03-16-2012, 12:19 PM
Of course many allies weren't loyal, especially after Cannae when the writing seemed to be on the wall. Most defections were in Southern Italy, particularly the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians.
The most startling defection was undoubtedly Campania, mostly because the Campanians weren't just allies, they were Roman citizens (albeit sine suffragio). To the north Etruscans were restless, and this required a major Roman military presence in the region to deter further rebellion.
Fear of Roman retaliation must certainly have played a role in keeping allies: Rome routinely devoted the vast bulk of her military resources to Italy, and many of these legions were deployed not so much against Hannibal as to watch over various parts of Italy.
Many of Rome's allies stayed loyal no doubt because they sincerely believed that the Roman alliance system represented a reasonable system for defending Italy, and Hannibal offered little in the way of alternative (indeed, his heavy use of Celtic allies may have alienated many Italians ever leery of Celtic invasion). The interception of the Carthaginian-Macedonian treaty indicated that Hannibal envisioned a peace with Rome left standing, so a wary Italian ally might note that even if Carthaginian armies departed Italy in victory, a disgruntled Rome would be left behind with grudges to settle.
The most startling defection was undoubtedly Campania, mostly because the Campanians weren't just allies, they were Roman citizens (albeit sine suffragio). To the north Etruscans were restless, and this required a major Roman military presence in the region to deter further rebellion.
Fear of Roman retaliation must certainly have played a role in keeping allies: Rome routinely devoted the vast bulk of her military resources to Italy, and many of these legions were deployed not so much against Hannibal as to watch over various parts of Italy.
Many of Rome's allies stayed loyal no doubt because they sincerely believed that the Roman alliance system represented a reasonable system for defending Italy, and Hannibal offered little in the way of alternative (indeed, his heavy use of Celtic allies may have alienated many Italians ever leery of Celtic invasion). The interception of the Carthaginian-Macedonian treaty indicated that Hannibal envisioned a peace with Rome left standing, so a wary Italian ally might note that even if Carthaginian armies departed Italy in victory, a disgruntled Rome would be left behind with grudges to settle.
