RomanArmyTalk

I am currently reading Vegetius and Ammianus about the Late Roman army of Dioclecian and Constantine.

The Legions orignally in the 2nd century were meant to be independent regiments stationed on the borders backed up by the Auxilary regiments. Now they were formed into border troops and a standing army in the heartland. Their quality varied a lot by commander.

What was the typical miltary spending and how much quality spent of the 2nd century, 3rd century, and the 4th century? And did it really effect army quality? The 4th century army I believe was only 1/3 the quality of military spending of the 2nd century I believe.

The Limitanei quality was reported to be "poorer" due to their farmer soldier status and being militia units. However I believe any bordering of soldiers far away on the frontier can hinder the quality even in the Principate army.


So by long unfamiliarity with fighting the Roman soldier was reduced to a cowardly condition. For as to all the arts of life, so especially to the business of war, is sloth fatal. It is of the greatest importance for soldiers to experience the ups and downs of fortune, and to take strenuous exercise in the open. The most demoralised of all, however, were the Syrian soldiers, mutinous, disobedient,seldom with their units, straying in front of their prescribed posts, roving about like scouts, tipsy from one noon to the next, unused to carrying even their arms.
Letter to Lucius Verus (Fronto)(this is in the 2nd century)

Also the disaster of the 3rd century Crisis, was the army strong or weak at the very start of the Crisis? By the end of the Crisis under Dioclecian the army was more experienced than ever before. Did Dioclecians reforms strengthed or weaken the army? What about Constantine's? Was Vegetius comment on the Legions "lost their substance" in the 4th century really due to economics and culture rather than the actual weakening of the army politically?

Also I question about the deployablity of Limitanei troops. During the Persian Wars in the 4th century, Ammianus points out how bravely they defended the Eastern Provinces, but in Gaul they got mauled by the Alamannii until the Comiatus showed up. In Julian's Strasbourg campaign, Constantius only sent 15,000 Comiatus and only 15,000 Comiatus was at the battle. What happened to the Limitanei troops? Isn't the army suppose to be 420,000 strong so I suppose maybe 50,000 at the single battle? Were the Limitanei that incapable of deploying out their fortressess as pseudoComiatus?

Also the Battle of Adrianople only 15,000 troops showed up. Were they Comiatus or Limatei PseudoComiatense? Valens' Comiatus was in Persia I beleive and he had to race back and get new troops. Why 15,000?(a small number) After Adrianople, the Romans simply say back in their frotresses and used Fabian tactics on the Goths, at the Battle of Constannople, a bunch of Arab Foderetii defeated Fritigern and described the battle as "the Romans outnumbered the Goths vastly". The Romans outnumbered the Goths even after Adrianople and decided not to engage....were Limatae troops that incapable of deploying?

Also what was the quality of Barbarian troops(troops outside borders) compared to Roman citizens?(Both regular Army and Foderetii)

Finally was the Cavalry of the post-Constantine army any better than the Principate? Aurelian, Gallienus and Constantine used them very well, but mostly used for skirmishing and to draw them into infantry. Elite Comiatus cavalry was routed at Strasbourg and Elite Schoe charged without permission at Adrianople. Did the Romans regard their cavalry more in this timeframe or not? The Byzantine Strakegikon describes the Cavalry mainly to skirmish I believe. What was Vegetius and Ammianus take on cavalry tactics?

I reccomend you acquire a copy of Pat Southern and Karen Dixon The Later Roman Army. Until then I will answer as many questions as I can.

There was very little to no decline in the quality of the Army, contrary to popular belief, until after about 406 AD. That's when you begin seeing the first stages of decline.

The Limitanei were not Militia units. They had a tendency to settle where they were stationed, but they were effective military professional soldiers.

Numbers in the late era are exaggerated - at the end of the 3rd century you see an increase to approximately 420,000 soldiers across the entire Roman empire. By the late 4th century with the necessary changes having been made to make a more effective and more suited army to the time, there were about 210,000 soldiers: 90K in the West and 120K in the East (I cite AHM Jones and Peter Heather on this one).

50,000 men at a single battle is highly unlikely - records of emperors like Constantine having over 100,000 men are exaggerating. The largest battles of the era could barely field armies of 50,000 - Aetius needed years of preperation to field his army at Chalons.

Really? According to Vegeitus, the Roman infantry at that time "Loss their strength and substance". Soldiers were said to be super disloyal and unable to mobilize.

Limitanei are really undeployable and hard to muster. When the Alamanni invaded during Constantius reign, Constantius had to send 15,000 Comiatus under Julian. Only 15,000 at the battle of Strasbourg, no other troop support.

Hmm 100,000 doesn't seem unlikely. Seeing how the records say 98,000 troops in a single Comiatus for Constantine. Constantine split up his Comiatus, so 100,000 all together is not unbelievable. I think at this time the Roman infrastructure to field that kind of army. Cannae, Arausio, Phillipi, Mark Antony's invasions of Parthia, Augustan wars saw those numbers. It was not till after Constantine that we see warfare much more smaller due to division.

Vegetius was a bureaucrat, he had almost no idea what the real Roman army was like and ended up mixing it up between the army of the day and the army of the 2nd century. Although he does provide some accurate information, his statements that the Late Antiquity Army sucked need to be taken with a [strike]grain[/strike] shaker of salt.

Mustering armies was always a problem - Comitatenses, Classical-era Legions, Classical-era Auxiliaries, and Limitanei all had a tendency to settle where they were stationed. But mustering Limitanei was no harder than mustering Comitatenses for a battle - the Notitia lists a large number of cases where Limitanei were sent to bolster the central field army. Prima Flavia Mettis is a good example (The First Flavians of Metz), who were town garrison (Burgarii I think, maybe Castelliani).

It would not be hard to have 100,000 troops across several locations, but keeping them in the same army was too difficult. A more accurate statement would be that Constantine may have had 98,000 supporting him, but not all of those were his field army.

The Romans had the capability probably to field their whole army if they wanted too, but organizing, controlling, and maintaining rank and discipline in 100,000 men was nearly impossible at the time.

The job of the Limitanei was to act as a counter to small raids, and if the force was too large to fall back to their garrison posts and let the Comitatenses take care of the rest. Strausborg is a perfect example of how that system operated - except the Limitanei were probably destroyed rather than falling back to their armed fortresses. Never a good idea to leave enemies behind your position when an army approaches from the front.

The empire was certainly NOT divided - even under Valentinian III and Theodosius II they considered the empire united, even though it never would be again. The division would have been seen as no different as two Consuls commanding in two different parts.

Barbarian troops were usually considered, surprisingly, quality soldiers. They were aggressive, could maintain rank and discipline under good (Roman) commanders, and if well rewarded were ferociously loyal. Under their own commanders I should note they had a tendency to break and flee.

Cavalry in the Roman Army did improve, although this was not a result of quality but a change in warfare - the Romans adopted lance and bow tactics over shock tactics in the late 4th or early 5th century.

Quote:Vegetius... ended up mixing it up between the army of the day and the army of the 2nd century.

And the 2nd century BC as well! (He apparently used the elder Cato's military treatise quite a bit).

Vegetius's claims that the contemporary army was no match for their forebears was part of his overall argument that reform was required. It need be taken as no more an objective judgement than anyone's view that things were better in the good old days. Such statements - about everything from military affairs to morality to the ethnic composition of the Roman people - are a commonplace in ancient writing. We tend to look to the future for our ideal state - the ancients invariably looked to the past.

Quote:Constantine may have had 98,000 supporting him, but not all of those were his field army.

Very likely, yes. The figure of 98000 for Constantine's army in AD312 (9000 infantry, 8000 cavalry) comes from the 6th century writer Zosimus, probably drawing on the 4th century Eunapius. An anonymous panegyricist, speaking c.313 and probably in the imperial presence, gives the figure for Constantine's force as 'fewer than 40,000', and notes that this was 'scarcely the fourth part' of his total army (panegyrici latini XII 3.3 / 5.1-2). So if Constantine invaded Italy with around 30,000 men, his entire force (spread over Gaul, Spain and Britain) could have totalled 120,000.

The Roman army was certainly better during some periods than others, but military weakness was fairly quickly addressed at intervals, and there was probably no slow steady process of inexorable decline from a particular point, at least not until the late fourth century. The mid-third century army that did so badly under Decius and Valerian was the same force, more or less, which triumphed under Aurelian. As often as not, it seems like poor leadership was the main problem.

Quote: Really? According to Vegeitus, the Roman infantry at that time "Loss their strength and substance". Soldiers were said to be super disloyal and unable to mobilize.

Vegetius is not aways to be taken literally. See earlier discussions hre 9there are plenty!!) of Vegetius and armour. His writings are also a complaint about 'the times'.

Quote: Limitanei are really undeployable and hard to muster.

Limitanei are not anything like that. In fact they could be taken up into the ranks of the field army without any problems.

Quote: When the Alamanni invaded during Constantius reign, Constantius had to send 15,000 Comiatus under Julian. Only 15,000 at the battle of Strasbourg, no other troop support.

I think you mean 'comitatenses', not 'comiatus'.

Quote:Hmm 100,000 doesn't seem unlikely. Seeing how the records say 98,000 troops in a single Comiatus for Constantine. Constantine split up his Comiatus, so 100,000 all together is not unbelievable. I think at this time the Roman infrastructure to field that kind of army. Cannae, Arausio, Phillipi, Mark Antony's invasions of Parthia, Augustan wars saw those numbers. It was not till after Constantine that we see warfare much more smaller due to division.

What is 'a single comiatus'? Comitatenses were the soldiers of the mobile field armies, but such an army usually consisted of comitatenses, auxilia palatinae, and in the case of Constantine a very large contingent of germanic soldiers, hired for one campaign.
Waht do you mean by "we see warfare much more smaller due to division"?

Quote:Also what was the quality of Barbarian troops(troops outside borders) compared to Roman citizens?(Both regular Army and Foderetii)

Likely very good. There is a reason several units in the Notitia are named after "barbarian" tribes. By this time, many of the barbarian tribes were familiar with roman fighting tactics and were equipped similarly..through trade and more so when they were given access to the roman armories.

Many a Roman general was a barbarian and brought his knowledge back to his tribe. Same goes for conquered barbarians whose fighting men were distributed throughout the legions.

Also, it seems that popular culture at the time was keen on portraying many barbarian troops as having the same qualities as the old legions...maybe for good reason. While the romans certainly had a better organization and logistical structure, the barbarian troops were comprised of free men fighting under a king they elected. Compare that mental picture with the number edicts entered by late emperors banning Romans from cutting off their thumbs to avoid army service and the growing need of the LRA to rely on conscription.

Quote:

Andy post=346711 Wrote:Also what was the quality of Barbarian troops(troops outside borders) compared to Roman citizens?(Both regular Army and Foderetii)

Likely very good. There is a reason several units in the Notitia are named after "barbarian" tribes. By this time, many of the barbarian tribes were familiar with roman fighting tactics and were equipped similarly..through trade and more so when they were given access to the roman armories.
Many a Roman general was a barbarian and brought his knowledge back to his tribe. Same goes for conquered barbarians whose fighting men were distributed throughout the legions.
Also, it seems that popular culture at the time was keen on portraying many barbarian troops as having the same qualities as the old legions...maybe for good reason. While the romans certainly had a better organization and logistical structure, the barbarian troops were comprised of free men fighting under a king they elected. Compare that mental picture with the number edicts entered by late emperors banning Romans from cutting off their thumbs to avoid army service and the growing need of the LRA to rely on conscription.

I think that the warrior culture was waning in the provinces of the Empire, especially in Italy and the 'inner provinces', but it was still good in frontier provinces. Infantry from Gaul was still highly praised during the 4th century (over infantry from Syria), and the warrior tribes of the Isaurians were a big help in the eastern Empire during the 6th century.

On the whole though, i'd say that the warrior culture was a lot more present in barbarian tribes, which is no doubt the reason that they were used so much by the Roman state.
On the level of equipment however, we see that barbarians are mostly equipped by the Romans when they enter the Empire. Also, when it came to command and discipline, barbarians were never as good as what the Romans had to offer.

Unless they were trained by the Romans, and there were plenty of Barbarian commanders who were better than their Roman counterparats; otherwise we wouldn't have had Attila the Hun being called "The Scourge of God."

Hmm then why was Vegetius miliary writings so influential in the Middle ages and even the Modern era? Can you give me reason why they sucked?

Previous armies don't seem that hard to muster. In the 3rd century Crisis armies were destroyed over and over again with little effect. Same with the Punic Wars.

Doesn't it say Constantine had 100,000 in his entire field army out of the 400,000? Remember Constantine divided his army between his sons.

There was 60,000 total Fiedl army at the time of Strasbourg. Constantius had to deal with the Persians so he sent 15,000 to Gaul. If there was at least 420,000 total troops we should expect a lot of troops in Gaul, more than the field army. Why couldn't they muster? I highly doubt every single army was destroyed.

Where are you getting these numbers?

AHM Jones gives the following numbers for the two main portions of the western Roman Army:

34,000 Men in Gaul (Field Army and Limitanei) Not accounting for Paper Strength
28,500 Men in Italy (Field Army and Limitanei) Not accounting for Paper Strength

The rest I'd have to get for you later, I don't have them with me.


Fielding a single force of 100,000 wasn't feasible, even with a Professional Army. The Persian invasion of Greece which is consistenly listed by the history channel as "A Million Men." Wasn't even close. It was more like the maximum of 100,000 men. You have to remember Ancient Authors usually were not witnesses to these events and usually didn't know accurate numbers. They could only guess; 30,000 men can easily look like 80,000 and etc.

Agathius=645,000 total Army
Zozimus=581,000 total Army
A. H.H Jones(Later Roman army)=600,000 total army

However modern estimated 400,000 total army. Constantine himself boosted up the Field army to 100,000 total strong. So 100,000 for his Field army is not unbelievable. And he later divided his field army between the 3 empires to his sons. And the numbers for Consantius' battles were able 60,000.

Anyway, them only being able to field 15,000-20,000 at Adrianople just shows the mobilization problems and unablity to draw border troops into battle. Only the Comiatense were capable of deploying. Think about it, this was a time of increased localism and rampid desertion. When the Vandals arrived in North Africa, the units stationed there didn't even muster to PseudoComiatenses to put up a fight. The Late army after Constantine seemed to be a pure Field army reliant army.

I doubt it. 80,000-100,000 men is compeletely capable army by judging the size at Cannae and Arausio. Why would the Romans overexaggerate their own numbers? The Romans always liked overexaggerating enemy numbers if anything.

One of the largest civil war battles ever fought between two Roman armies was between those of Constantius II and Magnentius in 353AD at Mursa. Between 150,000-300,000 troops fought in that battle and the losses were catastrophic, anything up to 90,000 in Magnetius' army and 50,000 in Constantius'. It took years to rebuild the armies of the East and West, and because the western half of the Empire was so weakened by the depletion of its units the 'barbarian' tribes north of the Rhine were able to overrun most of Gaul.

Julian was despatched with an army that Constantius probably believed was too small to deal with the task of retaking Gaul, between 12,000 and 15,000 strong, although he did send another army of 25,000 to support Julian, whilst Constantius himself campaigned with an army of 25,000 across the Danube. I suspect Constantius, roundly condemned for the slaughter of most of his relations when he became Emperor, hoped Julian would fall in battle against the Alamanni, and could therefore claim it was Julian's fault he died and not his. Unfortunately Julian proved to be not so much a great general but a great inspirer of men and he managed to defeat an Alamannic army at least twice the size of his own.

Vegetius, writing sometime after 390AD and 420AD, probably saw mostly Gothic foedorate troops and that was why he railed against the 'barbarisation' of the Roman army of his day.

As others have said, before Alaric, Gainas, Attila etc came on the scene there were many high ranking Roman officers of 'barbarian' parentage in the Late Roman army from at least Diocletian onwards. Ones I can think of straight away were Richomere, Victor and Vadomarius.

I have no problem believing the Late Roman army up to 378AD being at least 600,000 strong. That figure probably takes into account infantry of all types, cavalry of all types and Sea and Riverine units.

Quote:One of the largest civil war battles ever fought between two Roman armies was between those of Constantius II and Magnentius in 353AD at Mursa. Between 150,000-300,000 troops fought in that battle and the losses were catastrophic, anything up to 90,000 in Magnetius' army and 50,000 in Constantius'.

Do you mean the battle of AD351?

Potter (Roman Empire at Bay p.456) quotes Zonarus's figures: 36,000 in the army of Magnentius, and 80,000 in the combined force of Constantius and Vetranio. That would make a total for the battle of 116,000 - still quite a big one!

Are there alternative, higher, numbers in another source?

Isn't it the comparatively high percentage of casualties, rather than the unusual number of combatants, that made this battle so particularly destructive?

Quote:Hmm then why was Vegetius miliary writings so influential in the Middle ages and even the Modern era?

Vegetius was influential throughout the Middle Ages and through to the end of the eighteenth century because his Epitoma is chock-full of practical advice on recruiting, training and managing an army in the field that was relevant to armies of all ages, at least until the advent of modern mechanised warfare.