03-02-2023, 10:43 AM
Hello Allan,
Once again, thanks for putting forward a different perspective on this revolt. For my part, it is refreshing to have to think again about the strategy and tactics deployed by both sides and, more importantly, the mind-set of Suetonius and Boudica.
In your 'Aside' you write of difficulty visualising the battlefield. You write, "To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult ", hence your mention of Highland Glens. Given that most think the battle was somewhere in southern England then, to state the obvious, such defiles are not available - at least not ones that are c. 1 km wide between the rising flanks. The idea of the bounding flanks being the result of water bodies is unusual, unique even, however, like most people who take an interest in the battle and certainly all translators, I think Tacitus is describing a topographic depression. He does not mention water courses in relation to the battle-site but takes time to tell us that there was, arguably a less important, wood to the rear; I think he would have mentioned large water bodies flanking the battlefield.
When modelling and searching for likely battle-sites (see URL link below) I defined a 'defile' as a topographic depression of at least 15 m depth and a slope of at least 5 degrees (other parameters were also used). I take the view that a gradient is beneficial to a fighting force if it is up-slope from their combatants, especially in an age with limited ranged weapons. And, the Roman auxiliary on the flanks (with gradients nearly always greater than the defile bottom) are lightly armoured compared to the legionaries, better trained, equipped and experience than the rebel light infantry and also have the direct support of the Roman/aux. cavalry, i.e. the rebel infantry would - probably - be stopped by the Roman force on the slope above them even when the adverse gradient is low.
Furthermore, most would agree that Suetonius was probably at his chosen battle-site for some days waiting for the rebels (the main reason why he must have chosen a site with sufficient water for his force) which reminds me of his activity at one of the battles of Bedriacum (Cremona?) during the Year of the Four Emperors when Tacitus (Histories Book 2, 25) writes, "Suetonius Paulinus did not at once give his infantry the signal to engage, for he was naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success. So he kept issuing orders to fill up the ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line, thinking that it was soon enough to begin to conquer when they had made provision against defeat." Might Suetonius have earlier prepared his ground before Boudica engaged and, in doing so, further protected his flanking forces?
All told I think the battle-site did not need to be robust, instead, moderate defile gradients but with steeper flanks coupled to prepared defences and disciplined etc. warriors would be sufficient to hold light infantry. Once the initial rebel charge fails to break the legionary line then the effective combat numbers are equivalent, with the majority of the rebels being redundant, entrapped by their own mass. The legionaries push and kill; the auxiliaries and cavalry enclose; the wagons in the rear create an effect similar to the Carthaginian cavalry at Cannae - hence the large number of reported dead, many of whom would probably suffocated in the crush.
There is another aspect to this which you have touched upon - Suetonius probably did lure Boudica into a tactical trap by making his position tempting to the rebels, i.e. he probably did not choose a site that appeared impregnable.
I could write a lot about all these factors but most I've covered in an earlier essay (2015 [strewth, 8 years ago]) available on academia.edu ...
https://www.academia.edu/11015820/Findin...e_matching
It is long but you could probably skip the first half describing the template matching exercise and read the final half which covers options, strategy etc. It does cover your modelled direction of march for Suetonius, i.e. north east from London, and does find, echoing your comments, that Tacitus' description of the battle-site was poorly reflected in the terrain which resulted in no top 100 battle-sites in this area. Indeed, there were none east of Watling Street. But then again, my modelling might be missing an element or just wrong.
Moving on to your other comments.
You write that the presented course of action following the Combat Estimate methodology was one of many and that it roughly gave the result that Tacitus and Dio describe. That comment, and others within your reply {2441}, give me the impression that you might be treating Dio and Tacitus as equals regarding veracity. My bias is to ignore Dio's account because I think he is more a playwright or entertainer; his text seems manicured to be light on facts but heavy on theatre, especially the kind to titillate a Roman public. This is probably most evident when he writes that Suetonius at the final battle split his force into three, independent bodies and then gave lengthy speeches to all three. As we know, Tacitus has one Roman line which runs across a topographic depression, flank to flank; this is a far more conventional, sensible, prudent, etc. arrangement that presumably Agricola [or written Roman reports that we don't have] would have confirmed. In ignoring Dio I am left with Tacitus' numbers regarding the combatants - c.10k armed men and 80,000 dead rebels, meaning there might have been c.100k rebel people. Furthermore, I take a slightly pedantic stance, i.e. I take his numbers as roughly correct. But, if you take both authors numbers in combination then you do get some impressive figures, hence the possibility of 230,000 rebels at the final battle.
Why am I banging on about this? Because I'm still trying to understand how the Combat Estimate causes the Iceni (Boudica) to remain roughly in their homeland besieging the 9th legion in their forts, and for Suetonius to leave London and march towards the Iceni. I wonder if that figure of 230,000 rebels at the final battle, and your assessment that odds of > 10.1 against the Romans would lead to defeat, caused you to think at the beginning of the exercise that you had to avoid the Combat Estimate providing such a scenario - hence, the Iceni passivity and Suetonius marching to engage them, or, to put it another way, the Combat Estimate had to keep separate the Trinovantes and the Iceni if the final battle was to produce the outcome described by Tacitus.
Elsewhere you write, "it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army" with which I partially agree. By this stage, however, the 9th is no longer a field unit and can be simply watched - I don't think it is a significant threat to the Iceni. Meanwhile, Suetonius is marching to London and in my view his field army is the prime target for both the Iceni and Trinovantes.
"But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?" I suspect that we don't give the British tribal leaders enough credit for strategic thinking. After all, they recognised that the Roman invasion force in 43 AD had to be met by the combined tribes and so fought, and lost, the two-day battle on the Medway. That event effectively confirmed the early stage conquest of SE England. Surely Boudica et al. were equally capable of concluding that they had to destroy Suetonius' field army if they were to survive, especially so as their combined forces gave them much better odds against Suetonius than the Britons against Aulus Plautius in 43 AD - probably! As I've written in the document linked above (apologies for repeating this text; it comes from the section entitled, 'Was strategy governed by relative strengths and weaknesses?'), "logic may have dictated to Boudica that, of the two options, returning [or staying in, as in your scenario] home carried a certain death sentence while the second, pursuing Suetonius out of London and doing battle with his field-army, offered a chance of victory and life. Surely she would have chosen life?"
You write, "Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did." The problem with this argument is that the Roman strengths are not significantly diminished by rebel guerrilla warfare, meaning that the Roman field army can still proceed wherever it wishes. Eventually the Romans arrive en masse in your homeland and conquer either by battle/siege or simply robust occupation. In those circumstances various rebel actors can continue guerrilla warfare but it is a pointless endeavour, as it was for Caratacus, Hereward the Wake and so on.
I think the rebel leaders knew this; knew that remaining passive in their homeland (Iceni) and not combining with other forces (Trinovantes etc.) and destroying Suetonius in battle would eventually result in their re-conquest (probably the year after the uprising). This strategic necessity was granted an unexpected opportunity when, by the time Suetonius leaves London, the 9th had been destroyed and the 2nd had not materialised in London (or St. Albans - btw, why do you prefer this town over London as a Roman rendezvous point?) Suetonius would also have recognised the change in fortunes, his lack of mass now the 9th and 2nd were no longer available to him. Surely his only initial option when in London was to evade the rebels, not march towards them?
Back to the London civilians again: you write, "It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation." I agree with some of this, especially when you write that if Suetonius did take civilians then he didn't initially march to battle but instead to a fortress, town or port, Cogidubnus' area of control ... or any direction from London which out-paced and out-distanced the rebels. However, I do think Tacitus does mean citizens (as in non-combatants). In his text he is acknowledging that the abandonment of London is deeply regrettable, shameful and castes Suetonius (and his family) badly. Tacitus tries to convince the reader that Suetonius had to abandon London to save the province and he may have mentioned the escorting of civilians as another device to provide 'cover' for Suetonius. For a variety of reasons I think some citizens were escorted but chief among them is my bias that neither Tacitus nor Agricola were given to lying or, to be more cynical, would want to be seen to be lying.
I think I can see why you prefer the civilians to be "veterans and armed men" because they would be more acquiescent in marching towards the Iceni and the battle-site. It is an imaginative twist to use to support your scenario but I don't think many will support that.
Still writing of civilians, "However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy." We are not told that the civilians were at the battle or anything about them after the account of them leaving London. They may have only marched with Suetonius for a couple of days before he passed them on (somehow). Maybe they did reach the battle-site but Suetonius screened their passage to safety by, 'having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front his'. I admit to a little fanciful speculation. The point is that Tacitus tells us nothing of their fate beyond leaving London with Suetonius, who, I imagine, would want to get rid of them as quickly as possible. Of course, and to repeat the point, initially marching away from the rebels keeps the civilians save until they can be sent on to the western military zone or Cogidubnus' care.
I tentatively suggest that your doubts about the civilians has led to you writing, "that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense", which suggests that you are acknowledging that Suetonius marching towards the Iceni with civilians would not happen, it making no military sense, hence your questioning of Tacitus' account of the London episode. To put it another way: your scenario requires a very unlikely outcome (including the civilians marching to the Iceni and battle); this you recognise and to circumvent that result you cast doubt on Tacitus' London account. I don't buy that, but I do like the twist. In fact I'm smiling as I write.
I must draw this response to an end before I inflict further words and ideas (most already in that essay referenced above) on the readers of this thread.
I do hope you can find time to write the more detailed document, maybe include some of the other scenarios/outcomes of the combat Estimate.
Regards, Steve Kaye
Once again, thanks for putting forward a different perspective on this revolt. For my part, it is refreshing to have to think again about the strategy and tactics deployed by both sides and, more importantly, the mind-set of Suetonius and Boudica.
In your 'Aside' you write of difficulty visualising the battlefield. You write, "To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult ", hence your mention of Highland Glens. Given that most think the battle was somewhere in southern England then, to state the obvious, such defiles are not available - at least not ones that are c. 1 km wide between the rising flanks. The idea of the bounding flanks being the result of water bodies is unusual, unique even, however, like most people who take an interest in the battle and certainly all translators, I think Tacitus is describing a topographic depression. He does not mention water courses in relation to the battle-site but takes time to tell us that there was, arguably a less important, wood to the rear; I think he would have mentioned large water bodies flanking the battlefield.
When modelling and searching for likely battle-sites (see URL link below) I defined a 'defile' as a topographic depression of at least 15 m depth and a slope of at least 5 degrees (other parameters were also used). I take the view that a gradient is beneficial to a fighting force if it is up-slope from their combatants, especially in an age with limited ranged weapons. And, the Roman auxiliary on the flanks (with gradients nearly always greater than the defile bottom) are lightly armoured compared to the legionaries, better trained, equipped and experience than the rebel light infantry and also have the direct support of the Roman/aux. cavalry, i.e. the rebel infantry would - probably - be stopped by the Roman force on the slope above them even when the adverse gradient is low.
Furthermore, most would agree that Suetonius was probably at his chosen battle-site for some days waiting for the rebels (the main reason why he must have chosen a site with sufficient water for his force) which reminds me of his activity at one of the battles of Bedriacum (Cremona?) during the Year of the Four Emperors when Tacitus (Histories Book 2, 25) writes, "Suetonius Paulinus did not at once give his infantry the signal to engage, for he was naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success. So he kept issuing orders to fill up the ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line, thinking that it was soon enough to begin to conquer when they had made provision against defeat." Might Suetonius have earlier prepared his ground before Boudica engaged and, in doing so, further protected his flanking forces?
All told I think the battle-site did not need to be robust, instead, moderate defile gradients but with steeper flanks coupled to prepared defences and disciplined etc. warriors would be sufficient to hold light infantry. Once the initial rebel charge fails to break the legionary line then the effective combat numbers are equivalent, with the majority of the rebels being redundant, entrapped by their own mass. The legionaries push and kill; the auxiliaries and cavalry enclose; the wagons in the rear create an effect similar to the Carthaginian cavalry at Cannae - hence the large number of reported dead, many of whom would probably suffocated in the crush.
There is another aspect to this which you have touched upon - Suetonius probably did lure Boudica into a tactical trap by making his position tempting to the rebels, i.e. he probably did not choose a site that appeared impregnable.
I could write a lot about all these factors but most I've covered in an earlier essay (2015 [strewth, 8 years ago]) available on academia.edu ...
https://www.academia.edu/11015820/Findin...e_matching
It is long but you could probably skip the first half describing the template matching exercise and read the final half which covers options, strategy etc. It does cover your modelled direction of march for Suetonius, i.e. north east from London, and does find, echoing your comments, that Tacitus' description of the battle-site was poorly reflected in the terrain which resulted in no top 100 battle-sites in this area. Indeed, there were none east of Watling Street. But then again, my modelling might be missing an element or just wrong.
Moving on to your other comments.
You write that the presented course of action following the Combat Estimate methodology was one of many and that it roughly gave the result that Tacitus and Dio describe. That comment, and others within your reply {2441}, give me the impression that you might be treating Dio and Tacitus as equals regarding veracity. My bias is to ignore Dio's account because I think he is more a playwright or entertainer; his text seems manicured to be light on facts but heavy on theatre, especially the kind to titillate a Roman public. This is probably most evident when he writes that Suetonius at the final battle split his force into three, independent bodies and then gave lengthy speeches to all three. As we know, Tacitus has one Roman line which runs across a topographic depression, flank to flank; this is a far more conventional, sensible, prudent, etc. arrangement that presumably Agricola [or written Roman reports that we don't have] would have confirmed. In ignoring Dio I am left with Tacitus' numbers regarding the combatants - c.10k armed men and 80,000 dead rebels, meaning there might have been c.100k rebel people. Furthermore, I take a slightly pedantic stance, i.e. I take his numbers as roughly correct. But, if you take both authors numbers in combination then you do get some impressive figures, hence the possibility of 230,000 rebels at the final battle.
Why am I banging on about this? Because I'm still trying to understand how the Combat Estimate causes the Iceni (Boudica) to remain roughly in their homeland besieging the 9th legion in their forts, and for Suetonius to leave London and march towards the Iceni. I wonder if that figure of 230,000 rebels at the final battle, and your assessment that odds of > 10.1 against the Romans would lead to defeat, caused you to think at the beginning of the exercise that you had to avoid the Combat Estimate providing such a scenario - hence, the Iceni passivity and Suetonius marching to engage them, or, to put it another way, the Combat Estimate had to keep separate the Trinovantes and the Iceni if the final battle was to produce the outcome described by Tacitus.
Elsewhere you write, "it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army" with which I partially agree. By this stage, however, the 9th is no longer a field unit and can be simply watched - I don't think it is a significant threat to the Iceni. Meanwhile, Suetonius is marching to London and in my view his field army is the prime target for both the Iceni and Trinovantes.
"But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?" I suspect that we don't give the British tribal leaders enough credit for strategic thinking. After all, they recognised that the Roman invasion force in 43 AD had to be met by the combined tribes and so fought, and lost, the two-day battle on the Medway. That event effectively confirmed the early stage conquest of SE England. Surely Boudica et al. were equally capable of concluding that they had to destroy Suetonius' field army if they were to survive, especially so as their combined forces gave them much better odds against Suetonius than the Britons against Aulus Plautius in 43 AD - probably! As I've written in the document linked above (apologies for repeating this text; it comes from the section entitled, 'Was strategy governed by relative strengths and weaknesses?'), "logic may have dictated to Boudica that, of the two options, returning [or staying in, as in your scenario] home carried a certain death sentence while the second, pursuing Suetonius out of London and doing battle with his field-army, offered a chance of victory and life. Surely she would have chosen life?"
You write, "Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did." The problem with this argument is that the Roman strengths are not significantly diminished by rebel guerrilla warfare, meaning that the Roman field army can still proceed wherever it wishes. Eventually the Romans arrive en masse in your homeland and conquer either by battle/siege or simply robust occupation. In those circumstances various rebel actors can continue guerrilla warfare but it is a pointless endeavour, as it was for Caratacus, Hereward the Wake and so on.
I think the rebel leaders knew this; knew that remaining passive in their homeland (Iceni) and not combining with other forces (Trinovantes etc.) and destroying Suetonius in battle would eventually result in their re-conquest (probably the year after the uprising). This strategic necessity was granted an unexpected opportunity when, by the time Suetonius leaves London, the 9th had been destroyed and the 2nd had not materialised in London (or St. Albans - btw, why do you prefer this town over London as a Roman rendezvous point?) Suetonius would also have recognised the change in fortunes, his lack of mass now the 9th and 2nd were no longer available to him. Surely his only initial option when in London was to evade the rebels, not march towards them?
Back to the London civilians again: you write, "It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation." I agree with some of this, especially when you write that if Suetonius did take civilians then he didn't initially march to battle but instead to a fortress, town or port, Cogidubnus' area of control ... or any direction from London which out-paced and out-distanced the rebels. However, I do think Tacitus does mean citizens (as in non-combatants). In his text he is acknowledging that the abandonment of London is deeply regrettable, shameful and castes Suetonius (and his family) badly. Tacitus tries to convince the reader that Suetonius had to abandon London to save the province and he may have mentioned the escorting of civilians as another device to provide 'cover' for Suetonius. For a variety of reasons I think some citizens were escorted but chief among them is my bias that neither Tacitus nor Agricola were given to lying or, to be more cynical, would want to be seen to be lying.
I think I can see why you prefer the civilians to be "veterans and armed men" because they would be more acquiescent in marching towards the Iceni and the battle-site. It is an imaginative twist to use to support your scenario but I don't think many will support that.
Still writing of civilians, "However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy." We are not told that the civilians were at the battle or anything about them after the account of them leaving London. They may have only marched with Suetonius for a couple of days before he passed them on (somehow). Maybe they did reach the battle-site but Suetonius screened their passage to safety by, 'having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front his'. I admit to a little fanciful speculation. The point is that Tacitus tells us nothing of their fate beyond leaving London with Suetonius, who, I imagine, would want to get rid of them as quickly as possible. Of course, and to repeat the point, initially marching away from the rebels keeps the civilians save until they can be sent on to the western military zone or Cogidubnus' care.
I tentatively suggest that your doubts about the civilians has led to you writing, "that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense", which suggests that you are acknowledging that Suetonius marching towards the Iceni with civilians would not happen, it making no military sense, hence your questioning of Tacitus' account of the London episode. To put it another way: your scenario requires a very unlikely outcome (including the civilians marching to the Iceni and battle); this you recognise and to circumvent that result you cast doubt on Tacitus' London account. I don't buy that, but I do like the twist. In fact I'm smiling as I write.
I must draw this response to an end before I inflict further words and ideas (most already in that essay referenced above) on the readers of this thread.
I do hope you can find time to write the more detailed document, maybe include some of the other scenarios/outcomes of the combat Estimate.
Regards, Steve Kaye
