The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[Nathan Ross]

Had Caesar already dispatched his forward units before that ill-fated Ides of March?

Apparently so. The Appian excerpt diegis quoted above (Civil Wars II.110) says that Caesar "sent across the Adriatic in advance sixteen legions of foot and 10,000 horse", in readiness for war against first the Getae and then Parthia.

Later in Appian III.24 we learn that this force was stationed in Macedonia and "consisted of six legions, besides a great number of archers and light-armed troops, much cavalry, and a corresponding amount of apparatus of all kinds." After Caesar's death, Antony used the ruse of a rumoured Getic invasion (which actually didn't exist) to have himself appointed commander of this army. He then brought it back across to Brundisium and tried to use it against the 'Liberators'. Four of the legions ended up following him, while two defected to Octavian.

So why the discrepancy between the sixteen legions supposedly sent by Caesar and the six brought back by Antony? Syme reckons (here) that the sixteen were actually all the legions in the entire eastern empire, including Syria. The six were the 'field force' intended for use against the Getae and Parthians.

After the fall of Boadicea, the Empire... went through gradual decline in incremental stages... Britannia that Nero and others had a fetish with, ultimately caused the unseen force that pushed the Empire in a dreaded economical collapse.

Suetonius (Nero 17.1) tells us that Nero considered withdrawing the army from Britain, either because of Boudica or because the province was too expensive, perhaps. Britain was a poor investment at first, but by the third century it was wealthy and prosperous compared to much of mainland Europe, and a major food producer. Ammianus Marcellinus (18.2.3) mentions that by the fourth century the army on the Rhine was supported largely by provisions imported directly from Britain.

Caesar admired the feats and achievements of Alexander the Great. And he pledged he would be greater, and he was.

Caesar's fixation with Alexander the Great was shared by a bewildering number of Roman leaders and emperors, many of whom led vast and costly invasions of Parthia and Persia in emulation of their hero which nearly always ended in disaster. Trajan overstretched himself and died, Lucius Verus brought back a plague that decimated the empire (and killed him), and Julian's foolhardy invasion led to his own death and considerable attrition of the army in the east. If Julian had not invaded Persia, would the army have been in better shape to resist the Goths in 378? If the Goths had been repulsed would they have acted as a buffer against the Huns?...

In fact, Alexander-worship could almost be cited a major contribution to the decline of the Roman army and the eventual fall of the empire... ;-)

But that's a different topic!

[M. Demetrius]

But that's my point. They joined in the mutiny against Caesar.

I read a book once named Caesar's Legion, that sounds a lot like what you're saying (although in includes the mutiny episode). The writer of that book is not considered very historically credible. He makes opinion statements but makes them look like facts, when often they are not factual at all.

Of course, you can believe that LXE would have become a "legion if triarii" if you wish, but that does not make it so.

[Burzum]

Caesar's fixation with Alexander the Great was shared by a bewildering number of Roman leaders and emperors, many of whom led vast and costly invasions of Parthia and Persia in emulation of their hero which nearly always ended in disaster. Trajan overstretched himself and died, Lucius Verus brought back a plague that decimated the empire (and killed him), and Julian's foolhardy invasion led to his own death and considerable attrition of the army in the east. If Julian had not invaded Persia, would the army have been in better shape to resist the Goths in 378? If the Goths had been repulsed would they have acted as a buffer against the Huns?...

In fact, Alexander-worship could almost be cited a major contribution to the decline of the Roman army and the eventual fall of the empire... ;-)

But that's a different topic!

That is a very um, daring? Hypothesis.

I do not believe that Caesar would of failed in conquering Persia.

His ambition and military genius in his time proves.

And I will state my opinion that he was greatest of all Roman generals.

But if I must comment on your hypothesis, I will not direct brash comments directly at you, because I that theory is asserted by many. But I find rather naive to say that his ambition in the pending invasion of Parthia caused his death after a time where he decimated Gaul and stamped the Roman eagle of power in Gallic soil. This would of if anything, struck zeal in the hearts of Roman people and whilst this isn't shared by a select few in the Senate, most were actually in full support of Caesar.

My hypotheses on this subject states that, the power of Rome was governed by shadowy figures as are governments today. And the very idea of extending a Roman empire in the fringes of India and beyond didn't serve their ideology and plan.

Caesar was a powerful cancer of influence and creed the people loved, getting stronger day by day... that is what caused his death.

But again that is an entirely different topic than what this thread is about. Which you could say Rome's greatest enemy was herself. Period.

[Nathan Ross]

The writer of that book is not considered very historically credible.

No, not very! Dando-Collins has been discussed here often enough, of course. But the mutinies were in 47BC, when Caesar was trying to keep his legions in service and lead them off to Africa. He managed to calm things down, and discharged many of his veterans then and the rest a couple of years later (Chrissanthos, 'Caesar and the Mutiny of 47BC' (2001) provides a good summary of events).

The army in Macedonia in 44BC was composed of legions uninvolved with the earlier mutinies (only V Alaudae and Legio Martia are named in the sources). They all opposed Caesar's murder, but some of them followed Octavian and the rest Antony. They all ended up on the same side in the end though!

[EDIT - Sorry, David - I wasn't sure whether you were responding to my last post or Burzum's!]

[Nathan Ross]

I do not believe that Caesar would of failed in conquering Persia.

Well, that's one of the great unknowns of history!

But I find rather naive to say that his ambition in the pending invasion of Parthia caused his death after a time where he decimated Gaul and stamped the Roman eagle of power in Gallic soil.

There was a connection, I think. Caesar's power in Rome depending very much on his presence: there were far too many ambitious and jealous men in the senate who would have taken the opportunity of a lengthy absence to make a bid for control. Besides, many of these same senators believed that Caesar intended to make himself into a Hellenistic-style monarch. Leading a vast army into the east (always an impressive, and impressionable, place for those with monarchic aspirations) would have convinced many waverers that this was his intention.

In fact, much the same thing happened to Antony, who was apparently following Caesar's plan for the eastern campaign. But we would hope that Caesar would not have dallied so long in the fleshpots of the east with Cleopatra, enjoying his godlike status and thereby wasting the campaign season...

Which you could say Rome's greatest enemy was herself. Period.

Yes you could!

But you're quite right, we're waaay off topic now!

[Alexand96]

[quote="Burzum" post=328552]
I do not believe that Caesar would of failed in conquering Persia.

His ambition and military genius in his time proves.

And I will state my opinion that he was greatest of all Roman generals.
[quote]

What, no love for Scipio Africanus? After all, it's one thing to subdue barbarians and beat out an over-priveleged, over-the-hill has-been, and quite another to turn around a nation on the brink, while simultaneously out-generaling perhaps the greatest general to ever live...all at a very young age. ;-)

But yeah, about Dacia...

[Dan Howard]

I can't think of anyone ending every speech in the Senate with "Dacia must be destroyed".

[Alexand96]

I can't think of anyone ending every speech in the Senate with "Dacia must be destroyed".

Ha!

[Frostwulf]

@Nathan Ross
Thank you for finding Syme and the Appian link mile: , nicely done!

[Frostwulf]

As usual dont have much time so I will reply you now just to this

I sympathize with you, as I have the same problem, hence the time between my replies.

I gived you just primary sources, which some of historians you quoted seem to not know or connect them or you seem to not quote them properly.

You gave me "some" primary sources, certainly not all. This is the reason I seek the professional opinion because they generally have the bigger picture, as you will now see. It was not they nor I(not quoting them properly) that the mistake is with.

So let me tell you again. When Caesar was governor of Ilyria (and Galia Cisalpina and Transalpina) Dacians used to plunder at will Roman provinces as Macedonia and Ilyria, as Strabo I think say. However, Caesar, which was the governor in Ilyria, avoided to make any campaign against Dacians. 7.3.11

Roman provinces were not raided during the reign of Burebista:

And he began to be formidable even to the Romans, because he would cross the Ister with impunity and plunder Thrace as far as Macedonia and the Illyrian country; and he not only laid waste the country of the Celti who were intermingled2 with the Thracians and the Illyrians, but actually caused the complete disappearance of the Boii3 who were under the rule of Critasirus,4 and also of the Taurisci.5 To help him secure the complete obedience of his tribe he had as his coadjutor

He plundered as "far as" but not including Macedonia and Illyria(least not the Roman part). Have another quote about this further down. Please note, this is of Burebista as king, nothing before or after.

He abandoned the situation in Ilyria and chose a weaker, more easier prey, Ariovistus and Gauls, both to escape the pressure home because of his inaction against Dacians, and to get some money and glory as he wasnt quite OK financially from what i understand. Going against Getae he knew he have more chances to end at least without any glory or money if not worse.

Here is Goldsworthy's quote which you may think I posted incorrectly:

In 58 BC it was not obvious where Caesar’s campaigns would lead him. He had first been granted Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum as his province, and Transalpine Gaul was only added after the sudden death of its governor. Caesar’s original intention may well have been a Balkan campaign, probably to curb the growing power of the Dacian king Burebista, who was carving out a powerful empire around his heartland in what is now Transylvania. The region was wealthy, and scarcely explored by Roman armies, offering the glory attached to defeating a people never before encountered. He may well have been planning to advance in that direction, both in 58 BC and in later years, but events continued to provide him with ready opportunities for military adventures in Gaul, and the Balkan expedition never took place. Even so, it never left Caesar’s mind, for he was planning to move against Dacia in 44 BC when he was assassinated. Pg197

As you see he is hardly ignorant of the situation of Caesar and Illyricum, he also in earlier pages explains in detail how Caesar achieved getting Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and Transalpine Gaul.

So why does Goldsworthy, Matthias Gelzer(Caesar Politician and Statesman pg.82), James Sabben-Clare, C.Matthias(Caesar,C. Goudinau (Cesar et la Gaule) come to this conclusion of Caesar preparing to attack Burebista:

The province of Illyria incorporated little more than the strip of Dalmatian coast captured at the end of the third century and spasmodically patrolled thereafter so as to discourage piracy. The hinterland was not conquered until the time of Augustus. The country as a whole was extremely poor, but because of its proximity to Italy was sometimes treated as a training area for Roman arms. Pg.38

The province of Illyria by itself could not offer Caesar very much scope and it seems more likely that his reason for taking it was to enable him to come to grips with the expanding empire of the Getae. These people came from the Danube basin and seem to have been spreading their influence westwards at about this time under their king Burebistas. Pg39

Yet in the spring of 58 BC there was every sign that Caesar was wrong-footed by the Helvetii. Perhaps he had been surprised by the timing of the migration, or maybe its sheer scale. He had four legions at his command, but only one of these was in Transalpine Gaul. The remaining three were camped near Aquileia on the border of Cisalpine Gaul nearest to Illyricum. It is not known who stationed the troops there, but even if it had not been Caesar, then he had made no effort to alter this disposition. Even when he hastened to the Rhone he made no effort to send new orders to these troops. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he was still thinking very much in terms of a Balkan campaign. Perhaps it was only when he arrived near Geneva that he appreciated the full scale of the problem. The Helvetii and the allied clans who joined them in the migration had piled their possessions into wagons and set off with great purpose. Pg.209

Caesar’s Illyrian provance is easily forgotten in face of his achievements in Gaul, but it had been assigned to him before Transalpine Gaul and it did offer immediate prospects of conquest; what is more, at the beginning of his command he had three legions stationed at Aquileia, the natural starting point for any campaign beyond the north-east frontier. Pg.66

Caesar was given governorship in 59 and was married shortly after that. He had 3 legions in place that could strike NE, so why didn't he? Well as Goldsworthy already stated the Helvetii came into play and Caesar had to force march north to meet the menace.

The situation that developed in Gaul effectively prevented Caesar from undertaking an Illyrian campaign at this time (see next chapter). However when thirteen years later his supremacy was finally established at Rome, he seems to have planned another eastern offensive, which may shed some light on his intentions in 58. Pg.41

After the Belgian campaign Caesar regarded the conquest of Gaul as virtually complete (see below), and he could take another look at the Illyrian situation. As a preliminary he sent Galba to open a route through the Alps which would give his troops direct access to Cisalpine Gaul and beyond, while he himself conducted a personal reconnaissance (winter 57/56). Pg.66

Caesar even went to Illyricum, why bother if he was afraid? The Roman territory was not yet in jeopardy. There are other things to consider, such as just before the civil war Caesar(or at least his allies) were willing to give up Gaul, but not Illyria! Then of course there is this:

I think that other Illyrian tribes besides those mentioned had previously come under Roman rule, but how, I do not know. Augustus did not describe the transactions of others so much as his own, telling how he brought back those who had revolted and compelled them again to pay tribute, how he subjugated others that had been independent from the beginning, and how he mastered all the tribes that inhabit the summits of the Alps, barbarous and warlike peoples, who often plundered the neighboring parts of Italy.

It is a wonder to me that so many great Roman armies traversing the Alps to conquer the Gauls and Spaniards, should have overlooked these tribes, and that even Gaius [Julius] Caesar, that most successful man of war, did not dispatch them during the ten years that he was fighting the Gauls and wintering in that very country. But the Romans seem to have been intent only upon getting through the Alpine region on the business they were bestirring themselves about, and Caesar seems to have delayed putting an end to the Illyrian troubles on account of the Gallic war and the strife with Pompey, which closely followed it. It appears that he was chosen commander of Illyria as well as of Gaul - not the whole of it, but as much as was then under Roman rule. [§15]

Yes this is speaking of the Illyrians, but if he couldn't take care of them because of the Gallic war and Pompey, he hardly could have gone after the Dacians either.

[Frostwulf]

I had to do this in pieces as I couldn't get it to post otherwise.

When Caesar became Dictator on life (Emperor, just not officially) and had all the Roman army at his comand, just then he considered is able to attack Getae/Dacians. For this, beside those 6 legions already in Macedonia (and I assume there was some troops in Illyira as well) he send from Italy in Illyria (this is over the Adriatic) another 16 legions and 10,000 cavalrymen. Appian said he send those troops in advance of his arrival (so is possible he may come with some others too) for the attack of Dacia, first in his list, second beeing Parthia.

Again Syme as well as Gelzer say that the 6 legions of Macedonia were the ones to be used against Burebista and the Parthians.The other legions were used elsewhere, not for the battles against Dacia and the Parthians.

Antony, thinking that he should soon need troops for his own purposes, conceived the idea of transferring to himself the army in Macedonia, which was composed of the very best material and was of large size (it consisted of six legions, besides a great number of archers and light-armed troops, much cavalry, and a corresponding amount of apparatus of all kinds), although it properly belonged to Dolabella, who had been entrusted with Syria and the war against the Parthians, because Caesar was about to use these forces against the Parthians. Antony wanted it especially because it was close at hand, and, by crossing the Adriatic, could be thrown at once into Italy.

See what Nathan Ross wrote:
http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/25-alli...=75#328546

Teutoni and Cimbri was a threat, indeed. But that was mostly because of the stupidity of the patricians from Roman Senate who refused to let Marius to deal with them from the first time and keep sending all kind of incompetent generals on only base that they have a noble origin. Anyway, after that Germans was more of a threat in propaganda then for real. Thats why for example Vegetius dont mention them (or Celts for that matter) in his De Re Militari.

I have to disagree about all the Roman generals(Carbo), but as far as Vegetius and no mention of Gauls or Germans:

Victory in war does not depend entirely upon numbers or mere courage; only skill and discipline will insure it. We find that the Romans owed the conquest of the world to no other cause than continual military training, exact observance of discipline in their camps and unwearied cultivation of the other arts of war. Without these, what chance would the inconsiderable numbers of the Roman armies have had against the multitudes of the Gauls? Or with what success would their small size have been opposed to the prodigious stature of the Germans? The Spaniards surpassed us not only in numbers, but in physical strength. We were always inferior to the Africans in wealth and unequal to them in deception and stratagem. And the Greeks, indisputably, were far superior to us in skill in arts and all kinds of knowledge.

Marius wasnt for sure afraid of them. And about Caesar just keep in mind he avoided the Getae/Dacians but go with no problem against Suebii of Ariovistus and even go over the Rhine in proper Germania. Just later when he became the sole ruler of Rome he planned to finally fight Dacians, but for that he assembled a huge army

Marius himself may not have been afraid:

This was his language in private to his officers and equals; but he would station his soldiers on the fortifications by detachments, bidding them to observe the enemy, and in this way accustomed them not to fear their shape or dread their cries, p505which were altogether strange and ferocious; and to make themselves acquainted with their equipment and movements, thus in the course of time rendering what was only apparently formidable familiar to their minds from observation. For he considered that their novelty falsely imparts to terrifying objects many qualities which they do not possess, but that with familiarity even those things which are really dreadful lose their power to affright. 3 And so in the case of his soldiers, not only did the daily sight of the enemy lessen somewhat their amazement at them, but also, when they heard the threats and the intolerable boasting of the Barbarians, their anger rose and warmed and set on fire their spirits; for the enemy were ravaging and plundering all the country round, and besides, often attacked the Roman fortifications with great temerity and shamelessness, so that indignant speeches of his soldiers reached the ears of Marius.

Of course the rest about Caesar has been answered, had it not been for the Gallic war and civil war, Burebista would have been defeated.

no offence my friend, but what on earth are you talking about? Alexander didnt crush anything (maybe just some crops according to ancient authors), he had a campaign of just one day over the Danube. He managed to pass the big river by surprise and so he surprised the Dacian army who retreated, evacuating a nearby town along the way. Macedonians plundered quickly the emptied town but carefully not followed the Dacians (even if those was supposedly slowed down) for a fight deeper in their teritory. Imediatly after that and before the night fall Alex take his army back to south of Danube, and then prefered to sign a treaty with Dacians instead of make any other military move against them.
And he even say publicly that Dacians must be shunned, as Orosius mentioned (using probably sources that are lost today)

So he saw and feel something that make him think twice before go to a war against Getae. This proved to be a correct decision, as his general Zopyrion, left in charge in Thracia will be killed later with all his army (30,000 soldiers) by Getae. Then Lysimachos, one of the Diadochi, was defeated twice. In last campaign he used an army as big as 100,000 soldiers according with contemporary sources (posibly an exageration, but still an army at least as big as the one used by Alex in his Persia campaign if made such impression to contemproans). Getae king was Dromichaites who used a strategy that was a masterpiece that allowed him to kill and capture all Macedonian army, including Lysimachus, with little to none losses for him.
So yes, Pyrrhus dread the Getae after all these, and tried his luck against the Romans

You are correct about Alexander, my mistake. As for the other 2, you have to be joking considering the situation both Lysimachos and Zopyrion were in. Hardly a great military victory for the Geto/Dacians over Lysimachos or Zopyrion. Politically it was a great victory, militarily, not at all.

As far as Orosius, I think he may have been speaking of Gratian, either that or he just didn't understand the situation with J.Caesar. After all he was writing hundreds of years after the fact and didn't have the resources we have today, as most of his material is derived from Livy.

I will go with Strobel or Schmitz on this, and make my own idea by comparing periods, number of troops, primary sources and battles.

You are happy to go with Strobel and Schmitz on Roman numbers but not for Dacian numbers. Can you show me anywhere where Stobel or Schmitz say anything about the Dacians being a threat to Rome beyond the provinces they were next to?

[Frostwulf]

And Romans offer them the ultimate praise, considering them the true image of Mars, their mythical father and god of war who was born among Dacians/Getae, the most warlike race that ever existed, living in a land ruled by the same god of war.

The fable of Mars is fine, I believe it started with Virgil and grew from there(I could be wrong). The quote you use for Trajan is comical, and I mean that in a real sense. I read where it came from, a comedy written by Julian!

Julian The Caesars :
http://www.attalus.org/translate/caesars.html#320
The emperor Julian wrote this short comic sketch on the occasion of the Saturnalia, in December 361 A.D. It describes a contest between the Roman emperors, with Alexander the Great called in as an extra contestant, in the presence of the assembled gods. The conversation allows Julian to pass judgement concisely on many of his predecessors.

Stung by the taunt, since he was not deficient in eloquence, though intemperance often made him seem more stupid than he was, Trajanus began again. "O Zeus and ye other gods, when I took over the empire it was in a sort of lethargy and much disordered by the tyranny that had long prevailed at home, and by the insolent conduct of the Getae. I alone ventured to attack the tribes beyond the Danube, and I subdued the Getae, the most warlike race that ever existed, which is due partly to their physical courage, partly to the doctrines that they have adopted from their admired Zamolxis. For they believe that they do not die but only change their place of abode, and they meet death more readily than other men undertake a journey. Yet I accomplished that task in a matter of five years or so. [328] That of all the Emperors who came before me I was regarded as the mildest in the treatment of my subjects, is I imagine, obvious, and neither Caesar here nor any other will dispute it with me. Against the Parthians I thought I ought not to employ force until they had put themselves in the wrong, but when they did so I marched against them, undeterred by my age, though the laws would have allowed me to quit the service. Since then the facts are as I have said, do I not deserve to be honoured before all the rest, first because I was so mild to my subjects, secondly because more than others I inspired terror in my country's foes, thirdly because I revered your daughter divine Phiosophy?" When Trajanus had finished this speech the gods decided that he excelled all the rest in clemency; and evidently this was a virtue peculiarly pleasing to them.

Trajan never said that, it was all made up by Julian as a comedy!

Now lets talk about real history:

In the same winding tract of Germany live the Cimbrians, close to the ocean; a community now very small, but great in fame. Nay, of their ancient renown, many and extensive are the traces and monuments still remaining; even their entrenchments upon either shore, so vast in compass that from thence you may even now measure the greatness and numerous bands of that people, and assent to the account of an army so mighty. It was on the six hundred and fortieth year of Rome, when of the arms of the Cimbrians the first mention was made, during the Consulship of Caecilius Metellus and Papirius Carbo. If from that time we count to the second Consulship of the Emperor Trajan, the interval comprehends near two hundred and ten years; so long have we been conquering Germany. In a course of time, so vast between these two periods, many have been the blows and disasters suffered on each side. In truth neither from the Samnites, nor from the Carthaginians, nor from both Spains, nor from all the nations of Gaul, have we received more frequent checks and alarms; nor even from the Parthians: for, more vigorous and invincible is the liberty of the Germans than the monarchy of the Arsacides. Indeed, what has the power of the East to allege to our dishonour; but the fall of Crassus, that power which was itself overthrown and abased by Ventidius, with the loss of the great King Pacorus bereft of his life? But by the Germans the Roman People have been bereft of five armies, all commanded by Consuls; by the Germans, the commanders of these armies, Carbo, and Cassius, and Scaurus Aurelius, and Servilius Caepio, as also Marcus Manlius, were all routed or taken: by the Germans even the Emperor Augustus was bereft of Varus and three legions. Nor without difficulty and loss of men were they defeated by Caius Marius in Italy, or by the deified Julius in Gaul, or by Drusus or Tiberius or Germanicus in their native territories. Soon after, the mighty menaces of Caligula against them ended in mockery and derision. Thenceforward they continued quiet, till taking advantage of our domestic division and civil wars, they stormed and seized the winter entrenchments of the legions, and aimed at the dominion of Gaul; from whence they were once more expulsed, and in the times preceding the present, we gained a triumph over them rather than a victory.

This book was written around 98 AD, and in this chapter he mentions Samnites, Carthaginians, Gauls, Parthians and Spaniards, all very potent enemies. This is around 120 years after Burebista and around 10 years after Decebalus and no mention about the Dacians when talking about their fiercest enemies. Probably because Tacitus was worried about threats to Rome, not just threats of a locality.

[Frostwulf]

If we going to label a true enemy and one that actually proved to be a thorn in the Roman empire, I'll have to say the Celts and Picts.

The Teuteberg massacre and battles similar were once off incidents and poorly led by low quality command.

Varus did make a poor choice and that is what got him and most of his men killed, but he was hardly incompetent. Read my above quote from Tacitus, then look into the "Germani" situation such as the Lollian disaster, Frisian revolt, Chatti uprising(later on wars),Batavi uprising, the Marcomannic wars and many many more.

[diegis]

I can't think of anyone ending every speech in the Senate with "Dacia must be destroyed".

Well, it is good as well to look at a map and see how was Roman Republic during Hannibal wars (meaning it didnt control even the whole Italy, were some parts joined Hannibal camp) and how was Roman Empire during Dacian wars (meaning it was a collosus spread from Germania to Sudan and from Britania to Mesopotamia).

Kinda different categories, if you wish a more colorful comparation, during Hannibal era Rome was some middleweight boxer still fighting his way to win the belt. During wars with Decebalus Rome was already the uncontested heavyweight champion of the world. And yet he lost the first match. It was needed a rematch with a big extra time round to finally obtain a victory

[Dan Howard]

To summarise this thread, the answer to the OPs question is "not even close". There is a list of enemies from various periods in Rome's history that historians consider more of a threat than Dacia. There is a list of enemies from various periods in Rome's history that they themselves considered more of a threat than Dacia.