02-16-2012, 08:31 PM
Hi Tom, well yes you add some more points to it. My own idea was that the Persian Empire, a particularly well organised one despite its size - with a modern governance and logistics applied on well known pre-existing east-west traderoutes - had the feasibility to arrange in span of 1 year the mobility of several 100,000s of troops, let alone when it had the time to prepare for it over the span of more than 5 years.
Above I saw someone comparing Napoleontian armies to Persian implying the former were any vastly more advanced in logistic terms. Well that is far from being the case. The truth is (and ask any 19th warfare specialist) that the fastest moving land-based infantry western European army in 18th-19th century prior to the advent of railroad was that of Marlborough who mastered a very satisfying 25km per day. However even that is no close match to the casual 30-35km per day that Alexander's army would do, given that his father had already trained them to do even more if need arose. The mere physical conditions difference of the average ancient man to the average pre-industrial man are enormous. While in terms of ships there was constant evolution (still I do believe any pre-modern sail-ship equiped with cannons would struggle against Byzantine fire-galleys since fire destroys sails much faster than canons destroy oars & sails), in terms of land-based logistics, I cannot see any improvement. True that the employment of rifles made armies lighter but then Persians were not particularly heavy either. In terms of road networks I do not believe that early 19th century Napoleontian France was any better than Persia given that both used at best stone paved roads, their own feet and theirs animals. The newly discovered steam engines had not yet propagated into a wide use in transportation till later 19th century. In terms of food provisions there would be no difference - what is more funny is that in terms of warfare ancient armies would simply slaughter with particular ease the Napoleontian armies given that they only had to outrun the 150m distance (1 minute), lose by bullets say a 25-30% of their force and then enjoy the party slaughtering the totality of the opposing Napoleontian force in 4-5 minutes - but of course here our interest is logistics. So no, there is nothing particularly more evolved to logistics of Napoleontian era than that of the classical era - and one would note the absence of instant messaging via fire-signaling stations in mountains across Europe which was the case in Greece (and I guess most probably in Persia).
If Napoleon could get more than 500,000 men to travel to cold Moscow, Persians could send 3 times that number during summertime in Greece. A 400,000 minimum fighting force backed by 2-3 times this numbers in overall logistics (i.e. not just accompagning logistics but local-support logistics) should be seen as something very casual even if extraordinary in frequency and impressive to everyone. All it took was to have the financial support and the means and Persians had plenty of both, 10 times more than Napoleon.
As for the feasibility of supply lines - the mere paradigm of relatively small ships at 50tn carrying wheat whose every kilo more than suffices to cover the needs of 2 men for a day mean that it would suffice 1 ship arrival per day to bring in the daily allowance for 100,000 soldiers. Just 1 small ship per day!!! Persians had 100s of ships and they could arrange with sending 10 per day, i.e. they could arrange sending in daily food for 1 million people!!! Certainly they would not do it like that but rather in a step approach as well as armies carrying their own minimal stocks.
You can thus safely guess that the Persian king would not just bring their daily wheat portion but actually would bring even their favourite grandmothers' candies! Monday, Persian goat a la creme, Tuesday Median lentils with bacon, Wednesday Phrygian pizza with Ionian wine! Ok kidding but really do not think that supplying all that army was that difficult. Own minimal stocks, constant ship provisions, purchases from local allies, over-taxing from local vassals and common looting from conquered ones more than covered the needs without much anxiety - this as long as the army was on the winning momentum. On the other side, any losing army (losing safety of traderoutes and support of allies and vassals) would eventually face supply provisions. But Persians came in great numbers simply to avoid that possibility!
I guess that the largest part of the supplies came by ship and not by land or looting (Greeks did apply scorched earth tactics commonly afterall). Why on earth would anyone go to the extend of cutting a whole peninsula (at Chalkidiki)? Just out of personal idiocy following an earlier tragic event (as so many suggested in the past?). Of course not. This not only saved half-a-day voyage cutting throughput times but mostly enabled avoiding going to open sea where southern Greek navies could try to disrupt their lines. He would not spend time and ressources to cut it just to pass a military navy. The idea was to have a continuous supply line of many ships passing per day there throughout the year of the campaign. Notice how Persians moved for the most coastally. This was not done because they did not know how to sail but because they passed their cargo ships from own protected areas avoiding the risky open sea.
Complex yes. Extra-expensive yes. But totally feasible. Not just for 400,000 soldiers (+800,000 logistics) but for double that number though I would not jump to propose so - I guess 400,000 should be esteemed as enough for the task. Anything below 300,000 soldiers would be considered as very few given that even the 1/4th of Greeks could eventually amass more than 100,000 men. Persians had all the knowledge on roughly how many Greeks lived in Greece. They did seem to have knowledge how many ships are there and of course who is who.
While I would not also comment on the upper 5 million estimate, I do also believe that lower 1-2 million estimates among ancient writers and their inbetween numbers depends on the definition of who could be counted as part of the campaign and who was not. Personally i am surprised that 19th-early 20th century writers dismissed figures so easily, evidently out of their own preconceived ideas that as-if more modern armies like that of Napoleon were in better place to provide for food, for Napoleon this being for more than 500,000 soldiers walking all the way to cold distant Moscow rather than Persians who among every other advantage they had (border proximity, local vassals and allies, better roads, long established centralised Imperial logistics and planning) they had the added HUGE advantage of support by ships!
Nikos (Νικάνωρ)
Above I saw someone comparing Napoleontian armies to Persian implying the former were any vastly more advanced in logistic terms. Well that is far from being the case. The truth is (and ask any 19th warfare specialist) that the fastest moving land-based infantry western European army in 18th-19th century prior to the advent of railroad was that of Marlborough who mastered a very satisfying 25km per day. However even that is no close match to the casual 30-35km per day that Alexander's army would do, given that his father had already trained them to do even more if need arose. The mere physical conditions difference of the average ancient man to the average pre-industrial man are enormous. While in terms of ships there was constant evolution (still I do believe any pre-modern sail-ship equiped with cannons would struggle against Byzantine fire-galleys since fire destroys sails much faster than canons destroy oars & sails), in terms of land-based logistics, I cannot see any improvement. True that the employment of rifles made armies lighter but then Persians were not particularly heavy either. In terms of road networks I do not believe that early 19th century Napoleontian France was any better than Persia given that both used at best stone paved roads, their own feet and theirs animals. The newly discovered steam engines had not yet propagated into a wide use in transportation till later 19th century. In terms of food provisions there would be no difference - what is more funny is that in terms of warfare ancient armies would simply slaughter with particular ease the Napoleontian armies given that they only had to outrun the 150m distance (1 minute), lose by bullets say a 25-30% of their force and then enjoy the party slaughtering the totality of the opposing Napoleontian force in 4-5 minutes - but of course here our interest is logistics. So no, there is nothing particularly more evolved to logistics of Napoleontian era than that of the classical era - and one would note the absence of instant messaging via fire-signaling stations in mountains across Europe which was the case in Greece (and I guess most probably in Persia).
If Napoleon could get more than 500,000 men to travel to cold Moscow, Persians could send 3 times that number during summertime in Greece. A 400,000 minimum fighting force backed by 2-3 times this numbers in overall logistics (i.e. not just accompagning logistics but local-support logistics) should be seen as something very casual even if extraordinary in frequency and impressive to everyone. All it took was to have the financial support and the means and Persians had plenty of both, 10 times more than Napoleon.
As for the feasibility of supply lines - the mere paradigm of relatively small ships at 50tn carrying wheat whose every kilo more than suffices to cover the needs of 2 men for a day mean that it would suffice 1 ship arrival per day to bring in the daily allowance for 100,000 soldiers. Just 1 small ship per day!!! Persians had 100s of ships and they could arrange with sending 10 per day, i.e. they could arrange sending in daily food for 1 million people!!! Certainly they would not do it like that but rather in a step approach as well as armies carrying their own minimal stocks.
You can thus safely guess that the Persian king would not just bring their daily wheat portion but actually would bring even their favourite grandmothers' candies! Monday, Persian goat a la creme, Tuesday Median lentils with bacon, Wednesday Phrygian pizza with Ionian wine! Ok kidding but really do not think that supplying all that army was that difficult. Own minimal stocks, constant ship provisions, purchases from local allies, over-taxing from local vassals and common looting from conquered ones more than covered the needs without much anxiety - this as long as the army was on the winning momentum. On the other side, any losing army (losing safety of traderoutes and support of allies and vassals) would eventually face supply provisions. But Persians came in great numbers simply to avoid that possibility!
I guess that the largest part of the supplies came by ship and not by land or looting (Greeks did apply scorched earth tactics commonly afterall). Why on earth would anyone go to the extend of cutting a whole peninsula (at Chalkidiki)? Just out of personal idiocy following an earlier tragic event (as so many suggested in the past?). Of course not. This not only saved half-a-day voyage cutting throughput times but mostly enabled avoiding going to open sea where southern Greek navies could try to disrupt their lines. He would not spend time and ressources to cut it just to pass a military navy. The idea was to have a continuous supply line of many ships passing per day there throughout the year of the campaign. Notice how Persians moved for the most coastally. This was not done because they did not know how to sail but because they passed their cargo ships from own protected areas avoiding the risky open sea.
Complex yes. Extra-expensive yes. But totally feasible. Not just for 400,000 soldiers (+800,000 logistics) but for double that number though I would not jump to propose so - I guess 400,000 should be esteemed as enough for the task. Anything below 300,000 soldiers would be considered as very few given that even the 1/4th of Greeks could eventually amass more than 100,000 men. Persians had all the knowledge on roughly how many Greeks lived in Greece. They did seem to have knowledge how many ships are there and of course who is who.
While I would not also comment on the upper 5 million estimate, I do also believe that lower 1-2 million estimates among ancient writers and their inbetween numbers depends on the definition of who could be counted as part of the campaign and who was not. Personally i am surprised that 19th-early 20th century writers dismissed figures so easily, evidently out of their own preconceived ideas that as-if more modern armies like that of Napoleon were in better place to provide for food, for Napoleon this being for more than 500,000 soldiers walking all the way to cold distant Moscow rather than Persians who among every other advantage they had (border proximity, local vassals and allies, better roads, long established centralised Imperial logistics and planning) they had the added HUGE advantage of support by ships!
Nikos (Νικάνωρ)
