Alexander the Great was antiquity\'s greatest commander

[Spartan JKM]

Hello everyone!

I elevated Timoleon, Lucullus (Ponticus), and Agricola to TIER 2 (and that's just off the top of my head!). I wonder, possibly, are both Flavius Aetius and Attila 'overrated' and 'underrated', respectively, in terms of their levels of fame? Aetius was surely an adept and resilient 'diplomat in the field', so to speak, but the one success which he is renowned for, none other than Chalons (or Catalaunian Plains), was indeed a battle of nations (viz., he was one of three leaders who exercised independent command on the victorious side) resulted in compromising the security of Italy for riding the Hunnic threat of NW Europe. But they were already in a rearguard. Attila may be better than a consensus may reflect, if the studies of one expert on this era, Christopher Kelly, sustain relatively well. Or in the case of Aetius, is he 'underrated'? Mmmmm. This isn't my strong point, so forgive any paramount data I may be ignorant of. They stay on TIER 2 for now, pending my further research, and/or, possibly, another poster's more discerning views.

I have not posted in along time. I would like to convey my congratulations and admiration for what I came across the past summer in the two major bookstores (in terms of easy-access chains) around the USA:



Above: Ancient Warfare Magazine stands out effulgently amid the magazine racks at Borders Books and Barnes & Noble Booksellers (the former in Salt lake City, Utah, which is directly above; the top image is the Barnes & Noble in Lincoln Square, New York City). I promise you - I didn't rearrange them! Above is how they stood. Congrats to Jasper and Co. :wink:

Alexandr K astutely observed:

...interesting list. Just don't see Titus Labienus, a man who contributed significantly to Caesar's successes in Gaul and who then almost destroyed this great military genius in Africa...

Thanks! That was a noticeable omission. Titus Labienus, a Tribune of the Plebs, died in 45 B.C.

Johnny Shumate - the singularly virtuosic illustrator of extremely vivid depictions of ancient soldiery - identified:

Good article..!
B.H. Liddle Hart would rate Scipio Africanus as number 1. Simply because he had to deal with Hannibal and his tough army instead of Darius and the Persian army.

Did you include the Roman general Venditius..? He was the only one who was successful against the Parthians...

Thanks to you as well, Johnny. I love your work, as do the people I show it to .

Hart's classic book is invaluable. He elucidates, overall, how balanced and near-flawless Scipio was as a general, and he argues well that Scipio has been comparatively less received by history than other leaders; but he may have gone overboard with his tendentious views, and his book reads like a handbook of his theories on warfare which have been imputed to Scipio. However, that isn't wrong, just not balanced. Professor Howard H. Scullard's studies on Rome's greatest general (yes, quite arguable) are more comprehensive. Scipio was alike an ancient Marlborough, not greater than Napoleon without criterial specifics. Richard A. Gabriel, who also gave us a fine military bio on Scipio, has come out with a new book on Philip II. I would love to grab it as soon as possible! This military author, while fallible (like every other human being, present or historical), is a superb expert on war studies and strategy, etc. But I saw the title - Philip II of Macedonia: Greater Than Alexander - without a question mark at the end! No, no. Without a specific viewpoint (eg., a composed applicator with policy and patience), 'ranking' the great father over his mercurially fiery son is not acceptable (IMHO). Without an arbitrary set of guidelines (which is anyone's right to do so), Alexander may be the only Captain-General (and conqueror, visionary, stimulator, etc. - however revised the traditional 'romance' should be) in history who can be stated as greater than any other - without any set criterion (IMHO, of course!).

D B Campbell wrote, after showing Johnny I placed Publius Ventidius Bassus on TIER 2

...Same guy, although the late Sir Ronald Syme argued that the cognomen Bassus is a mistake...

Love your work, too, Duncan, particularly your convincing arguments concerning ancient artillery (in that field, Biton seems very underrated).

Great reference there. Thank you. I cannot imagine that any good general in history, let alone a great one, was not thoroughly au courant with movement and supply. All we have, AFAIK, to detail anything about this very under-appreciated general (he was not a member of any eminent gens, and his Parthian triumph, which was punitive and limited, seemed not to be in accord with Augustus' politics as of a decade later. That's up for grabs, though!) is Aulus Gellius, and, for whatever it may be worth, Eutropius writes 'Bassus' as well (Abridgement of Roman History, Book 7.5). But Eutropius wrote verbatim, 'Lucius Ventidius Bassus defeated the Persians' in three engagements. But Ventidius is mentioned by Cicero, Livy, Tacitus, Frontinus, Appian, Cassius Dio, and others make reference to him ('no less than twenty-six ancient writers make mention of Publius Ventidius or Publius Ventidius Bassus', wrote one James E. Seaver, in his article Publius Ventidius - Neglected Roman Military Hero, The Classical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 7, p. 275, April of 1952). But the cognomen of Bassus come only from Gellius, Eutrpoius, and Festus (Breviarium, Book 2.18, who wrote, 'P. Ventidius Bassus'). The aforementioned sources probably hold more credulity overall, albeit omissions are less evincing than actually refuting a topic. But that still leaves room for dispute. Arrrghh! Where did the three writers get their data?

All those interested, look for a recent article by one Emma Strugnell (Ventidius' Parthian War: Rome's Forgotten Eastern Triumph, Acta Antiqua, Vol. 46, No. 3, June of 2006), who offers a hypothesis to unravel what seems to be an amazing lack of acknowledgment for Ventidius, even by usual standards, I myself propose, of 'overrated' and 'underrated' lines of judgment. Basically, Ventidius, à la Miltiades at Marathon, effectively neutralized the Asiatic superiority in movement and missile power by getting them into close-quarter fighting. But he beat them three times and marched east to besiege Samosata (located in the modern Ad?yaman Province), at which point Antony dismissed him. Rumors began to spread that Ventidius was accepting bribes, yet Antony 'negotiated a settlement' for the Roman departure from Samosata. According to Cassius Dio, Antony was jealous of Ventidius' exploits (Roman History, Book 49.21.1). Speaking of Miltides, his tactical conduct at Marathon seems quite sophisticated for its time. But in judging his rank is difficult as we do not know how much he concocted on his own - was he divorced from the other nine of the strategoi, and only his novel thinking - to charge the approaching Persian-led army, arrayed for battle no less, to get them at close-quarters - 'saved the day'? As if all this were simple...

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, Book 15.4,

"...The story of Ventidius Bassus, a man of obscure birth, who is reported to have been the first to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.

It was lately remarked in the conversation of certain old and learned men that in ancient times many persons of most obscure birth, who were previously held in great contempt, had risen to the highest grade of dignity. Nothing that was said about anyone, however, excited so much wonder as the story recorded of Ventidius Bassus. He was born in Picenum in a humble station, and with his mother was taken prisoner by Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey the Great, in the Social War, in the course of which Strabo subdued the Aesculani. Afterwards, when Pompeius Strabo triumphed, the boy also was carried in his mother's arms amid the rest of the captives before the general's chariot. Later, when he had grown up, he worked hard to gain a livelihood, resorting to the humble calling of a buyer of mules and carriages, which he had contracted with the State to furnish to the magistrates who had been allotted provinces. In that occupation he made the acquaintance of Gaius Caesar and went with him to the Gallic provinces. Then, because he had shown commendable energy in that province, and later during the civil war had executed numerous commissions with promptness and vigor, he not only gained Caesar's friendship, but because of it rose even to the highest rank. Afterwards he was also made tribune of the commons, and then praetor, and at that time he was declared a public enemy by the senate along with Mark Antony. Afterwards, however, when the parties were united, he not only recovered his former rank, but gained first the pontificate and then the consulship. At this the Roman people, who remembered that Ventidius Bassus had made a living by taking care of mules, were so indignant that these verses were posted everywhere about the streets of the city:

Assemble, soothsayers and augurs all!
A portent strange has taken place of late;
For he who curried mules is consul now..."

Jona Lendering wrote:

Although he was defeated at Issus and Gaugamela, I think that Darius III Codomannus deserves a place. He was a very brave man and a great organizer: take the cost of life in Babylon when he was mustering an army (the same as usual) and compare it to 323, when Alexander was there (prizes sky high). Or take the brilliance of his campaign in 331: Alexander behaved like a puppet and walked straight into the trap Darius had set at Gaugamela. Darius would have won, if the omens had been better; see my essay over here or the website here.

I totally acquiesce without even slight questioning, Jona. I love your site, BTW. I often never need supplementing. Thanks for all your contributions

In both battles, Darius actually was more than a match for Alexander in the strategic preliminaries, particularly at Issus.

The realm of the Achaemenid Great King by the time of Darius III, ruling mainly from Susa (modern Shush, western Iran), was a tremendous accomplishment laid down by Cyrus the Great two centuries earlier, which within one generation after the latter's death had been expanded and re-solidified by Darius I (the Great): the states within the vast cultural diversity, permeating the lands from the Aegean-Syr Darya-Egyptian region to the Indus River Valley, were autonomous states liable to a central authority. The sagacious imperial foresight of Cyrus was forwarded by Darius I within few decades following the death of the former: a stable process of the Great King's authority was established by the dawn of the 5th century B.C., in which an ethno-cultural absorption was realized, centered on a sound administrative network of tributary regions - satrapies; they constituted twenty regional divisions among twenty-two regions, following Herodotus' breakdown in The Histories (Book 3.90-97). All the satrapies were subject to Darius I at the culmination of his reign. There was no uniformity regarding Persian rule entailing direct control from the center; each satrapie's legal systems were codified, tribute exacted through appointed officials with established regional treasuries, and an advanced form of communications was established through engineered roads and bridges which streamlining travel, which in turn greatly facilitated commerce. An innovative 'postal service' was realized, most notably exploited viably via the famous Susa-Sardis Royal Road. All this reflected an efficient territorialization which linked the Great King's rule from his center.

Moreover, a universal currency was introduced, the daric, which standardized the increasingly flowing commerce which permeated the diverse languages and customs of Darius I's growing hegemony. But the satrapies' own distinctive structures were not altered, and they effectively continued their own traditional ways, with some native kings (now effectively 'client kings' of the Great King) still in place despite the appointed satraps. Of course things were bound (not necessarily 'inevitable'?) to go awry at times. But for two centuries the Achaemenid Persian Empire endured with overall superb handling, due very much because of Darius I's (and surely an administrative counsel he had) codifications and standardizations. Cyrus was an ingenious visionary leader in conciliating various peoples, and Darius I, an innovator in far-reaching administration and commerce.

The Achaemenid sphere of influence was huge by the time of the Ionian revolt (the springboard to the epoch struggle between Persians and Hellenes) in 499 B.C., and the proclivities of 'political inertia and cupidity' (John Cook, The Persian Empire, Pg. 70) cannot be estimated with no room for error, etc. Indeed, the numerous revolts and inability of the Royal Court to limit independent powers within many of the satraps (the 'protectors of the Kingdom's authority') became a recurring problem: the satraps were the provincial leaders of the Great King, and often members of the royal line, such as Artaphernes, were in charge of the internal administration and security of their own satrapie, as well as its responsibilities to the Great King, including the provision of military levies if called upon), on a relatively minimal scale, from this time until the 340s B.C. indeed illustrated the problem of a fragility of the Achaemenid imperial framework, of which Cyrus and Darius I were certainly not unaware; however, all the suppressions and re-conquests of those rebellions reveal a resilience of the Persian overlords, effectuated with an efficient martial and mustering capacity to move and deploy armies over vast swaths of territories. The Empire at the accession of Darius III may have been economically weaker due to the loss of revenue in some satrapies, but is so, it wasn't exorbitantly so, and the realm was probably no less well administered, nor smaller, than two generations prior; all the aspects of immense resources and centralized commerce (internally within each satrap and their tributary allocations to the Great King) was still under strong and able administrative control from a good Great King (the Empire under Darius III 'was irrefutably not moribund', writes Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire, Pg. 812 of the English edition).

Achaemenid control of Asia Minor had been re-established by 386 B.C., and likewise in Phoenicia and Egypt in the mid-late 340s B.C., and the rising power of Macedon which included incursions east into the regions of Perinthus and Byzantium, was met with Persian aid for defensive measures at the Bosporus Straits, for the time being, which helped stave off that threat. When it was reported to Artaxerxes III of the increasing power of Philip II of Macedon, he reacted to the Macedonian threat with alarm (Diodorus, Bibliotheca Historica, Book 16.75), and Pausanias (the travel writer of the 2nd century A.D.) tells us it was the satrap of Phrygia, Arsites, who sent the mercenary force to aid against Philip's attacks (Description of Greece, Book 1.29.10) on the two major strongholds linking the bridgehead to Asia from Europe.

The direct line of the Achaemenid Royal House was effectively wiped out in 336 B.C., the result of murderous acts of the powerful minister turned vizier Bagoas. The accession of Codomannus (Darius III was immediately assumed as his regal name upon becoming the Great King), was an appointment with an aim of procuring control of the Court of the Great King by the powerful vizier and his associates, including Mentor, who was along with Bogoas a hero in re-conquering Egypt; but Darius III was a member of the royal stock, hence a legitimate Great King. It seems he had been a very capable military leader, something we know thanks to the accounts of Justin, who epitomized the lost works, to our misfortune, of Gnaeus Pompeius Trogus: Justin tells us, Historiarum Philippicarum Libri XLIV, Book 10.3,

"…Possession of the throne was given to Ochus [Artaxerxes III], who, dreading a similar conspiracy, filled the palace with the blood and dead bodies of his kinsmen and the nobility, being touched with compassion neither for consanguinity, nor sex, nor age, lest, apparently, he should be thought less wicked than his brothers that had meditated parricide.

Having thus, as it were, purified his kingdom, he made war upon the Cadusii. In the course of this campaign Codomannus [Darius III], followed by applause from all the Persians, challenged a volunteering enemy soldier in single combat, and, having killed his antagonist, regained the victory for his fellow soldiers, as well as the glory which they had almost lost. For this honorable service Codomannus was made governor of Armenia. Some time after, on the death of Ochus, he was chosen king by the people from regard to his former merits, and, that nothing might be wanting to his royal dignity, honored with the name of Darius. He maintained a long war, with various success, but with great efforts, against Alexander the Great. But being at last overcome by Alexander, and slain by his relations, he terminated his life and the kingdom of the Persians together…"

This is also in Diodorus (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 17.6.1-3, with a slight variance). The last few words there from Justin are not unprejudiced, IMHO, taking them at face value: the organized resistance of Achaemenid authority fell in the face of the formidable Macedonian juggernaut on the huge plain around Gaugamela in October of 331 B.C. (or with a stamp the next year with Alexander's circumvention of the defense mustered at the Persian Gates, then the horrid sack of Persepolis), but Darius III is not personally responsible for the 'termination' of his kingdom, nor his life. He didn't flee cowardly, as many attest: his person was needed for a planned further resistance, hence he was heading to the eastern satrapies once he saw his cause at Gaugamela was hopeless. He was then betrayed, and was overall one of the few not 'incompetent' figures (eg, Gaius Terentius Varro at Cannae, Vercingetorix amid the Gallic revolt, Johann Tserclaes at Breitenfeld) who was unfortunate to lead men in battle against a genius of war. As Great King, Darius III had the capacity to draw on abundant sources of revenue, despite perhaps a weaker economy of his realm than the 'mature' days some six or so generations prior (maybe it wasn't so at all), and he deployed a vast array of military contingents no less ample than the previous generations; he proved he was determined to adapt to changing conditions he identified. His strategy outdid Alexander by flanking the Macedonians and placing his larger force (though not substantially, as even 'revised' accounts claim) astride their communications just before the Battle of Issus (he seems to have been mobilizing a contemporaneous land and sea offensive against Alexander and the Greek League, and Memnon's death may have been a fortunate occurrence for the Greeks). Using elephants at one point, an influence from the eastern subjects of the Indus (though we read nothing of their action, if any took place), was not without tactical credence, and Darius drilled his men with newer weapons more conducive to facing the Macedonians after the lesson of Issus; scythed chariots had worked well before against Hellenic troops (most notably when 700 hoplites, not at the ready, where stymied by 400 Persian horsemen spearheaded by just two scythed chariots, in 395 B.C., at the backdrop of Agesilaus II's incursion in Asia Minor), and when he tried to create initial damage to the enemy with them (clearly not stubbornly banking solely on the chariot charges), he had a huge preponderance in numerical superiority in all arms - and he had even adopted better Greek-style weaponry between the battles fought at Issus and Gaugamela, as Alexander sojourned in Egypt. Moreover, he prudently awaited Alexander to come to his chosen position into the hinterland, as Artaxerxes II did with his younger brother Cyrus within his probable strategy of the famed blood feud of the royal brothers over six decades earlier. Whatever the details of how much Darius III could avail himself of Hellenic mercenary hoplites, or the intricacies behind the kardaces (they were probably lighter than a conventional hoplites, but crack infantrymen of some sort), there is nothing to indicate that Achaemenid levied infantrymen had lost any adeptness since their role in the Battle of Cunaxa in 401 B.C. (even though by the time of Granicus front-line infantry had been replaced by cavalry along a their battle front, perhaps a reflection of the rising supremacy in Macedonian horsemanship, to which they had no heavy foot to stand up to). Darius III was faced with a 'smart bomb' of antiquity to which he could parry no successful answer; Artaxerxes II, with his able subordinates (Tissaphernes was probably the brainchild behind the Cunaxa campaign), was not.

If we can sustain couple substantial snippets from Xenophon, followed by Plutarch (the Carian historian and physician in the Achaemenid Court, Ctesias, was doubtless used and filtered) the army under the Great King's general Teribazus were well-marshaled and disciplined to a degree which amazed the Hellenic 'observers' when the opposing lines were being drawn up; this reeks of irony, because although we know there certainly was not a figure of 900,000 men under Teribazus (cited by Plutarch), Hellenic authors thought so (perhaps disingenuous, if not wholly), thus a superb discipline was exercised here by a 'marshaled' (ie, the type of army typically mustered by the Achaemenid court) army of the astronomical numbers they themselves often believed was the case - one affecting aspect part and parcel of the growing idealization of Panhellenism, and to the whole perception of martial 'Persian inferiority'. Modern estimates, drawing on logistic realities and the simple logic that Cyrus the Younger would not have marched into the hinterland if he knew his older brother could muster such a colossal force, conclude the armies were of similar size, perhaps neither exceeding 60,000 men (the Royal Army was probably larger). The campaign was a huge domestic wrangle, of which the Greek participation is blown far out of proportion by the Greek polemical tradition to their actual role in the campaign.

Xenophon, Anabasis, Book 1.8.12-14, at the onset of the action at Cunaxa,

"...At this moment Cyrus rode along the line, attended only by Pigres, his interpreter, and three or four others, and shouted to Clearchus to lead his army against the enemy's center, for the reason that the King was stationed there; 'and if,' he said, 'we are victorious there, our whole task is accomplished.' Clearchus [the Spartan leader of the 13,600 Greek mercenary force], however, since he saw the compact body at the enemy's center and heard from Cyrus that the King was beyond his left wing (for the King was so superior in numbers that, although occupying the center of his own line, he was beyond Cyrus' left wing), was unwilling to draw the right wing away from the river, for fear that he might be turned on both flanks; and he told Cyrus, in reply, that he was taking care to make everything go well.

At this critical time the King's army was advancing evenly, while the Greek force, still remaining in the same place, was forming its line from those who were still coming up. And Cyrus, riding along at some distance from his army, was taking a survey, looking in either direction, both at his enemies and his friends..."

Plutarch, Life of Artaxerxes, Ch. 7 (more pronounced),

"...As Cyrus proceeded on his march, rumours and reports kept coming to his ears that the king had decided not to give battle at once, and was not desirous of coming to close quarters with him, but rather of waiting in Persia until his forces should assemble there from all parts. For he had run a trench, ten fathoms in width and as many in depth, four hundred furlongs through the plain; and yet he allowed Cyrus to cross this and to come within a short distance of Babylon itself. And it was Teribazus, as we are told, who first plucked up courage to tell the king that he ought not to shun a battle, nor to retire from Media and Babylon, as well as Susa, and hide himself in Persia, when he had a force many times as numerous as that of the enemy, and countless satraps and generals who surpassed Cyrus in wisdom and military skill. The king therefore determined to fight the issue out as soon as possible.

So, to begin with, by his sudden appearance with an army of 900,000 men in brilliant array, he so terrified and confounded the enemy, who were marching along in loose order and without arms because of their boldness and contempt for the king, that Cyrus could with difficulty bring them into battle array amid much tumult and shouting; and again, by leading his forces up slowly and in silence, he filled the Greeks with amazement at his good discipline, since they had expected in so vast a host random shouting, and leaping, with great confusion and dissipation of their lines. Besides this, he did well to draw up in front of his own line, and over against the Greeks, the mightiest of his scythe-bearing chariots, in order that by the force of their charge they might cut to pieces the ranks of the Greeks before they had come to close quarters..."

We are to believe, unless the tacit revealings above of the disciplined ability of the Royal Army are incorrect, under adept generals (Tissaphernes, particularly, who was very familiar with Greek arms) no less, that, upon the advance of the men of bronze, the thousands of men on the Great King's left fled like cowards before the Greeks even came within missile range, which would have meant their execution (many were Egyptian soldiers, far from home)? I don't think so. Many of the chariots which arrived at the Greek ranks were riderless, and Tissaphernes swiftly threw Cyrus' right, now sans the Greeks, into defeat. The Persians could win battles more subtly, and used what they had to work in their favor (such grand tactical maneuvering in antiquity reached a pinnacle with the likes of Hannibal). Basically, the Greek force was drawn away from the main battle, hence effectively isolated far from home, thus in turn, strategically neutralized. The subsequent great journey 'home to the sea' certainly merits legendary status, but that's a separate context, for another time...

At the risk of over-simplifying, the underlying reason, why the organization of the great Achaemenid Persian realm of its 'land' and 'peoples' (empire is an anachronistic term), or the khora basileos (royal territories) of the Great King's arkhe (power) in Greek linguistics, crumbled by early 330 B.C. was not due to any significant element in connexion with 'decadence', 'weakness' or mishandled administration. The Empire of the Great King fell because one of the greatest, standing (ie, professional), balanced, adaptable, and overall most scientifically developed armies of warfare for its era, built by one of the most underestimated men of political and military action of any era (specifically from a reflection of surviving sources), Philip II of Macedon, was launched into Asia led by his far more mercurially fiery, but no less ingenious, son; Alexander was one of the most brilliant yet vainglorious (a necessary attribute for what took place from 334-324 B.C.; plenty more 'humble' leaders would have stopped much further west) battlefield commanders of all time. In the Macedonian-led army of conquest, a cohering military base was established for the invading army under a system of logistical application brilliantly created by a master, and applied by a brilliant practitioner. Alexander was determined with the total conquest of the Achaemenid realm, and Darius III and his subalterns, though afflicted with some extremely circumstantial bad luck, simply could find no military answer against this supreme instrument of war designed with all the aspects which make a flexible and disciplined army of conquest so great. The army of conquest (not one mustered to just win battles, as Greeks basically did before Philip II), to reiterate, had a military genius at its helm, arguably the greatest of all time (if that 'title' must be sought). But a strong spirit did not die in the wake of the transfer of power, and the dynastic outgrowths of Parthia and the Sassanids stood strong against the later aggressions of Rome. At Carrhae in 53 B.C., the superiority of the principles of shock, missile power, and logistics by a horse-army was overtly demonstrated by the Parthians against heavy infantrymen superior to anything that came out of Greece (other than perhaps the hypaspistai, but they were not as preponderant as the best Roman legionaries).

Heavy heavy crack infantryman from rugged NW Iran, the Dailamites (or Daylami, who fought at close-quarters, armed with swords, battle-axes, two-pronged javelins, etc., and wore heavy mail) arrived on the warring scene under the Sassanids, most predominantly under the reign of Khosrau (Khosrow) I in the early 6th century A.D. These heavy infantrymen were a compliment to the vaunted Savaran cavalry (Sassanid knights every bit a match for their Byzantine counterparts). The Dailamites (aluh = 'eagle', amu[kh]t = 'taught') hailed from the rugged terrain of northern Persia (modern Gilan and environs). They are 'the only Persian infantry force positively praised by Greco-Roman sources', writes Dr. Kaveh Farrokh (in his excellent Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, pg. 232, although not as strong on issues concerning the Achaemenids as with later Persian eras).

If the Daylami were indeed descended from the Median Dimilii tribe, the biggest question may be why their capacity to fight as heavy close-quarter infantrymen was never utilized, even marginally, until the c. late 4th century A.D. I wish they received better press. Do you know much about these soldiers? I realize it's far removed from the epoch of the Achaemenids.

Agathias, Histories, Book 3.17.7-9,

"...The Dilimnites are among the largest of the nations on the far side of the Tigris whose territory borders on Persia. They are warlike in the extreme and, unlike most of the Persians, do not fight principally with the bow and the sling. The carry spears and pikes and wear a sword slung across one shoulder. To the left arm they tie a very small dirk and they hold out shields and bucklers to protect themselves with. One could hardly describe them simply as light armed troops, nor for that matter as the type of heavy infantry that fight exclusively at close quarters. For they both discharge missiles at a distance when the occasion arises and engage in hand to hand fighting, and are expert at charging an enemy phalanx and breaking its close-knit ranks with the weight of their charge. They can reform their own ranks with ease and adapt themselves to any contingency. Even steep hills they run up without difficulty thus seizing in advance all points of vantage, and when they are put to flight they escape with lightning rapidity whereas when they are the attackers they press the pursuit with perfect timing and co-ordination. Well-versed as they are in practically every type of warfare they inflict considerable harm to their enemies. They are accustomed for the most part to fight alongside the Persians, though not as the conscript contingents of a subject people since they are in fact free and independent and it is not in their nature to submit to any form of compulsion..."

Moreover, Procopius mentions the Dolomitai infantrymen (in the same context as Agathias, beginning in 551 A.D.) as having shields, yet also wielding swords and three javelins apiece in each hand (as the image above seems to show), and that they were exceptionally nimble in mountain country (Wars of Justinian, Book 8.14.6-9). This particular Persian army is described as, apart from a few men, comprising 'all cavalry' (8.13.4); thus it seems only the Dolomitai made up any of the Persian-led infantry (at least during the Lazic War).

The Dailamites (aluh = 'eagle', amu[kh]t = 'taught') who served the Sassanids (mercenaries, not subjects, as Agathias tells us) usually fought in the Caucasus against enemy incursions (mainly Byzantine and Turkic) into Caucasian Albania (modern Azerbaijan). Agathias seems to describe the 'Dilimnites' as professional and well-drilled in action amid the Lazic War - "the Dilimnites brought round their wings and encircled" a smaller force of Romans and their allies (from Agathias' Histories, Book 3.22.6). Their rows of infantry in battle order revealed large shields painted with sparkling colors, and in facing the enemy their two-pointed javelins (jupin) were their primary weapons. To develop more initiative, the aid of cavalry was necessary and in this facet the Turks rendered a largely unappreciated service. When the power of Sassanian Persia fell to the Arabs by 651 A.D., the Dailamites remained at large, never submitting to the Caliphate. Interestingly, Dailamite arms were roughly the same as those brandished by none other than the vaunted Savaran (not the mailed heavy armor).



Top: I found this depiction of ranks of Dailamite infantry (here, specifically), certianly not considered 'light', but not encumbered so as to preclude their natural swiftness (Agathias, Histories, Book 3.28.7). Directly above: around a millennia earlier, there existed the Achaemenid dathabam (a file of ten men), which followed the Assyrian tradition of archers shooting behind a shield (spara) wall. The shield-bearer (hence sparabara) fought behind his spara with a six-seven ft. spear and, if need be, a long dagger (the akinaka). He was also the dathapatis, the leader of the dathabam (should he fall and enemy soldiers reach them, the archers defended themselves as best as they could with an akinakes, a short sword not unlike the Greek xiphos); ten dathaba constituted the infantry tactical unit known as a satabam; ten sataba of a hundred men formed the thousand-man regiment called a hazarabam; ten hazaraba, in turn, comprised a baivarabam (the convenient 10,000 'myriad' to the Greeks; the Mongol tümen), hence Turkic in origin, was the field army numbering 10,000 men) of which the most renowned was the Amrtaka (the 'Immortals'), who were always kept up to full strength (traditional). Otherwise, the decimal system was certainly not always maintained at these paper-strengths amid campaigns, a military historical reality for all 'parade-strengths' of every national army's organized units. By the early/mid 4th century B.C., this tactical concept had disappeared.

Different scholarly hypotheses can often be equally convincing, and the various explanations often reflect the current beliefs and attitudes of the society in which certain archaeologists and historians live and work. It gets complicated, and Territorial expansion by ancient states is influenced by macro-sociological aspects free of the paramount (though basic) influencing agent of environment (ie, waterways and deltas). There is a great variation in the qualitative and quantitative evidence that different ancient cultures have left for modern archaeological scholarship; Egyptian civilization, throughout its staple periods left great monuments, a wealth of artifacts, and a rich literary legacy (albeit not in prose form), while other cultural centers, such as Meroë and Carthage (the horrifically thorough destruction of the latter in 146 B.C. notwithstanding) are hitherto more mysterious, even staying within conventional science (ie, no Lemuria or Atlantis!). The controversy surrounding the interesting Jiroft theory seems to reflect an overview of what can be seen as independent or part of a whole 'culture' with the various city-states. Much of the evidence of life and warfare in antiquity always entails interpretation, perhaps the strongest 'catalyst' of controversy, if I may; fascinating stuff bequeathed by antiquity is often partial and even contradictory, thus scholars always draw thought-provoking but imprecise conclusions.

Literary and archaeological evidence, and the occasional interjection of circular reasoning (which doesn't always lift the interpretation issue), can often offset each other now and then, and focalized changes can upsurge with newly uncovered data. To each his/her own, though, and many great and differing scholars are a joy to study: passionate disinterest and melancholic yearning both exist among the nostalgic, but that we are availed the balance of more 'balanced' professionals such as Samuel Kramer (Sumer), Ian Shaw (Egypt), Pierre Briant (Achaemenid Persia; I'm sure we can add one Jona Lendering in there, too!), Nicholas G. Hammond (a multitude of topics on Greek warfare!), to name a few, we should consider ourselves quite fortunate. Of course it runs deeper, particularly with ancient Persia (Elamites, Sassanids etc.), and I'm going off on tangents from the issue of Hellas and the Achaemenids for our topic. But I'll never feel bad for thinking so pensively about the indirectly connected aspects of the ancient history of 'Europe' (mainland Greece and Roman eras), the Near East (Asia Minor, Egypt, and Phoenicia, etc.), and 'Asia' (Sumerian and Persian dynasties).

From my view, the multicultural and social issue of 'let's be fair to the Persians' should not be undertaken for the stroking of political correctness per se, at least for students etc. interested in the grand topic who are not political pundits or lobbyists for historical figures and subjects (ie, those who kiss babies and exhort in a manner influenced by their forensic requirements, etc.). Moreover, I feel, such a feeling shouldn’t be coupled with an overlapping denigration of the traditional historiography laid down by Hellenes, of which the advent lay with Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who, whichever school of thought about him various scholars and aficionados, etc., of this subject decide to advocate, was the first to not only adeptly narrate for us an accurate account (historicity beyond the surface will never be proven, particularly in antiquity, and Herodotus' works are not free from unevenness) of a monumental past event, but to imbue it with what he saw as intent, cause, and effect; he was indeed the Father of History, or at least the architect, putatively for his classic The Histories, the first account of prose work we have which can be valued as a tremendous historical source; The Histories, almost certainly, were to be directed at readers rather than listeners, evidenced by the frequent use of the past tense when referring to Herodotus' own time, thereby adopting the perspective of future absorbers of his work. From the get-go Herodotus clearly assumes the role as an historic abutment of Homer. Reliance is almost solely dependent on Herodotus for the great events of the early 5th century B.C. which decided the fate of the overall political course of the eastern Mediterranean Basin and 'Europe'. Moreover, he furnishes much data about Achaemenid Persia in the decades prior; he was well placed to hear and learn much, coming from the Carian port of Halicarnassus, traveling extensively when his mind was mature and knew what he was looking for. But the backdrop isn't exclusive with Herodotus, as professor John F. Lazenby, one the finest modern scholars dealing with the momentous events of ancient Greece and Republican Rome, lucidly writes on the first page of Ch. 1 of his superb The Defence of Greece 490-479 B.C.,

"…The Persian Wars without Herodotus would not so much be Hamlet without the prince, as Hamlet without Shakespeare…"

Food for thought.

Thanks and enjoy, James K MacKinnon