08-18-2011, 10:33 AM
I agree with Robert.
There is a general myth put about due to out of date scholdarship that the 'barbarianisation' of the Roman Army in the 4th/5th century lead to its decline and hence the collapse of the Empire.
There is little actual evidence (just the persistence of the myth) for this coupled with the fact that the Empire itself did not collapse at all - only the Western provinces eventually falling away.
There is also no evidence that the Legions of the so-called 'Classical' period were better quality troops than any other Roman period. If you read the histories of say Tacitus and Ammianus for comparison for example you will see similar tropes to do with indiscipline, corruption and venality and shows that the Roman armies remained fairly constant in terms of their underlying character, as it were.
I would argue it is not the quality of the troops or their equipment (an oft debated issue which in my mind is a false trail) that caused a decline in the army - of the west certanly - but instead the underlying logisitical and organisational structure which allows the war apparatus to operate.
Here at least is a better field of study and a more demonstrable one. We can see in the West that the losses of the underlying tax base, recruitment pool and infrastructure (roads, transport, suppplies, manufacture of arms, etc) lead to a serious cripping of the machinery of war. The Roman state in the Western provinces lost its ability to mount war as an organsational operation and thus lost its only real advanage over the tribes and cultures which bled in through the limes or frontier.
In the Eastern provinces of the Empire, this was not so and as a result there was no comparative 'decline'. I think John Haldon's book 'The Byzatnine Wars' is a good example of a focus on the underlying logisitics of war which really allowed the Roman state to gain tactical and strategic superiority in a conflict. The glorification of the Roman soldier and his 'legio' is in part an ideology which masks this crucial element. Rome operated in a theatre of war at a superior level when it came to logistics and supply in a way that the 'barbarians' - with the exception of Sassanid Persia - could not.
This is why I think a focus on weapons and armour and fighting tactics sometimes misses the point.
Don't forget that we can see a continuity of training at least at mid to high-level officer level from the 'Classical' period right through to Vegetius, Mauricius and on into the 'Byzantine' period thus demonstrating a concern with developing correct tactics and instilling them in the Army. This never ceased!
There is a general myth put about due to out of date scholdarship that the 'barbarianisation' of the Roman Army in the 4th/5th century lead to its decline and hence the collapse of the Empire.
There is little actual evidence (just the persistence of the myth) for this coupled with the fact that the Empire itself did not collapse at all - only the Western provinces eventually falling away.
There is also no evidence that the Legions of the so-called 'Classical' period were better quality troops than any other Roman period. If you read the histories of say Tacitus and Ammianus for comparison for example you will see similar tropes to do with indiscipline, corruption and venality and shows that the Roman armies remained fairly constant in terms of their underlying character, as it were.
I would argue it is not the quality of the troops or their equipment (an oft debated issue which in my mind is a false trail) that caused a decline in the army - of the west certanly - but instead the underlying logisitical and organisational structure which allows the war apparatus to operate.
Here at least is a better field of study and a more demonstrable one. We can see in the West that the losses of the underlying tax base, recruitment pool and infrastructure (roads, transport, suppplies, manufacture of arms, etc) lead to a serious cripping of the machinery of war. The Roman state in the Western provinces lost its ability to mount war as an organsational operation and thus lost its only real advanage over the tribes and cultures which bled in through the limes or frontier.
In the Eastern provinces of the Empire, this was not so and as a result there was no comparative 'decline'. I think John Haldon's book 'The Byzatnine Wars' is a good example of a focus on the underlying logisitics of war which really allowed the Roman state to gain tactical and strategic superiority in a conflict. The glorification of the Roman soldier and his 'legio' is in part an ideology which masks this crucial element. Rome operated in a theatre of war at a superior level when it came to logistics and supply in a way that the 'barbarians' - with the exception of Sassanid Persia - could not.
This is why I think a focus on weapons and armour and fighting tactics sometimes misses the point.
Don't forget that we can see a continuity of training at least at mid to high-level officer level from the 'Classical' period right through to Vegetius, Mauricius and on into the 'Byzantine' period thus demonstrating a concern with developing correct tactics and instilling them in the Army. This never ceased!
Francis Hagan
The Barcarii
The Barcarii
