Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Renatus]

What the MonsGraupius hypothesis fails to recognise is that the established Roman response to a revolt was not to retire behind a line of defence but to march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum.  Any course such as that proposed would have been seen as a sign of weakness and serve only to encourage the rebels.  We know from Suetonius' reprisals after the revolt had been put down that there were tribes that had not joined the rebels but had been wavering in their loyalty.  Had Boudica been seen to be in the ascendancy and Suetonius cowering in the south-west (as it would have been portrayed), these tribes would almost certainly have joined her.  Suetonius would have been acutely aware that, in that event, there was a danger that the whole area north of the Thames would be lost to Rome and that, if the Welsh tribes joined in, as they were likely to do, his army in North Wales would have been cut off and he would have been completely isolated.  Hence the necessity of placing himself in a position to call the army down to reinforce him as quickly as possible, while still being able to monitor the actions of the enemy.

Anyone who has taken the trouble to read through this thread (something of a task, I must admit) will know that neither I nor anyone else here has proposed 'the mad dash up the M1/6'.  The furthest north anyone has suggested is the site at Church Stowe favoured by John.  I have suggested a strategic withdrawal of 25 miles to St Albans and then a further withdrawal of 16 miles west along Akeman Street to Tring.  If a further withdrawal yet were necessary, I have suggested that it could have been less than 25 miles in the direction of Alchester.  By no stretch of the imagination can this be characterised as a 'mad dash up the M1/6'.