(Late) (Roman) Formations

[Salvianus]

My understanding of the Late Roman panoply of missile weapons seems to suggest that, if not a last resort, hand to hand was at least well down the list of actions they were prepared for. However, if units came to contact, I feel they would favour close order formation instinctively if not by training and that the outcome would be decided by which side maintained its cohesion most successfuly over the next few crucial seconds and perhaps, if well matched in training, experience, morale, numbers and equipment, minutes.

For me the point of re-enactment is to illuminate the gaps in the historical record, so I would be interested in hearing more explicitly about what our various experiments would suggest about the nature of such large scale infantry clashes.

I ought to put my money where my mouth is, so I offer three observations although my own experience in big shield formations is limited (so apologies to the many of you who have stood amongst 2000 other re-enactors at Hastings).

Firstly, whatever the motivation of the officers, I believe some members of the rank & file are sometimes reluctant to close with the enemy. At a time when men were prepared to mutilate themselves to attempt to avoid service, I could imagine that a formation might be designed partly to control their disposition to run. A close order advance with more experienced troops pressing behind seems to me to be pretty effective in supporting your morale and locking you in position. I certainly feel more secure in close order than open, and, if under attack, maintaining pressure & the structure of the formation seems to become an immediate matter of personal protection quite different from any training or order to advance individually to relieve a comrade.

Secondly, even in a single rank, when under blunt missile fire and cavalry attack I have felt highly motivated to maintain my position rather than desert it, and when comrades have gone down the line closed instinctively & without order. Whilst orders appear to take a considerable time to travel down a shield wall, the need to shelter seems to impose a tendency to follow the active elements into attack (or indeed to fall back in response to an opponent's break-through): as pressure leaves the shield, one tries to move to re-establish that safe connection. This appears to result in 'waves' of action along a line of a couple of hundred.

Thus, the interpretation of a cuneus as an attack column that distorts into something of a wedge in charging makes perfect, visceral, sense. Without physical contact, I haven't experienced how an open order formation might handle such motion.

Thirdly, we have experimented with competitive skirmishing in wooded areas, including repeatedly pitting 'heavy' infantry (but perhaps more objectively described as 'medium': large flat shields, mail or scale cuirass armour & late helmets) against light (small shields and some light helmets). The results suggested that the heavier units remained unassailable even against mixed javelins & archers until separated by terrain or tactic. The light troops then quickly adapted and surrounded individuals that moved into in open order, resulting in consistent wins.

Obviously, the classic Imperial Legionary protected by much heavier helmet, segmented plate and heavily curved shield is a very different case.

To summarise, occasions when the dead could not fall might have been notable and uncomfortable exceptions, but my re-enactment experience urgently recommends close order to me as a matter of practical protection even facing friendly blunts, let alone contact with a line of men that wish me ill.