(Late) (Roman) Formations

[Robert Vermaat]

Hi Ian,

My first point is that I would treat Junkelmann with a great deal of care: I have been led to believe that he may over-emphasise those aspects of his research that support his own views. It may be possible to train horses to attack an enemy formation from the front, however if the infantry formation stands firm, such a charge exposes the horses to missiles and other weapons at very close quarters. Given the cost, time and effort needed to train these horses, almost certainly the question should be whether the Romans actually did charge into the front of formed infantry, not whether the horses would or not.

You are not wrong, but I think Junkelmann is right. All he did is try to train his horses to charge directly into an enemy, just to prove that it was possible. I should re-read that chapter again, but I don't recall that Junkelmann advocated that this was THE Roman way of attack. But he proved that it could be done. Like you, I don't think that it was the common way to attack an enemy, because I agree that it would be very costly. Normally, cavalry would attack from the flank or harass the infantry by riding past it, etc. But if the battle could be won, a commander (I think) would not hesitate to force his cavalry straight into an enemy formation. That's as common today as it was back then - if a victory was within reach, to hell with the consequences.

As to whether the infantry fought in close formation, locked shields formation, or whatever, wouldn't this depend mainly upon circumstances? Having read van Wees and Goldsworthy, I am now little inclined to believe that two infantry forces would close up and then begin an epic 'pushing match' in order to decide the battle. From what the above historians have said, it is likely that individuals or small groups would take the initiative and try to force back those troops opposite them. When both sides resisted, then the reinforcements sent in would possibly close up and push. However, this would not be very long lasting as such pressure is physically draining. After a short period, either one side lost and suffered heay casualties, or the press loosened and the troops retired to their own 'lines' to catch their breath before a second attempt.

I'm more with John here, but not entirely. I think that when two sides got close, they first would try to dislodge the other side by missile fire, and only then (or like Adrianople, if one side got wenthusiastic) would one side rush the other. Close order combat would then follow, spears first and swords afterwards, maybe at that time would one side try to push the other side away. Or, miore likely, one side would try to break the other line with a concerted attack at a weak spot. If one side broke, that was it. meanwhile, cavalry would attack the flanks each other and possible the rear if possible.

Maybe it could further hint at why the Late Roman Army were no longer prepared to fight so many open battles: the increased political and military importance of the 'centurions' resulted in their being less willing to risk life and limb in order to break the enemy, and their being more likely to take a position to the rear, leaving the common soldiers to take the initiative?

If I read the sources correct, that might be part of it - but also extended to the rest of the army. Apparently, at times the soldiers were difficult. Apparently, when Stilicho had shut Alaric up on some Greek peninsula, he did not destroy him. Some say it was because Constantinople warned him off, but others these days are of the opinion that he could not trust his combined armies. Even Julian had such problems - I'd say that the partition of East and West had caused rivalries that made the troops think twice about throwing away their lives, if they could choose whom to fight for.