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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Robert Vermaat - 10-03-2021
(10-02-2021, 04:00 PM)Renatus Wrote:(10-02-2021, 02:23 PM)Hanny Wrote:(10-02-2021, 02:17 PM)Renatus Wrote: Does he? Where?In his parrellel structure of the chronology of events, just as he gives for the rest of his book, you can read up on his analistic mthods at JSTOR.
Perhaps you'd be kind enough to give a reference.
Agreed! Referring to JSTOR is like referring to 'the library'..
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-03-2021
(10-03-2021, 11:11 AM)Robert Vermaat Wrote: Agreed! Referring to JSTOR is like referring to 'the library'..It took 10 secs to find this from the first search, https://www.jstor.org/stable/526056
Tactitis tells us how he is going to record events Tactitus, e suum quaeque in annum referre 4.71, meaning he intends to record each event in its year of occurrence, he list 2 years and chronicles the events, one of the years lacks crops sown.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-03-2021
(10-03-2021, 09:44 AM)Hanny Wrote: a single crop cycle had already been sown... the spring crop has been sown
However, the sources we have for the period - sources that you yourself have cited - tell us that the main crop was sown in the autumn:
In the sixth period, from the autumnal equinox, the authorities state that sowing should begin and continue up to the ninety-first day. After the winter solstice, unless necessity requires, there should be no sowing. (Varro, De Rustica, 1.34.1)
Most people anticipate the times for sowing, and begin to sow corn at the eleventh day of the autumnal equinox... although the true method is not to sow before the leaves have begun to fall. Some think that this occurs exactly at the setting of the Pleiades on November 10 (Pliny, NH 18.60)
An autumn sowing season makes perfect sense of the notes in Tacitus that the revolt began in late summer (late in the Roman campaign season) and the Britons were away in autumn (planting season). As I've said, if they were away for a spring planting season then the revolt must have either begun or continued throughout the preceding winter.
(10-03-2021, 09:44 AM)Hanny Wrote: mules have a forward lift of c2850000 lbs, plus a 15 day Army carried with it, so c3015000 so each day your army is supplied by half (55%) its overall requirements in your timeline... a frontage of 4 cohorts at the rear most line, so 2900 feet... min 1450 front rankers... 100 Romans at Watling, are doing the work of 270 men
The problem with all of these complex calculations of logistics, supply, deployment etc is that they rest on unverifiable assumptions. We do not know how much food or water a Roman soldier was issued per day, we do not know the exact size of the force Paulinus led from Anglesey, we do not know the formation or deployment for the final battle. Even a small error in the estimates can expand into a gross miscalculation.
Instead, I think we should begin with the textual evidence as we have it:
i. Paulinus marched an expeditionary force from Anglesey and reached London before Boudica's forces could advance from Colchester.
ii. He 'saved the province with rapid movement' (Agricola, 16)
So I think we would be better figuring out how this might have happened than trying to calculate how it would have been impossible!
![[Image: wink.png]](https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/images/icons/wink.png){kind=icon}
As for logistics: in AD359 Julianus Caesar led a springtime expedition against the Franks with each of his soldiers carrying 17 days rations 'about their necks' (Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2); he previous says that this 'this hard-tack (as they commonly call it)' was carried 'on the backs of his willing soldiers,' (ibid 17.8.2) - so no mules needed.
Suetonius Paulinus could easily have drawn 17 days marching rations for his expedition from that allocated to his full campaign force in Wales. (In fact, this might explain why the troops left in Wales were unable to march quickly to reinforce him, i.e. he had taken a portion of their alloted campaign rations with him!)
17 days would get Paulinus down to Godmanchester, or to London, where he could have resupplied from the granaries there. His men could have partially topped up supplies at forts and towns along the route, without having to exhaust them completely. As for water, they could have done what the British army did in South Africa during the Boer War - a two-pint (1.2 litre) canteen issued to every man, for all purposes, to be replenished as and when possible on the march. Water carriers could fetch water from any rivers, wells, streams and springs along the route.
It would be tough, but it would work.
We should remember too that 18 miles per day (20 Roman miles) is the lower figure from Vegetius; at the 'full pace' they could routinely cover 22 miles (24 Roman miles) per day. We have evidence of Roman armies covering even longer distances that that too, when required.
Anyway, I think at this point, Hanny, it might be worth sharing your own estimates for when and how the campaign might have happened - and perhaps even any ideas you might have about the site of the final battle - which is, of course, supposedly the point of this discussion!
![[Image: smile.png]](https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/images/icons/smile.png){kind=icon}
(10-03-2021, 11:21 AM)Hanny Wrote: he list 2 years and chronicles the events
He only mentions one year: Caesen[n]io Paeto et Petronio Turpiliano consulibus gravis clades in Britannia accepta (Annals 14.29): 'In the consulship of Caesonius Paetus and Petronius Turpilianus [AD61], a serious disaster was sustained in Britain.'
He later says (14.40) 'That same year two remarkable crimes were committed at Rome': Eodem anno Romae insignia scelera. Anno is singular, therefore this is a single year he has been discussing.
[edit - we've mentioned the Kevin Carroll paper you linked several times here. You will notice that he says on his first page that "These events must cover parts of two years: at least part of one campaigning season (Suetonius's attack on Mona [Anglesey] and his battle with Boudicca), plus a winter, during which the governor of Britain was changed, and the period when Petronius was governor." - therefore the events we have been discussing, from the Anglesey campaign to the final battle, fall within the same year, prior to winter, according to Carroll.]
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-03-2021
(10-02-2021, 01:09 PM)Hanny Wrote: Two problems with compressing it all into a single year, first is tacitus records it as a 2 season event,
Are we getting confused here? What do you mean by 'season' - season of the year or campaigning season? If the former, I could agree with you that that is a possibility. Depending on when one thinks the revolt started, it could be spring/summer or summer/autumn, even autumn/beginning of winter. It could equally be within a single season, however. If you mean the latter, there is no chance. All the indications are that it was a relatively short affair. Carroll, in the article that you cited, suggests that the revolt started at the beginning of May and that the final battle took place five weeks later. That said, as I indicated before, I have no difficulty in believing that the revolt started in one year and that, after the defeat of the rebels, the aftermath extended into the following year.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-04-2021
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: However, the sources we have for the period - sources that you yourself have cited - tell us that the main crop was sown in the autumn:
You clearly have not read or not understood what i have posted, as they include refernces to natural cycle, replaced and or in conjucture with newer methds, spring as being the principle emmer crop cycle after a build up of winter manure to effect in 1 cent AD, and to autumn using spelt being the principle crop cycle in later centuries, and i further pointed you towards how different callender systems and crop cycles can produce crops to fit into a time line. Emmer sring and spelt autumn which dominates in 3 and 4th century in NWE but not earlier here for example http://www.butser.org.uk/Cereal%20Yields%20Worst%20Option.pdf
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: An autumn sowing season makes perfect sense of the notes in Tacitus that the revolt began in late summer (late in the Roman campaign season) and the Britons were away in autumn (planting season). As I've said, if they were away for a spring planting season then the revolt must have either begun or continued throughout the preceding winter.
autumn sowing makes sense if its the year before, when P is in Angelsey, it makes no sense otherwise. Tactitus records in chronology P actions, he then says, "While he was thus occupied, the sudden revolt of the province7 was announced to Suetonius."
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: The problem with all of these complex calculations of logistics, supply, deployment etc is that they rest on unverifiable assumptions. We do not know how much food or water a Roman soldier was issued per day, we do not know the exact size of the force Paulinus led from Anglesey, we do not know the formation or deployment for the final battle. Even a small error in the estimates can expand into a gross miscalculation.Sigh you keep ignoring what we do know, we do know the principle formation was the boar head, from which we can adduce the rest of the army frontage, we do know you gave number values and a timeline, from which i have shown its highly improbale to work as written.
We know the weight of food and water ration as we are told what it comprises, we are told its emmer wheet to make the bread of the legions and its porridge from. Sure i could be out with assumptions and calcs, as i said i used a high end carry weight of 15 days, P was expecting to go Anglsey at 120 miles and fight there, so carried what he considerd he needed, as it turned out he ends up fighting 300 miles from his base of supply, and did not know he would have to do so, so did not carry more with him, but they show in broad terms that your timeline is militarily impracticle, and contradicts to much of the evidence we have.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Instead, I think we should begin with the textual evidence as we have it:
i. Paulinus marched an expeditionary force from Anglesey and reached London before Boudica's forces could advance from Colchester.
ii. He 'saved the province with rapid movement' (Agricola, 16)
So I think we would be better figuring out how this might have happened than trying to calculate how it would have been impossible!
Removing the impossible leaves the possible to chose from.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: As for logistics: in AD359 Julianus Caesar led a springtime expedition against the Franks with each of his soldiers carrying 17 days rations 'about their necks' (Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2); he previous says that this 'this hard-tack (as they commonly call it)' was carried 'on the backs of his willing soldiers,' (ibid 17.8.2) - so no mules needed.
As i referenced earlier the legions can carry different amounts with them, 15 is a high end lets be sure we can do what i want to do. So all you have to do is explain why your campaign 6 days march away, now requires 60 days, and then how a Roman can carry enough to go to Angelsey in 60 days and then on to godmanchster on it without starving to death or not being able to lift its ration weight on day one.
Hard tack is bucellatum, in Feeding the Roman Army The Archaeology of Production and Supply in NW Europe, we have its recipe, emmer wheet and barley.
Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/17*.html
For he could not leave until the grain supply was brought up from Aquitania during the mild summer season, and after the breaking up of the cold weather and frost. 2 But as careful planning is victorious over nearly all difficulties, he turned over in his mind many various possibilities; and this at last he found to be the only one, namely, without waiting for the height of the season, to fall upon the savages before he was looked for. And having settled on his plan, he had the grain allowance for twenty days taken from what was to be consumed in the winter quarters, and baked up to serve for some time; he put this hard-tack (as they commonly call it) on the backs of his willing soldiers, and relying on this supply he set out under favourable auspices (as he did before), thinking that within the fifth or sixth month two urgent and inevitable campaigns might be brought to completion.
So he wont wait for the summer crops, but takes it from the winter stocks and issues 20 days hard tack, to allow him to operate for 2 months, how will 20 days hard take supply an army for two month?, is the rest of what was required on mules.....
But things go south, and in no time and he has to re build 3 forts and put 17 days grain into the forts leaving the legion to starve and they mutiny, principly from poor logistical planning.
Ammianus Marcellinus 17.9.2
https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Ammian/17*.html
1 Julianus Caesar rebuilds three fortresses on the Meuse that had been destroyed by the savages, and is assailed with insults and threats by the soldiers, who are suffering from hunger.
1 So, as everything was proceeding in accordance with his prayers, he made haste with watchful solicitude to put the well-being of the provinces in every way on a firm footing; and he planned to repair (as time would permit) three forts situated in a straight line along the banks overhanging the river Meuse, which had long since been overthrown by the obstinate assaults of the savages; and they were immediately restored, the campaign being interrupted for a short time. 2 And to the end that speed might make his wise policy safe, he took a part of the seventeen days' provisions, which the soldiers, when they marched forward on their expedition carried about their necks, and stored it in those same forts, hoping that what had been deducted might be replaced from the harvests of the Chamavi. 3 But it turned out far otherwise; for the crops were not yet even ripe, and the soldiers, after using up what they carried, could find no food anywhere; and resorting to outrageous threats, they assailed Julian with foul names and opprobrious language, calling him an Asiatic,57 a Greekling58 and a deceiver, and a fool with a show of wisdom.
A better example from this later period is https://www.amazon.co.uk/Nisibis-War-Defence-Roman-337-363/dp/1526782065
In 507 Joshua the Stylite chronicler recorded the events of the Roman-Persian War of 502-507. During the 501-502 campaign two Roman armies, totaling 52,000 men, were operating in the vicinity of Edessa. The army bakers were unable to make sufficient biscuits for the combined force so the commissary-general Appion ordered the people of Edessa to make the biscuits (bucellatum) for the army at their own cost with 630,000 modii of grain. One modii, was approximately eight dry quarts, fed a contubernium (tent group or squad) of eight soldiers for one day. The grain recorded could feed 52,000 men for approximately 90 days and weighed 10,080,000 pounds or 5,040 tons. Joshua only takes note of the grain made into biscuits. A document from 360 lists individual daily rations in a garrison at the equivalent of three pounds of bread, two pounds of meat, two pints of wine and 1/8 pint of oil. If one adds the grain and fodder for the cavalry horses and fodder for the draft animals to the tonnage required to feed the army for 90 days totals are doubled to a minimum of 10,080 tons. When these logistical planning factors are applied it becomes apparent that a besieging army of 50,000 men must either capture a fortified city within 90 days or pack up and march home. If the army’s operation exceeded the 90- day limit, it starved. During the 359 Campaign, Ammianus claims the Persians left 30,000 dead in the Roman province. The siege lasted 73 days and the maneuvers before the siege were between 15-30 days. Shapur’s total operation lasted between 90-100 days. Most of the deaths would have been caused by starvation and related diseases.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Suetonius Paulinus could easily have drawn 17 days marching rations for his expedition from that allocated to his full campaign force in Wales. (In fact, this might explain why the troops left in Wales were unable to march quickly to reinforce him, i.e. he had taken a portion of their alloted campaign rations with him!)
Sure he could, 20 days ration only means your carrying 100lbs on your back and why not take massive amounts on your back when your going to attack angelsey 120 miles away, or look at the entrails and know your going to need x and not y 3 months later. His base of supply has a min of a years supply for a Legion, so thats 4015000 lbs so taking 17 days worth, which is 5% taken on the Legions back ( now its twice the normal amounht on your back and your still punching out your 18mpd for weeks on end0and leaves plenty and now you say he does not even take the Legion with him, despite giving us that he has the whole legion plus aux in Anglsey in Sept.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: 17 days would get Paulinus down to Godmanchester, or to London, where he could have resupplied from the granaries there. His men could have partially topped up supplies at forts and towns along the route, without having to exhaust them completely. As for water, they could have done what the British army did in South Africa during the Boer War - a two-pint (1.2 litre) canteen issued to every man, for all purposes, to be replenished as and when possible on the march. Water carriers could fetch water from any rivers, wells, streams and springs along the route.
It would be tough, but it would work.
I already explained your views on logistics do not acord with reality, your posting history shows a solid understanding of most things, but logistics seems to be a soft spot in your reading, the grain in roman fort towns granaries is insuffiecent, if it was you lose 10% to 20% a day getting it loaded and your march rate drops when you want it to increase, you also seem to want march all day every day, mules require a rest day every 7, a Roman rested every 3 to 4 days when marching, so when you calculate what you want the march rates to be and what humans and animals are capable of doing you find your would work, becomes imposible to work.
How tough kinda intrested me so...
Ok 17 days on the backs of the legion, is now 100 lbs, using the A Hitler school of logistics, lets not concern our selves with logistical reality, the campaign time will just have to change to conform to what i want to do.
September 3rd 198 miles to Godmanchester, arrives September 13th.
14th leaves for london at 56 miles arrives 16th.
Total days 13, 19.5 mpd, every day.
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/1603388/Medical effects of a loaded march of one day with results in a 24% injury rate for traing for TAB, average sick days lost per injury 2.
Using current US medical data we get 90 injuries per 000s man hours injury rate, from troops carrying 70 to 100+lbs during rucks, therfore a legion has had 3611 on sick call, half requiring hospsitalization for more than day by end of march, half with severe blisters and slight sprains etc and by day 13 has lost 1800 as left behind as unable to march and catch up.
So behind his TAB is a lot of people wondering how to catch up, which makes me wonder if P did not re align his supply net but simply extended it from Wroxeter to Menai, and then onwards to Godmancheter and beyond, so a 300 odd mile supply line behind him, that he knows is secure as falling out provides the garrisons to secure his Loc and los. Instead of a 120 mile supply net for his needs, he could instead create a 300 mile supply net that can give him perhaps half his needs, therby forcing him to get a conclusion or be forced back along the supply chain towards more supplies etc.
(10-03-2021, 03:56 PM)Renatus Wrote:No confusion on my part.(10-02-2021, 01:09 PM)Hanny Wrote: Two problems with compressing it all into a single year, first is tacitus records it as a 2 season event,
Are we getting confused here? What do you mean by 'season' - season of the year or campaigning season? If the former, I could agree with you that that is a possibility. Depending on when one thinks the revolt started, it could be spring/summer or summer/autumn, even autumn/beginning of winter. It could equally be within a single season, however. If you mean the latter, there is no chance. All the indications are that it was a relatively short affair. Carroll, in the article that you cited, suggests that the revolt started at the beginning of May and that the final battle took place five weeks later. That said, as I indicated before, I have no difficulty in believing that the revolt started in one year and that, after the defeat of the rebels, the aftermath extended into the following year.
(02-19-2012, 12:02 AM)Steve Kaye Wrote: Vindex: Interesting you should mention Sandhurst because I wrote to the library asking for assistance with the water needs of 18/19Century cavalry units etc.. I reasoned that if anyone had that information .... Didn't get a reply.
Try instead, the Defence Academy, https://www.da.mod.uk/contact-us/ if you have clearence your looking for those involved in simulations https://www.da.mod.uk/news/wargames-and-simulation/ and validation models.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-04-2021
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: You clearly have not read or not understood what i have posted
I have, and I have quoted from the sources you cited, which appear to say the opposite to what you claim they are saying.
If you know of other sources that would support your suggestions, please provide exact quotes or references, so we know what you mean.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: Tactitus records in chronology P actions, he then says, "While he was thus occupied, the sudden revolt of the province7 was announced to Suetonius."
Exactly: in the late summer. The revolt began then and continued into the autumn.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: we do know the principle formation was the boar head, from which we can adduce the rest of the army frontage
As I'm sure you are aware, we do not know what sort of formation the cuneus was. Maybe a wedge, or a column, no idea of its size or formation.
Trying to make detailed estimates on army size or organisation based on such vague references is pointless.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: 15 is a high end lets be sure we can do what i want to do
As I've shown, 17 days would be a 'high end'.
Modern theories are only any use if they accord with ancient evidence. If they do not, they are mere number games.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: how a Roman can carry enough to go to Angelsey in 60 days and then on to godmanchster on it without starving to death
Anglesey was a full scale seasonal military campaign involving multiple legions and auxiliaries, with a full mule supply train and probably wagons as well. The march against the Iceni rebellion was an emergency expedition using only a portion of the available troops, intended to move fast using available infrastructure.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: I already explained your views on logistics do not acord with reality
Strong words! I would suggest at this point you really ought to set out your own views on how all this happened, so we can all see how well they 'accord with reality'...
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-04-2021
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: No confusion on my part.
Good. Then perhaps you would be good enough to enlighten the rest of us.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-04-2021
(10-04-2021, 11:42 AM)Renatus Wrote:(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: No confusion on my part.
Good. Then perhaps you would be good enough to enlighten the rest of us.
Enlighten you you mean, your the one confused by what you read, and asking for clairification to reduce your confusion, so i directed you to JSTOR, telling you what to look for there, you have chosen not to do so, so i see no reason why helping you further is my problem, as the problem is all at your end and any further help would be a waste of my effort.
(10-04-2021, 10:07 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: As I've shown, 17 days would be a 'high end'.
What you showed was an inability to read and understand a primary source.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-04-2021
(10-04-2021, 11:50 AM)Hanny Wrote: an inability to read and understand a primary source.
I believe in this case the misunderstanding is yours: he did not, as you claim, "put 17 days grain into the forts leaving the legion to starve and they mutiny".
Read the text again and you will see that he took 17 days full ration with him, and only allocated a portion of that to the forts. The troops complained but neither starved nor mutinied, and the campaign was a success.
This demonstrates that ancient logistics were considerably more flexible, and effective, than the rigid arithmetic of modern military analysis might have us believe.
(10-04-2021, 09:11 AM)Hanny Wrote: mules require a rest day every 7, a Roman rested every 3 to 4 days when marching
Where are you getting this from?
Mules can work for twenty days in rough terrain without rest.
Roman troops marched five hours a day and rested the remainder. Infantry General William B Hazen, in a well-known anecdote, claimed that infantry could outmarch cavalry after seven days on the road (campaigning in the arid regions of the US southwest). If American infantry could march across arid country for more than seven days without rest, what leads you to believe that trained Roman troops could not?
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-04-2021
(10-04-2021, 11:50 AM)Hanny Wrote: Enlighten you you mean, your the one confused by what you read, and asking for clairification to reduce your confusion, so i directed you to JSTOR, telling you what to look for there, you have chosen not to do so, so i see no reason why helping you further is my problem, as the problem is all at your end and any further help would be a waste of my effort.
You seem incapable of understanding what is put to you, so let me explain in terms that you may understand. You spoke of a 'two season event' and I asked you what you meant by 'season'. Do you mean two of the seasons in a year, i.e., spring, summer, autumn (or fall, if you prefer), winter? Or do you mean two campaigning seasons in different years with a break in between? Or do you mean simply two years? And, if you mean two years, do you mean the period from the outbreak of the rebellion to the final battle or do you mean the whole period from the outbreak up to and including the replacement of Suetonius as governor? Is that clear enough for you?
Incidentally, I have read and am fully conversant with the article that you referenced. Indeed, i have the volume of Britannia in which it appears.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Mark Hygate - 10-05-2021
(10-04-2021, 12:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: ..............................
Roman troops marched five hours a day and rested the remainder.............................
I have to ask - for my own sanity in recent posts...
Do you include:
- Striking the camp and filling in all the ditches; collecting the stakes and parcelling them up; rounding up your mule and making sure they're properly loaded...
- Marching for 5 'Summer' hours for 20 miles carrying upwards of 60lbs or more...
- Finding your marked new tenting site; making camp; unloading and caring for your mule; digging ditches and placing a pallisade/stakes...
- Doing everything for those lazy (sorry, doing other important 'officer' things) seniors...
- and Guard duty - where falling alseep is punishable by death...
As "rest" ?
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-05-2021
(10-05-2021, 11:05 AM)Mark Hygate Wrote: - Striking the camp and filling in all the ditches; collecting the stakes and parcelling them up; rounding up your mule and making sure they're properly loaded...
- Marching for 5 'Summer' hours for 20 miles carrying upwards of 60lbs or more...
- Finding your marked new tenting site; making camp; unloading and caring for your mule; digging ditches and placing a pallisade/stakes...
- Doing everything for those lazy (sorry, doing other important 'officer' things) seniors...
- and Guard duty - where falling alseep is punishable by death...
As my late father would have said, 'After that, the rest of the time's your own.'
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-05-2021
(10-05-2021, 11:05 AM)Mark Hygate Wrote: Do you include:
Milner's note on Vegetius's text adds that his estimates "will correspond to the speed of a standard march or iustum iter known from Caesar Bell Civ 3.76, defined as a normal route-march on good roads in good weather between camps, leaving time to build the camp and curare corpora and leave in time the next day".
I am assuming that curare corpora (care of the body) includes things other than hard labour! And perhaps that a five-hour summer march day would include a midday rest period as well.
The Roman army was trained to march long distances, as is well known, and I am assuming (again) that the daily march rate could be kept up for long periods. Otherwise a shorter daily march would have been more useful. Our sources often seem to suggest that armies covered long distances relatively quickly (even leaving aside Caesar's 'forced marches' and his comments about marching both day and night!)
I notice in Bell Civ 1.78 that Caesar's legionaries "had been ordered to bring a twenty-two days' supply [of grain] from Ilerda; the light-armed and auxiliaries had none, since... their bodies were not trained to carry burdens." So 22 days rations could apparently be carried 'on the body' by troops trained to do so.
[for those who refuse to accept the idea of legionaries marching every day, I would add that Vegetius's 'full step' of 24 Roman miles (22 modern miles) a day would get Paulinus's force the 198 miles from Anglesey to Godmanchester in 9 marching days - thus allowing two full days off for R&R en route!]
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-05-2021
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I believe in this case the misunderstanding is yours: he did not, as you claim, "put 17 days grain into the forts leaving the legion to starve and they mutiny".
Belief is what people fall back on when the facts dont support their viewpoint, its very simple, you have not read or not undeerstood the text.
I posted the link so all can see what he wrote, that he took 20 not 17 days with him, "And having settled on his plan, he had the grain allowance for twenty days taken from what was to be consumed in the winter quarters, and baked up to serve for some time; he put this hard-tack" later after moving some distance, he then writes, "And to the end that speed might make his wise policy safe, he took a part of the seventeen days' provisions, which the soldiers, when they marched forward on their expedition carried about their necks and stored it in those same forts, hoping that what had been deducted might be replaced from the harvests of the Chamavi." He then relates, "But it turned out far otherwise; for the crops were not yet even ripe, and the soldiers, after using up what they carried, could find no food anywhere; and resorting to outrageous threats, they assailed Julian with foul names and opprobrious language, calling him an Asiatic,57 a Greekling58 and a deceiver, and a fool with a show of wisdom" he then mentions the mutiny twice ending with "At length, after the mutiny had been quelled, not without various sorts of fair words, they built a pontoon bridge and crossed the Rhine".
Shame your use of a refernce to 17 days actually refers to a 20 days carry weight, and putting a part of 17 days of it into granaries in forts.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Read the text again and you will see that he took 17 days full ration with him, and only allocated a portion of that to the forts. The troops complained but neither starved nor mutinied, and the campaign was a success.
I can read and count so that gives me an advantage over you, he started with 20 days extra rations for a 2 month campaign "he put this hard-tack (as they commonly call it) on the backs of his willing soldiers, and relying on this supply he set out under favourable auspices (as he did before), thinking that within the fifth or sixth month two urgent and inevitable campaigns might be brought to completion", since 20 days is not suffiecent rations for 2 months in the field, this is extra to what he would need, and not the full load.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: This demonstrates that ancient logistics were considerably more flexible, and effective, than the rigid arithmetic of modern military analysis might have us believe.
It demonstartes you have issues with both reading comprehension, and how much ahuman body can do under loaded marches. You can put another 20 days rations on your back, making it now over c100lbs weight,and what you think that means is you can then spend 90 days with it on your back marching to Angelsey and fighting there for a week with it not on your back, and then from Sept 3 to 16 Sept march to london at 198 and 56 miles in 13 days, a total of 19.5 mpd. Thats the longest sustained 100lbs march rate in human history, Roman march rate of 5 hours a day is c4mp with full gear, that does not include weeks of extra food rations, so when i used a high end 15 day, its high end, you otoh say with hindsight, actually no, i need it to be more....
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Where are you getting this from?
Its in almost every book on logistics that looks at mules, note also the effects of forced march on troop numbers at end of march 144, page https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ntMeWddadwAC&pg=PA144&lpg=PA144&dq=roman+mules+rest+vegitus&source=bl&ots=1n_zMU4Y7l&sig=ACfU3U1Vect5g9dlkPj7Ed-mut0gEZ3aUA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj-_YnWobPzAhWKX8AKHXuwChcQ6AF6BAgWEAM#v=onepage&q=roman%20mules%20rest%20vegitus&f=false
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Roman troops marched five hours a day and rested the remainder.
No they did not. They marched 5 hours under their normal weight and then did a vast array of other things, from erecting the camp which took hours, grinding their own corn, which took hours, to standing gaurd in full kit, https://www.jstor.org/stable/525803 and http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/8075/2/8075_5075-vol2.PDF?UkUDh:CyT
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Infantry General William B Hazen, in a well-known anecdote, claimed that infantry could outmarch cavalry after seven days on the road (campaigning in the arid regions of the US southwest). If American infantry could march across arid country for more than seven days without rest, what leads you to believe that trained Roman troops could not?
this is the quote "After the fourth day's march of a mixed command, the horse does not march faster than the foot Soldier, and after the seventh day, the foot Soldier begins to outmarch the horse," recounted COL William B. Hazen
Congress disagreed and kept the Cav strength at 10 Regiments.
Hazen, a true Infantryman hated the Cavlary arm and Custer in particular, wanted Congress to reduce the cav Regiments numbers in favour of more Inf Regiments, his testomany to Congress to which you refer, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JE9HAQAAIAAJ&pg=RA4-PA454&lpg=RA4-PA454&dq=After+the+fourth+day%E2%80%99s+march+of+a+mixed+command,+the+horse+does+not+march+faster+than+the+foot+Soldier,+and+after+the+seventh+day,+the+foot+Soldier+begins+to+outmarch+the+horse&source=bl&ots=q8m8uJAyF8&sig=ACfU3U0BdWIpFYr94D7A5SkHq0oTiMn2XA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjSqIuJprPzAhXYh_0HHf19B14Q6AF6BAgEEAM#v=onepage&q=After%20the%20fourth%20day%E2%80%99s%20march%20of%20a%20mixed%20command%2C%20the%20horse%20does%20not%20march%20faster%20than%20the%20foot%20Soldier%2C%20and%20after%20the%20seventh%20day%2C%20the%20foot%20Soldier%20begins%20to%20outmarch%20the%20horse&f=false
Includes his reasoning why 10 Cav Regiments was to many, but excludes an explantion of why this was so, horses require rest days, they dont sweat the same way a human does who has evolved a skin suited to pursuit hunting allowing him to pursue on foot more effiecently than a horse/deer etc can run away, a man can run down his prey who eventually drops from heat exhustion and kill it from this evolutionary advantage. They require more food and water inputs than human do, and lack of natural fodder meant horses perfomed poorly in arid areas, so 50 horse needed an acre of fodder each day, which simply did not exist, so had to be wagoned in which is the part of hazens testomany you ignore, that its wagons that slow the daily march rate down as they are needed to transport the horse fodder, as well as teh munitions, botyh horse and cav regiments required c 180000 rnds of munitions, so the 12000 lbs of firearms munitions was mostly in the wagons, see also supplying War M V crevald, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Supplying-War-Logistics-Wallenstein-Patton/dp/0521546575
US infantry of the period carried 3 days rations in there 60lbs weight carried, and achived 8-12 mpd, not 20 days rations and 100lbs and 19.5 mpd you want them to carry for months.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-05-2021
(10-05-2021, 01:21 PM)Hanny Wrote: you have not read or not undeerstood the text... a refernce to 17 days actually refers to a 20 days carry weight, and putting a part of 17 days of it into granaries in forts.
I'm afraid we'll have to differ on this - the text states, I think, that the soldiers carried "seventeen days' provisions... when they marched forward on their expedition". This was apparently prepared using the grain alloted for twenty days' winter provisions. A portion of it was then allocated to the forts, which caused supply problems later.
Perhaps if somebody would like to look at the text in latin they could clear up this difference in interpretation?
[*ex annona decem dierum et septem, quam in expeditionem pergens vehebat cervicibus miles, portionem subtractam in isdem condidit castris - Amm Mar 17.9.2]
(10-05-2021, 01:21 PM)Hanny Wrote: what you think that means is you can then spend 90 days with it on your back marching to Angelsey and fighting there for a week with it not on your back, and then from Sept 3 to 16 Sept march to london at 198 and 56 miles in 13 days, a total of 19.5 mpd.
Fourteen to seventeen days marching ration was apparently standard for the Roman army, carried by the troops themselves. Besides the quote from Ammianus, we also have the Historia Augusta:
"During his campaigns he [Alexander Sev] made such careful provision for the soldiers that they were furnished with supplies at each halting-place and were never compelled to carry food for the usual period of seventeen days, except in the enemy's country. And even then he lightened their burdens by using mules and camels..." (HA Alex Sev 2.47.1)
(Note that this implies carrying marching provisions on mules would not previously have been standard practice.)
And Cicero:
"how great the labor is of an army on its march... consider that they carry more than a fortnight’s provision, and whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the stakes, for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more encumbrance than their own limbs." (Tusc Disp II.17)
So our ancient sources tell us that troops could carry 14-17 days provisions on the march. You, however, using modern military statistics and calculations, claim that this would be impossible without exhausting and crippling the troops, and therefore Suetonius Paulinus could not have done it.
Either your calculations are wrong, or history is wrong. Which should we consider more likely?