The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[Frostwulf]

Hmm, from where do you get this ambush part? Sabinus was killed during battles in Roman province Moesia, and Fuscus was maybe "surprised" by the arrangement of Dacian battle formations, because is hard tot alk about an ambush against 5-6 legions + auxiliar troops.
The very few writings preserved today talk about battles, not ambushes, and about "lost legions" and they even talk about "keeping silence about the number of slains" suffered by Romans

For the surprise:

At the end of 85 or the beginning of 86 AD,[1] the Dacian king Duras ordered his troops to attack the Roman province of Moesia on the southern course of the Danube river. The Dacian army was led by Diurpaneus, the later king Decebalus.[2] It seems that Romans were caught by surprise, since the governor Oppius Sabinus and a legion, probably the V Alaudae, were annihilated.[1]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domitian%27s_Dacian_War
And this:

It would seem that the outbreak of the Dacian war took the Romans by surprise. The first attack on Moesia at the end of 85 or the beginning of 86 was so unexpected that the governor, Oppius Sabinus, together with a legion, probably V Alaulade, was defeated. Pg.82

Perhaps it was meant another way, but that is the way I took it.

For Fuscus and surprise:
http://www.ancientlibrary.com/smith-bio/1300.html
see pg. 192
http://books.google.ro/books?id=swDMiX4_...&q&f=false
see pg. 11

In the same year (86), after the initial success against Dacians, Cornelius Fuscus crossed the Danube. However, his army was ambushed and destroyed while Fuscus himself died in the battle.[3] According to E.T. Salmon and other historians, this was the battle where Legio V Alaudae was annihilated.[6] At any case, this legion subsequently disappeared from the Roman army list.[4]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domitian%27s_Dacian_War

As far as Fuscus and 5-6 legions see same wikipedia article and those addressed, and this:

Perhaps flushed with his recent victory, the desire for further glory and the need to challenge Decebalus in battle pushed Fuscus to adopt the bolder course of action. To postpone battle would only delay the inevitable and permit Decebalus and his army to grow stronger. Fuscus assembled the V Alaude and the VII Claudia with perhaps the millarian cohorts of the IIII Flavia and I Adiutrix legions. To this force was added a small collection of auxilia. Evidence for auxilia in Dacia prior to 93 CE was scant given that most auxiliary units were transferred to Moesia only after the destruction of the XXI Rapax in 92 CE. Most of the auxilia in Moesia during Fuscus command served in the fort system in Dobrogea. Given the scarcity of auxilia Fuscus placed the V Alaude reinforced with the millarian cohorts of the IIII Flavia and I Adiutrix legions at the forefront of the column.

This is not 5-6 legions but maybe over 2, maybe considering the casualties these legions took.

Ceaser himself (which was governor of Iliria) prefered to close his eyes over that and turn around and go for an easier prey, the Gauls and Germans/Suebi of Ariovist

Or what all the historians I read say, that the Helvetii provided opportunity first, thereby preventing Caesars crushing of Dacia. You say he was afraid, yet he made preparations for their destruction right after the civil war.

1- where is said that? Marcomani was Roman clients back then and Domitian had some war against Chatti as far as i know, years before wars with Dacians. By the time of Dacian attack Romans was on the way to conquer Caledonia, with Agricola sailing around there after defeating the Caledonians in battle. Actually i think CAledonia was spared for occupation at that moment precisely because Dacian attack, as Agricola was called back imediatly after that

This:

He remained content, however, with one Dacian victory and immediately moved against another enemy, the Germans on the Danube. There is much to support the view that in the early 80s he had already been mobilizing against them; at that time he was already concentrating troops on the German Danube front, and it is not out of the question that the sudden appearance of three legions in Moesia in 86 was made possible by previous preparations for an assault on the Germans. The Dacian attack came as such a surprise to the Romans simply because the government was concentrating all its attention on the Germans. This had probably not escaped the notice of Decebalus. Pg.83

The war against the Chatti was in 82-83.

2- Dacians attacked because Domitian ended a previous agreement to pay them. It was a punishment expedition

3- correct in much part, except the ambush

4- correct, with the mention that Tettius Iulianus retreated imediatly after the battle, way before any problems with Quadi, Marcomani or Saturninus. Which mean that Romans losses was too big to keep going and he was afraid to do that. Dio Cassius mention a trick of Decebalus, with trees cut at the height of a man and with armors, helmets, shields and weapons put on them to look as an army from the distance. When Romans saw that they was afraid to advance, turn around and leave Dacia, but not sure how correct was that

I don't know about number 2, where did you get that information from?
3. See what was written above about ambush.
4. Not according to this:

Facing new problems on the northern and Pannonian Danube, Domitian could not solve the Dacian problem militarily by a victory that could make up for the two previous defeats and dissolve the Dacians’ unity, for an easier defense of Moesia. That is why he accepted Decebalus’ peace offer. Although Decebalus had won two victories, he was aware that a methodical Roman campaign, led by a professional like L. Tettius Julianus could not result in but his downfall. Pg.194-195

It is suggested that Julianus based himself at Viminacium when the time came to enter Dacia, since this is the gateway to the heartland, leading to the Dacian stronghold of Sarmizegethusa. This would lead him across the Banat- on the same route that Trajan followed in 101- leading to Tapae on the south-western edge of Transylvania, where the final battle was fought, a victory for the Romans. Little is known of the details of the preliminaries of the battle, or the troops involved. The Dacians were soundly defeated, but not eradicated. Dio describes how Vezinas, next in rank to Decebalus, pretended to be dead and later escaped. The story continues with the bizarre description of how Decebalus cut down trees and placed armour on the remaining stumps so that the Romans would think they were warriors and withdraw, instead of attacking the royal residence. Nothing more is known of the fighting, save the decorations won by a centurion of II Adiutrix may have been won during the campaign. The battle of Tapae may have been fought too late in the year to pursue the Dacians right into their capital. Domitian had recieved two further Imperial salutations by September 88, and another by October, reaching a total of 17. Julianus probably thought it prudent to avoid pursuing the campaign in hostile territory in winter and Domitian may have approved or advocated plans for another attack beginning in the following spring. But before the victory could be followed up and the coup de grace delivered, another rather more immediate problem had arisen. Pg.100

Shortly after, news reached Rome of Julianus’ victory over the Dacians at Tapae, only the lateness of the season preventing him from pressing home the advantage. Domitian took his fifteenth and sixteenth imperial salutations at the end of the year, and with the gateway to the Dacian Basileion stormed, could reasonably look forward that winter to outright victory in the coming season - only to be distracted from achieving his aims once again, this time by an insurrection fomented by L. Antoninus Saturninus, army commander of Moguntiacum (Mainz) and Upper Germany. Pg.29

5- Domitian didnt lost that heavily, actually Marcomani send two envoys before, ask him for peace and tell him that they obey. Domitian however kill the emisaries every time, which produced outrage among Marcomani and Quadi who decided to fight back.
The reason Domitian wanted to beat them (they was Roman clients) was that they didnt want to participate in the war against Dacians. They wasnt back then of any threat for the Roman empire, or its frontiers.

He lost and had to sue for peace with Decebalus, and also the Marcomanni did attack in 92.

After two Roman generals had suffered serious reverses, a third, Juliunus, forced his way to the Dacian capital, won a victory at Tapae (in the east of the Banat), and forced him to sue Domitian for peace. That emperor’s defeat by the Marcomanni prevented him from following up this success, and not merely did he leave Decebalus to all intents and purposes independent, but in the end purchased immunity from Dacian raids by the payment of an annual tribute. Pg2

Before coming to the actual course of the Marcomannic Wars we must mention briefly the fighting in this region previous to the Wars. These conflicts between the Romans and the “barbarians” were not by far so sharp or so dangerous as the Marcomannic Wars, but they did constitute a certain threat to which the Romans had to respond, although -as events were to prove- the measures they took on the Danube frontier were not enough.
A serious disturbance broke out in the central Danube region at the end of the first century A.D., under Domitian, when the Romans undertook a punitive expedition against the Marcommani and the Quadi for not having helped them in the war against Dacia. After they had crossed the Danube the Romans were defeated and had to retreat to within their own frontiers again. Pg.267-268

6- Saturninus rebellion was put down before Domitian even reach there, in 89 both Marcomani and Saturninus problems was resolved, yet Domitian was afraid to cut again the payment of tribute for Dacians, or even to ask for those lost standards. And it was about Pretorian Guard standard, the most important of Roman army, representing the elite unit who guard the emperor himself.

With everything going on with the Marcomanni and Saturninas, Domitian had no choice.
But also see what kind of agreement it was:

This encomiastic statement made by Pliny the Younger makes one infer that Decebalus was also forced to had over hostages in 89. Pg.255

But, given the new historical circumstances, it contained a new element: technical and financial assistance for Decebalus. Still this does not change the character of the treaty - imposed after a dedito- by which the Dacian king has to integrate himself into the Roman political and legal system as one of the numerous reges socii. Pg.190

Unfortunately time is preventing me from further writing and expanding on this.