06-06-2007, 04:01 PM
All Allied units suffered high casualties and they deserve everyone's highest regard and gratitude for what they did to liberate the Netherlands. There were many displays of individual heroism in all units as well.
The problem is that an operation like MG is very much a game of "Getting there the furstest with the mostest". Individual heroics are very quickly outweighed by the effects of the clock and logistics.
From the moment the operation started, the Germans reacted with lightning speed, getting reinforcements from everywhere they could to the operations area as soon as possible. That sense of urgency seems to have been lacking in the higher echelons, especially at the start of the operation.
Because the RAF was afraid of Flak over Arnhem (never mind the biggest fighter bomber escort ever), not the dropzones (good enough for the planned drop of the Poles on the Tuesday) and fatigue of ground- and aircrew, the 1st Airborne and 82nd had to fight the first day with one hand tied behind their backs, guarding dropzones for their reinforcements.
This was aggravated by Browning insisting that his Corps HQ was useful the first day. That required 38 gliders for HQ troops and equipment to Nijmegen, which could've brought almost an entire batallion to Arnhem.
And yes, the road from Belgium to Nijmegen was narrow, but nothing prevented XXX Corps from driving in the evening or at night. They might have hooked up with the 101st on the first day, instead of the second.
The problem is that an operation like MG is very much a game of "Getting there the furstest with the mostest". Individual heroics are very quickly outweighed by the effects of the clock and logistics.
From the moment the operation started, the Germans reacted with lightning speed, getting reinforcements from everywhere they could to the operations area as soon as possible. That sense of urgency seems to have been lacking in the higher echelons, especially at the start of the operation.
Because the RAF was afraid of Flak over Arnhem (never mind the biggest fighter bomber escort ever), not the dropzones (good enough for the planned drop of the Poles on the Tuesday) and fatigue of ground- and aircrew, the 1st Airborne and 82nd had to fight the first day with one hand tied behind their backs, guarding dropzones for their reinforcements.
This was aggravated by Browning insisting that his Corps HQ was useful the first day. That required 38 gliders for HQ troops and equipment to Nijmegen, which could've brought almost an entire batallion to Arnhem.
And yes, the road from Belgium to Nijmegen was narrow, but nothing prevented XXX Corps from driving in the evening or at night. They might have hooked up with the 101st on the first day, instead of the second.
