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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Printable Version

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 06-06-2023

... and Steve Kaye made me do this:

https://www.academia.edu/102948828/Boudicca_at_Church_Stowe_Campaign_Working_Draft

   

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 06-07-2023

(06-06-2023, 05:43 PM)John1 Wrote: ... and Steve Kaye made me do this:

Well done! You make a good case.

I have my usual carping objections, but you know them all too well by now.

Hopefully this will broaden the debate, attract further study and spark some new thinking.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 06-11-2023

Nathan wrote:
Hopefully this will broaden the debate, attract further study and spark some new thinking.

Yes, new thinking is needed. And the one that needs to be discussed again is the cavalry dash.

According to Polybius, while at Marseilles, Publius Scipio (father of Scipio Africanus), ordered his brother Gnaeus Scipio, with the greater part of the army, to proceed to Iberia, while Publius Scipio, with a small force, returned to Genoa in Italy. Polybius does not give the number of men that accompanied Scipio to Genoa. Luckily for us, Appian has Publius Scipio return to Italy in a single quinquereme, and with Polybius claiming a quinquereme can convey 120 soldiers, we have an answer. In 168 BC, the consul Scipio Nasica, in order to capture the Petra Pass took with him 8,000 men and a body of 120 cavalry. The 120 cavalry are the consul’s personal guard cavalry.

Following Polybius, at the Ticinus, Publius Scipio, in order to reconnoiter the Carthaginian army, took the whole of his cavalry, accompanied by his javelineers. Academic have incorrectly assumed that all of Scipio’s cavalry from his consular army went with him. No, just his 120-guard cavalry, and those light infantry allocated to a force of 120 cavalry. In Spain, Publius Scipio was killed while undertaking a reconnaissance. This is what consuls did, undertake risky recons.

So why is it not possible for Suetonius to recon ahead of his army with his guard cavalry, and maybe some explorates? It is a standard Roman military doctrine. Arrian gives his guards at about 200, which ticks my boxes. Comments have been made on this thread about Suetonius not travelling back the way he came with his army due to them eating everything out of house and home, and yet with just his guard cavalry, he can easily move back the way he came, because he hasn’t eaten everything out of house or home.

For me, Suetonius simply went ahead of his army with his guard cavalry, and when he had a clear picture of the situation, returned to his army. For Suetonius, his recon involved risks, but that was the role of an army commander.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 06-12-2023

(06-11-2023, 10:46 AM)Steven James Wrote: And the one that needs to be discussed again is the cavalry dash.

I enjoyed Duncan Mackay's Echolands a great deal, and generally agreed with a lot of what he said; although, as mentioned above, I wasn't too convinced by the proposed battle site! I was a bit disappointed that he basically went for the 'cavalry dash' scenario though - he renames it a 'relief column', but its basically the same thing. This is despite having admitted that the whole thing was invented by Haverfield and has no real justification. He seems in the end just to like the dramatic appeal of it, which I suppose is as good a reason as any - and he has the infantry catching up with Suetonius by St Albans, which makes it all rather unnecessary.

So this idea clearly still has its supporters, although it's rare for anyone to try and argue its merits. This is because of three main points, which might need restating:

1. Nowhere in any of our sources are we told that Suetonius rode down to London, on reconnaissance or for any other reason. Instead he marched to London 'with wonderful resolution', thinking to establish his forces there 'as a seat of war'. Needless to say, he could not do this with cavalry alone, and certainly not only 120 of them.

2. If he was 'on reconnaissance', why would he need to go to London? He knew what London looked like and what its defences were like. The enemy were not at London. They were at Colchester. Why did he not ride to or towards Colchester?

3. Our source (Tacitus) points out that Suetonius was a careful commander who planned everything thoroughly. That reputation would be totally at adds with this scenario.

As for 'standard Roman military doctrine' - I would disagree. One example you cited has both armies camped very close together, and the cavalry clashing in between. I don't know how Publius Scipio died - was it not in battle? Neither example compares to a commander and provincial governor leaving his troops behind and riding for several days through hostile territory, with very little idea of the position of the enemy, just to visit a town he has already visited several times before.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 06-19-2023

Nathan wrote:
Nowhere in any of our sources are we told that Suetonius rode down to London, on reconnaissance or for any other reason.

Polybius never mentions how Regillus in 255 BC travelled to the River Bagradas. Polybius never mentions how Scipio travelled from Marseilles to Italy. Maybe, as some on this thread have mentioned, Suetonius went by boat. There is not enough information to come to a positive conclusion. Nothing can be ruled out.

Nathan wrote:
Instead he marched to London 'with wonderful resolution', thinking to establish his forces there 'as a seat of war'. Needless to say, he could not do this with cavalry alone, and certainly not only 120 of them.

That is reading too much into it. As I already stated in my previous post, 120 cavalry belongs to the republic. During this period, bodyguard cavalry amounted to ‘about’ 200 cavalry as per Arrian, or 200 as per Josephus. Interestingly, during the revolt Tacitus writes that “as Suetonius was far away, they applied for help to the procurator Catus Decianus. He sent “not more than two hundred men”, without their proper weapons. I wonder if this was Catus Decianus’ guard unit.

Nathan wrote:
If he was 'on reconnaissance', why would he need to go to London? He knew what London looked like and what its defences were like. The enemy were not at London. They were at Colchester. Why did he not ride to or towards Colchester?

Objection your honour, this is speculation.

Nathan wrote:
Our source (Tacitus) points out that Suetonius was a careful commander who planned everything thoroughly.
This can be interpreted that he “looked before he jumped.”

I remain open to a reconnaissance with his guard cavalry. I will not rule it out nor will defend it with my life. An open mind has more doorways. When all is said and done, there is not enough information to go on. However, I’m betting on John1 making the discovery concerning the location of the battlefield.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - MonsGraupius - 09-15-2023

(06-19-2023, 07:40 AM)Steven James Wrote: Nathan wrote:
Instead he marched to London 'with wonderful resolution', thinking to establish his forces there 'as a seat of war'. Needless to say, he could not do this with cavalry alone, and certainly not only 120 of them.

Nathan wrote:
If he was 'on reconnaissance', why would he need to go to London? He knew what London looked like and what its defences were like. The enemy were not at London. They were at Colchester. Why did he not ride to or towards Colchester?

Objection your honour, this is speculation.
The only plausible reason to move to London is because the Thames is a defensible barrier ... something which has been denied by the people here, and if you cannot accept basic military reality like that, then there isn't any realistic chance of having a sensible discussion on anything else.

The text also mentions something like "giving up delay" ... he then decides to go to battle. When Romans march "with wonderful resolution" ... it doesn't mean a gallop. It means not delaying days on route to do the normal chores. Again, this is just the reality of war ... armies take months to get into position ready for a battle.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 09-15-2023

(09-15-2023, 08:19 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: The only plausible reason to move to London is because the Thames is a defensible barrier

If Suetonius was sheltering behind the Thames barrier, why did he feel compelled to give battle, when he had only 10,000 men and was vastly outnumbered?  Why not bring the legions down from north Wales, draw in reinforcements from the Continent and march out when he was sufficiently reinforced?


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - I Claudius - 10-03-2023

       
The entire matter hinges on Tacitus's text
 
He chose a position approached by a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest, having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front, where an open plain extended without any danger from ambuscades. His legion where in close array, round them the light armed troops, and the cavalry in dense array on the wings. On the other side, the army of the Britons, with its masses of infantry and cavalry, was confidently exulting, a waster host that ever had assembled and so fierce in spirit that they actually brought with them, to witness the victory, their wives riding in wagons, which they placed they had placed on the extreme border of the plain.
 
Tacitus describes a valley situated on the outskirts of a mountainous region. Beyond the valley lies a large open plain, surrounded by steep mountains that face the open plain.
"Wives riding in wagons, which they had placed on the extreme border of the plain." It is assumed that it was difficult to navigate the terrain with horses and wagons. The wagons appeared to be arranged in a line roughly parallel to Suetonius's battle line. This could suggest that they were positioned on a road. Roads often demarcate boundaries, so a road could be what Tacitus refers to as the border.
"He chose a position approached by a narrow defile." The opening is narrower at the entrance than further into the valley.
"Having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front." The location is a geographical bottleneck into the mountainous area, extremely difficult to access except through the opening.
Suetonius had 10,000 soldiers at his disposal. According to Dio, the Britons numbered 230,000, though these figures are likely exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Britons had a significant numerical advantage. This forced Suetonius to find a perfect defensive position that met the requirements for winning the battle. Suetonius found the perfect spot; otherwise, he would have lost the battle.
Boudicca's last known location was St. Albans. So, what was her next target? Looking back, she had attacked Roman towns or the Roman Ninth Legion, which confronted her. The Second Roman Legion remained in their base in Exeter, posing no threat to her. Suetonius must have been north of Boudicca on Watling Street, marching south to confront her. This threat Boudicca had to face.
After Boudicca's successes in capturing Colchester, more tribes sided with her. Suetonius must have been aware of this, which compelled him to confront Boudicca as quickly as possible. The nearest Roman towns from St. Albans were Alchester or Towchester, which could have been her next possible targets. Tacitus does not mention Boudicca destroying these towns, which could imply that the battlefield might be somewhere between Alchester, Towchester, and St. Albans.
A search using lidar finder reveals no suitable defensive positions south of Towchester or south of Alchester. However, in the northern Chiltern Hills, there are valleys that penetrate the mountains and seem interesting.
Chiltern Hills might have been a large impenetrable forested area 2,000 years ago. If we study the valleys in detail, one fits well with the criteria mentioned.
The valley that enters Northern Chiltern near the town of Wendover aligns well with all these assumptions. The Roman Road Akeman Street approximately corresponds to modern-day A41. The distance between Wendover and A41 is about 6 km. Boudicca could have moved from St. Albans to the open field outside Wendover, formed her army on Akeman Street, roughly opposite Suetonius, who had already taken a position at the opening.
The opening at Wendover is approximately 1400 meters wide. If Suetonius had lined up his 10,000 soldiers with a 2-meter width between each, the column would be 7 men deep. A more reasonable assumption is that cavalry stood on the flanks behind the infantry, making the column shorter in depth. The cavalry would likely have been used to sweep out to the flanks to prevent encirclement.
A search for archaeological finds on the proposed battlefield reveals no evidence of a battle taking place here.
The opening at Wendover is a location that should have appealed to Suetonius as a suitable battlefield.
Many details align well, and if the reasoning is correct, the answers lie in the ground. If someone finds this reasoning plausible and has the time, knowledge, and resources, they could investigate the ground at the suggested location. It would be incredibly exciting if someone could solve this historical mystery.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-07-2023

Bing Maps might just have revealed the footprint of the Principia at the centre of the potential Fort at Windridge .... Does anyone have any matching Principia plans that they are prepared to share? 

   

... also seem to have picked up the Northern Gatehouse but too little definition to assign a type to it so far;

   

   

.. and Windridge appears again this month, if you fancy springing £7.95 you can read Duncan MacKay pointing at Windridge as the final battle site again in here... still no more convincing ....

   

.. certainly Windridge as a Fort location was high on Rosalind Niblett's (ed Steve Greep) list of candidates back in 1990

   

https://woolmerforest.org.uk/E-Library/R/ROMAN%20TOWNS%20-%20THE%20WHEELER%20INHERITANCE.pdf

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - MonsGraupius - 12-30-2023

(09-15-2023, 10:19 AM)Renatus Wrote:
(09-15-2023, 08:19 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: The only plausible reason to move to London is because the Thames is a defensible barrier

If Suetonius was sheltering behind the Thames barrier, why did he feel compelled to give battle, when he had only 10,000 men and was vastly outnumbered? 

Suetonius was doing what any sensible general would do, which is to select a seat for war that was easily defended ... so he was not wasting his resources attempting to defend the indefensible.

He then spent the next months, perhaps a whole year, preparing for war ... that is why a general selects a "seat for war" ... to prepare. Then, when he was ready, at a time of his choosing, he drew Boudica into battle at a site of his choosing.

(09-15-2023, 10:19 AM)Renatus Wrote: Why not bring the legions down from north Wales, draw in reinforcements from the Continent and march out when he was sufficiently reinforced?
Did he need to leave these other areas undefended?

Unlike the ninth who rushed into battle without preparation, we are told Suetonius did not rush into battle, so he spent his time preparing for battle. That is why a much smaller force was able to defeat a larger one.

[removed by mod]


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 01-02-2024

Happy New Year 

   

Essentially most theories align with the campaign model set out in the image above. Phase 3 could be amended to move the Roman position up or down Watling Street from Mancetter to Dunstable/Tring with no significant change in the diagram and all within reasonable commuting range of the Iceni homelands. This model does make it unlikely the battle was south of, or even as far south as, Verulamium in my view (just Occam's razor at play). My own view is that deviation from this model requires a very strong case to be made, but may be possible.

   

The Jurassic ridge was, and is, a significant feature in the country both physically (height and watershed) but also culturally (historic tribal divisions and, in my view, the basis of our current north/south divide). The combination of the ridge and Fens seem to me to mark an obvious northern limit to the Iceni campaign. The area south of the ridge would be dangerous territory for any large force moving south with it's eastern flank exposed and no topographic cover to seek until the Chilterns, a ridge that can be flanked to the north and south and its spine actively advanced along. Hence I favour a site on the southern face of the Jurassic ridge adjacent to a Roman and pre-Roman pass with highway, great river access, proximity to Iceni territory, a closed steep sided valley with features and material objects that can be interpreted as of 1st Century Roman military origin.

Nothing new here for the OG thread members but a summary for new readers which can be read in detail here;

https://www.academia.edu/102948828/Boudicca_at_Church_Stowe_Campaign_Working_Draft

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 01-15-2024

(12-30-2023, 01:12 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: Suetonius was doing what any sensible general would do, which is to select a seat for war that was easily defended ... so he was not wasting his resources attempting to defend the indefensible.

It depends what is meant by 'seat of war' - a rallying point for troops or a place to make a stand.  Tacitus implies the latter when he says that Suetonius looked at the paucity of his troops (circumspecta infrequentia militis) and decided that it could not be London.

(12-30-2023, 01:12 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: He then spent the next months, perhaps a whole year, preparing for war ... that is why a general selects a "seat for war" ... to prepare.

If he did, his time was not well spent, if he could only raise one legion, which was probably with him already, the veterans of another and the nearest auxiliaries, of which there were likely to have been few south of the Thames

(12-30-2023, 01:12 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: Then, when he was ready, at a time of his choosing, he drew Boudica into battle at a site of his choosing.

How was this achieved?  Did he attempt to lure her south of the Thames, an invitation she would most likely have refused?  Or did he cross the Thames looking for a likely battlefield and vulnerable to attack until he found one?  It must be remembered that Dio says that he was forced to give battle against his better judgment because he was running short of food and the enemy was pressing upon him.  In saying that he decided to cease delay and give battle, Tacitus is more than likely making a virtue of necessity.

(12-30-2023, 01:12 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote:
(09-15-2023, 10:19 AM)Renatus Wrote: Why not bring the legions down from north Wales, draw in reinforcements from the Continent and march out when he was sufficiently reinforced?
Did he need to leave these other areas undefended?

Drawing reinforcements from the Continent would not have left it undefended.  The troops in north Wales were campaigning outside the defended area of the province, so calling them down would not have left anything undefended.  It would have meant abandoning his conquests but he did that anyway when he consolidated his forces for his campaign of reprisals, leaving Agricola to reconquer Mona when he became governor.

(12-30-2023, 01:12 AM)MonsGraupius Wrote: Unlike the ninth who rushed into battle without preparation, we are told Suetonius did not rush into battle, so he spent his time preparing for battle. That is why a much smaller force was able to defeat a larger one.

Have you read Adrian Goldworthy's paper 'Instinctive Genius'?  He makes the point that warfare is not conducted in the same way in all periods and in all cultures.  He demonstrates that the Roman method of tackling uprisings was to attack immediately with the forces available, even if they were under-prepared and inadequately supplied, with the object of intimidating the rebels with a rapid show of force.  Sometimes it worked, sometimes it didn't.  If that was what Petilius Cerialis was attempting, his failure did his reputation and career no harm because, despite Tacitus' criticism of his temeritas, he had done what was expected of him.

Suetonius was more cautious and the rebellion had passed its initial stage before he could intervene but he would nevertheless have been aware of the expectation that he would engage the enemy as soon as possible, before the rebellion gained further momentum.  If he had retreated south of the Thames, this would have been seen as a sign of weakness which Boudica would not have hesitated to exploit.  The tribes north of the river would have felt themselves abandoned by Rome and those wavering in their loyalty and even those sympathetic to the Romans would have thrown in their lot with the rebels to protect themselves from continued or anticipated depredations.  Furthermore, Suetonius would have had to keep track of the progress of the rebellion and he could only do that by keeping himself within scouting distance of the rebel forces, not by sheltering south of the Thames.


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 03-09-2024

New publication by Fernandez Gotz and Nico Roymans still goes for Mancetter based on Hingley 2022.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/elements/archaeology-of-the-roman-conquest/4A2339C9BE1F9F94C0CAFF6733F2E104 

Along with Windridge as a Claudian battle site via Reids paper.

I haven't seen the Hingley book yet, has anyone got it and are prepared to give a synopsis of his position that seems to lead back to Mancetter?

   

https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0190937416

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 03-10-2024

(03-09-2024, 09:47 PM)John1 Wrote: still goes for Mancetter based on Hingley 2022.

How disappointing!


(03-09-2024, 09:47 PM)John1 Wrote: I haven't seen the Hingley book yet, has anyone got it and are prepared to give a synopsis of his position that seems to lead back to Mancetter?

I hadn't heard of it, but the relevant section is online (Hingley, Conquering the Ocean: The Roman Invasion of Britain, p.118):

   

'High ground broadly matching this description' can be found, of course, all over south-east England... [Image: wink.png]


RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 03-10-2024

"How disappointing!" oh I don't know.... it's great to have necks on blocks even if only by omission... and adherence to 60 year old dogma... high risk for Prof Hingley.... I do enjoy a bit of academic jeopardy....

I also enjoy Hingley's characterisation that there have been hundreds/thousands of frenzied searches over centuries.... makes it very high credibility for whoever eventually gets it.... at very low credibility risk

I've ordered the book so we'll see if there is anything more of note.

I struggle to see how Mancetter "broadly matches"  his translation "a narrow valley" but I think I align with most in here in that view.