02-24-2023, 04:26 PM
This is a long answer. But let me say that I am not proposing this as the only course of action only a possible one of many. I was not trying to fit the war to Tacitus or Dio but to consider from first principles several courses of action and selected one that seemed likely to give roughly the resut that Tacitus and Dio describe.
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
There is a difficulty in creating a timeline because warfare seldom runs along a linear path. Events are frequently concurrent or nearly so. I know it is nice to have a sequence but, from experience, this is seldom the case.
1) Paulinus assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. Triggered by the first report which would probably be the Iceni Revolt and his first objective would be to march there to suppress it.
2a) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and contain them in their forts. 2b) The Iceni start to muster the levy and any disaffected elements from other tribes.
2c) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
3a) Paulinus, with his field army, marches to St. Albans (a reasonable forward base from which to deal with the Iceni.
3b) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so. (A possible pincer movement?)
3c) The Trinovantes and any disaffected elements are now marching on London. Suetonius arrives in London. Why does he go to London? – Possibly to see if he can defend it but it means leaving St Albans undefended to be destroyed. I found this action difficult to rationalise unless London was a muster point for 2nd Legion and supporting troops from Cogidubnus.
3d) The Iceni muster is now almost complete, disaffected elements absorbed, captured Roman weapons and equipment distributed and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th and St Albans. 3e) Paulinus marches north again to contest this or has decided to decapitate the insurrection.
4) Paulinus arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica. Trinovantes are occupied in an orgy of violence and destruction and follow a few days later.
5) Paulinus can no longer delay as he may be caught in a pincer move himself. The Iceni are defeated somewhere.
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
I see Cerialis marching south into Iceni lands whether to relieve the trapped force, to the Iceni capital or direct to Colchester (if he knew it was besieged) the distances are not great in any case. My military mind would say that his initial thrust was the same as Paulinus – to tackle the Iceni revolt. When he set off he may not have known that the Trinovantes were in revolt or that Colchester was threatened. At some stage he may have altered his plan and/or route. He may indeed have been ordered to muster his forces, though I would think St Albans more likely than London but as he was impetuous, he possibly decided to put the Iceni down with what he had ready. Tacitus and his father-in-law may be doing a bit of spin doctoring to protect a friend, colleague, fellow senator?
I also considered what the Iceni would do – something often forgotten when we rely only on one side’s version. They knew that the nearest potent military threat was the 9th Legion. If the revolt was to be successful (by whatever means they judge success) then the 9th had to be neutralised or eliminated. This may be done by outright defeat or by blocking their movement. The “besieging” may be done exactly as Tacitus says by guerrilla warfare occupying the survivors and pinning them in place.
Simultaneously, the Trinovantes taking advantage of the disturbance up north, decided to settle a few scores as well and rebelled. From Tacitus is appears that they were better prepared with their psychological warfare (or is this spin doctoring too?).
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
As above, I see the Iceni conducting a guerrilla campaign against the 9th Legion north of the Wash and maybe as far west as St Albans. This would also make sense by providing the hostile ground that Paulinus had to traverse. Whether or not the revolt was in any way planned with the Trinovantes it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army.
I also think that both the Iceni and Trinovantes gathered in disaffected elements from other tribes.
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
I consider that both the Trinovantes and the Iceni employed guerrilla warfare (so does Tacitus). I have the Iceni fighting in the traditional British way that has been effective in the past – guerrilla warfare. As Tacitus says, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence." On the other had the Trinovantes act a bit differently by forming an army and tackling unwalled (lightly defended) towns – Colchester and London at least. Archaeology provides a fort nearby Colchester but I could not find a reference to its presence at the time or its destruction.
The Trinovantes may well have turned north in pursuit of Paulinus. Even if they did not, the threat was there and Paulinus would have to fight before the two forces joined.
If we follow the majority view, the Iceni have mustered and then left their territory undefended and marched south to help/incite the Trinovantes to take Colchester and also defeat Cerialis. They then marched on London. Paulinus meanwhile marched from Anglesey to London and then marched back north to give battle against the combined Iceni and Trinovantes who were following his army. Or if Paulinus went in another direction (west or south) someone else appears to have tied up the 9th preventing them linking up with Paulinus and may also be the force that sacked St Albans but who were they?
I also considered this: the Iceni leave their territory undefended and leave scorched earth behind them anticipating the Roman reaction. They march south to help/incite the Trinovantes take Colchester. They then march on to London. Paulinus meanwhile marches from Anglesey to London and marches back north without the 2nd Legion (why because going west makes more sense - unless to call in the 9th or other reinforcements and also reach his chosen ground?). The combined Iceni and Trinovantes now march north after him and sack St Albans in passing perhaps hoping to pin Paulinus in the scorched Iceni territory hence his lack of food and the later famine. But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
I don’t know which Latin word Tacitus uses for ”tribe” or if it had more than one meaning. In any case I see no reason why the Iceni or any other tribe fought in a single mass The Iceni may have disaffected elements of several tribes. I would assess that they fought in some sort of tribal tactical groups, each under its own chief. It is also likely that each tribe divided the cavalry and infantry and may even have sub-divided them (cf Caesar’s description in referring to an engagement with the British cavalry he calls it an 'unusual combat' in which their tactical style demonstrated a level of command and control which implied a high level of training, discipline and tactical competence. “There was also the fact that they never fought in close formation, but rather in small groups with large spaces between: they had squadrons posted at intervals and each group took over from another in turn, so that fresh troops could take the place of those who were tired out.”
From this we may deduce that the Gallic cavalry tactics were quite different to those employed by the British and that Boudica went from “tribal group” to “tribal group” (“tribes” to the Romans listening to the tale). After all modern commentators often call every armoured vehicle a “tank” whether it is a tank, armoured personnel carrier, self-propelled gun, armoured car etc.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
The figures I use are from Dio and Tacitus. Neither make much sense to me given the final outcome of the battle. With odds of 5 or 6:1 against the Romans I can understand a Roman victory but 10:1 or more is pushing it. Even with modern weapons and artillery support odds of 10:1 Ancient Britons would be a “sporty” day and at 20:1 definitely on the “dodgy” side. Think about the population figures the 230,000 strong army is a huge proportion of the entire population (estimated) at the time. The tribal and Roman deaths quoted by Tacitus would have seriously depleted the population of England.
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
That is precisely why the Iceni stay in their lands to defend it from the approaching field army to their west and the 9th Legion to the north. Why in your estimation did they leave the reduced 9th Legion and also abandon their land that “they own and control” (the Romans have not captured it militarily yet) and leaving the population undefended against any retribution from Paulinus? Or did virtually every Iceni tribesperson pack their worldly goods onto their wagons to march south through the Trinovantes land, west to London and thence to wherever Paulinus is ready to fight?
The immediate threat to the Trinovantes was likely to be Cogibubnus and maybe the Catuvellauni hence the drive on London to secure the Thames boundary. I drew a map of deployments leaning heavily on Webster. It shows that the Iceni and Trinovantes were surrounded on two sides (north and west) by Roman forces and the “Romanised” Catuvelaulni, to the south by Cogidubnus and to east by the sea.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
The Combat Estimate does not make decisions. It presents Options to the commander for consideration. There must have been a reason to go to London instead of taking on the Iceni in their homeland, a reason not to draw in the remnants of the 9th Legion and so many more factors. I could not fathom out why he went to London unless to get something – supplies, reinforcements, intelligence or something else?
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Yes, Paulinus would very probably have considered all of this. The actual zone of military control lies in a diagonal band west and north of London. Paulinus is well aware that a field battle is the best option but needs to fight it on his own terms at a place and time of his own choosing. He has the option of choosing which way to march but we do not know which way he went nor the factors that he considered most important in deciding. If he cannot get sufficient reinforcements to tackle the combined Iceni and Trinovantes he needs to deal with them separately.
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
Agreed. It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation. However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy. Paulinus obviously had a plan in mind and I hope his autobiography turns up some day.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
No. It is a method of organising thoughts and then presenting options to the commander by his staff (the commander usually does a Combat Estimate too). It presents a framework that has remained in use under different names (when I first learned it the name was Combat Apprecation) at least as far back as the 18th Century. It was probably done throughout history by various commanders. The outcome of a Combat Estimate is the selection of a Course of Action which leads to a plan for the operation. The plan then changes to suit the circumstances as the enemy will probably have their own Combat Appreciation and plan (however informal) which is designed to combat your one. And so it goes on. The forces involved are assessed as they are be they Roman Legions, Greek Phalanx, Napoleonic Corps, Zulu Impis, Mongol Hordes. Also included are the relative weaponry, rates of movement, style of fighting, doctrine, logistics, leadership etc. of both sides.
As is said “no plan survives first contact with the enemy” but if the Combat Estimate was done well then it contains alternative courses of action that can then be selected or modified. In this one I stopped after looking at 9 courses of action for Paulinus.
An aside: I have difficulty visualising the battlefield. The tribal forces were largely made up of light infantry who are the least likely battlefield troops to be stopped by difficult ground. To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult. I was left visualising something like a Highland Glen or a steep valley in Welsh mountains. I am not familiar enough with the terrain of mid-England to make a tactical decision. But could the defile not be between hills but large water obstacles? These would certainly impede tactical movement and often feature on one or both flanks in classical battles.
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might b
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
There is a difficulty in creating a timeline because warfare seldom runs along a linear path. Events are frequently concurrent or nearly so. I know it is nice to have a sequence but, from experience, this is seldom the case.
1) Paulinus assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. Triggered by the first report which would probably be the Iceni Revolt and his first objective would be to march there to suppress it.
2a) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and contain them in their forts. 2b) The Iceni start to muster the levy and any disaffected elements from other tribes.
2c) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
3a) Paulinus, with his field army, marches to St. Albans (a reasonable forward base from which to deal with the Iceni.
3b) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so. (A possible pincer movement?)
3c) The Trinovantes and any disaffected elements are now marching on London. Suetonius arrives in London. Why does he go to London? – Possibly to see if he can defend it but it means leaving St Albans undefended to be destroyed. I found this action difficult to rationalise unless London was a muster point for 2nd Legion and supporting troops from Cogidubnus.
3d) The Iceni muster is now almost complete, disaffected elements absorbed, captured Roman weapons and equipment distributed and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th and St Albans. 3e) Paulinus marches north again to contest this or has decided to decapitate the insurrection.
4) Paulinus arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica. Trinovantes are occupied in an orgy of violence and destruction and follow a few days later.
5) Paulinus can no longer delay as he may be caught in a pincer move himself. The Iceni are defeated somewhere.
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
I see Cerialis marching south into Iceni lands whether to relieve the trapped force, to the Iceni capital or direct to Colchester (if he knew it was besieged) the distances are not great in any case. My military mind would say that his initial thrust was the same as Paulinus – to tackle the Iceni revolt. When he set off he may not have known that the Trinovantes were in revolt or that Colchester was threatened. At some stage he may have altered his plan and/or route. He may indeed have been ordered to muster his forces, though I would think St Albans more likely than London but as he was impetuous, he possibly decided to put the Iceni down with what he had ready. Tacitus and his father-in-law may be doing a bit of spin doctoring to protect a friend, colleague, fellow senator?
I also considered what the Iceni would do – something often forgotten when we rely only on one side’s version. They knew that the nearest potent military threat was the 9th Legion. If the revolt was to be successful (by whatever means they judge success) then the 9th had to be neutralised or eliminated. This may be done by outright defeat or by blocking their movement. The “besieging” may be done exactly as Tacitus says by guerrilla warfare occupying the survivors and pinning them in place.
Simultaneously, the Trinovantes taking advantage of the disturbance up north, decided to settle a few scores as well and rebelled. From Tacitus is appears that they were better prepared with their psychological warfare (or is this spin doctoring too?).
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
As above, I see the Iceni conducting a guerrilla campaign against the 9th Legion north of the Wash and maybe as far west as St Albans. This would also make sense by providing the hostile ground that Paulinus had to traverse. Whether or not the revolt was in any way planned with the Trinovantes it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army.
I also think that both the Iceni and Trinovantes gathered in disaffected elements from other tribes.
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
I consider that both the Trinovantes and the Iceni employed guerrilla warfare (so does Tacitus). I have the Iceni fighting in the traditional British way that has been effective in the past – guerrilla warfare. As Tacitus says, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence." On the other had the Trinovantes act a bit differently by forming an army and tackling unwalled (lightly defended) towns – Colchester and London at least. Archaeology provides a fort nearby Colchester but I could not find a reference to its presence at the time or its destruction.
The Trinovantes may well have turned north in pursuit of Paulinus. Even if they did not, the threat was there and Paulinus would have to fight before the two forces joined.
If we follow the majority view, the Iceni have mustered and then left their territory undefended and marched south to help/incite the Trinovantes to take Colchester and also defeat Cerialis. They then marched on London. Paulinus meanwhile marched from Anglesey to London and then marched back north to give battle against the combined Iceni and Trinovantes who were following his army. Or if Paulinus went in another direction (west or south) someone else appears to have tied up the 9th preventing them linking up with Paulinus and may also be the force that sacked St Albans but who were they?
I also considered this: the Iceni leave their territory undefended and leave scorched earth behind them anticipating the Roman reaction. They march south to help/incite the Trinovantes take Colchester. They then march on to London. Paulinus meanwhile marches from Anglesey to London and marches back north without the 2nd Legion (why because going west makes more sense - unless to call in the 9th or other reinforcements and also reach his chosen ground?). The combined Iceni and Trinovantes now march north after him and sack St Albans in passing perhaps hoping to pin Paulinus in the scorched Iceni territory hence his lack of food and the later famine. But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
I don’t know which Latin word Tacitus uses for ”tribe” or if it had more than one meaning. In any case I see no reason why the Iceni or any other tribe fought in a single mass The Iceni may have disaffected elements of several tribes. I would assess that they fought in some sort of tribal tactical groups, each under its own chief. It is also likely that each tribe divided the cavalry and infantry and may even have sub-divided them (cf Caesar’s description in referring to an engagement with the British cavalry he calls it an 'unusual combat' in which their tactical style demonstrated a level of command and control which implied a high level of training, discipline and tactical competence. “There was also the fact that they never fought in close formation, but rather in small groups with large spaces between: they had squadrons posted at intervals and each group took over from another in turn, so that fresh troops could take the place of those who were tired out.”
From this we may deduce that the Gallic cavalry tactics were quite different to those employed by the British and that Boudica went from “tribal group” to “tribal group” (“tribes” to the Romans listening to the tale). After all modern commentators often call every armoured vehicle a “tank” whether it is a tank, armoured personnel carrier, self-propelled gun, armoured car etc.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
The figures I use are from Dio and Tacitus. Neither make much sense to me given the final outcome of the battle. With odds of 5 or 6:1 against the Romans I can understand a Roman victory but 10:1 or more is pushing it. Even with modern weapons and artillery support odds of 10:1 Ancient Britons would be a “sporty” day and at 20:1 definitely on the “dodgy” side. Think about the population figures the 230,000 strong army is a huge proportion of the entire population (estimated) at the time. The tribal and Roman deaths quoted by Tacitus would have seriously depleted the population of England.
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
That is precisely why the Iceni stay in their lands to defend it from the approaching field army to their west and the 9th Legion to the north. Why in your estimation did they leave the reduced 9th Legion and also abandon their land that “they own and control” (the Romans have not captured it militarily yet) and leaving the population undefended against any retribution from Paulinus? Or did virtually every Iceni tribesperson pack their worldly goods onto their wagons to march south through the Trinovantes land, west to London and thence to wherever Paulinus is ready to fight?
The immediate threat to the Trinovantes was likely to be Cogibubnus and maybe the Catuvellauni hence the drive on London to secure the Thames boundary. I drew a map of deployments leaning heavily on Webster. It shows that the Iceni and Trinovantes were surrounded on two sides (north and west) by Roman forces and the “Romanised” Catuvelaulni, to the south by Cogidubnus and to east by the sea.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
The Combat Estimate does not make decisions. It presents Options to the commander for consideration. There must have been a reason to go to London instead of taking on the Iceni in their homeland, a reason not to draw in the remnants of the 9th Legion and so many more factors. I could not fathom out why he went to London unless to get something – supplies, reinforcements, intelligence or something else?
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Yes, Paulinus would very probably have considered all of this. The actual zone of military control lies in a diagonal band west and north of London. Paulinus is well aware that a field battle is the best option but needs to fight it on his own terms at a place and time of his own choosing. He has the option of choosing which way to march but we do not know which way he went nor the factors that he considered most important in deciding. If he cannot get sufficient reinforcements to tackle the combined Iceni and Trinovantes he needs to deal with them separately.
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
Agreed. It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation. However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy. Paulinus obviously had a plan in mind and I hope his autobiography turns up some day.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
No. It is a method of organising thoughts and then presenting options to the commander by his staff (the commander usually does a Combat Estimate too). It presents a framework that has remained in use under different names (when I first learned it the name was Combat Apprecation) at least as far back as the 18th Century. It was probably done throughout history by various commanders. The outcome of a Combat Estimate is the selection of a Course of Action which leads to a plan for the operation. The plan then changes to suit the circumstances as the enemy will probably have their own Combat Appreciation and plan (however informal) which is designed to combat your one. And so it goes on. The forces involved are assessed as they are be they Roman Legions, Greek Phalanx, Napoleonic Corps, Zulu Impis, Mongol Hordes. Also included are the relative weaponry, rates of movement, style of fighting, doctrine, logistics, leadership etc. of both sides.
As is said “no plan survives first contact with the enemy” but if the Combat Estimate was done well then it contains alternative courses of action that can then be selected or modified. In this one I stopped after looking at 9 courses of action for Paulinus.
An aside: I have difficulty visualising the battlefield. The tribal forces were largely made up of light infantry who are the least likely battlefield troops to be stopped by difficult ground. To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult. I was left visualising something like a Highland Glen or a steep valley in Welsh mountains. I am not familiar enough with the terrain of mid-England to make a tactical decision. But could the defile not be between hills but large water obstacles? These would certainly impede tactical movement and often feature on one or both flanks in classical battles.
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might b
Alan
Lives in Caledonia not far from the Antonine Wall.
Lives in Caledonia not far from the Antonine Wall.
