RomanArmyTalk

Quote:Actually, Nick, I do not get your argument about the attacker "having to" be more in numbers than the defender.

Speaking of ancient texts, the attacker having more than the defender due to the latter's advantage of holding ground, is mentioned in Sun Tzu if I remember correctly (I have a small reservation on this in case my memory betrays me). Sun considered campaigns below 100,000 as amateurisms (ok maybe Chinese standards but stil...) and he underlined the importance in conquest campaigns to field as many as possible for as short as possible to clear out fast and clean the game avoiding logistics-originated failure. We can see that both Persian and Carthagenian campaigns aimed at that massive fast campaign 1-summer strike rather than a prolonged campaign of attrition, say Roman-Dacian wars like. Also remember that in the above we make reference to campaigns, not to single battle encounters where an enemy can send a task force to strike in surprise etc. Also we must stick to armies of "roughly comparable levels", certainly not the case of the highly trained Alexander's army as compared to the Asian armies of his times - a historic exception of the rule.

Quote:I very much doubt that alone, only from its own Libyophoenician population it could effectively muster 240,000 men

I share your doubt. But then mercenary soldiers came from all over western Mediterranean, Iberia, Gaul, Corsica, Sardinia, plus the N. African troops. A far larger human pool than "little" Sicily. Difficult to attract so many? Maybe yes, but still very feasible if one pays some "ad" cash in front and promises a nice big part of the loot of hyper rich Sicily. Phoenicians were not interested in the looting of Sicily. They were interested only in the wiping out of the commercial threat and in the establishment of monopoly.

Quote:Although I do not dismiss the possibility...I very much question the ability of the Carthaginians to transport them over to Sicily. This is a major difference to Xerxes' campaign, whose army marched along the coast and was not carried over by ships.
Even if these numbers also contain the crews of the navy, which would bring the total for the army down by maybe a third or more, it still is a huge operation (not impossible) and many thousands of transport ships are necessary to cross over the men, horses and chariots attested... a supply effort that would have been very vulnerable, especially near Sicily, whose harbors would largely be controlled by the enemy Greeks...

First I am happy that somebody can see the logistic approach of Persians. Then let us move to see the rough numbers mentioned by the 2 ancient writers Herodotus-Diodorus = roughly 300,000 men, 3000 cargo ships, 200 war ships - and let us analyse the logistics.

- Carthagenians were not interested in looting Sicily but wiping out the competition. Certainly there was loot there for 300,000 mercenaries so they could eventually attract so many with a small forward payment and a later high loot-cash reward in a campaign meant to last 1 summer. Note that such mercenaries of course were traditionally attracted in such campaigns only when there was some degree of certainty.

- Carthagenians and their outposts could potentially amass 3000 cargo ships of various sizes - and Phoenice/Carthage had the biggest ships around! Let us say 200 big cargo (more than 150 men per ship), 1000 average (more than 100 men per ship), 1800 small (more than 50 men per ship) - in this sailors are not included : remember, cargo ships were sailing with sails, not oars but even in those military oar-ships there was no olympic games to compete, you could put some of the untrained mercenaries to row as part of their job! Result? 220,000 in one go!!! Ok, cut the numbers in 2 to accomodate for horses and food stocks (IF these were carried in parallel) and it sufficed 2,5 goes to bring the 300,000 into Sicily!!! Given that only a fraction of that was needed to carry the Sardinian and North African stationed men since ships could do multiple goes.

- The 200 war ships present in Italy was an extremely low number of ships for Carthagenians (even little Samos gathered more than 100!!!) who had not sent big numbers for the Persian invasion either. It should tell us a lot. It implies that the massive part of the military fleet was occupied by following and guarding strategic points of the supply lines with these 200 only as a tip of the iceberg : remember, Carthage wanted to conquer by land the island, not just play business-port wars, business as usual style - so all attention was given to fielding a massive army.

Personally I find it not difficult to imagine commercial power Carthage amassing 600 war ships (if Samos could have 100) out of which 200 securing west Sicily and along with all western Phoenician ouposts amassing 3000 cargo ships of various sizes. I would also imagine that the largest part of logistics (remaining our of Sicily) would not be even visible to Greeks and that if we consider a 300,000 force only the 1/5th of it would be occupied with land/port-based logistics. Remember: on the other side there was sitting an alledged 6-digit Greek army, what hope could a mere 80,000 or 120,000 Carthagenians have? Remember too the size of army Syracuse alone could raise, remember its casual offer to send 24,000 troops and 4000 cavalry and 200 military ships to aid mainland Greece (would't they be able to amass 3ple that force in Sicily?). Treat the above as rought suggestions but ponder well over them.

Am I excessive? Too much mobilisation? Not at all. I would like someone to explain to me what would be the difference for Phoenician salesmen, captains, sailors to transfer goods not for sale at Carthage or Egypt but for the army to be sent in Sicily. Job as usual. Next day they would be back home with wifes and children. What difference would it make for Iberian farmers if the wheat they sold to Carthagenians went not to Carthage but to the army in Sicily? You get my point? Like for an important part of the Persian logistics, the largest part of Carthagenian logistics saw it as business as usual, no big change in their lifes. The war campaign occupied the minds of the mercenaries while for the military fleets who were into that game of passage guarding peace or war alike afterall.

Nikos

Quote:The touch of zealotry surfaces MD. You should depart along with myself...

When I lose an argument I do not accuse the other of being a zealot and run away. It is a discussion, not war that we do here. I am all open to the different viewpoint - should you have anything stronger than what I present I would happily converge to your position. I simply underline that there is no serious base till now to change ancient references to numbers by a scale approaching the 1/10. That is all. So where is the zealotry? In the time I consacrate perhaps to clear out false perceptions of antiquity? I love the issue, that is all.

In anyway, please accept another dedicated interesting information:

Some 71 years decades later, Carthagenians campaigned again in western Sicily and attacked at Himera. This time the mobilisation is mentioned to had been "considerably smaller" at 120,000 troops including the local allies. Syracusians had not sent their full force there but a part of their army and Carthagenians avoided head-on collision and took victory by employing misinformation moves that convinced the major part of the Syracusian force to rush back to protect the roads to Syracuse. Thus Carthagenians were able to surpass the resistance of the remaining Greek force and call it a victory - punishing exemplary the city of Himera and taking revenge for the earlier loss.

With such a large army and after a very important defeat that would resonate among Sicilian Greeks as well as mobilise more the anti-Greek elements among Sicans and Sicels, they could have as well gone for the kill. But not only they did not but they left back fairly quickly.

Conquest not on the plan? Yes, certainly. Afterall Carthagenians knew their opponents by heart, including their wall defenses. But if 120,000 (ok, let them be 80,000 no problem) visibly did not offer them the chance to clear out their opponents, on what basis (or....why on earth!) anyone today would suggest that the 480 invading force was the 1/4th of the mentioned numbers?

See... if we start amassing the points one after the other (Suracysian force offered for mainland Greece, later Carthagenian "expenditionary task force" at 6-digits etc. etc.) then we will get a long long list.

One can always claim that the above are loosely-binded circumstantial evidence. I agree. But for the other side, there is simply not even that one.

Just some general observations.

Even today, estimates of the number of people involved in some event can vary widely and be reported by oppposing, or involved official sources inaccurately. Even when neutral entities attempt to determine numbers they are sometimes unable to give more then a very rough estimate.
Some examples are: The number of Somali Casualties at the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. The number of casualties from the recent earthquake in Haiti. The number of people present at marches and protests (ie. The Million Man March). Insurgent casualties in Irag over the last 10 years, etc.
When such uncertainty exsists in the 21st Century, any numbers given in sources should be considered with extreme caution.

The better organized armies, that maintained records are not necessarily to automatically believed either. Often politics and propoganda dominate to a great extent. As an example, one can again use the Grande Armee that invaded Russia. The apparently detailed and supposedly accurate 'Parade States' were actually regularly doctored at the the senior level of the units. Commanders altered the states (increased the number) so as not to look bad to the Emperor, or compare badly to other commanders.

All events are unique. People, location, weather, random factors, psychology all shift and change, even to an hourly or daily basis. No two ancient campaigns or battles were exactly alike, and using later (or earlier) military battles or situations to evaluate ancient armies invites even greater inherent chance of error.

It is hard to give much credence to any ancient army report, or even any later constructed estimation. The further you get from things you can actually count, the greater must be the plus/minus error factor...so and so's army was about 100,000 strong +/- 95%.

I do agree with what you write Tom. And this is precisely the reason I have been repeatedly referring to "magnitude of volumes", not to "precise numbers". I would never present any strong objection to anyone wishing to reduce by 1/2 or 1/3 the overall huge numbers Herodotus mentions for Persian campaign because at such high numbers none can be sure. I did this myself above and also presented the full case explaining why.

However when someone goes on to cut the referenced numbers to to 1/10 and sometimes even more, then I do seriously object. And I do object because precisely there is absolutely no single valid reason to do such a thing. Financial and logistics feasibility, underlying political and financial reasoning, strategic and tactical reasons - these are all there to explain the magnitude of numbers Herodotus mentions (precise numbers not maybe but magnitude yes).

You have also to keep in mind that contrary to what some modern writers say, numbers mentioned DO make sense when viewed in their proper context (fighting force, garissons and rear-guard, navies, logistics). You cannot reduce the numbers of one war/battle and accept the numbers on another - and this is done for the same source by some modern writers. Totally arbitrary. Herodotus mentions 10,000 Athenians and 1000 Plateans in Marathon? Heroic deflation? How about Platea then where he mentions about 110,000 Greeks? What about Imera that is mentioned to had seen the largest ancient Greek army ever at around 120,000 Greeks? Heroic deflations too? I could accept a reduction from 110,000 to an absolute min of 80,000 but I could never get a reduction from 110,000 to 40,000. This does not make sense. 40,000 is just the people gathered in a modern stadium, easily packed, easily ordered, easily measured - back then people were much more used than us to measure the gatherings of people, particularly armies. Scouts were much more knowledgeable than modern police forces in counting concentrations of people. Guess now how able would be Greek officers of the allied states each measuring up his own forces and those of his alleis. There could be an error but that would not be greater than 5-10% at worst. Herodotus did not use 1 source for his text, he claims to have talked to many people and numbers is something that indeed you ask more than 1 person to tell you.

We have also to understand that for Greeks back then it was of absolutely high-most necessity to know how many opponents they faced in a battle and how many soldiers themselves used. Before the battle certainly, but really also after the battle, so as to be able to do a correct de-briefing so as to measure what they needed to field in future when facing the same opponent. And that de-briefing worked. We see it in Xenophon's epic march in Mesopotamia, we see it 150 years later when Alexander was setting to Asia with an incredibly small army for the task. He was not crazy, he already had compared his forces with the southern ones that had compared theirs with the asian ones (both of whom had not changed radically in that lapse of 15 decades), he had done his research. He knew what to face and he knew what was the balance of power on the battlefield. Had all the referenced numbers on Persian-Carthagenian wars been a bunch of lies, all chances are that Xenophon would had never seen the sea again, Alexander would had fared as far as Byzantion.

There is a constant context, a repetition of patterns, references by so many sources and one has to go on and discredit really the whole bunch of them to explain cutting allied Greek numbers from 100,000 to 40,000 and Persian overall campaign numbers from 2 million to 200,000. I do support critical viewing of numbers, I do support wholeheartedly research but I do support it only when this is done in a proficient manner. Not in the arbitrary unscientific and downright derogatory manner of "I do not like those numbers, I chop them as per my own preferences". I have done that analysis above and notice that the absence of comments (apart side-questions) on my main points is self-evident.

Nikos

Quote:and at Gaugamela indeed 1,000,000.

When we check detailed information from Arrian and Curtius Rufus, we can find the following units / formations / nationalities of the Persian army present at Gaugamela (only in some cases their commanders or their strength is given):

On the left wing of the Persian army:

- 100 scythed chariots
- Scythian horse archers, under Mavaces
- 1000 Bactrian cavalry
- 1000 Dahae cavalry
- 1000 or 2000 (?) Arachotian cavalry, under Barzantes
- (possibly also Indian hillmen with this cavalry, under Barzantes)
- 1000 or 2000 (?) Susian cavalry, under Oxathres
- (possibly also Uxians with Susian cavalry, under Oxathres)
- 2000 Massagetae cavalry, under Satibarzanes
- (possibly some units of infantry of "various nations" added to this cavalry)
- behind them all, 8000 more Bactrian cavalry (possibly includes some Indian cavalry)

- then some unspecified "Persian cavalry and infantry, mixed together"
- possibly also Cadusians (although we see them also on the right wing)

And "This was the arrangement of the left wing as far as the middle of the whole phalanx" (seems a bit far - if the left wing was up to the middle of the whole phalanx - I suppose it is about enemy phalanx -, then where was the center?).

In the center of the Persian line we can see:

- 1000 (?) Grecian mercenary hoplites, under Patron the Phokian (?)
- 1000 kinsmen cavalry with Darius himself
- 1000 apple-bearers guard
- 1000 (?) Grecian mercenary hoplites, under Glaucus the Aetolian (?)
- 15 elephants in front of kinsmen cavalry
- 50 scythed chariots in front of kinsmen cavalry

- Indians (probably different than those hillmen on the left wing)
- Carians
- behind them - Phrygians and Cataonians under their own king
- Mardian archers, probably under Otanes
- Uxians (but previously Arrian writes that Oxathres commanded both Susians & Uxians - so I would suspect they were in one place of the battlefield, but maybe they were split and their cavalry was deployed on left wing, infantry in the center?)
- (possibly also Susians - see above)
- Babylonians
- Persians (I suppose different ones than that mixed infantry-cavalry force on the left), probably under Ariobarzanes
- Sogdianians, probably under Orontobates
- Sitacenians
- "large number of" Caspians under Fradates
- somewhere here, further 50 chariots (but probably non-scythed ones)
- soldiers from Armenia Minor (under Mithraustes or Orontes)
- Belites (?)
- some hillmen from Caspian / Caucasus mountains
- Parthyans (?)

Then on the right wing:

- Parthian cavalry
- Hycarnians (cavalry too I guess)
- Tapurians

All those above under Phrataphernes,

- Sakae cavalry

- Syrians from Coele Syria and mesopotamian Syria (probably 1000 in total)
- Grecian mercenary cavalry (probably 2000 in total)

These Syrians and Grecian mercenaries under Mazaeus,

- Medians
- Albanians
- Sacesinians
- Cadusians (again? - they were already mentioned on the left wing)

All of them under Atropates,

- Cappadocians under Ariaces
- Armenians from Greater Armenia (under Orontes or Mithraustes)

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And that's all they mention.

Although in most case strength of these formations is not given - it doesn't look like there could be 1,000,000 there, contrary to what Arrian writes later.

Curcius Rufus gives 45,000 cavalry (but Arrian gives the number of cavalry as 40,000, on the other hand) and a much more realistic number of infantry than Arrian - 200,000 - which however probably already includes non-combatants (camp servants, etc.), not just actual battle formations.

Macedonian "foot" strength, on the other hand, was most likely more than 40,000 infantry, because I do not think that this number includes non-combatants (and we know they were there - and even "accidentally" took part in the battle, when Macedonian baggage train was charged by Persian & Indian cavalry which had broken through their lines and then headed towards the rather defenceless Macedonian baggage train, surely inflicting heavy losses on camp servants gathered there in the process).

By the way - did the Persian army still use decimal organization system at the times of the Alexander's invasion? If yes, then they should divide into units of 1000 and bigger units of 10,000 (and of course units smaller than 1000 - 100 and 10 - but we don't have to take these into consideration here). The fact that those of the "formations" of the Persian army at Gaugamela listed above, for which numbers were given either by Arrian or by Curtius Rufus, usually number 1000 (or can be divided by a factor of 1000 - for example 8000 Bactrian cavalry), it seems that this organization was still in effect. And 40,000 cavalry in total at Gaugamela indicates that there were 4 units of 10,000 and 40 units of 1,000 - probably 20,000 cavalry on each wing of the Persian army (Curtius and Arrian give much more detailed numbers for the Persian left wing cavalry force than for the right wing force - and from the size of those numbers on Persian left wing it seems like they had a dozen or so thousands cavalry there - but a few cavalry units are listed without info what was their strength - so I guess it is possible that the total cavalry force on the left wing numbered 20,000 - or at least that "paper strength" of that force was supposed to be 20,000, while of all Persian cavalry in the battle - between 40,000 and 45,000 - even if the actual number of soldiers was lower than "paper strength", which is very likely).

Quote:Even the highest modern estimates don't go over 94 thousand troops at Gaugamela, and that's based on speculation rather than hsrd logistics.

But 94 thousand troops require further +/- 94 thousand non-combatants.

This is the usual proportion (1 non-combatant per each 1 soldier).

Which gives us 200,000 - a figure already close to that of Curtius Rufus.

Of course the Macedonian army also had non-combatants - in adittion to its 47,000 actual soldiers. The Ancient historians most likely distorted the proportion by counting only actual soldiers on the Greek side, while all men on the Persian side. Of course this still doesn't explain where did Arrian take his figure of 1,000,000 Persian infantry at Gaugamela - perhaps he multiplied 100,000 (infantry soldiers - without non-combatants) by a factor of 10, or 200,000 (soldiers + servants) by a factor of 5.

But again - these are also speculations.

Quote:Of Alexander’s men-about 100 were killed, and more than 1,000 of his horses were lost either from wounds or from fatigue in the pursuit, nearly half of them belonging to the Companion cavalry. Of the foreigners there were said to have been about 300,000 slain, and far more were taken prisoners than were killed.

So Arrian, 3.15.6. That's exceptional killing for a modern industrial army let alone a force of some 47,000 Greco-Macedonians; killing at a rate on 300 to one. It's also palpable nonsense.

"Far more" than 300,000 were taken prisoner so this propagandist figure would have one believe. Far more would mean tens of thousands at a minimum - perhaps 400,000. Clearly whichever source invented these figures didn't bother to stop to think just how an exhausted army of 47,000 was going to corral and herd "far more" than 300,000 prisoners about Mesopotamia. Such should give anyone pause over the hugely inflated numbers given for the Persian force.

Prisoners would have been gathered in a matter of days, even weeks, not hours. Many, in small or pretty large groups, would willingly surrender to escape death, others (probably many more) would be handed over by the numerous local communities to which thousands of survivors would have sought safety, provisions etc. Many groups, some thousands strong, would resort to razing the formerly friendly country in their effort to escape, which would greatly enhance the Greek position in the area and win over many allies to herd up even more prisoners. The problem only arises if one tries to defend a position that these prisoners were taken overnight. The taking of (hundreds of) thousands of defeated enemies that lack the will, the means and the supplies to escape is and was nothing new.

Quote:So Arrian, 3.15.6. That's exceptional killing for a modern industrial army let alone a force of some 47,000 Greco-Macedonians; killing at a rate on 300 to one. It's also palpable nonsense.

Of course, but Arrian actually self-proves that his number (100 dead) is wrong, as he contradicts himself regarding casualties. In one place he states that Macedonian losses in entire battle were only 100 men killed, while in another place he writes that just in one engagement, in the very final phase of the battle, just one unit - Companion cavalry under personal command of Alexander - lost 60 killed and numerous wounded (and after that engagement it was again involved in further combats):

Quote:(...) The Persians on the right wing, who had not yet become aware of the flight of Darius, rode round Alexander's left wing and attacked Parmenio in flank. At this juncture, the Macedonians being at first in a state of confusion from being attacked on all sides, Parmenio sent a messenger to Alexander in haste, to tell him that their side was in a critical position and that he must send him aid. When this news was brought to Alexander, he turned back again from further pursuit, and wheeling round with the Companion cavalry, led them with great speed against the right wing of the foreigners. In the first place he assaulted the fleeing cavalry of the enemy, the Parthians, some of the Indians, and the most numerous and the bravest division of the Persians. Then ensued the most obstinately contested cavalry fight in the whole engagement. For being drawn up by squadrons, the foreigners wheeled round in deep columns, and falling on Alexander's men face to face, they no longer relied on the hurling of javelins or the dexterous deploying of horses, as is the common practice in cavalry battles, but every one of his own account strove eagerly to break through what stood in his way, as their only means of safety. They struck and were struck without quarter, as they were no longer struggling to secure the victory for another, but were contending for their own personal safety. Here about sixty of Alexander's Companions fell; and Hephaestion himself, as well as Coenus and Menidas, was wounded. But these troops also were overcome by Alexander; and as many of them as could forced their way through his ranks and fled with all their might. And now Alexander had nearly come into conflict with the enemy's right wing; but in the meantime the Thessalian cavalry in a splendid struggle, were not falling short of Alexander's suc cess in the engagement. For the foreigners on the right wing were already beginning to fly when he came on the scene of conflict; so that he wheeled round again and started off in pursuit of Darius once more, keeping up the chase as long as there was daylight. Parmenio's brigade also followed in pursuit of those who were opposed to them. (...)

And of course of the wounded surely many died of their wounds after the battle - especially considering how "advanced" was medicine at that time (even in WW2 many soldiers were later dying of their wounds - sometimes days, sometimes months after being wounded).

=================================================

It seems that this practice to give both propaganda and actual numbers in one account was not so uncommon in the past (of course in this case Arrian gave actual numbers for just one engagement and one unit - Alexander's Companions).

We can track this down using example from a battle (in this case Medieval) for which actual casualties are known from a rather reliable source - account of a bishop who was responsible for burial of the dead after the battle. It was the battle of Plowce in year 1331 between Teutonic Order and Poland. Polish bishop who buried the dead of both sides (except some 73 - 80 bodies of the fallen Brother Knights of the Order - who were taken from the battlefield when the Order's army marched away - so they could not be included in this count) wrote about 4187 bodies buried after the battle - he didn't say how many of them Poles, how many Teutonic men (but historians generally assume that Teutons suffered higher losses, especially in the first phase of the battle when their rear guard was ambushed and almost completely destroyed they must have lost a lot of men).

Some of those 4187 could also be peasants from neighbouring villages who died as "collateral damage".

Anyway - another Polish source - Rocznik Traski chronicle - claims that Teutonic losses were 20,000 dead (twenty thousand!). But in another place, the same source contradicts itself, mentioning the number of dead "knights", "heavily armed troops" and "auxiliaries" on the Teutonic side - the sum of these 3 groups is 2000, which is very close to the real scale of Teutonic losses (probably in fact they lost rather 2200 or more dead - anyway, clearly a number which can be rounded to 2000).

So it seems that Arrian does the same thing - in one place he gives a clearly propagandistic number of allegedly just 100 Macedonians dead (while in fact he probably had no freaking idea how many died in reality), in another place he provided a figure of 60 dead (and clearly many wounded - including Coenus and Menidas) in just one clash (relatively "minor" compared to the scale of entire battle) and of just one unit (Alexander's Companions) who took part in that engagement (while maybe other Macedonian units also participated in that clash against that Persian cavalry).

Or instead of "propagandistic", maybe I should rather say "symbolic". Arrian's overall casualty numbers are "symbolic" - they are intended to show the disproportion between Macedonian and Persian casualties. Instead of giving these numbers, he could have as well just written "very heavy" and "relatively small" - but probably he wanted to be perceived as more competent / more credible, so instead of admitting that he simply doesn't know the detailed numbers, he did what he did.

In Rocznik Traski 20,000 is also "symbolic" - a symbol of a battle which stopped the Teutonic onslaught and their invasion was halted there - exactly due to huge losses (but of course not 20 thousand - their army was much smaller than 20,000, so they couldn't lose more than they had).

The number of dead Persians according to Arrian is also like that "20,000" from Rocznik Traski.

======================================

But when it comes to army strength figures:

Regarding the probable origins of those very high numbers, I wrote something here:

http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat.html?fu...673#316129

There is no reason at all for Arrian to "propagandize". He was a Roman general/governor of Greek nationality living in a world 5 centuries after Alexander's exploits. Arrian reported the numbers of his sources, numbers that his considerable experience made him view as realistic. Ancient battles and especially those fought with the spear or pike by armored soldiers, very seldom meant high death rates for the winner. Casualties in general is another thing and usually the wounded were many times more than the dead.Some would eventually die, some would be saved by the doctors that followed the train. There is absolutely no rule that says that when you are facing x enemies you have to sustain x/y deaths and in order to push an argument that Alexander could not have suffered that few casualties one has to just throw the whole Greek historiography out of the window. An Arrian that would wish to hide Alexander's shortcomings or casualties would not have him fail at Gedrosia, sustain disproportionately higher casualties at Hydaspes etc. As far as Arrian is concerned, this is what he believed to be the truth, this is what the sources that he himself trusted in wrote. One can always prefer to believe Diodorus who reports 500 dead at the battle for Alexander. As for the "symbolic" part I totally disagree. There were reports at hand, however trustworthy and these were quoted by the Greek historians. There was nothing "symbolic". Whenever they wanted to say "a few" or "a lot" they would write so. Many times they (Arrian too) would not give numbers, other times, they would criticize them as improbable, impossible, conflicting etc. If by symbolic you mean "plainly wrong" then yes, reports historians got and still get often were and are wrong, so he of course could be wrong. The thing is that he did not think he was wrong, which to me is most important.

It is wrong to take for granted that Arrian or anyone else deliberately hid a truth which was known to him. It is as wrong as always accepting the lowest numbers of troops present and the highest of casualties as more realistic. To me, there are as many chances for Diodorus to be correct as are for Arrian. It could also be that none is.

As for the casualties reported for the Companions, you are making a mistake that I see very often. You think that whatever casualties they sustained have to be but a small part of the total because they numbered but a small part of the total. This is not so. The battle of Gaugamela was more of a skirmish than a battle. There was absolutely no infantry clash and only the Companions actually engaged in any kind of melee as long as the battle was undecided. The Persian and Greek cavalry did not charge into each other as Arrian (and not only him) very clearly describes. They fought like horsemen normally fought at the time, that is attack in squadrons, hurl their javelins and then retreat as other squadrons did the same. Of all the cavalry present only the Companions would according to plan and training engage in melee, since they were the only "spear-bearing" (doratophoroi) horsemen present. Even the heaviest of the Persians were mounted javelineers at the time. As that, there was little fight at Gaugamela anyways, so low casualties (whatever one calls low) on the part of the Greeks, to me, should not be surprising.

Quote:Ancient battles and especially those fought with the spear or pike by armored soldiers, very seldom meant high death rates for the winner.

Sure - this is a claim. But based on what proofs / sources exactly? :twisted:

You know this from what? From... sure, from those Ancient sources which always claim that the winner lost like "10 killed 5 wounded" and the loser "100000000000 killed, 30000000000000 captured and 2232235023542323 wounded" :?: Exactly. :mrgreen:

Or maybe you examined some battlefield and counted skeletons?

Surely not because such well-preserved battlefields do not exist.

We have more (and more of reliable ones, first of all) contemporary evidences regarding casualties in Medieval battles - which were relatively similar in style to Ancient battles (well, much more similar than battles from any other historical era which came later - after Medieval).

Quote:Arrian reported the numbers of his sources, numbers that his considerable experience made him view as realistic.

Arrian was a historian - not a military commander. And historians often now nothing what is realistic and what is not in warfare. This is true also in our modern times. That some guy considered something as realistic doesn't mean that it was indded.

Quote:Casualties in general is another thing and usually the wounded were many times more than the dead.

This is not true.

At least not for Medieval or Early Modern Era battles (more similar to Ancient battles than anything later - because battles from both these eras consisted of many casualties suffered from melee weapons or pre-gunpowder missile weapons). The ratio of wounded to killed was like 1:1 or at most 2:1.

"Many times more" wounded than killed is something typical for 19th century battles (as well as WW1 of 1914 - 1918). But in battles where close combat was the main killer usually the number of wounded was not much bigger than the number of killed.

Of course among casualties from arrows this proportion was more in favour of wounded, since wounds inflicted by arrows were typically not so lethal (unless we are talking about some more advanced types of bows - for example the "great bows" which were used by some Persian units at Gaugamela - for example by Mardian archers - those bows were reported in those ancient sources to be capable of piercing shields and armour - another fact which disproves Arrian casualty number of 100 Macedonians killed).

Quote:As for the casualties reported for the Companions, you are making a mistake that I see very often. You think that whatever casualties they sustained have to be but a small part of the total because they numbered but a small part of the total. This is not so.

No - I don't think that the Companions suffered only a small portion of total casualties.

But you missed one important fact apparently - that they suffered those 60 killed just in one engagement, not in entire battle. Both before that clash and after that clash they were involved in other fightings. So 60 killed refers just to one fight, not to entire battle - both before that fight and after that fight there must have been further killed among the Companions.

Quote:.Some would eventually die, some would be saved by the doctors that followed the train. There is absolutely no rule that says that when you are facing x enemies you have to sustain x/y deaths

I know this mate.

But when I read description of a battle, I get some picture of how many casualties could be sustained in that battle by each side. And in case of Gaugamela in all existing original (Ancient) descriptions of this battle, there are mentioned various "episodes" of this battle, in which some Macedonian units must have suffered considerable casualties. Just to mention Greek mercenary / allied cavalry being defeated on both flanks by enemy cavalry, or to mention Macedonian baggage train being attacked and largely slaughtered by Persian cavalry which before that broke through Macedonian lines (Arrian, III, 14). And many other similar episodes. It did not went completely smoothly for the Macedonians and many Persian units fought to the last man and did not collapse like their king and many other units.

Quote:and in order to push an argument that Alexander could not have suffered that few casualties one has to just throw the whole Greek historiography out of the window.

But who is throwing the whole Greek historiography out of the window?

I am not for sure. I am basing my claims on Grek historiography - namely on descriptions of the battle from Greek historiography, which describe this battle in such a way that clearly disproves the casualty claims made by the same historiography (again it contradicts itself) - because we can see many episodes in the battle of Gaugamela, which must have produced considerable casualties on the Macedonian side.

Some of them were mentioned above.

Apart from that Greek historiography also tells us that some of Persian archers were armed in "great bows" - as they are called there - which could pierce Macedonian shields and armours. For example Mardian archers had such weapons at their disposal.

Quote:There were reports at hand, however trustworthy and these were quoted by the Greek historians.

Any proofs for this claim? That Ancient armies had casualty reporting systems?

By the way - if numbers were from casualty reports, they would not be so round - but detailed (for example 112 not 100 killed) and they would not contradict each other so much (Arrian - 100, Curtius - 300, Diodorus - 500, etc., etc.).

Quote:Many times they (Arrian too) would not give numbers, other times, they would criticize them as improbable, impossible, conflicting etc.

Please don't apply modern standards to Ancient historians.

Quote:If by symbolic you mean "plainly wrong" then yes, reports historians got and still get often were and are wrong, so he of course could be wrong. The thing is that he did not think he was wrong, which to me is most important.

I think accounts are much more frequently wrong than actual written reports / documents (but again I don't think that Ancient armies had something like casualty reports - considering that the main purpose of reporting casualties is to check how many reinforcements are necessary for each unit, and Alexander was incorporating to his army any reinforcements he could get, without paying much attention how many are "necessary" and how many are not "necessary" - IMO).

So maybe they had those casualty info from accounts of so called "witnesses".

Quote:It is wrong to take for granted that Arrian or anyone else deliberately hid a truth which was known to him.

Did I ever write such thing?

Actually if you read my post above you can see that I wrote that Arrian most likely had no freaking idea how big were Macedonian casualties.

If he had no freaking idea about a truth, he could not deliberately hid it.

Quote:There was absolutely no infantry clash

I think you are wrong here.

But if you aren't wrong then it means that Persian casualties must have been relatively low as well.

Quote:The Persian and Greek cavalry did not charge into each other as Arrian (and not only him) very clearly describes.

Actually you are wrong - Arrian and also others describe cavalry charging into each other and even into infantry and baggage train. For example:

Quote:(...) Simmias and his brigade were not yet able to start with Alexander in pursuit, but causing the phalanx to halt there, he took part in the struggle, because the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed. In this part of the field, their line being broken, some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians; and there the action became desperate. For the Persians fell boldly on the men, who were most of them unarmed, and never expected that any men would cut through the double phalanx and break through upon them. When the Persians made this attack, the foreign prisoners also assisted them by falling upon the Macedonians in the midst of the action. But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take, and coming upon the Persians in the rear, killed many of them there collected round the baggage. But the rest of them gave way and fled. The Persians on the right wing, who had not yet become aware of the flight of Darius, rode round Alexander's left wing and attacked Parmenio in flank. (...)

Another fragment is already above (the one when he mentions sixty killed Companions).

And there are other fragments too.

Quote:They fought like horsemen normally fought at the time, that is attack in squadrons, hurl their javelins and then retreat as other squadrons did the same.

Only light cavalry fought like this, while heavy & medium cavalry - and both sides had numerous heavy & medium cavalry at Gaugamela - fought in a completely different way (well, medium cavalry sometimes carried both javelins and sidearms + shields - so they could fight both ways).

And by the way even light cavalry sometimes fought "unlike normally".

For example check the Gaius Sallustius Crispus' account of the Jugurthine war.

While describing the battle at the outskirts of Zama (a much later one, against Jugurtha) in 108 B.C., Sallustius (59.) writes:

"(...) during the fight Numidian cavalrymen, self-confident (...) contrary to the usually applied tactics consisting of attacking and retreating*, were directly knocking against the enemy, breaking their battle array and sowing confusion into their ranks; hereby (...) almost achieving victory over Romans."

*So called skirmishing.

So here Sallustius gives an example of light cavalry (Numidians) fighting like heavy cavalry.

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Edit:

And for example Macedonian sarissophoroi lancers - although being lightly armoured (light cavalry) - also fought like heavy cavalry, using their lances. Especially they fought like this after being incorporated to Companions (before that they played mainly the role of scouts, IIRC, but sometimes also charged enemy lines).

Sarissophoroi weren't the only lightly armoured, but still shock lance-armed cavalry formation in history. For example in Medieval times and Early Modern Era there were also such cavalry formations in Europe, which were very lightly armoured (sometimes had no armour except of shields - which sarissophoroi also most likely had, as well as helmets) but armed in very long lances and fought as shock cavalry - not skirmish cavalry.

Quote:Of all the cavalry present only the Companions would according to plan and training engage in melee, since they were the only "spear-bearing" (doratophoroi) horsemen present. Even the heaviest of the Persians were mounted javelineers at the time.

No, no, no.

The Persian time at that time was different than 100 years earlier. You are talking about earlier times (more or less times of the battle of Marathon) when even the heaviest Persian cavalry looked like this:



But by the time of Gaugamela the Persians already had units of heavy cavalry designed to carry out shock charges - very similar tactics to that of Companions. For example, they had cataphracts in their army. But also other types of heavy cavalry.

And regarding the "spear-bearing" cavalry on the Macedonian side - apart from Companions, also Thessalian cavalry was a "spear-bearing" heavy cavalry unit. Then we had Thracian, Odrysian and Paeonian cavalry - they can be classified as "medium cavalry" - they had both javelins and weapons intended for meelee combat, so they were dual purpose cavalry, but of course they wore less armour than Companion and Thessalian cavalry. And there were also already mentioned sarissophoroi (also called prodromoi) - lightly armoured, but also "spear-bearing" and capable of shock charges.

Only mercenary and allied Greek cavalry of Alexander were typical light skirmish cavalry armed with javelins. And maybe some Syrian horse archers, if he had them at Gaugamela.

Quote:As that, there was little fight at Gaugamela anyways, so low casualties (whatever one calls low) on the part of the Greeks, to me, should not be surprising.

In such case the Persians would also suffer relatively low casualties.

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Regarding Persian cavalry:

But by the time of Gaugamela the Persians already had units of heavy cavalry designed to carry out shock charges - very similar tactics to that of Companions. For example, they had cataphracts in their army. But also other types of heavy cavalry.

For example Sakae / Saca cavalry and Barkan (not sure if I translate this to English correctly) cavalry was armed in double-edged war axes called bipennis - clearly a weapon intended for use in close-combat. They were also armed in swords called akinakes and single-edged, smaller than bipennis, axes called sagaris.

Then they had very well armoured Persian, Bactrian and Indian cavalry.

As well as Scythian (Saca) cataphracts. Also Bactrians, Armenians and Cappadocians fielded some very well armoured, cataphract and other heavy cavalry.

Persian and Indian heavy cavalry units were armed with long spears.

Quote: The Persian and Greek cavalry did not charge into each other as Arrian (and not only him) very clearly describes. They fought like horsemen normally fought at the time, that is attack in squadrons, hurl their javelins and then retreat as other squadrons did the same. Of all the cavalry present only the Companions would according to plan and training engage in melee, since they were the only "spear-bearing" (doratophoroi) horsemen present. Even the heaviest of the Persians were mounted javelineers at the time.

Oh dear George. There's nothing like ignoring the sources:

Quote:Arrian 3.12.3-4: Alexander ordered the cavalry of the Grecian mercenaries under the command of Menidas to attack them. But the Scythian cavalry and the Bactrians, who had been drawn up with them, sallied forth against them, and being much more numerous they put the small body of Greeks to rout. Alexander then ordered Aristo at the head of the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries to attack the Scythians; and the barbarians gave way. But the rest of the Bactrians, drawing near to the Paeonians and Grecian auxiliaries, caused their own comrades who were already in flight to turn and renew the battle; and thus they brought about a general cavalry engagement, in which more of Alexander’s men fell, not only being overwhelmed by the multitude of the barbarians, but also because the Scythians themselves and their horses were much more completely protected with armour for guarding their bodies. Notwithstanding this, the Macedonians sustained their assaults, and assailing them violently squadron by squadron, they succeeded in pushing them out of rank.

It would appear you have misread your Arrian. He clearly describes only the Macedonians as assaulting squadron by squadron. Are you claiming the Macedonians rode in and hurled their "javelins" and retreated?

Quote:The battle of Gaugamela was more of a skirmish than a battle. There was absolutely no infantry clash and only the Companions actually engaged in any kind of melee as long as the battle was undecided.

Tell that to Parmenion. I'm afraid that is not sustained by the source material. You would have it that the only battle occurred on the far right of the Macedonian line. This is clearly a result of the hero-king, Alexander-centric nature of the source material - something you seem oblivious to. Do you really suggest that Darius only intended to fight the Macedonian right?

Quote:There is no reason at all for Arrian to "propagandize". He was a Roman general/governor of Greek nationality living in a world 5 centuries after Alexander's exploits. Arrian reported the numbers of his sources, numbers that his considerable experience made him view as realistic.

And so we come to source criticism. Badian ("Orientals in Alexander's Army"; The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 85 1965, pp. 160-161) long ago observed the following about the "Roman general/governor of Greek nationality":

Quote:For one thing, accurate reporting of military matters is not one of Arrian's virtues. The man who - to cite only a few obvious examples - can use the word somatophylake in three different senses (iv 3.2 et al.: the foot agema; vi 27.2: a governor's bodyguard; and the proper technical use for the elite of great nobles, passim); who can contradict himself within a few lines on who led the mounted archers to the junction of Acesines and Hydraotes (vi 5-5; 6.I); and who seriously thought that Alexander meant to defeat Porus' forces with cavalry and archers (v 14.I f.-cf. Hamilton, PACA i (1961) 9)--this man was far from the great military historian of conventional modern encomia.

Arrian does not, necessarily, propagandise. He does, though, reproduce the propagandist figures of his sources. As we know (from Arrian), a king should not lie. What then of Callisthenes or Aristoboulos? These figures reek of court "approved" material.

What, then , happens when "the Great" is dead? What of the wars after? The greatest army we hear of is that of Antigonus. This is entirely understandable and tops at some 80,000. The silly notion that it is only made up of mostly Greco-Macedonians is just that: silly. Here we have - even if via an intermediary - the "sober" historian Hieronymus as a source. It is alarming how the numbers then shrink.

In any case George, let Arrian's (non-propagandising!) figure of 300,000 be killed by the Macedonians at the "skirmish" of Gaugamela. How then can you describe it as such? If you allow the battle to have taken six hours (oh dear, more than a "skirmish") then that amounts to some 834 Persians killed per minute.

As they say out west in the US, you'll have to excuse me all to hell George...

And that Persian and Indian heavy cavalry armed with long spears even managed to break through the line of Macedonian phalangites (pezhetairoi) at the point of contact of taxis (one taxis = "paper strength" of 2048 phalangites - according to: http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/...Notes.html) under command of Simmias and taxis under command of Polysperchon:

Quote:(...) Simmias and his brigade were not yet able to start with Alexander in pursuit, but causing the phalanx to halt there, he took part in the struggle, because the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed. In this part of the field, their line being broken, some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians; and there the action became desperate. For the Persians fell boldly on the men, who were most of them unarmed, and never expected that any men would cut through the double phalanx and break through upon them. When the Persians made this attack, the foreign prisoners also assisted them by falling upon the Macedonians in the midst of the action. But the commanders of the men who had been posted as a reserve to the first phalanx, learning what was taking place, quickly moved from the position which they had been ordered to take, and coming upon the Persians in the rear, killed many of them there collected round the baggage. But the rest of them gave way and fled. The Persians on the right wing, who had not yet become aware of the flight of Darius, rode round Alexander's left wing and attacked Parmenio in flank. (...)

A quite extraordinary and valiant achievement.

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Edit:

Quote:In any case George, let Arrian's (non-propagandising!) figure of 300,000 be killed by the Macedonians at the "skirmish" of Gaugamela. How then can you describe it as such? If you allow the battle to have taken six hours (oh dear, more than a "skirmish") then that amounts to some 834 Persians killed per minute.

And you forgot that Alexander's infantry practically didn't take part in that "skirmish" (according to George) and that supposedly all his cavalry except of 1800 Companions didn't charge but at best did some skirmishing (which typically doesn't inflict many casualties unless continuing for a very long time).

So we are left with 1800 Companion cavalrymen killing 834 Persians per minute (or 1668 per 2 minutes) for 6 hours (360 minutes) without any rest. I think they must have been robots.

And don't forget about another "non-propagandistic" figure - over 300,000 captured. So apart from killing 1668 per minute (or roughly one killed per 2 minutes by each of Macedonian Companions - and average Macedonian Companion killed 167 during entire battle), they also captured a similar number.

167 Persians captured by each 1 of Macedonian Companions! :mrgreen:

And further 167 killed by each 1 of Macedonian Companions! :mrgreen:

Quote:He clearly describes only the Macedonians as assaulting squadron by squadron. Are you claiming the Macedonians rode in and hurled their "javelins" and retreated?

And mighty javelins killed more per minute than German machine guns at the 1st day of the Somme! :mrgreen:

Quote:And that Persian and Indian heavy cavalry armed with long spears even managed to break through the line of Macedonian phalangites (pezhetairoi) at the point of contact of taxis...

Ah yes, the famous "break in the line". I have some very definite thoughts on this. The court tradition (that is, Arrian's transmission) is clear (you'll excuse me for not transcribing the far better Landmark translation):

Quote:When the armies drew near each other, Darius and the men around him were observed: the apple-bearing Persians, the Indians, the Albanians, the Carians who had been forcibly transported into Central Asia, the Mardian archers ranged opposite Alexander himself and the royal squadron of cavalry.

So Arrian 3.13.1. Alexander is clearly described as opposite the Persian centre.

Quote:For a time Alexander led his men in column but, when the cavalry, charging the Persians who were trying to surround the Macedonians' right wing....

Arrian 3.14.2 (Landmark translation). And, so, even given the "chariot charge" Alexander was leading the Macedonians in column. Two things: Alexander began his rightward advance opposite the Persian centre. Secondly he wound up opposite the Persian left wing chariots and he got there advancing in column.

This, if correct, has some implications for the entire battle.