The "Fred thread": the Argead Macedonian Army

[Paralus]

But in Polybius, ‘euzanoi’/unencumbered or lightly equipped...

We are not discussing Polybius here. The quote was from Diodorus who describes an army sent to confront Eumenes. You are suggesting that Antigonus sent some 20,000 “peltasts”, psiloi or Cretans to confront the argyraspids and Eumenes other forces?

Also, troops don’t come any more lightly armed than shieldless, unarmoured archers/light armed, so who can the ‘lightest armed’ of these be , if not those who leave their bagggae behind with the remainder? Troops still do this today – dropping their packs to become ‘lighter armed’ and leaving them for others to bring up…..

You skip past the point Scipio. That is that the term should be translated as “mobile’ or “agile”. That passage, “the lightest armed of the light armed” is the clincher.

All in all, not very impressive evidence for sarissa armed Hypaspists ( Phylarchus is not very credible, according to Polybius,(II.56 etc) who charges him with falsifying history, inter alia....)

I would expect little less. The criticism of Phylarchos, by Polybius, which you reference is entirely in relation to the former's narrative of the rise of the Acahaean League and its demotion to near lapdog status under Macedon. There were two strong traditions in the ancient source material; you discard one absolutely to suit your view. Polybius, naturally, was incapable of bias: particularly when it came to an historian who chronicled Kleomenes III of Sparta; a man who represented the absolute antithesis of everything Polybius, his father Lycortas and his coterie stood for. One might almost imagine Phylarchos was an Aeatolian rather than an Athenian...

Consign Phylarchos to the McDonnell-Staff waste basket. To quote Pierre Briant: “A historian can’t choose his sources”. You will continue to do so I expect.

Theopompus is in any event contradicted by another source contemporary with Philip – Anaximenes ( who incidently wrote a lampoon of Theopompus), who tells us that the Macedonian army reform were started by ‘Alexander’ II (Alexander II reigned 370-368 BC; he and Perdiccas were both Philip’s elder brothers who were killed). He tells us that Alexander bestowed the name ‘Hetairoi’ on all the heavy cavalry ( probably no light at that time)and ‘all’ the infantry were called ‘pezhetairoi’. He describes the infantry being organised in units ( lochoi) cositing of files ten deep. (decades). Whether it was in fact Alexander who initiated use of the sarissa, or Philip, later as he is commonly credited with, is unknown.

As I see you’ve just done. You’ve published this paper I assume? This proof of the above bald assertion?

Demosthenes does not in fact refer to Hypaspists as ‘pezhetaroi’. That is pure inference.

Nice attempt. After all the ink to discredit Theopompus, only this? Demosthenes refers to “foot companions” (pezhetairoi). It is clear they are his guard. They are later named hypaspists under Alexander. The utterly discredited and totally unreliable (another ancient source dismissed to the McDonnell-Staff waste bucket) Theopompus also names them. Go figure.

As to the Cleitus incident (Arr.Anab 4.8.8) :

Then his companions were no longer able to restrain him; for according to some he leaped up and snatched a javelin from one of his confidential body-guards (somatophylakes); according to others, a long pike from one of his ordinary guards (hypaspists), with which he struck Cleitus and killed him…

So we can now consign Arrian to the same waste bucket? The text is plain: the murder and its lead up are the same; one source saw a “javelin” and the other reported a sarisa. Nothing to do with later interpolation: the somatophylakes carried a javelin and the hypaspists carried a sarisa. Here Arrian is recording what the two sources he relied upon reported. That’s fine though: Theopompus in the bin, Phylarchos in the bin and Arrian’s source in the bin (be that Aristobulos or Ptolemy) as you well know which “story seems unlikely and probably comes from later knowledge”.

This is something of a ‘myth’ – Hoplites held their own and more on numerous occasions against sarissaphoroi – Chaeronea, Issus etc

Which, of course, is why Greek states belatedly went to sarisa-armed troops. We know little of Chaeronaea and Issos is a poor example for your thesis: the phalanx needed to cross a river with steep banks and assault a hoplite phalanx on extremely favourable defensive ground. It should have lost here. That it did not tells much about the quality of troops and the tactics. Read Devine on this battle.

Again: were the argyraspids, hoplite armed, to charge a Macedonian phalanx they will have come off second best. The successor wars show up the increasing reliance on phalanx infantry. Your thesis would see Eumenes battle Antigonus with 3,000 hoplites, 3,000 native “hypaspists” (hoplites?) and a mob of mercenaries. This up against some7,500-8,000 best troops of the day (Macedonian phalangites) which Antigonus fielded. I reject such a weak argument.

[Old Husker]

The often heated discussion regarding the true nature of hypaspists seems something unlikely to ever be resolved between true believers on any side of the issue, and certainly not through quoting from our far from complete and not always themselves well informed sources. One can argue with some support (not conclusive) that both the hypaspists and Silver Shields of Eumenes were hoplites or one can argue with some support (not conclusive) that these same troops were sarissa-bearing phalangites or one can even argue with some support that the hypaspists were hoplites (carrying on an old tradition with mostly fresh troops) while the Silver Shields were phalagites (a team culled from at least a few surviving 'old sweats' from Alexander's day, perhaps reconstituting an elite composite unit formed in India ["picked troops from each batallion of heavy infantry" - Arrian 5.20]) and heavily filled-out with new recruits (thus, the Silver Shield's failure to hold good discipline as a unit at Paraetacene, losing vital order in pursuit to suffer a counter-attack and ultimately cost Eumenes that engagement).

I think that we should accept that legitimate alternative interpretations of the hypaspists (and many another contentious subject) exist. That doesn't mean that we have to give them all equal weight in expressing our personal visions of what happened on an ancient Greek battlefield; there, we 'pays our money and takes our choice', citing our reasoning for preferring a particular interpretation (acknowledging others but without need to go into overt detail unless you really wish) and then moving forward with it full bore. The result is a rich variety of reconstructions from which readers can pick as the arguments (and their own backgrounds) sway them. Surprisingly, the overall reconstruction of a battle (keeping in line with our source information) will often be little effected by coming down on different sides such issues. Would Gabiene really be any different on either end of the hypaspist argument? The Silver Shields seem to have faired well early on, whether they were hoplites fighting hoplites, phalangites fighting hoplites, or phalangites fighting phalangites (I myself tend to prefer the latter at this time, but that's just me and both other variations seem to be at least possible) only to fall to cavalry attack in the end. Still, all that having been said, I do enjoy the discussions on each side and find them very educational toward deciding where I personally will 'pay my money and take my choice'. - Regards all, Fred

[Paralus]

The often heated discussion regarding the true nature of hypaspists seems something unlikely to ever be resolved between true believers on any side of the issue, and certainly not through quoting from our far from complete and not always themselves well informed sources.

Ahh... the eponymous Fred! Wondered where you'd got to.

Don't mind me: Paul Mac and I have rehearsed this before; once around a pool with dead and dying bottles of red. Bit like a married couple.... My position is likely as entrenched as is Paul's though I'd see these troops as having fought in both forms. But you're right: like any good married couple, we're unlikely to persuade each other otherwise we can't bicker later.

or one can argue with some support (not conclusive) that these same troops were sarissa-bearing phalangites or one can even argue with some support that the hypaspists were hoplites (carrying on an old tradition with mostly fresh troops) while the Silver Shields were phalagites (a team culled from at least a few surviving 'old sweats' from Alexander's day, perhaps reconstituting an elite composite unit formed in India ["picked troops from each batallion of heavy infantry" - Arrian 5.20]) and heavily filled-out with new recruits (thus, the Silver Shield's failure to hold good discipline as a unit at Paraetacene, losing vital order in pursuit to suffer a counter-attack and ultimately cost Eumenes that engagement).

As you qualify: "with some support". I don't think that is a widely accepted view. The troops mentioned in India are a one off. Craterus and Ceonus (from memory) are left behind as Alexander marches on - eventually to Sangala. Here we have some of the phalanx, half the cavalry, the Agrianes and the hypaspists (all three chilliarchies commanded by Ptolemy incidentally). The "rearguard" then join them. I don't have the Greek but I do wonder if the picked men of the phalanx are not the "most mobile and best armed"?

The modified position of the above is Lock's. He claims that "argyraspid" is a Seleucid throwback and that these troops were simply three thousand mutinous old sweats detached from the royal army at Triparadiesos. There are any number of problems with that view beginning with their commander (Antigenes) and the hypaspists being in Egypt with Perdiccas and the fact that Diodorus clearly names them, under the command of the archihypaspist Nikanor, at Gaugamela. Arrian names the self same troops, under Nikanor, as the hypaspists.

Moving off the armament of these blokes, it is interesting that the sources' clear line is that this unit was 3,000 strong - both under Alexander and after his death. This has implications for their final numbers as the other plain fact is that the argyraspids do not have an agema. This is to be expected after their role as the king's guard lapsed during the Diadoch wars. It is possible then that the hypaspists corps by the end of Alexander's reign was some 4,000 strong - the royal hypaspists being the other chilliarchy?

As for Paraetekene, Antigonus in fact lost this engagement. His behaviour post battle signals this clearly (the detaining of Eumenes’ envoy as he buried his far, far greater dead etc) and the battle was fought over access to the region of Gabiene: access Eumenes gained and Antigonus lost (having to retreat to Media). The argyraspids did not cost Eumenes the battle on the field. They cost him the battle in demanding to return to their baggage and refusing to occupy the field. Antigonus was clearly attempting to win this engagement with his heavy cavalry and Macedonians of his right. That Eumenes left wing stubbornly stayed put with its flank protected by the hills made this impossible. Unfortunately it meant that as Eumenes' right pressed forward and the infantry, lead by the argyrapsids, drove the Antigonid infantry from the field, a gap opened as the Eumenid left stayed rooted to the hills. Had Eumenes left Eudamos (on his left) to look after himself "Antigonos might have found himself the leader of a cavalry detachment and little more" (Gaebel, Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World p. 215).

Addendum:
Just on the Anaximemes thing. There are as many interpretations of that fragment as there are commentators - or so it seems. At bottom we have an out of context reference to Anaximenes (a contemporary of what he writes as were Theopompus and Demsothenes) preserved in Harpocration if I recall. There is little or no context revealed for the fragment and it is hardly likely that Alexander (II or III or even I for that matter) had to accustom or teach the Macedonian hetairoi to ride a horse. Probably the best discussion - linguistically and context wise - is Erskine's The Pezhetairoi of Philip II and Alexander III (Historia , 38, No. 4, pp. 385-394) And, yes, I do have a soft copy...

Adendum II:
The corrollary to the above is Anson's excellent discussion in his Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek Amongst Macedonians (pp.237-230).

[Old Husker]

Indeed, I don't believe that the idea of the Silver Shields being a composite elite unit originating in India is a widely held notion, though it remains a possibility and has been mentioned as such in the past. My point here is that real 'proof' is an extremely elusive thing and there are a great many scenarios from which to choose depending upon just how we personally choose to view ancient realities. The strongest ties (though none all that direct) seem to be between the Silver Shields and hypaspists, but this doesn't 'prove' that Silver Shields and hypaspists were (respectively) former members and current members of the same unit from Alexander's days in India nor that they were even the same type of troops in two elite units of differing origins. This is something I will continue to wrestle with in the months ahead.

Rather than declare Paraetacene a victory for Antigonus (which it technically was by the standards of the era, he having possessed the field and its dead at day's end, something that both sides accepted as shown by their maneuvering to sieze the battlefield in the action's wake), I chose to cast Paraetacene as 'inconclusive' by stating that Eumenes was denied the victory rather than saying that he had lost outright. Similar scenarios played out in many an ancient Greek battle, with the closest parallel maybe being Tangara (457), in which Sparta held the field despite having taken casualties at least equal to that of their Athenian-led foes. Diodorus called this engagement a draw, but the historian and former general Thucydides awarded the victory to Sparta because it had held onto the contested ground. Here too, the operational advantage lay with the 'loser', in that the Athenians succeeded in sending the Spartans home in the battle's wake, thus separating them their Boeeotian allies (whom Athens would attack and defeat decisively in a mere matter of weeks). It's thus interesting that Diodorus, who had been so generous as to give the Athenians a draw at Tanagra, didn't do the same for Eumenes, instead boldly declaring that it was Antigonus who had "gained the victory" (XIX.30.7).

My claim that the Silver Shields had cost Eumenes ultimate success was too harsh, since Diodorus actually stated that it was the Silver Shields and the remaining body of that general's infantry that broke their line in a pursuit that carried toward the nearby hills. For heavy infantry to chase enemy troops off the field of battle was a cardinal sin in the ancient Greek world. This was work for cavalry and light foot, who were vastly better suited to the task. The truth is that unless the Silver Shields and their heavy foot comrades abandoned much of their own cumbersome gear, which I strongly doubt they did, then they could never have caught the fleeing foe, thus becoming no more than 'cheerleaders' trailing far behind the action. Of course, seeing so grave an error on his opponents' part, an old warhorse like Antigonus took advantage to attack the now exposed inner end of Eumenes' left wing, routing the enemy horsemen there before turning back to rally his foot soldiers into a new battle line at the foot of the hills. At this point, Eumenes called back his men, hoping to get them once again into some semblance of proper order for another attack under a bright moon. Unfortunately, these troops now refused to stand their ground, chosing to fall back against orders all the way to their camp. Note that their camp with its valuable baggage was not at that time (nor had ever been) under attack. Indeed, Eumenes and his entire army stood between the enemy and the baggage train. This indicates that the most logical interpretation is that once Antigonus and his reformed troops began advancing once more, Eumenes soldiers made their second abandonment of the battlefield, this time doing so in full retreat rather than in an ill-advised pursuit.

All in all, I think that a close reading of Diodorus' account shows why he chose to award the victory to Antigonus, despite his primary source for the action (direct or second hand) being a close friend and supporter of Eumenes who must have cast that general's and his army's performances at Paraetacene in the most favorable light possible. Regards, Fred

[rocktupac]

One word: wow.

[Paralus]

Rather than declare Paraetacene a victory for Antigonus (which it technically was by the standards of the era, he having possessed the field and its dead at day's end, something that both sides accepted as shown by their maneuvering to sieze the battlefield in the action's wake), I chose to cast Paraetacene as 'inconclusive' by stating that Eumenes was denied the victory rather than saying that he had lost outright. [...] It's thus interesting that Diodorus, who had been so generous as to give the Athenians a draw at Tanagra, didn't do the same for Eumenes, instead boldly declaring that it was Antigonus who had "gained the victory" (XIX.30.7)

Possession of the dead and, so too, the field was the ancient claim to a victory. That said, Diodorus’ text clearly shows that Antigonus only "won" this due to the intransigence of the Silver Shields as we agree. As well he had to retreat – in as discrete a way as possible – to Media and thus forgo the objective he’d fought the battle for (Gabiene). Polyaenus (4.6.10) has it right when he describes Antigonus as concealing the nature of his loss.

19.26.1-2; 31.2 – 32.3 Eumenes, on considering the matter, concluded rightly that the enemy intended to withdraw into Gabenê, as this place, distant about three days' march, was unplundered and filled with grain, fodder, and in general with that which could amply supply the provisions for a great army.

Eumenes undertook to march back to the dead, desiring to control the disposal of the bodies and to put his claim to victory beyond dispute. When, however, the soldiers would not listen to him, insisting with shouts that they return to their own baggage train, which was some distance away, he was forced to yield to the majority […] When after leaving the battle Antigonus saw that his men were disheartened, he decided to move as far as possible from the enemy with the utmost speed. Wishing to have the army unencumbered for the retirement, he sent the wounded men and the heaviest part of the baggage ahead to one of the neighbouring cities. He began to bury the dead at dawn and detained the herald who had come from the enemy to treat for the recovery of the bodies; and he ordered his men to eat dinner at once. When the day had passed he sent the herald back, assigning the removal of the bodies to the next morning, but he himself at the beginning of the first watch broke camp with the whole army, and by making forced marches withdrew a long distance from the enemy

Note that Diodorus implies a Eumenid victory: disposal of the dead would simply put it beyond doubt or confirm it. The Macedonians that mattered saw matters otherwise though.

My claim that the Silver Shields had cost Eumenes ultimate success was too harsh, since Diodorus actually stated that it was the Silver Shields and the remaining body of that general's infantry that broke their line in a pursuit that carried toward the nearby hills. For heavy infantry to chase enemy troops off the field of battle was a cardinal sin in the ancient Greek world. This was work for cavalry and light foot,

Which, unfortunately for Eumemes, stayed rooted to the hills. His infantry and right wing were in the ascendency. I doubt that the Eumenid infantry discarded their weaponry; rather that Diodorus’ formulaic language here has them “pursue” the enemy in the same manner as his topos of "many had fallen on either side" (clearly many only fell on Antigonus' side). The Eumenid infantry drove the Antigonid phalanx from the field as it collapsed in evident disarray in a preview of the rout at Gabiene and Diodorus also describes Antigonus' left wing as defeated. The numbers for Antigonus' army at Gabiene internally confirm the nature of the defeat of his phalanx at Paraetekene. I would say the Eumenid infantry, particularly the argyraspids, were still in formation as their battlefield discipline - described at Gabiene - would indicate. The "fleeing" soldiers that Eumenes then collars and rallies are the light troops and cavalry of his defeated left wing - not his own heavy infantry line which has driven the opposition onto the hills behind them in concert with Eumenes' right wing. Antigonus needs to collar and rally not only left wing but also his heavily defeated phalanx ("Although Antigonus saw that his own left wing had been put to flight and that the entire phalanx had been defeated..." 19.30.7)

This indicates that the most logical interpretation is that once Antigonus and his reformed troops began advancing once more, Eumenes soldiers made their second abandonment of the battlefield, this time doing so in full retreat rather than in an ill-advised pursuit.

Antigonus “rallied” his soldiers and formed them into a line along the foothills to which they’d been driven. This is far from a menacing attacking move and is, rather, redolent of a defensive strategy. Antigonus' cavalry charge had, in reality, caused little damage to Eumenes’ army only damaging the cavalry and “lights” of the left that remained in their positions. Diodorus’ text does not indicate any “full retreat” rather a prolonged shadowing stand-off in the dark where neither side was inclined to go at it all over again. Both armies retired for the night but, unfortunately for Eumenes, his Macedonians – those who were clearly the most important (more later) – refused to return to the dead wanting rather to return to camp and their baggage. There was a lesson in this that Eumenes failed to heed for Gabiene and it would cost him his life. I do not see any “full retreat” by either side though the text describes an earlier collapse of the Antigonid infantry – also to be repeated in some weeks’ time.

All in all, I think that a close reading of Diodorus' account shows why he chose to award the victory to Antigonus, despite his primary source for the action (direct or second hand) being a close friend and supporter of Eumenes who must have cast that general's and his army's performances at Paraetacene in the most favorable light possible. Regards, Fred

It is most unlikely that Hieronymus, under Antigonid patronage, chose to portray Eumenes so favourably whilst consistently casting the dynasty’s founder as a rebel to royal authority constantly conniving at supreme power. Those who see the favourable treatment of Eumenes (and the exaggeration of Antigonus’ losses etc) as a clear Hieronymian partisanship seem gladly to pass over the traducing of Antigonus and the persistently favourable portrayal of his deadly adversary, Ptolemy. The latter is generally and conveniently passed off as a stray Ptolemaic source but the other themes – consistent throughout books eighteen and nineteen – are not so easily put aside.

Indeed, I don't believe that the idea of the Silver Shields being a composite elite unit originating in India is a widely held notion, though it remains a possibility and has been mentioned as such in the past. […] The strongest ties (though none all that direct) seem to be between the Silver Shields and hypaspists, but this doesn't 'prove' that Silver Shields and hypaspists were (respectively) former members and current members of the same unit from Alexander's days in India nor that they were even the same type of troops in two elite units of differing origins. This is something I will continue to wrestle with in the months ahead.

A possibility that I’d hold as rather remote. That the argyraspids were the hypaspists is as near to a certainty as one might come to in discussions such as these. That they were a group selected from the phalanx - either in India or after Triparadeisos - is not borne out by the sources that remain to us. I’ve already adduced the descriptions of Gaugamela where the two units are clearly (if anachronistically) treated as one and the same including commander. There are more though:

Arr. Succ. 35 To Antigenes, commander of the Macedonian argyraspidae, who had first attacked Perdiccas,

Here we have Antigenes, the argyraspid commander, identified as their commander in Egypt where Diodorus refers to them as hypaspists.
The reputation and consistently emphasised fighting skills of the argyraspids argues for a cohesive unit rather than selected groups from the entire phalanx. They consistently stress their service to Alexander – indeed to both the kings (Philip and Alexander most famously at Gabiene) and the length of that service. Again this is far more applicable to a long term corporate unit rather than a group selected, late in the anabasis, from the entire phalanx.

Most telling, though, is how they were seen by others and how they saw themselves. The regent, Polyperchon, and Olympias are both attested as having written to the argyraspids instructing them, in the name of the kings, to pace themselves at the service of the royal general, Eumenes (Diod.18.58 ff). This they do without any promise of monetary or other reward: it is service to the Argead crown. Most unlikely that a motley and rebellious group detatched from the royal army at Triparadeisos would be so inclined I'd suspect.

During the disputes over who should command the satrapal army in Susiane it is Antigenes and the argyraspids who will decide. Even though there clearly were other Macedonian veterans of the anabasis in this army, they have no say: the premier unit and its commander trump them (Diod.19.1-2):

Peucestas thought that because of the number of soldiers who followed him on the campaign and because of his high rank under Alexander he ought to have the supreme command; but Antigenes, who was general of the Silver Shields, said that the right to make the selection ought to be granted to his Macedonians, since they had conquered Asia with Alexander and had been unconquered because of their valour.

The other Macedonians in Eumenes' army who’d accompanied Alexander (19.22.2; 18.62.4 for example) do not rate a look in. This is behaviour indicative of an elite unit whose history, reputation (as above) and primacy commands such priviledges. Such a unit is most unlikely to have been either a group selected from amongst the average phalanx drafts in India or detached as troublemakers at Triparadeisos. It fits very well, though, the hypaspists and pezhetairoi of Alexander and Philip for mine.

[Paralus]

Just back to the source material here...

...Theopompus, who, while fairly contemporary with Philip, was an orator rather than a historian....

I do not see why that would disqualify him as an historian. Theopompus lived at Philip’s court during the late 340s (from about 343 according to Speusippas' letter to Philip) and was contemporary with the events of which he wrote. To quote Hammond (Philip of Macedon):

Theopompus, born some thirty years later (than Ephorus) and outliving Alexander, "combined the flair of a first rate historian" wrote G.T.Griffith, "with the flair of the second rate journalist for misinterpretation by hyperbole". Living at the court of Philip in the late 340s, he knew Macedonia and Philip, whom he regarded as the central figure of his time. His facts were accurate, however harsh and prejudiced his judgements might have been.

He [Theopompus] tells us that Philip’s guards were called ‘pezhetairoi’. Theopompus was also known for his wild stories, so he is hardly a reliable source. Demosthenes does not in fact refer to Hypaspists as ‘pezhetaroi’. That is pure inference.

It is doubtful that Theopompus’ notice here of pezhetairoi could be categorised as a “wild story”.

Dem 2.17: Hence it is not difficult to see how the majority of the Macedonians regard Philip. As for his household troops (?????)and footguards (??????????), they have indeed the name of admirable soldiers, well grounded in the science of war; but one who has lived on the spot, a man incapable of falsehood, has informed me that they are no better than other soldiers.

Demosthenes clearly contrasts the majority of the Macedonians (peeved at the continual campaigning) and the pezhetairoi (and either mercenaries or "guest-friends"): they are a distinct unit.

Theopompus is in any event contradicted by another source contemporary with Philip – Anaximenes ( who incidently wrote a lampoon of Theopompus)…

Anaximenes was a rhetorician. I do not know if that disqualifies him as an historian – I’d think not.

… [Anaximenes] tells us that the Macedonian army reform were started by ‘Alexander’ II (Alexander II reigned 370-368 BC; he and Perdiccas were both Philip’s elder brothers who were killed) […] Alexander bestowed the name ‘Hetairoi’ on all the heavy cavalry ( probably no light at that time)and ‘all’ the infantry were called ‘pezhetairoi’. He describes the infantry being organised in units ( lochoi) cositing of files ten deep. (decades).

The notice is merely “Alexander”; Alexander II is your supposition. The fragment – taken as written – claims that the entire re-organisation of the Macedonian military (including teaching the Macedonian nobility to ride) was accomplished by a single “Alexander”. That such was achieved by the single monarch is rather reminiscent of the Spartans according every constitutional / social reform to “Lycurgus”.

Brunt (Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon) writes the following:

Nor for the very same reason can Anaximenes have alluded to Alexander II, who in any case reigned barely a year, and to whom any great military reorganisation cannot plausibly be ascribed.

With which I’d agree.

The evidence of Anaximenes is probably to be preferred to Theopompus who was careless about facts, or perhaps confused about nomenclature ( c.f. Dionysus of Halicarnassus, who clearly describes Roman ‘Triarii’ but mistakenly calls them ‘principes’ – here we have Philip’s ‘Foot-companions’, and Theopompus probably was aware that ‘hetairoi/companions were a guard unit, so such a mistake would be easy.)

Again, the fellow lived at the court and one might suppose that to be something of an egregious error. Anaximenes, on the other hand, is not beyond criticism as Brunt observes:

If Anaximenes attributed its creation to Alexander I, his statement was quite unhistorical. But the very text of the fragment ought to suggest that it is a piece of fiction. It is not at all plausible that any single man taught the Macedonians ??????? (to ride horseback) or devised the whole of the later Macedonian military system.

Finishing with:

We should not in my view even suppose that his testimony has some unidentifiable substratum of truth. All that it permits us to infer is that the institutions he mentions are earlier than the time of Philip II, of whose innovations he could not have been ignorant, and perhaps somewhat remote.

In fact both Hammond and Griffith (the latter using the fragment to argue for Alexander III) have noted that Anaximenes was not noted for his accuracy as Anson (Eumenes of Cardia) so delicately puts it.

[Paullus Scipio]

'Old Husker' Fred wrote:

The often heated discussion regarding the true nature of hypaspists seems something unlikely to ever be resolved between true believers on any side of the issue, and certainly not through quoting from our far from complete and not always themselves well informed sources.

I would certainly agree with much of this post, as we have seen from the (very!) detailed discussion here, it is not possible to be definitive, but if we move away from the literature, it can be shown from the iconography that some Macedonian troops were armed as Hoplites, and the obvious, or at least most likely candidates, are the Hypaspists.....certainly, I and many others are of the view that the weight of evidence favours 'dory/longche/Aspis' armament, and have been for thirty years !! ( see e.g. "Warfare in the Classical World" - Warry 1980 and "Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars"-Duncan Head 1982). All the archaeological evidence coming to light since then supports this view. ( notably the so-called 'Philip' tomb, with its 'aspides' and 'dory' heads, but no 'sarissa' parts,for when an Argead King fought on foot it was with the 'Hypaspists'.)

......... ["picked troops from each batallion of heavy infantry" - Arrian 5.20]) and heavily filled-out with new recruits (thus, the Silver Shield's failure to hold good discipline as a unit at Paraetacene, losing vital order in pursuit to suffer a counter-attack and ultimately cost Eumenes that engagement).

The reference here in Arrian is not to any elite unit being formed, but to an expedition Alexander puts together to 'mop up' after he defeats Porus at the Hydaspes.....He takes these infantry, the archers, the Agrianes, and all the mounted archers together with half the Companions. The rest of the Army are left with Craterus to consolidate.
That when Macedonian re-inforcements arrived at various points in Alexander's campaigns, the 'Hypaspists' were brought up to strength by promoting experienced and the best members of the pezhetairoi/phalanx is highly likely. That recruits were so promoted is not.
Overall, I would agree with Paralus - there can be little doubt the 'Argyraspides' were the 'Hypaspists' with silver-plated shields in lieu of bronze....

Still, all that having been said, I do enjoy the discussions on each side and find them very educational toward deciding where I personally will 'pay my money and take my choice'.

Indeed! D ....such discussions encourage one to re-read and check the sources and usually something new will pop up....

As to the outcome of Parataikene, I would agree with both of you ! The battle, in it's simplest categorisation would have to described as 'indecisive'. Equally in modern terms it was a 'tactical win' for Eumenes, - in addition to the 'ground of tactical importance', consider that Antigonus lost 3,700 foot and 54 horse killed, with over 4,000 wounded, to Eumenes light losses of 540 foot, "very few" horse and 900 wounded - but a 'strategic draw', with both ultimately withdrawing for logistic reasons - supplies and winter quarters.

[Paullus Scipio]

Paralus wrote:

Just back to the source material here...

Well, as we have seen, the literature is not conclusive. I would rather get back to the subject matter of this thread, rather than debate snippets of fragmentary sources. Many scholars have debated on the relative merits of Phylarchus,Theopompus and Anaximenes without any consensus emerging.One could debate in detail Paralus' post here, but since I expect the readership's eyes are 'glazing over', I won't, save for a brief comment...... D lol:

The notice is merely “Alexander”; Alexander II is your supposition. The fragment – taken as written – claims that the entire re-organisation of the Macedonian military (including teaching the Macedonian nobility to ride) was accomplished by a single “Alexander”. That such was achieved by the single monarch is rather reminiscent of the Spartans according every constitutional / social reform to “Lycurgus”.

Brunt (Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon) writes the following:

Nor for the very same reason can Anaximenes have alluded to Alexander II, who in any case reigned barely a year, and to whom any great military reorganisation cannot plausibly be ascribed.


With which I’d agree...........................It is not at all plausible that any single man taught the Macedonians ??????? (to ride horseback) or devised the whole of the later Macedonian military system.

To begin with, it is not merely my supposition at all, but the opinion of others too. Alexander II, the elder brother of Philip, who reigned less than two years, is the only realistic candidate for reasons I set out in an earlier post. It is not necessary to suppose, like Brunt, that the process was complete under AlexanderII - his short reign, less than two years, was plenty of time to get the process under way, to be completed by Philip, who got most of the credit.
" ???????" is not 'to ride on horseback' but rather it is a noun, 'the riding of horses/horsemanship." (Slater) Bear in mind this is a fragment, taken out of context....so that Anaximines words could well indicate that he 'regularised' or 'professionalised' what had formerly been a gathering of noble horsemen for a campaign into proper cavalry, whose members were much more professional....to be named 'Hetairoi'.

Anyway, that's more than enough about the literature !! hock:

Instead of leaping about - from Philip's "reforms" to the Successors, let us get back on track, and begin by describing the Macedonian 'army' before Alexander II/Philip's reforms..... hopefully the subject of my next post, if we don't digress further !! :wink: :lol:

[Paralus]

To begin with, it is not merely my supposition at all, but the opinion of others too. Alexander II, the elder brother of Philip, who reigned less than two years...

The issue was your categoric statement of uncontested fact that "Anaximenes tells us that Alexander II..." As well, Brunt would disagree at less than a year.

Apologies for glazed eyes but such statements, given that some "glazed eyes" may not be familiar with the furious academic debate that has existed about this, should not go uncontested; particularly when based on evidence as: "[Theopompus] tells us that Philip’s guards were called ‘pezhetairoi’. Theopompus was also known for his wild stories, so he is hardly a reliable source."

I agree, though, that the discussion on sources could merit a paper or a dozen.

Instead of leaping about - from Philip's "reforms" to the Successors, let us get back on track, and begin by describing the Macedonian 'army' before Alexander II/Philip's reforms..... hopefully the subject of my next post, if we don't digress further !! :wink: :lol:

Not so fast: the original thread was the "Argead Macedonian army". Whilst we might consider what, if any regular, army existed prior to Philip as being Argead, the thread from which it was moved was discussing the late army of Philip and of Alexander. I will be interested to read what you have none the less.

[Paullus Scipio]

I posted this yesterday, but somehow it seems to have got "lost". It is now rather out of context, but for completeness sake I'll restore it......

Paralus wrote:-

Paullus Scipio wrote:But in Polybius, ‘euzanoi’/unencumbered or lightly equipped...

We are not discussing Polybius here. The quote was from Diodorus who describes an army sent to confront Eumenes. You are suggesting that Antigonus sent some 20,000 “peltasts”, psiloi or Cretans to confront the argyraspids and Eumenes other forces?

No, but we are discussing usage of the term ‘euzanoi’ which can refer to ‘light armed’ in the technical sense, or mean more generically ‘lightly equipped’ as in no baggage. Antigonus’ army is an example of the latter, since of course Antigonus did not send only ‘light armed’ forces to confront Eumenes, rather a mobile, lightly equipped ( with no baggage) force.

Paullus Scipio wrote:Also, troops don’t come any more lightly armed than shieldless, unarmoured archers/light armed, so who can the ‘lightest armed’ of these be , if not those who leave their baggage behind with the remainder? Troops still do this today – dropping their packs to become ‘lighter armed’ and leaving them for others to bring up…..

You skip past the point Scipio. That is that the term should be translated as “mobile’ or “agile”. That passage, “the lightest armed of the light armed” is the clincher.

Huh?....I think we are here agreeing that ‘mobile/agile’ = no baggage/lightest equipped, so that a better translation is “the most lightly equipped/baggage-less of the light-armed” – otherwise, as we have seen, it simply does not make sense…..

Paullus Scipio wrote:All in all, not very impressive evidence for sarissa armed Hypaspists ( Phylarchus is not very credible, according to Polybius,(II.56 etc) who charges him with falsifying history, inter alia....)

I would expect little less. The criticism of Phylarchos, by Polybius, which you reference is entirely in relation to the former's narrative of the rise of the Acahaean League and its demotion to near lapdog status under Macedon. There were two strong traditions in the ancient source material; you discard one absolutely to suit your view. Polybius, naturally, was incapable of bias: particularly when it came to an historian who chronicled Kleomenes III of Sparta; a man who represented the absolute antithesis of everything Polybius, his father Lycortas and his coterie stood for. One might almost imagine Phylarchos was an Aeatolian rather than an Athenian...

Consign Phylarchos to the McDonnell-Staff waste basket. To quote Pierre Briant: “A historian can’t choose his sources”. You will continue to do so I expect.

It is not I who consign Phylarchus to the “waste-basket”, but rather Polybius. The passage you refer to as evidence for the argyraspides carrying sarissa is a later, fanciful tale of the extravagance of Alexander and his companions, to be found here:- [url:32cffpi0]http://www.attalus.org/translate/phylarchus.html[/url]- this translation does not mention ‘sarissa’ - like I say, pretty thin as evidence, especially as the passage as a whole is not very credible….

Paullus Scipio wrote:Theopompus is in any event contradicted by another source contemporary with Philip – Anaximenes ( who incidently wrote a lampoon of Theopompus), who tells us that the Macedonian army reform were started by ‘Alexander’ (Alexander II reigned 370-368 BC; he and Perdiccas were both Philip’s elder brothers who were killed). He tells us that Alexander bestowed the name ‘Hetairoi’ on all the heavy cavalry ( probably no light at that time) and ‘all’ the infantry were called ‘pezhetairoi’. He describes the infantry being organised in units ( lochoi) cositing of files ten deep. (dekades). Whether it was in fact Alexander II who initiated use of the sarissa, or Philip, later as he is commonly credited with, is unknown.

As I see you’ve just done. You’ve published this paper I assume? This proof of the above bald assertion?

We know the ‘Alexander’ cannot be Alexander I ( early 5C BC), because no ‘regular’ heavy Infantry existed in Macedon at that time, and cannot be Alexander III ‘The Great’ because both Hetairoi and Pezhetairoi existed in his father Philip’s time. Alexander II ( ruled370-368 BC) is the only possible candidate, especially as he is the elder brother of Philip….
Eighteen months (nearer 2 years?) is plenty of time to set in motion military reforms completed by, and credited to his brother Philip.....and if he set about reforming the cavalry from 'irregular' to regular ( i.e. disciplined drilled cavalry as opposed to a bunch of nobles who only got together for a campaign, and replaced the previous pair of longche with the hand-to-hand xyston) he could be said to have "taught them to ride" ( as proper cavalry), remembering that under Philip (Alexander?) the 'hetairoi' were opened up to include other than macedonian nobles.....turned into 'professional cavalry' in fact....

Paullus Scipio wroteemosthenes does not in fact refer to Hypaspists as ‘pezhetaroi’. That is pure inference.

Nice attempt. After all the ink to discredit Theopompus, only this? Demosthenes refers to “foot companions” (pezhetairoi). It is clear they are his guard. They are later named hypaspists under Alexander. The utterly discredited and totally unreliable (another ancient source dismissed to the McDonnell-Staff waste bucket) Theopompus also names them. Go figure.

Sigh !! It is said that sarcasm is the lowest form of wit, and I must say I had hoped this debate would be above this sort of personal attack…..usually a sign that the perpetrator has run out of rational arguments !
Later you quote the Demosthenes piece:

Dem 2.17: Hence it is not difficult to see how the majority of the Macedonians regard Philip. As for his ‘household troops’ (?????)and ‘foot-companions’/phalanx ( a more accurate translation than ‘footguards’ – as you clearly acknowledge above.) (??????????), they have indeed the name of admirable soldiers, well grounded in the science of war; but one who has lived on the spot, a man incapable of falsehood, has informed me that they are no better than other soldiers.

As I said, nothing here to indicate that the ‘pezhetairoi’ were ‘Guards’ and later became ‘Hypaspists’.

As to the Cleitus incident (Arr.Anab 4.8. :


Then his companions were no longer able to restrain him; for according to some he leaped up and snatched a javelin from one of his confidential body-guards (somatophylakes); according to others, a long pike from one of his ordinary guards (hypaspists), with which he struck Cleitus and killed him…


So we can now consign Arrian to the same waste bucket? The text is plain: the murder and its lead up are the same; one source saw a “javelin” and the other reported a sarisa. Nothing to do with later interpolation: the somatophylakes carried a javelin and the hypaspists carried a sarisa. Here Arrian is recording what the two sources he relied upon reported. That’s fine though: Theopompus in the bin, Phylarchos in the bin and Arrian’s source in the bin (be that Aristobulos or Ptolemy) as you well know which “story seems unlikely and probably comes from later knowledge”.

Like I said, I consign no historian to the ‘waste basket’ – those are your words. Personally, I think that even a bad or unreliable historian sometimes preserves nuggets of fact and/or useful information. These are the ‘witnesses’ who provide our ‘evidence’, some good some bad, all (including Polybius!) more or less biased. And as with any witness, especially when there are contradictions between them, “the evidence is weighed, not counted”. We must try to decide which evidence is more likely/probable/correct.

BTW, Hammond's 'blade' is in fact a 'longche'. Plutarch has an 'aichme'/spear snatched from a 'doryphoroi', Curtius a 'lancea'/longche from an 'armiger'/somatophylax, which Alexander is deprived of, whereupon he seizes a 'hasta'/dory/pike? from a 'vigil'/guard/hypaspist? ....Arrian says 'longche' in one version, 'sarissa' in another - but we can't even be sure who these 'guards' are, let alone the weapon used! How can this be evidence of anything? ( and I'd bet it was a 'longche'.....). Alexander first spits Cleitus (indoors! ) with a PIKE?..... then places butt of same against a wall and tries to run himself through? Incredible ! My point about later writers assuming a particular weapon is a valid one - it still goes on today, a notorious example being the Loeb translation of Hannibal's 'longche' and 'longchophoroi' as 'pike' and 'pikemem' which misled Connolly, and it is certainly possible that some Roman writers, writing almost 500 years later, wrote 'sarissa' because 'everybody knows' that was the Macedonian spear.

Paullus Scipio wrote:This is something of a ‘myth’ – Hoplites held their own and more on numerous occasions against sarissaphoroi – Chaeronea, Issus etc

Which, of course, is why Greek states belatedly went to sarisa-armed troops. We know little of Chaeronaea and Issos is a poor example for your thesis: the phalanx needed to cross a river with steep banks and assault a hoplite phalanx on extremely favourable defensive ground. It should have lost here. That it did not tells much about the quality of troops and the tactics. Read Devine on this battle.

Again: were the argyraspids, hoplite armed, to charge a Macedonian phalanx they will have come off second best. The successor wars show up the increasing reliance on phalanx infantry. Your thesis would see Eumenes battle Antigonus with 3,000 hoplites, 3,000 native “hypaspists” (hoplites?) and a mob of mercenaries. This up against some7,500-8,000 best troops of the day (Macedonian phalangites) which Antigonus fielded. I reject such a weak argument.

Troops “armed in the Macedonian fashion” with sarissa and pelta, may or may not have had an advantage over conventional Hoplites. The conversion by later Greek states may have been as much about aping Alexander’s all-conquering troops as anything else. Having said which, I do believe ‘sarissaphoroi’ did have an advantage in phalanx warfare, but not a huge one.
Antigonus’ Macedonians at Parataikene and Gabiene were young and inexperienced. As I said earlier, warfare being largely a matter of morale, it would be unsurprising if they broke and ran, even before contact, before the fearsome charge of “the Conquerors of the World”, whichever armament they carried, ( as Fred has pointed out) and the brevity of the clash ( and see also your signature quote! :wink: ) are strong indicators of this. After all, other Hoplites broke before contact with the equally fearsome reputation of the Spartans……

Again, doesn’t tell us anything about ‘Hypaspist/Argyraspid’ armament, one way or another.

Against this literary uncertainty, we haven't even touched upon other evidence such as the iconography.....BTW, there is one more minor piece of literary evidence. In Plutarch, the Hypaspist officer Neoptolemus ( who may be the officer who succeeded Nicanor as commander) claims to have served Alexander with 'longche' and shield....no mention of 'sarissa'. Then there's the archaeology....'Aspis' and 'dory' heads (more than one) in the Kingly "Philip" tomb, but no trace of 'sarissa'..... and the 'Alexander' sarcophagus.....Certainly some Macedonian troops were ‘dory/longche’ and ‘aspis’ armed, and it can really only be the ‘Hypaspists’.The idea that it was 'Asthetaroi' who were 'dory' armed would lead to a very mixed phalanx !! Diferent taxeis with different arms?? ( not that we have any certainty as to whether 'Asthetairoi' was a unit, or several units, or a nickname for a unit, of the phalanx!)…and the continued depiction of the Aspis on Macedonian monuments into the 3 rd C BC ( see Markle “A shield monument from Veria” )

I would submit the weight of evidence, especially non-literary, favours dory/longche armed ‘Hypaspists/argyraspides’ over sarissa armed – but the reader must decide on the evidence for themselves.

[Paralus]

....Arrian says 'longche' in one version, 'sarissa' in another - but we can't even be sure who these 'guards' are, let alone the weapon used! How can this be evidence of anything? ( and I'd bet it was a 'longche'.....). Alexander first spits Cleitus (indoors! ) with a PIKE?..... then places butt of same against a wall and tries to run himself through? Incredible ! My point about later writers assuming a particular weapon is a valid one - it still goes on today, a notorious example being the Loeb translation of Hannibal's 'longche' and 'longchophoroi' as 'pike' and 'pikemem' which misled Connolly, and it is certainly possible that some Roman writers, writing almost 500 years later, wrote 'sarissa' because 'everybody knows' that was the Macedonian spear.

You bet wrong. Arrian, Anabasis 4.8-9:

???????????? ??? ?? ??? ?????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????????????? ????? ??? ????? ???????? ??????? ??????????, ?? ?? ???????? ???? ??? ??????? ????? ??? ??????. ???????????? ?? ???? ??? ? ???????? ?????? ?? ?????, ??????? ?? ???????? ????? ??? ????????, ?? ?? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????????????? ??’ ????? ?? ????????????? ????????? ??? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?????, ??? ???????, ???? ?????????? ??? ????? ??? ????????????? ?? ???????????? ?? ?????????? ????? ??? ???????? ????????? ???????? ??????? ???????????, ??? ????? ??? ????? ??? ??? ? ???????, ? ????????? ??? ?? ????? ???????? ?? ??????? ?????????.

anapêdêsanta gar hoi men logchên harpasai legousi tôn sômatophulakôn tinos kai tautêi paisanta Kleiton apokteinai, hoi de sarissan para tôn phulakôn tinos kai tautên. Aristoboulos de hothen men hê paroinia hôrmêthê ou legei, Kleitou de genesthai monou tên hamartian, hon ge ôrgismenou Alexandrou kai anapêdêsantos ep' auton hôs diachrêsomenou apachthênai men dia thurôn exô huper to teichos te kai tên taphron tês akras, hina egineto, pros Ptolemaiou tou Lagou tou sômatophulakos: ou karterêsanta de anastrepsai authis kai peripetê Alexandrôi genesthai Kleiton anakalounti, kai phanai hoti: houtos toi egô ho Kleitos, ô Alexandre: kai en toutôi plêgenta têi sarissêi apothanein.

he leaped up and snatched a javelin from one of his confidential body-guards; according to others, a long pike from one of his ordinary guards, with which he struck Clitus and killed him. Aristobulus does not say whence the drunken quarrel originated, but asserts that the fault was entirely on the side of Clitus, who, when Alexander had got so enraged with him as to jump up against him with the intention of making an end of him; was led away by Ptolemy, son of Lagus. the confidential body-guard, through the gateway, beyond the wall and ditch of the citadel where the quarrel occurred. He adds that Clitus could not control himself, but went back again, and falling in with Alexander who was calling out for Clitus, he exclaimed :—“ Alexander, here am I, Clitus!” Thereupon he was struck with a long pike and killedkilled.

The weapon is clealry referred to as a sarisa - twice. The person supplying the testimony is Aristobulos. Aristobulos hardly qualifies as a Roman writer writing 500 years after the event. Aristobulos is hardly likely to replace "longche" with sarisa because everybody knew it was "the Macedonian weapon". The bodies tasked with the care of the king are the somatophylakes, the paides baslilikoi and the hypaspists. The context makes plain that he snatched the first from a somatophylake and the second from an "ordinary" guard. Too, he has called for the hypaspists (who likely are at the entrance and about the tent). The context of Aristobulos' testimony also makes plain that Ptolemy took Cleitus away "through the gateway, beyond the wall and ditch of the citadel where the quarrel occurred" - that is, out of the tent or "citadel". Cleitus . Then returns and falls in with Alexander who has been calling for him. In Curtius' version Alexander went into the vestibule "stood at the doorway by which his dinner-guests had to exit")and runs him through with a sarisa as he leaves. The guard is on duty at the door is, on the basis of all probaility (an ordinary guard) a hypaspist. He is armed, according to Aristobulos, with a sarisa.

This promts Markle to observe that whilst grave goods (hoplite aspides) are clearly not ceremonial this weapon, in the hands of a hypaspist, is ceremonial.

[Paullus Scipio]

More digressions? Bugger !
Paralus wrote:-

You bet wrong. Arrian, Anabasis 4.8-9

You misunderstand ! I was betting that, amongst the plethora of weapons referred to in our various sources, not only is 'longche' the most referred to (including Arrian), but also the most likely for the purpose, as opposed to a 'sarissa'.

The weapon is clearly referred to as a sarisa - twice.

Err, not in your quote it isn't ! His first version has a 'longche' snatched from a 'somatophylakes'. "according to others" it was a 'sarissa' taken from a 'guard'/phylakes (Arrian does not say a 'hypaspist', the guard might even be an ordinary 'sarissaphoroi' from one of the 'Taxeis'). Nor do we know if Arrian is quoting his sources word-for-word - we have only Arrian's words. Is Aristobulus the source of the 'longche/somatophylakes? Or is he one of the "others"? According to Arrian; "Aristobulus does not mention the occasion of the drinking bout", so he is NOT the source of Arrian's primary version. Arrian does not even say if Aristobulus is one of the "others".
In Arrian's words: "Accounts of this incident differ".

What is clear is that we know neither who the Guard in the incident was, nor what the weapon was. Hardly evidence of 'Hypaspist' armament. Arrian doesn't even mention 'Hypaspists' in your quotation !

What do you say to the iconography? ....the archaeology?

Anyway, enough distractions :x ?

[Paralus]

More digressions? Bugger !

Why must anything not conducive to your view be prefaced by such dismissives as "more digressions"? You yourself raised this question - sorry - digression. The armamnet of the hypaspists has, in fact, been part of this thread the "pre-Philip army" has not.

You bet wrong. Arrian, Anabasis 4.8-9

You misunderstand ! I was betting that, amongst the plethora of weapons referred to in our various sources, not only is 'longche' the most referred to (including Arrian), but also the most likely for the purpose, as opposed to a 'sarissa'.

Hmmm...

Arrian says 'longche' in one version, 'sarissa' in another - but we can't even be sure who these 'guards' are, let alone the weapon used! How can this be evidence of anything? ( and I'd bet it was a 'longche'.....).

The parenthetic comment can hardly refer to "evidence of anything"; rather it seems clearly to refer to "but we can't even be sure who these 'guards' are, let alone the weapon used".

Nor do we know if Arrian is quoting his sources word-for-word - we have only Arrian's words.

Surely you are not serious? I can't ever remember anyone suggesting that we ought not to take Arrian for what he says because he may not be reproducing a source verbatim! Indeed, if we take Arrian at his word, he likely never reproduced verbatim his source material: he was the writer of his times! If I were suspicious I might suspect that such a question is raised to cast doubt upon the notice of "sarisa" as possibly not verbatim. If I were supicious.

What is clear is that we know neither who the Guard in the incident was, nor what the weapon was.

Your intransigence is difficult to understand. The weapon is described twice: sarissan and sarisei. As for the guard...

The weapon is clearly referred to as a sarisa - twice.

Err, not in your quote it isn't ! His first version has a 'longche' snatched from a 'somatophylakes'. "according to others" it was a 'sarissa' taken from a 'guard'/phylakes (Arrian does not say a 'hypaspist', the guard might even be an ordinary 'sarissaphoroi' from one of the 'Taxeis') [...] Is Aristobulus the source of the 'longche/somatophylakes? Or is he one of the "others"? According to Arrian; "Aristobulus does not mention the occasion of the drinking bout", so he is NOT the source of Arrian's primary version. Arrian does not even say if Aristobulus is one of the "others".
In Arrian's words: "Accounts of this incident differ".

I have adressed all of that above; you ignore it or have not read it properly (the last English sentence in the Arrian quote did not cut & paste correctly which doesn't help - it has been rectified). Clearly it is Aristobulos reporting the sarisa use as everything which follows his name is his testimony - as Arrian makes plain: "Aristobulus does not say whence the drunken quarrel originated [...] He adds that Clitus could not control himself, but went back again..." This is Aristobulos' testimony ending with the running through with a sarisa. Whose else can it be?

Three groups had the responsibility for the guarding of the king: the paides basilikoi, the somatophylakes and the hypaspists. This is, outside of yourself, not questioned. Clearly identified are a somatophlyake and an "ordinary" guard - at the door. The paides basilikoi are refered to as the pages and identified as such in Arrian. This guard is generally accepted as being a hypaspist. You would suggest that rather than one of the groups who were tasked to guard the king we have an average phalanx grunt? That, if I might say, is a real stretch.

[Rumo]

Hi Michael,

I believe Paul has a point. The summary from Aristobulos seems to start with "Aristoboulos [...] ou legei" but the question is where it ends and how Arrian fit it in his own work. We can reasonably assume the words "outos toi egô ho Kleitos, ô Alexandre" were also in Aristobulos' account, but I'm not so sure about the last sentence introduced by "kai". That one can be Arrian's own wording as well, ending this digression and resuming his own narrative. But in this case we no longer have the sarissa mentioned by Aristobulos, and that is either Arrian's own interpretation or it comes from a source which we can't identify (and it can be also Aristobulos, only that we have no hints it is actually so).

I also have noticed Aristobulos calls the guard a sômatophulax. If we check the two versions of the story presented in the beginning of this passage and we consider the wording is supposed to make a difference, it seems then the weapon was a logchê.