Rome\'s most able general?

[Paullus Scipio]

Alas, they may be somewhat disappointing from your point of view, Steven, since they are largely tactical rather than organisational, but here goes......
Firstly, the Barcids in Spain had produced over a long period of time a "professional", full-time (albeit mercenary) army, composed of multi-national contingents - and this army, with Hannibal at it's head represented a crisis the like of which the citizen-militia of Rome had only faced relatively briefly previously (Pyrrhus' army). The Barcid army could manouevre, drill and respond tactically in ways the Roman citizen-militia, commanded by "amateur" annual magistrates, could not. Cannae was to highlight this problem, and expose all the faults of the Roman system when facing "professional" opponents commanded by a brilliant "professional" General......
Fabius Maximus (Cunctator) could only stem, but not resolve the problem.
Rome needed to sacrifice it's system of annual command.....This had first occurred with the elder Scipios, sent to Spain and not replaced or superceded, except by death......
Scipio Africanus 'broke the mold' in that he was sent to Spain with sole and prolonged command ( donec deballatum foret) at an age too young for major command, never having held curule command, yet given pro-consular imperium/power to carry on in Spain until victory was won.......( although it should be said that there was an element of 'no-one else wanting the job').He was given similar power in Africa later.....

He was thus arguably Rome's first "professional" General with time to tactically reform his army, and whose soldiers looked to him as Commander,( apparently the first to be hailed Imperator by his troops...) rather than an annual succession of Generals ( yes, I am aware there had been occasional exceptions to the 'annual' rule in the past, and there was the Elder Scipiuos referred to above..).

Traditional Roman tactics involved (at this time) the triplex acies (three lines of maniples) formation in depth and had served Rome well, even standing up to Pyrrhus' Phalanx and elephants, but whilst it was trained to advance and retire, and to change over lines, it could not wheel or turn easily, or adopt other formations. This depth and resilience and 'changeover' tactics were it's strength but the inability to manouevre was also a grave weakness, exploited to the full by Hannibal at Cannae and earlier( whose army could wheel, extend it's wings, change formation, extend front and make a flank attack)
It was this weakness that Scipio, with his long-term command, was able to address and change. After the fall of Cartago Novo(New Carthage), he armed his troops and trained them in new drill and tactics.He was the first to introduce ( so far as we know) individual weapons training, which was to be carried on by Rutilius Rufus and Marius ( who apparently utilised the expertise of gladiatorial schools), and may have introduced the Gladius Hispaniensis as standard, (The later Suda/Suidas , following a lost passage of Polybius (frag.179) records this occurring during the Hannibalic War, and since Cartago Novo was an arsenal, this seems the logical opportunity - though elsewhere there is evidence in PolybiusII.30.8; 33.5 that this occurred much earlier....perhaps Scipio merely emphasised expertise in the 'new' weapon) He also taught his troops to move in sub-units (Maniples and for the first time, Cohorts, rather than as lines/acies.) Indeed, Polybius first uses the term 'cohort' of Roman troops( as opposed to Allies who were organised in cohorts) when describing three maniples of Roman troops moving together at Ilipa. (Polybius XI.23 - Livy, at 28.14.17, has a slightly garbled version) [i](edit: Actually, I am guilty of an over-simplification here. While use of cohorts as tactical units seems to have first occurred in the second Punic War in Spain, it seems they were in use before Scipio took command. Livy(XXV.39) tells us of Lucius Marcius concealing a cohort with cavalry support in woods to ambush Carthaginians a year or so before Scipio takes command. Under Scipio this use of cohorts as tactical units seems to have expanded, probably because maniples were too small ( liable to be over-run) and legions too large to pin down the elusive spaniards.Cohorts continue in use in Spain, but maniples were used elsewhere, especially in the East against the Phalanx (e.g.Cynoscephalae, where 20 maniples act independently) and at Pydna( Paullus orders the maniples to act independently against the phalanx). Even Scipio continues to use manipular tactics e.g. at Ilipa, where the velites withdraw through the gaps in the maniples, though the outflanking manoeuvre seems to have been carried out by cohorts( or units of three maniples, if you will). At Great Plains and Zama Scipio uses the manipular triplex acies...in both battles bringing up the maniples of Principes and Triarii on the flanks....Manipular tactics under Marius and Sulla are heard of even as late as the war in Africa against Jugurtha (grandson of Scipio's friend Massinissa), apparently.(112-105 BC)[/i]
The results of these tactical reforms were first seen at Baecula - where Scipio used the Roman Legionaries to carry out a 'flanking' attack, ( they usually occupied the centre) though he failed to surround Hasdrubal, which would have given him a decisive victory.....
At Ilipa, once again at the critical moment, The Roman legionaries carried out an outflanking manouevre, (having suddenly been deployed on the flanks instead of in the centre) by turning outward and moving in 'cohorts' as Polybius tells us, to outflank the more numerous Carthaginians.... whether this entailed an actual organisational change ( the cohorts may have already been 'administrative' units) is not known. This time the Carthaginians were only saved from complete destruction by a providential thunderstorm and downpour. This innovation ( of using 'cohorts' as a tactical sub-unit) would become standard later...... Ilipa was Scipio's masterpiece, justifying his reforms ...
Later, it would be veteran 'volunteers' from this Army that would provide the core of Scipio's invasion of Africa, and pass on these tactical reforms to the army, where they would re-appear at Great Plains and Zama....

Thanks to these reforms, the Roman Army would never again be 'rigid', but instead flexible and manouevrable, with the 'new' "professional" i.e. full-time, legionaries appearing for the first time ( many of them would go on to fight in Greece) , being better trained in individual skills, and better at drill and manouvre in sub-units (maniples and cohorts).

So, as well as tactical reforms, we may credit Scipio with instigating the later organisational change into 'cohorts' and the introduction of professional soldiers who were both the strength and bane of later Republican Warlords, such as Marius and Sulla, and Caesar and Pompey ( settling veterans became a big social and military problem in the Late Republic)......all of this began with Scipio, and indirectly, Hannibal....