of thousands of soldiers ...

I hope you do not mind me saying so, but you are contradicting yourself. It is not a good idea, but nevertheless the regular part of the tactical repertoire of armoured cavalry (or scythed chariots) in many places and times.

That is only a contradiction if you assume that soldiers only use wise tactics. I see nothing to justify that assumption in the last five thousand years of military history! One might compare how soldiers towards the end of the Cold War prepared for a style of warfare which all the experts told them would kill them within a week or two and probably end civilization. Or see De Vries' Infantry Warfare where he documents how in early 14th century Latin Christendom, cavalry attacks on a standing infantry army usually ended in disaster for the attacker. But because battles were rare, and horsemen arrogant, it took decades for this to be generally acknowledged by Latin soldiers. Usually, after an especially big disaster the soldiers in one country changed their tactics, at least against the enemy which had defeated them.

And it is not suicidal and doomed, but if it was suicidal, oh well, than it was a good idea anyway, because who cares about a couple of suicidal maniacs and their suicidal horses when the outcome of battle between such large numbers are involved?

Respectfully, Eduard, that is a straw man. Suggesting that scythed chariots would probably suffer heavy casualties in an attack on infantry who did not run away or part as they approached is not the same as saying that such an attack was suicidal. And it is very easy to find examples of soldiers who accepted duties which could potentially put them in a situation where they would probably die!

I suspect the maniacs themselves cared. What made them do it? I keep on asking this, what made the horseman throw his pony on the spears of the infantry? I think we have become so innured to the horrors of total war that we automatically assume that soldiers went to war to be massacred, but is it true? And even if it is, and the ancient and medieval warriors sacrifised themselves willingly for whatever reason they might have had, ideology, religion, whatever, what made their horses suicidal? Did those armies really train such expensive soldiers as horsemen and charioteers for kamikaze against lowly infantry? It simply does not make sense.

Eduard, you keep repeating things like "throw his pony on the spears" and assuming that such attacks were suicidal for the cavalry horses and riders. I suggest that the first step is to write battle narratives at the traditional big-picture level, and then to perform a Face of Battle analysis of the mechanics of these big events to understand how they could have worked. The high-level analysis tells us things like "at the Battle of the Standard, King David and his cavalry passed right through the line of English spearmen, axemen, and bowmen" then the Face of Battle analysis obliges us to figure out how that was done. The second stage is very difficult and requires us to read the sources carefully and consider what they brush over and how what they describe could have worked, not to reject them based on assumptions about how something which no living man has seen worked. I have a few tentative ideas, but I will need more thought and more reading of the early sources before I am willing to put them in public.