07-30-2006, 09:23 PM
Dear Jona,
You clearly know a lot about this matter, and you argue very well, but not convincingly enough, in the final analysis.
For me, your argument breaks down on two points:-
An operation which fails to achieve its objective by sheer weight of numbers, as expected, has suffered a setback. When this operation also sees the failure of the artillery and your elite troops, you have a serious problem. I conclude that the defenders of Thermopylae gave the Persians a hard time. Evidence for this is the sudden stiffening of Greek resistance to the invader after the battle.
I couldn't find any sound basis in your posts for your assumption that Leonidas accidentally got himself trapped and "mopped up". This very evocative phrase could indeed describe the lats hours of the action, but not the battle as a whole. More to the point, the notion that Leonidas could have seen the stand as a holding action makes perfect sense, but there is also good sense in the idea that, when he saw that his position was turned, he chose to make a point, by refusing to leave the field.
There is a well-established and documented warrior-ethic which demands that the elite fighters must be prepared to stand and die, in certain circumstances. We see it at Thermopylae, amongst the Plains Indians of America, the Samurai and the Gesithas of the Anglo-Saxons as well as the Huscarls of the Vikings.
Johnny already mentioned the Alamo on this thread. I believe that was a pre-meditated "re-enactment" of Thermopylae, carried out to achieve the same results as the original - to unite and inspire the remaining defenders.
Spartans (although, as you say, they were known to retreat) were also expected to be prepared to sacrifice themselves to achieve their military objectives. Leonidas, as one of two kings, left Sparta fully conscious that he was expendable. He may also have felt that to return to Sparta having yielded the pass would lead to disgrace and loss of power. This also ties in with the warrior culture of the age and most specifically of the Spartans.
In terms of the logic of the Spartan warrior, Leonidas could have done nothing other than what he did; hold the pass for as long as possible and then die covering the withdrawal of his allies. I feel you have completely by passed the issue of mindset.
Hi, Floof, nice to hear from you again.
You clearly know a lot about this matter, and you argue very well, but not convincingly enough, in the final analysis.
For me, your argument breaks down on two points:-
An operation which fails to achieve its objective by sheer weight of numbers, as expected, has suffered a setback. When this operation also sees the failure of the artillery and your elite troops, you have a serious problem. I conclude that the defenders of Thermopylae gave the Persians a hard time. Evidence for this is the sudden stiffening of Greek resistance to the invader after the battle.
I couldn't find any sound basis in your posts for your assumption that Leonidas accidentally got himself trapped and "mopped up". This very evocative phrase could indeed describe the lats hours of the action, but not the battle as a whole. More to the point, the notion that Leonidas could have seen the stand as a holding action makes perfect sense, but there is also good sense in the idea that, when he saw that his position was turned, he chose to make a point, by refusing to leave the field.
There is a well-established and documented warrior-ethic which demands that the elite fighters must be prepared to stand and die, in certain circumstances. We see it at Thermopylae, amongst the Plains Indians of America, the Samurai and the Gesithas of the Anglo-Saxons as well as the Huscarls of the Vikings.
Johnny already mentioned the Alamo on this thread. I believe that was a pre-meditated "re-enactment" of Thermopylae, carried out to achieve the same results as the original - to unite and inspire the remaining defenders.
Spartans (although, as you say, they were known to retreat) were also expected to be prepared to sacrifice themselves to achieve their military objectives. Leonidas, as one of two kings, left Sparta fully conscious that he was expendable. He may also have felt that to return to Sparta having yielded the pass would lead to disgrace and loss of power. This also ties in with the warrior culture of the age and most specifically of the Spartans.
In terms of the logic of the Spartan warrior, Leonidas could have done nothing other than what he did; hold the pass for as long as possible and then die covering the withdrawal of his allies. I feel you have completely by passed the issue of mindset.
Hi, Floof, nice to hear from you again.
