02-18-2013, 10:44 AM
Thanks.
I mentioned Nosworthy's With Musket Cannon and Sword already, and going over it, I misremembered some things.
He emphasizes both the morale effect and the intense shaking that a cavalry charge could inflict on infantry. (p. 311) both of which made it difficult to use muskets against cavalry. (p. 311) (and might have made it difficult to use weapons on either side?)
He emphasizes that musket-armed infantry could get one good shot against charging cavalry. (p. 312) Although they technically had time for several shots, the first would be the best volley, and would be wasted if fired at extreme range. Because horses wounded by bullets could be unpredictable and would not necessarily shy away from the bayonets, he explains that the infantry tried to fire at 30 English paces, 75 feet, not closer. (p. 315) I may have overestimated the reluctance to fire at shorter ranges though, I don't know. I can't find any reference to the use of carbines against infantry, it looks like I misremembered something, and I had assumed that something must be keeping the infantry from firing on account of it.
He notes that horses wounded by bayonets tended to back off, while horses wounded by bullets were unpredictable. (p. 313) He discusses the tactic of forcing the horses to rear and fall onto the infantry's bayonets. (p. 315) which apparently involved riding almost to the infantry and then backing. I don't have the riding experience to understand this or to judge how difficult it was.
He discusses wave and echelon attacks, as well as the use of low-lying ground to conceal the cavalry's approach. (pp. 315 to 319)
And there is some controversy over the relative effectiveness of cavalry against formed infantry even in the Napoleonic era, when we have relatively more documentation, in addition to the controversy over whether the switch to the musket and bayonet made infantry more vulnerable or less vulnerable to cavalry.
I mentioned Nosworthy's With Musket Cannon and Sword already, and going over it, I misremembered some things.
He emphasizes both the morale effect and the intense shaking that a cavalry charge could inflict on infantry. (p. 311) both of which made it difficult to use muskets against cavalry. (p. 311) (and might have made it difficult to use weapons on either side?)
He emphasizes that musket-armed infantry could get one good shot against charging cavalry. (p. 312) Although they technically had time for several shots, the first would be the best volley, and would be wasted if fired at extreme range. Because horses wounded by bullets could be unpredictable and would not necessarily shy away from the bayonets, he explains that the infantry tried to fire at 30 English paces, 75 feet, not closer. (p. 315) I may have overestimated the reluctance to fire at shorter ranges though, I don't know. I can't find any reference to the use of carbines against infantry, it looks like I misremembered something, and I had assumed that something must be keeping the infantry from firing on account of it.
He notes that horses wounded by bayonets tended to back off, while horses wounded by bullets were unpredictable. (p. 313) He discusses the tactic of forcing the horses to rear and fall onto the infantry's bayonets. (p. 315) which apparently involved riding almost to the infantry and then backing. I don't have the riding experience to understand this or to judge how difficult it was.
He discusses wave and echelon attacks, as well as the use of low-lying ground to conceal the cavalry's approach. (pp. 315 to 319)
And there is some controversy over the relative effectiveness of cavalry against formed infantry even in the Napoleonic era, when we have relatively more documentation, in addition to the controversy over whether the switch to the musket and bayonet made infantry more vulnerable or less vulnerable to cavalry.
