The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[Frostwulf]

@Nathan Ross
Sorry for my late reply, but life gets in the way :-)

It should be said that we have no actual evidence of the composition of the force that Fuscus led into Dacia, except that it apparently included units of the praetorian guard. Neither do we know for sure that an entire legion was lost. Tacitus (Agricola 41.2) mentions 'so many armies lost through the rashness of their commanders', which is vague. Dio (68.9.3) mentions a single standard (not an eagle) recovered by Trajan (although I seem to remember the Column shows an eagle...). Suetonius mentions a legion lost to the Sarmatians c.92, but nothing about one lost to the Dacians earlier.

Placing V Alaudae in Moesia, or in Fuscus's army, might seem convenient but is not necessary. It still remains very possible that were destroyed or disbanded after 69/70 (Ritterling and Brian Jones believe so, among others). IIII Flavia were likely still based in Dalmatia until c.86. Fuscus's force most likely involved elements of the legions of the still-united Moesia: VII Claudia, V Macedonica and I Italica, perhaps with vexillations from elsewhere.

I will not disagree with what your saying, much of conjecture on the parts of historians. That being said there can be ways of reasonably determining which units may have been used, as you have done. Regardless it seems very unlikely that much if any over two legions were used by Fuscus because of the arrangements in the area. Blanchard has his reasoning:

Fuscus had two options for the 86 CE campaign. He could advance immediately with the VII Claudia and V Alaude or wait for the millarian cohorts from the I Italica and the V Macedonia to reinforce his column. Stationed at Oescus, the V Macedonia some 325 km away and the I Italica was stationed at Novae some 400 km away. It would take perhaps six to seven weeks, without any complications to mobilize the millarian cohorts from these legions and march them to Viminacium. The effectiveness of both of these legions was doubtful given that both were responsible for the demoralizing and disgraceful defeat in 84 CE and had campaigned aggressively with Fuscus in 85 CE. Perhaps by 86 CE elements of the I Adiutrix and the IIII Flavia were available to participate in the campaign of Fuscus. The arrival of the II Adiutrix in Moesia did not occur until after the Fuscus’ campaign. However, the IIII Flavia was engaged in the construction of a fortress near the Pannonian border at Singidunum and the I Adiutrix reinforced the dangerously undermanned Pannonian limes and was stationed at Brigetio. These legions may well have provided Fuscus vexillations, but certainly neither legion participated in the upcoming campaign with its full compliment.
Fuscus had two options for the 86 CE campaign. He could advance immediately with the VII Claudia and V Alaude or wait for the millarian cohorts from the I Italica and the V Macedonia to reinforce his column. Stationed at Oescus, the V Macedonia some 325 km away and the I Italica was stationed at Novae some 400 km away. It would take perhaps six to seven weeks, without any complications to mobilize the millarian cohorts from these legions and march them to Viminacium. The effectiveness of both of these legions was doubtful given that both were responsible for the demoralizing and disgraceful defeat in 84 CE and had campaigned aggressively with Fuscus in 85 CE. Perhaps by 86 CE elements of the I Adiutrix and the IIII Flavia were available to participate in the campaign of Fuscus. The arrival of the II Adiutrix in Moesia did not occur until after the Fuscus’ campaign. However, the IIII Flavia was engaged in the construction of a fortress near the Pannonian border at Singidunum and the I Adiutrix reinforced the dangerously undermanned Pannonian limes and was stationed at Brigetio. These legions may well have provided Fuscus vexillations, but certainly neither legion participated in the upcoming campaign with its full compliment.

Perhaps. Alternatively, perhaps both expeditions - Fuscus and Julianus - were intended as punitive campaigns, rather than attempts at conquest. Domitian himself accompanied neither force, which he may well have done if he expected the complete subjegation of Dacia. But we will never know for sure...

Once again I will agree with you that this could be a possibility, but it seems more likely that more was involved:

Despite the derision of contemporary observers, all writing after the fact, it is clear that Domitian’s Suebic-Sarmatic wars were the necessary preliminaries to an intended military settlement of the Dacian problem. And such a settlement was required, to avenge the defeats of Sabinus and Fuscus and to escape the crippling subsidies agreed with Decebalus for his neutrality after the debacle of 89, which included large sums of money ‘as well as artisans of every trade pertaining to both peace and war’. In the event, Domitians never resumed hostilities against the Dacians, perhaps because intermittent warfare with the Suebi continued for another five years. Pg.31

The victory at Tapae was not followed up by occupation and annexation of Dacian territory. This may never have been part of Domitian’s plan, but even if it had been there was a hiatus at this stage of the Danubian wars. It is suggested that the preparations were under way at the end of 88 for the continuation of the war in 89, but before the army could take the field, or the Emperor himself could take any action, he had to deal with the revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany. Pg.101