The Whole North Into Gaul

[Renatus]

I should note that I was unable to download the Submission guide to the JRS, I will try again later.

Surprising. Try this link:
http://www.romansociety.org/fileadmin/do...s_2014.doc

[Flavivs Aetivs]

That one worked, I'm going to try to submit it to them or the JRMES next (the latter depends on whether or not they accept studies on battles).

I'd like to ask if you would be willing to look over and edit the article again, as it is going to require a substantial amount of time and work to edit in everything. So far I have gotten together a general format of all the new sections, but I still need to get the evidence and sources together to support them, as well as to update the rest of the article with "modern scholarship."

[Flavivs Aetivs]

I have been researching the possibility of Alemannic participation in the Battle; they are not mentioned by the sources at all, but Attila would have had to pass through their territory in order to get to Gaul.

Reading Drinkwater's The Alamanni and Rome, he suggests that, based on Archaeological evidence, the Alamanni served in the old Roman Limitanei Garrisons on the Rhine. His argument is that these Garrisons had been established (and recruiting Right-Bank Germans) since the 3rd century, and were difficult to uproot, therefore providing an "Arm" of Roman military presence from the Swiss Alps to the North sea, which would have been useful in Aetius' time as a force for checking Barbarians internally, and preventing more from coming into the Empire. He even goes so far as to suggest that the Alamanni provided manpower for Aetius' army.

Although some of this is doubtful (I would imagine that much of the Rhine Frontier was not under direct Roman influence, although it could be supported that it was based on the recapture of Cologne and Trier in the 430's/440's), my interest is that in discussing possible Alamannic participation at Chalons, he says that Geuenich suggests that the "Neckar" part of Sidonius' description of Attila's forces was a rhetorical bit, and these could have been any franks.

This reference would be useful for my article, in the section of Frankish troops participating at the Battle of Chalons. I have determined the Author must be Dieter Geuenich, who writes in German, and the book is from 1997(-ish). Does anyone know of this particular passage and can reference it to me? Even if I could find the text it's in German.

[Renatus]

. . . or the JRMES next (the latter depends on whether or not they accept studies on battles).

Mike Bishop would be the one to tell you about that.

I'd like to ask if you would be willing to look over and edit the article again

Happy to oblige. I'm sure others would be as well.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Thanks Renatus. I plan to spend most of the year re-working the article, now that I know what standards of quality they're looking for and what needs to be added to make this acceptable for publishing.

[Renatus]

. . . he says that Geuenich suggests that the "Neckar" part of Sidonius' description of Attila's forces was a rhetorical bit, and these could have been any franks.

This reference would be useful for my article, in the section of Frankish troops participating at the Battle of Chalons. I have determined the Author must be Dieter Geuenich, who writes in German, and the book is from 1997(-ish). Does anyone know of this particular passage and can reference it to me? Even if I could find the text it's in German.

Doesn't he cite a reference? There are a number of books and articles by Geuenich in his bibliography.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

....
Geuenich, D. (1997a), Geschichte der Alemannen, Stuttgart.

I feel stupid. It was in the references. Now I have to figure out how to get the passage...

EDIT:

Anyone got Stephen Johnson's Late Roman Fortifications? I'm looking for it on the interwebz right now. It's for research on the Walls of Orleans, Troyes, etc.

I have this one Dr. Campbell reccomended on the walls of Orleans (it's free from Google Books):
Les enceintes romaines de la Gaule

However, it's in french. I'm gonna run it through Translate and see what I can pull out of it.

[Michael Kerr]

Hans Delbruck in his book The Barbarian Invasions mentions the Lex Gundobada but there is no reference to the date 451AD as some sort of cut-off point. But he writes about how there were 3 types of agricultural property classifications in 5th Century Gaul. Small farmers who work their farms themselves, medium landholders who no longer work their land themselves but have slaves do the farming and the large landholders who have managers supervise tenants or half free serfs tied to the land as small farmers. He writes.

“Concerning the manner in which the German areas of domination were established in the former Roman provinces in the course of the fifth century, we learn most from the Burgundians, whose Notices of the Chronicles, as well as the articles of a book of laws, the lex Gundobada, have come down to us.
After the Burgundians, who had originally come from eastern Germany, had first settled on the left bank of the Rhine in the area of Worms, where under King Gunther they suffered their legendary defeat by the Huns, a few years later (443AD) they were assigned by Aetius new areas in Sapaudia, that is Savoy. “Spaudia is given to the remnants of the Burgundiones to be divided with the natives” we are told by the chronicler Prosper Tiro.
Fourteen years later (456 0r 457) another chronicler, Marius von Avenches, who was familiar with this region, reports “In this year the Burgundiones occupied part of Gaul and divided that land with the Gallic senators.” Still another, later chronicler, Fredegar, recounts that the Burgundians had come at the invitation of the Romans themselves, who in this way had wished to get rid of their tax burden.
According to these accounts, on both occasions – when they first settled in Savoy and again when they extended their area beyond Lyons and across the Rhone – the Burgundians did not come as conquerors but were settled in agreement with the Romans. The specific provisions under which the settling was to take place have not been preserved for us, but they were related to the forms of the Roman billeting procedure that is mentioned in the sources. Like that procedure they were also called “hospitalitas”; King Gundobad says in his Book of Laws (Title 54): “At the time when our people received one-third of the serfs and two-thirds of the land from the locality where he was assigned a living area.” He also says that this order was disregarded by quite a few; for that reason, it was thereby commanded that the land that had been unrightfully taken from the inhabitants would be returned, so that the previously maltreated Romans would enjoy security.
This is the significant content of the historical source from which we have to form a picture of how the intersettling and establishment of the Germans among the Romans took place, by which the whole course of later history was determined.

Don't know if this helps.

Regards
Michael Kerr

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Thanks Michael.

I"m going to use a lot of Maenchen-Helfen's more recent work On the World of the Huns as well as Heather's works on the Huns, as EA Thompson, although he has some good theories, is outdated.

Reading Maenchen-Helfen, I was thinking about the attempts to retake Africa, and the figures of income from the loss of Africa. Although at first it seems to hit rather hard, you have to account for the fact that the Empire no longer needed to fund an army to defend Africa, so that covers part of the troops cut. Doing the Math 40,000 seems about right at the maximum of troops cut, including the African army (which was decimated and probably combined into the Gallic and Praesental armies to make up for understrength units).

What bugs me is the lack of a navy for the West. In 458 Ricimer defeated a fleet of Vandal pirates off the coast of Corsica. It's reported that Aetius' general Marcellinus had a fleet at Salona. The Notitia, which was updated several times between 395 and 420, records several navies.

I'm wondering if Aetius at some point in the 430's or 440's, either gave the support and maintinence an existing navy needed, or built/bought a small fleet to counter vandal piracy. Thoughts? It would explain where the ships in 458 came from.

[Michael Kerr]

Hi Evan, below is a link to paper discussing late empire army & military stuff. I don't know much about late empire but writer seems well informed & may contain information which you might find useful regarding collapse of tax base in late Western Empire & he has bibliography of books which you might find useful in your research.

http://usna.edu/Users/history/abels/hh38...LL_OF_THE_
Regards
Michael Kerr

[Flavivs Aetivs]

I've done a lot in the past few days, right now I've got several paragraphs of information for each of the foederatic groups, which I plan to add more sources to and edit. I'm am in the process of re-working my section on the Roman Army. This is what I have so far:

However, neither the composition nor the forces contributed to the battle by the Roman field army are recorded by any contemporary author, save Sidonius Apollinaris, who writes:

"Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meager force of auxiliaries without one Roman soldier, vainly and with ill-starred confidence in expecting that the Gothic host would join his camp."

This description certainly does not match that of the once prestigious western army of the fourth century, or of Aetius’ previous campaigns. It also brings up another question, were these forces even Roman? One can make the argument that the Romans still had central field armies at the time, while others have suggested that the Roman army was gone by the time of the battle. Determining definitively what the Roman army was like at this time is impossible, but extensive research has been done into the issue.

Manpower seems to have been the biggest problem at the time, coupled with paying the soldiers already in service. Drinkwater suggests Alemanni may have provided manpower for the army of Flavius Aetius, as the established garrisons along the Rhine provided continued defense against external threats, as well as checks on new internal ones. Ian Hughes suggests that the frequent victories the army experienced under the reign of Aetius would have encouraged recruitment, and manpower wouldn’t have been as significant of an issue because casualties were lower in battles that were won. Either way, it seems that a significant portion of the army was made up of either foederati¸ or barbarians recruited as professional soldiers. Sidonius Apollinaris states that:

"There the Herulian found in thee his match in fleetness, the Hun in javelin throwing, the Frank in swimming, the Sarmatian in use of shield, the Salian in marching, the Gelonian in wielding the scimitar; and in bearing of wounds thou didst surpass any mourning barbarian to whom wailing means self-wounding and tearing the cheeks with steel and gouging the red traces of scars on his threatening face."

Although he makes a does an excellent job of making Avitus seem gifted in the martial arts, there is some truth in this passage. First, looking that he distinguishes between the Salian Franks and the Franks in general, it would seem that he was referring to the Salii as a group of foederati under their own command. The Franks, then, may have been troops recruited into Roman units, just like Romans would have been. Sarmatians are to be expected, this likely again refers to the Alans of Goar and Sambida, who had recently campaigned in Armorica. The Gelonian is a rhetorical device in this instance, and will later be used by Sidonius to describe forces in Attila’s invasion of Gaul. Heruli, however, are surprising. One possibility is that these Heruli were troops serving in Aetius’ Hunnic bucellarius, as the ethnogensis of the Huns could have incorporated Heruls into the standard “Hun” ethnicity. This would further be supported by Orestes’ service at the Hunnic court, who was of Herulic origin. The argument that the field army was no longer composed of Roman troops, at this point, is very strong and likely the case.

Sidonius does provide another reference, which would support the theory that Aetius’ “few and sparse auxiliaries” were actually auxilia palatina, not limitanei. This passage is regarding that Aetius’ bucellarii had been combined into the Palatine bands, and that Majoran had been appointed comes domesticorum in order that he might win over them. The claim that they were “without one roman soldier” could reference the fact that although they were professional Roman infantry, the individual milites were not recruited of Roman stock.Liebschuetz also argues that the garrison forces in the various imperial towns and cities were of Roman stock, or at least Roman regiments manned by Germans, even though the field armies were not.

However, this also comes to the point that the entire tactics of the Roman Army had changed. The contemporary sources show that Aetius favored aggressive campaigning, and so did his generals. Litorius surprised the Gothic forces besieging Narbonne in 437, and defeated them before the Goths could form a battle line. Mons Colubrarius, in 438, routed the Visigoths after a successful ambush, and in 444 the Battle of Vicus Helena surprised the Frankish King Chlodio in the middle of a celebration. Furthermore, the Romans continued to rely on their skills in siege warfare, in both defending and attacking, to defeat their enemies. Majoran successfully defeated a Frankish siege of Tournai in 444 with the local garrison, and the Roman defense of Aquileia almost resulted in the complete abandonment of the campaign of 452 by Attila. The change in Roman tactics in the 5th century shows how the Romans were adapting to both fight the federates, and to utilize these federates effectively.

What do you guys think so far?

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Okay, messed up. I meant to hit the "edit" button, but accidentally hit the "delete" button instead.

I've done a lot in adding new sections to the article, which I will go back and revise over time, but am currently working on my section on Aetius' army. what do you think?

However, neither the composition nor the forces contributed to the battle by the Roman field army are recorded by any contemporary author, save Sidonius Apollinaris, who writes:

“Aetius had scarce left the Alps, leading a thin, meager force of auxiliaries without one Roman soldier, vainly and with ill-starred confidence in expecting that the Gothic host would join his camp.”
-Sidonius Apollinaris, Carmina 7.329

This description certainly does not match that of the once prestigious western army of the fourth century, or of Aetius’ previous campaigns. It also brings up another question, were these forces even Roman? One can make the argument that the Romans still had central field armies at the time, while others have suggested that the Roman army was gone by the time of the battle. Determining definitively what the Roman army was like at this time is impossible, but extensive research has been done into the issue.

Manpower seems to have been the biggest problem at the time, coupled with paying the soldiers already in service. Drinkwater suggests Alemanni may have provided manpower for the army of Flavius Aetius, as the established garrisons along the Rhine provided continued defense against external threats, as well as checks on new internal ones. Ian Hughes suggests that the frequent victories the army experienced under the reign of Aetius would have encouraged recruitment, and manpower wouldn’t have been as significant of an issue because casualties were lower in battles that were won. Either way, it seems that a significant portion of the army was made up of either foederati¸ or barbarians recruited as professional soldiers. Regarding Aetius' campaign against the Burgundians in 436, Sidonius Apollinaris states that:

“There the Herulian found in thee his match in fleetness, the Hun in javelin throwing, the Frank in swimming, the Sarmatian in use of shield, the Salian in marching, the Gelonian in wielding the scimitar; and in bearing of wounds thou didst surpass any mourning barbarian to whom wailing means self-wounding and tearing the cheeks with steel and gouging the red traces of scars on his threatening face.”
- Sid. Apol. Carm. 7.235

Although he makes a does an excellent job of making Avitus seem gifted in the martial arts, there is some truth in this passage. First to note is that he distinguishes between the Salian Franks and the Franks in general, it would seem that he was referring to the Salii as a group of foederati under their own command. The Franks, then, may have been troops recruited into Roman units, just like Romans would have been. Next are the Sarmatians, who are to be expected, as this likely again refers to the Alans of Goar and Sambida, who had recently campaigned in Armorica. The Gelonian is a rhetorical device in this instance, and will later be used by Sidonius to describe forces in Attila’s invasion of Gaul. Heruli, however, are surprising. One possibility is that these Heruli were troops serving in Aetius’ Hunnic bucellarius, as the ethnogensis of the Huns could have incorporated Heruls into the standard “Hun” ethnicity. This would further be supported by Orestes’ service at the Hunnic court, who was of Herulic origin. The argument that the field army was no longer composed of Roman troops, at this point, is very strong and likely the case.

Sidonius does provide another reference, which would support the theory that Aetius’ “few and sparse auxiliaries” were actually auxilia palatina, not limitanei. This passage is regarding that Aetius’ bucellarii had been combined into the Palatine bands, and that Majoran had been appointed comes domesticorum in order that he might win over them. The claim that they were “without one roman soldier” could reference the fact that although they were professional Roman infantry, the individual milites were not recruited of Roman stock. Liebschuetz also argues that the garrison forces in the various imperial towns and cities were of Roman stock, or at least Roman regiments manned by Germans, even though the field armies were not.

However, this also comes to the point that the entire tactics of the Roman Army had changed. The contemporary sources show that Aetius favored aggressive campaigning, and so did his generals. Litorius surprised the Gothic forces besieging Narbonne in 437, and defeated them before the Goths could form a battle line. Mons Colubrarius, in 438, routed the Visigoths after a successful ambush, and in 444 the Battle of Vicus Helena surprised the Frankish King Chlodio in the middle of a celebration. Furthermore, the Romans continued to rely on their skills in siege warfare, in both defending and attacking, to defeat their enemies. Majoran successfully defeated a Frankish siege of Tournai in 444 with the local garrison, and the Roman defense of Aquileia almost resulted in the complete abandonment of the campaign of 452 by Attila. The change in Roman tactics in the 5th century shows how the Romans were adapting to both fight the federates, and to utilize these federates effectively.

However to determine a troop count, one needs to look at the Roman force, and account for what nations were already serving as foederati at the time. Jones puts the size of the Gallic army, according to the Notitia, at 34,000 men. However, Heather’s numbers for the loss of Africa state that the Romans may have had to cut as many as 40,000 men from their armies. It is likely that the Romans chose to cut these troops and call upon the foederati for service, to partially supplement the loss of Roman troops. The Empire, from this point forward, was in dire financial straits, and the coffers were usually empty. To supplement the sudden lack of troops, Valentinian III passed two edicts allowing Roman citizens the right to bear arms, keep any equipment taken from an enemy slain in the field, and assured them they would not be obligated to go on a campaign. At first, this actually seems like it would be more beneficial than detrimental, returning to them their ‘martial spirit.’ However, the right to bear arms had only been revoked in 364, and it likely had no effect on the Roman culture at all. The ability to keep the equipment of the slain likely only promoted the use of bucellari and federates by the possessores.

What do you guys think so far?

[Flavivs Aetivs]

Hey guys, I'm looking for the Novella Valentiniani - although I have the Codex Theodosiani, I don't have any of the subsequent Novels for the individual emperors that record laws passed.

I have not found it online so far, but I am still looking. Google don't fail me now!

[Renatus]

If you can get hold of a copy of Pharr's translation of the Theodosian Code, you will find them there. Failing that, I have one and, if you can tell me which one you're interested in, I can let you have it. Failing that again, I can give you a link to the Latin text. I have not checked it but it seems to list the chapters individually, so again you may need to know what you're looking for.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

If you link me to the Latin text I can work with it from there.