08-09-2007, 11:52 AM
In a juridical sense the Roman empire never ended till perhaps 1806 but in fact the western part expired slowly after the 2nd c. AD. When I look at the social, emotional and economical side I often have difficulties to see a Roman empire after the 2nd c. AD.
Military defeats don't count much if the defeated state is able to cope with it. From 218 till 216 BC about 100000 Romans were killed, a tenth of the militarily abled population, but in 212 the Romans again had 25 legions travelling around. In 410 a city with a population of 1 million (with perhaps 100000 able bodied males) was not able to defend itself against an army of perhaps 30000. Why not was a militia army formed? The social and ideological circumstances were totally different and against it.
The defeat at Adrianople and the reactions after it were important because it showed the actual conditions of the state. It was a symbol of the things to come.
The defeats in the east (260 AD for example) were important because it kept the empire busy and was a never ending black hole for money and lives.
The defeat in the Teutoburger Wald was important because it unfortunately stopped the spread of Roman culture and law to the east. In the area of the former province Germania the small tribes could form big dangerous leagues in the 3rd c. AD. That Germania was not important for the Romans is possible (it is sure they did not want it at all costs) but I often question myself why they struggled for it nearly 20 years before the province was founded in 4 AD? Why did they start to build civilian cities in the new province? Why did they later build and manned an expensive border wall from Rhine to Danube to cover the south-west parts of Germany which were only left after 260 when the soldiers were needed in the east and to kill other Romans?
What happened 15/16 AD in north Germany is a bit cloudy. The Romans won the three battles but left the country suspiciously quickly. Parts of the army nearly suffered the same fate as their comrades 6/7 years before. If decisive victories would habe been achieved Tiberius would have been an idiot not to use it. Germanicus had shown before that he was loyal to the emperor so the story about Tiberius' fears has never convinced me totally. Tiberius was a talented and realistic military leader and might have seen more problems than covered in the sources.
Military defeats don't count much if the defeated state is able to cope with it. From 218 till 216 BC about 100000 Romans were killed, a tenth of the militarily abled population, but in 212 the Romans again had 25 legions travelling around. In 410 a city with a population of 1 million (with perhaps 100000 able bodied males) was not able to defend itself against an army of perhaps 30000. Why not was a militia army formed? The social and ideological circumstances were totally different and against it.
The defeat at Adrianople and the reactions after it were important because it showed the actual conditions of the state. It was a symbol of the things to come.
The defeats in the east (260 AD for example) were important because it kept the empire busy and was a never ending black hole for money and lives.
The defeat in the Teutoburger Wald was important because it unfortunately stopped the spread of Roman culture and law to the east. In the area of the former province Germania the small tribes could form big dangerous leagues in the 3rd c. AD. That Germania was not important for the Romans is possible (it is sure they did not want it at all costs) but I often question myself why they struggled for it nearly 20 years before the province was founded in 4 AD? Why did they start to build civilian cities in the new province? Why did they later build and manned an expensive border wall from Rhine to Danube to cover the south-west parts of Germany which were only left after 260 when the soldiers were needed in the east and to kill other Romans?
What happened 15/16 AD in north Germany is a bit cloudy. The Romans won the three battles but left the country suspiciously quickly. Parts of the army nearly suffered the same fate as their comrades 6/7 years before. If decisive victories would habe been achieved Tiberius would have been an idiot not to use it. Germanicus had shown before that he was loyal to the emperor so the story about Tiberius' fears has never convinced me totally. Tiberius was a talented and realistic military leader and might have seen more problems than covered in the sources.
Wolfgang Zeiler
