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Issus; request for comments - Jona Lendering - 01-21-2009
I have put online a long article on the battle of Issus. As I am not really familiar with the details of phalanx warfare, I may have made mistakes; so I invite you to suggest improvements. The text was originally written in Dutch and I have translated it myself, which usually means that it becomes a bit clumsy (writing directly in English is usually easier). Any suggestion will be appreciated.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Paralus - 01-23-2009
Quote:Darius will not have realized that the army to his south was the united Macedonian force. His scouts told him that the enemy was moving to the south, and the obvious conclusion was that it was trying to escape from the king's army. Believing he had succeeded in getting between the two Macedonian armies, Darius decided to use the next day to pursue the fleeing enemies; they would be defeated on the coastal strip between Issus and the Belen Pass, while the second army could be dealt with later.
This is quite a cogent reading of the available material. The wonderful story – paralleling the traitorous Demaratus of Herodotus – of Amyntas needs to be consigned to the apocrypha of history. Darius well knew what he intended; that it did not work out as planned in no way requires a Demaratus motif to show him up as a lightweight.
Quote:The Persians may have heard the frightening sound of thousands and thousands of Macedonian hoplite panoplies. Sometimes, the Macedonians halted, to make sure that their battalions were in one straight line. The terrain was gradually becoming wider, and the battalions had to deploy themselves accordingly. All this took some time, but in the end, the Macedonians were ready to cross the Pinarus.
This is one of the more expansive descriptions in Arrian. Redolent of the display before Glaucias. Here are Philip’s (and Alexander’s) Macedonian professionals doing what they have been trained to do. This description – the files “multiplying” whilst shallowing in depth from column – puts the sarisa through the argument that the front ranks carried shorter sarisae than the rear (thus explaining the 15-18 foot sarisae over the period).
Your use of “hoplites” for Macedonian infantry is good: this is what Arrian refers to them as. The only times he clearly refers to the pezhetairoi is in places one would not find phalangites ( such as when Alexander takes the “pezhetairoi” on his visit to Corinth – I can well imagine that some 9,000 souls will have blocked Diogenes’ sun).
More later: there is a bar to get to selling cold black beer and it is stiflingly hot in Sydney….
Re: Issus; request for comments - Giannis K. Hoplite - 01-23-2009
Hi Jona. A very enjoyable article,I usually get bored reading again about such battles like Issus,Granicus,Thermopylae etc.
I have a few points to mention though.
First that you mention that the Greeks mercenaries would have a 4m spear,and that it would be used like the macedonian sarissa when in close combat. Some have suggested that after Iphicrates and after the Theban Sacred Band the lenght of the spear had increased,but there is no evidence for that. Hoplites in fourth century would have a spear of about 2,5m,the higher estimate is 3m. And they would always use it one handed raised above their shoulder,nothing like the sarissa.
Another point is that you said one of the macedonian soldier's disadvantage was that he could use his lance only once. This has a base,since given how thin the sarissa shaft was in the tip,many would break if stuck into the killed enemy's body. However sure it would have been part of the phalangite's trainning,and certainly experiance,how to use his weapon,how to strike and pull it back quickly in order to prevent it from breaking. In all,you leave it indicated that the sarissa was an one-use weapon.
Last,those mountains of bodies of the dead Kardakes could not have been more than three bodies tall. This I read in Hanson's "The Western Way of War" and he was quoting some other author on the subject. I don't have the book at hand,sorry.
Overal it was a very vivid article.
Khaire
Giannis
Re: Issus; request for comments - PMBardunias - 01-24-2009
Quote:The Greek phalanx in the Persian army was probably deeper and more massive, but the Macedonian soldiers had longer lances.
Why do you think the hoplites were deeper? If the phalangites were in 16 ranks, then hoplites only rarely formed deeper.
Quote:During the often crucial first seconds, the Macedonian was in a better position. He must have aimed at his opponent's vulnerable places. An experienced warrior might aim at his enemy's face and kill him with one thrust, but against the Greek professionals, this was hardly possible; the lance would be caught on the shield.
I have never seen a satifactory description of what occurred when hoplites faced sarissaphoroi. As you describe above, and as is told later for Romans at Pydna for example, the sarissa must have often lodged in the shield and held a hoplite "pinned" at a distance. These clashes are problematic because the fact that both hoplites and sarissaphoroi fought in linear formations without the tactical and small unit flexibility of the later Romans made exploiting small gaps difficult. To exploit such a gap you'd have to break your own phalanx.
In my opinion this is what happened. Initially you had a stand-off at sarissa length with some hoplites' shields being pinned and them having really no way to reach the sarissaphoroi. All the hoplites could do is try to fight their way through the hedge of sarissa point. We can look to Cleonymus the spartan's attack on sarissa armed men where he (supposedly) ordered his front rank men to drop their weapons and grab the sarissas while the second rankers slip past to see how this might occur. Unlike what is purported for Cleonymus, this would not be an organized thing and the hoplite phalanx would largely disintigrate into a mob of small groups as men manage to slip past the sarissa. The sheer number and density of sarissa makes getting past all of them to within the 5' range of a greek doru unlikely. This is why hoplites generally lost these encounters.
But if a hoplite got within range, he would have a great advantage over his foes due to the maneuverability of his spear.
Quote:The Macedonian advantage lasted for only a couple of seconds. The Greek phalanx, armed with four meter spears that were, when the two arrays collided, used in the same way as the six meter Macedonian lance, now had the advantage of its superior numbers. Besides, Persian light armed soldiers threw missiles from behind the Greek mercenaries into the Macedonian phalanx, which created serious damage and helped to open the already existing gaps even more.
The doru is 8' long and held overhand in a hoplite phalanx. How they would hold them against a hedge of sarissa instead of other hoplites is anyone's guess. What you would really want to do if pinned at some 10' or so from your foe is throw your spear, but the doru was horribly balanced for this. Perhaps this explains in part why the dual-use lonche and the Thureophoroi become popular.
Quote:In this way, the two armies were locked to each other, with their lances and spears pierced into their enemies' lines. The clash of the phalanxes resembled, if it is permissible to compare a battle to a game, a scrum during a rugby match. That side which was able to exercise most pressure, would eventually overthrow its enemy. The Greeks were more numerous and stronger, and the Macedonians were gradually pushed back to the river. Giving all they had, the soldiers pushed against each other, gasping, sweating, stumbling across the fallen, with ringing ears, their feet slipping in the mud, and a furiously beating heart.
The large gap in the sarissa line is why we see such carnage among the Macedonians. In this battle the hoplites were able to pierce the line of the phalangites in a still-ordered phalanx instead of small groups. All of the advantage is with the hoplites at this point. I agree that the battle moved into othismos at this stage. Because the hoplites could back the sarissaphoroi up to the river, they could not give ground to avoid being stacked up and pushed. Again I don't know if the greeks were deeper.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Jona Lendering - 01-24-2009
Thanks all! I will look at it later this week.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Paralus - 01-25-2009
Quote:Why do you think the hoplites were deeper? If the phalangites were in 16 ranks, then hoplites only rarely formed deeper.
The phalangites were in ranks eight deep. The notion that Darius had thirty thousand “Greek” mercenaries at Issos is as preposterous as the twenty thousand (eighteen of whom are killed) at Granicus. One should – at a minimum – reduce that by a third and more likely half. Even so, at 15,000 plus, the Greeks will outnumber the Macedonians. That, plus the need for the Macedonians to extend their line to save being outflanked and the fact that the Greeks are flanked by the kardakes, will have resulted in the Greeks being deeper than the Macedonians.
The “first historian” of Alexander, Polybios, goes into minute detail in describing this battle. The fact that he does so to discredit Kallisthenes does not detract from the description. He paraphrases Kallisthenes account throughout his critique (misguided though it is but that’s for another day) and it is clearly congruent with Arrian / Ptolemy:
Quote:Pol. 12.19.5
In consequence he turned and marched back through the pass with the phalanx in front, followed by the cavalry, and last of all the baggage-train. Immediately on issuing into the open country he re-formed his order, passing to all the word of command to form into phalanx, making it at first thirty-two deep, changing this subsequently to sixteen deep, and finally as he approach the enemy to eight deep.
Arrian, whilst omitting the detail of the file changes, describes the care Alexander took in dressing his line as this extension and advance took place. Indeed he describes it as “leisurely” which, given the changes in depth and width as well as obstacles presented, is what it likely looked like.
One of the points of Polyibios’s tirade is to show up how silly is Kallisthenes’ suggestion that the Macedonian army (of 42,000 infantry) needed to extend that far to fill the plain which Kallisthenes describes as being 14 stades wide. Polybios, in a fit of righteous pique, singularly fails to comprehend that it is only the Macedonian foot that occupies the battle line: the allied Greek hoplites – as in every major battle – are relegated to the rear. (As an aside, it is distinctly curious that Alexander, concerned about being outflanked, thins his national troops rather than finding a place in the line for 7,000 hoplites; they seemingly lacked something in comparison to the Macedonians) Arrian, in an explicit statement, makes this clear
Quote:Arr. 2.8.11
First, upon the right wing near the mountain he placed his infantry guard and the shield-bearers, under the command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio; next to these the regiment of Coenus, and close to them that of Perdiccas. These troops were posted as far as the middle of the heavy-armed infantry to one beginning from the right. On the left wing first stood the regiment of Amyntas, then that of Ptolemy, and close to this that of Meleager.
So then, it is only the regular Macedonian heavy infantry that occupy the battle line and thus Alexander’s concern over extending his frontage so as not to be outflanked. Hence we wind up with 12,000 Macedonians eight deep. The Greeks and Kardakes, double the size of the Macedonian line if we have only 15,000 Greeks and 15-20,000 kardakes, did not have this problem; they in fact had the opposite problem and so it is quite possible - indeed more than probable - that the Greeks were deeper than the Macedonians.
Quote:The doru is 8' long and held overhand in a hoplite phalanx. How they would hold them against a hedge of sarissa instead of other hoplites is anyone's guess. What you would really want to do if pinned at some 10' or so from your foe is throw your spear, but the doru was horribly balanced for this. Perhaps this explains in part why the dual-use lonche and the Thureophoroi become popular.
I think Jona’s idea of using the apsis to deflect the sarisa has merit; more so here given the difficulties of the terrain. The shape of the aspis will help in this though a deflection to the right or left (or downwards towards an unguarded leg) might prove dangerous. Grabbing at the sarisae is, as you say, attested in later times and I’m sure it happened earlier. As to what good it would do is anyone’s guess. On favourable ground and in close order a charge by an experienced phalanx would be deadly to the average hoplite array. Hence the reliance upon epigoni troops during the “Successor wars”.
It is a pity we do not have a fuller and less “coloured” description of Agis’ battle against the forces of Antipater than Curtius’. Clearly it was a bloody affair and, given what we have, a deadly one. Agis evidently chose his ground well to neutralise Antipater’s numbers and maximise his own. The numbers of Macedonians in Antipater’s force will have been minimal if Bosworth’s reckoning of some 5,000 being left to him is correct. Add to that the fact that Amyntas had just left with 6,000 Macedonian infantry for the east and one can see Antipater’s problem: too few phalngites with far too little experience.
I’m not certain about the twelve foot “hoplite” spear: Jona may well be thinking in terms of “Iphicratean mercenaries”. This is a suggestion that has been made by others (Billows?) and is based on the notion that such gear was more affordable to the itinerant mercenary.
I also think that the sarisae of the phalanx became misaligned and their effectiveness was largely negated. Much of this was due to the river but much also was due to the charge of the right with Alexander. In this charge the Companion Cavalry will have forded the river and the “infantry guard” (royal hypaspists) and the regular hypaspists will have followed along with those of Coenus’ Aesthetairoi who could. Dislocation was inevitable as, towards the centre, other divisions attempted to cross and were left pinned by the difficulty of the terrain plus the Greeks from their advantageous position.
In the end Jona has it right: Alexander and the infantry on the right rolled left to take the Persian centre in the flank and drive at Darius. This is what is executed at Guagamela where, far from “pursuing” Darius, Alexander, the hypaspists and those of Coenus brigade in touch wheel left towards the centre and Darius thus attempting to “close the loop”.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Scythian - 01-29-2009
This is a good and interesting article but there are a few things I disagree with.
Quote: A trained archer needs about ten seconds to put his arrow on the string, aim, and release the missile. Opponents who approached him on feet, would be in his field of fire for about a minute and a half.
I have only had a few lessons and can sustain about one arrow in 5 seconds. Against massed troops there is no need to aim and so trained archers could manage a much higher rate of fire. The only reason a charge against archers by cavalry could be as successful as it was is psychological. Knowing that they were defenceless once the cavalry closed the archers would get flustered, would fumble stringing the bow and would flee behind the defences of the phalanx.
Quote: Alexander and Parmenion knew that the superior Persian cavalry, which had all the space it needed on the beach, would break through the Macedonian lines, and decided to put their Greek hoplites in a second line, which could, at least for some time, slow down the Persian horsemen.
The reason Parmenion was ordered to fight, anchored on the shore and even fighting in the surf was to prevent any outflanking maneuver. The second line of troops was a reserve. Philip had been one of the first commanders to make use of reserves and Alexander made good use of them in his battles.
Quote: The Greek phalanx in the Persian army was probably deeper and more massive, but the Macedonian soldiers had longer lances. During the often crucial first seconds, the Macedonian was in a better position. He must have aimed at his opponent's vulnerable places. An experienced warrior might aim at his enemy's face and kill him with one thrust, but against the Greek professionals, this was hardly possible; the lance would be caught on the shield. The Greek would try to push the Macedonian lance to the ground, where it was useless, while his enemy attempted to pierce through the shield and hit hs opponent's chest. A fraction of a second later, the Greek mercenary could be struck by a lance from the second line of the Macedonian army. He could be wounded in one of his lungs, fall down, and would die from loss of blood and dyspnoea, being treampled underfoot by those who were fighting over him.
There was an advantage on the initial seconds but for a reason you don't give. The Greek phalanx usually charged into a clash, striking as a solid wall of spears and shields. Against the wall of sarissas facing them they couldn't do this. They needed to push their way between the sarissas without exposing the people behind them. As long as the Macedonian formation held this would be extremely hard. However if the Greeks held back it would be hard for the macedonians, fighting at the limit of their range to get a lethal strike on the Greeks. This was the strength of the Macedonian phalanx. It was great in a holding action or for driving troops back over level terrain. Trying to get them to advance across a river bed was a stupid mistake and might have cost Alexander the battle.
As for the final charge by Alexander's cavalry, his meneuver to extend the right was very important to creating a weak point in the persian lines. More so than the routine advance and retreat of the archers. By different means it was the same tactic which he duplicated at Gargamella.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Paralus - 01-29-2009
Quote:There was an advantage on the initial seconds but for a reason you don't give. The Greek phalanx usually charged into a clash, striking as a solid wall of spears and shields. Against the wall of sarissas facing them they couldn't do this. They needed to push their way between the sarissas without exposing the people behind them
Indeed: a hoplite phalanx "falling heavily" upon a Macedonian phalanx woud soon become so much Greek souvlaki.
Quote: Trying to get them to advance across a river bed was a stupid mistake and might have cost Alexander the battle.
And yet it succeeded. This is not to say it was not a close run thing: it demonstrably was. This phalanx was, though, no later Hellenistic phalanx.
Quote:As for the final charge by Alexander's cavalry, his meneuver to extend the right was very important to creating a weak point in the persian lines. More so than the routine advance and retreat of the archers. By different means it was the same tactic which he duplicated at Gargamella.
Not entirely certain the source material indicates that Alexander attempted to extend the Persian line to create a gap. He reacted to the forces placed in the "hills" to his right and - supposedly - rear by creating "two right wings". He recalled most of these before charging though - particularly the hammipoi or Agrianes.
I doubt that charge was made at any huge pace. The river will have played its part in limiting that. Polyibios describes the kardakes as "peltaphoroi" and, whilst Arrian is intent on highlighting the epic clash of the kings as well as the Macedonians and Greeks, Alexander will have belted the lighter armed kardakes and then turned to the left and centre.
Exactly, as you say, what was on the menu at Gaugamela.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Gaius Julius Caesar - 02-08-2009
Quote:I think Jona’s idea of using the apsis to deflect the sarisa has merit; more so here given the difficulties of the terrain. The shape of the aspis will help in this though a deflection to the right or left (or downwards towards an unguarded leg) might prove dangerous. Grabbing at the sarisae is, as you say, attested in later times and I’m sure it happened earlier. As to what good it would do is anyone’s guess. On favourable ground and in close order a charge by an experienced phalanx would be deadly to the average hoplite array. Hence the reliance upon epigoni troops during the “Successor wars”.
I have often imagined it this way. I would think that the ideal manouver would be to use the aspis to deflect the sarissa up, so you can advance under them?
It might be possible to close ranks that way to bring your shorter weapon into play, or even to agressively close with the enemy for hand to hand fighting?
Re: Issus; request for comments - Giannis K. Hoplite - 02-08-2009
I wonder,how would a hoplite phalanx fight a pike phalanx,in open or close order? Isn't it more likely to penetrate the wall of sarisae in open order? How did the romans fight against it?
Re: Issus; request for comments - PMBardunias - 02-09-2009
They largely didn't fight against it, which, as Polybius points out and many incidents show, is suicidal. What they did was give ground until the phalanx became disorganized because of their advance, with units of the line pulling apart to leave gaps that small units of Romans could infiltrate. Greeks lacked the tactical flexibility of the manipular system and so could not systematically exploit small gaps in the same way, but as seen in this thread could be just as deadly as romans if the sarissaphoroi were disorganized enough, with large enough gaps.
The main problem is that the hoplite phalanx and the sarissaphoroi phalanx are too similar tactically and share many of the same weaknesses. This made it difficult to exploit terrain for example that would cause a loss in cohesion to the sarissaphoroi and not suffer from the same yourself. My guess is that these were true soldier's battles and very brutal when the hoplites did manage any success.
Contrary to what you might read, Pila don't seem to have been all that effective against the front of a sarissa-phalanx, but perhpas someone knows more on that.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Scythian - 02-10-2009
Quote:Quote:I think Jona’s idea of using the apsis to deflect the sarisa has merit; more so here given the difficulties of the terrain. The shape of the aspis will help in this though a deflection to the right or left (or downwards towards an unguarded leg) might prove dangerous. Grabbing at the sarisae is, as you say, attested in later times and I’m sure it happened earlier. As to what good it would do is anyone’s guess. On favourable ground and in close order a charge by an experienced phalanx would be deadly to the average hoplite array. Hence the reliance upon epigoni troops during the “Successor wars”.
I have often imagined it this way. I would think that the ideal manouver would be to use the aspis to deflect the sarissa up, so you can advance under them?
It might be possible to close ranks that way to bring your shorter weapon into play, or even to agressively close with the enemy for hand to hand fighting?
Sorry guys, but this isn't going to work. Remember that you aren't facing one sarissa but 10 and that is just from the two ranks directly in front of you. It doesn't take much for someone either side of them to attack you too. If you swing your shield to deflect a sarissa aside you will open yourself up to attack from some other direction.
Something like a boar snout might possibly work as long as you push in slowly, rather than rushing them.
The most effective strategy is a holding action or a defensive one, with the focus on a flanking action, because the Macedonian phalanx is exceptionally vulnerable on the flanks.
This is why the hypaspists, or other infantry formations, were placed on the flanks between the heavy infantry and the cavalry. If you can just fall back slowly, whilst allowing your best troops to attack the flanks then you can hit them from the sides. It is very hard, if not impossible, for a phalanx of this sort to fight troops in front and on the side too.
If you are lucky then you might retreat over broken ground and cause the phalanx to become broken up, allowing your troops to get inside.
Re: Issus; request for comments - Giannis K. Hoplite - 02-10-2009
In Issus the mercenaries didn't outflank the Macedonians. In fact they even broke through the phalanx in one place! The ground was certainly broken as they had to cross a river and "climb" the bed. But a fact is that if the battle was to be decided by the infantry,the macedonians nearly lost.
Khaire
Giannis
Re: Issus; request for comments - Sean Manning - 02-10-2009
Hi Jona,
I liked the article! Its a good change from common accounts which focus on tactics and source criticism. You posted it for suggestions on style, so I'll make a few comments on that before debating the history.
I would say “sharp stones” rather than “edgy stones” on page 2.
On page 3 its “lost consciousness” not “lost conscience”.
In describing the cataphracts on the Persian right (page 3) you use the phrase “plate mail.” That's a legitimate English term, but it gets armour scholars upset because mail properly refers only to armour of interlinked rings. I would say “scale armour” or “lamellar armour.”
Your idea that the mysterious Persian infantry in the hills south of the river got lost or confused makes sense. So does the idea that the kardakes on the Persian right had not finished closing their lines after letting the archers through. However, its also possible that the kardakes who Alexander charged were lightly armed. Duncan Head has suggested that there were two groups of kardakes, one armed as hoplites which fought alongside the Greek mercenaries and almost beat Alexander's phalanx before they were attacked in the flank, and one armed as peltasts which was routed by Alexander's charge.
I don't think that the fact that Darius preceeded his line with skirmishers shows a lack of confidence. Greek and Roman armies routinely did the same with their psiloi and velites, and two thousand years later the Swiss did the same with handgonnes and crossbowmen. Nobody could accuse them of a lack of confidence in their fighting ability!
It might also be worth mentioning the various adventures of Persian survivors of Issus. There's that Egyptian who left a stela in Egypt thanking the gods for his safe return, the exiled Macedonian who gathered up a force, stole a fleet, and tried to size Egypt, and another large group which headed north into Anatolia They spent a cold winter organizing a new army. In the spring they tried to invade Lydia, but were defeated in three battles which we don't know much about because Alexander wasn't there. Characteristically, QCR is the only Alexander Historian who tells their story.
Re: Issus; request for comments - PMBardunias - 02-10-2009
Quote:Something like a boar snout might possibly work as long as you push in slowly, rather than rushing them.
If you have one of those hair brushes with a soft oval cushioned pad and steel or hard plastic bristles, you can reenact this event by pushing on it. As the wedge pushes into the phalanx, the unengaged sarissaphoroi on each side simply angle their spears into the flanks of the wedge formation and things get ugly.
Where any small group attack on a phalanx can be successful is if the unengaged flanking units of sarissaphoroi do not stop and keep station with the engaged unit. The small unit still dies, but other units can exploit the gap.
I agree with you though, that fighting your way into the front of a phalanx is next to impossible- unless you are similarly armed. When it occurred it was either through truly heroic effort (and on a local scale) or as a result of some disruption of the phalanx's order.
Remember that the one description I know of where men grabbed sarissa and fought past was the Cleonymus episode which occurred at a breach, and from the description- first rank grabbing while second rank moved in- it seems the phalanx was not so deep.
Something that is interesting to me is what you do if you are in a phalanx whose front had been breached, with your front rankers fighting shield to shield. You can have ranks 6-11 lower sarissa at the backs of your own men who must then fight and try not to die on the points of their own mate's spears. Kinda brutal. Any examples of this? Probably more likely that you just go to swords.