Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[MonsGraupius]

This assessment seems to be based on three misconceptions: first, that in abandoning London Suetonius was seeking safety; secondly, that going north would take him into hostile territory; thirdly, that any 'delay' was likely to be a long one.

Suetonius would clearly have liked to have saved London but, if he was to do so, he would have had to concentrate his troops there and most of his army was in North Wales.  He realised that he did not have sufficient troops (probably little more than the 14th Legion) to hold off the enemy until the rest of the army could join him and he saw from the experience of Cerialis and the 9th Legion the folly of trying to engage the rebels with inadequate forces.  Consequently, he decided to abandon the town.  However, this was not to seek safety but to gather reinforcements and that with the minimum of delay.  The longer the delay, the more chance the rebels had to capitalize upon their successes and encourage other tribes to join them.

As the majority of his army was in the north, that is the direction in which he had to go.  There were few reinforcements to be found in the south-west.  The 2nd Legion, if it was based at Exeter at the time, was almost certainly with the campaigning army in Wales, with its base fortress manned only by its veterans, those with 16 years' service, under the command of its praefectus castrorum.  He was prepared to allow civilians to accompany him but only if they could keep pace with him and did not impede his military objectives.  If he could get them to safety, that was a bonus but it was not his prime purpose.

Going north from London would take him into the territory of the Catuvellauni.  Their tribal capital was Verulamium and that had been made a municipium.  The inference to be drawn from this is that the tribe was pro-Roman and that probably accounts also for what the town later suffered at the hands of the rebels.  Consequently, Suetonius would not have been entering hostile territory to go there and the town might be expected to provide a safe haven for the civilians.  It is true that Tacitus does not mention Suetonius going to St. Albans but he does not mention him going to Calleva or anywhere else either, so that is a non-point.

Tacitus' comment that Suetonius marched to London through the midst of the enemy evidently does not involve his travelling down Watling Street.  We have discussed this before but Tacitus' comment relates to his response to the news that Camulodunum was under threat.  We have postulated that his intention was to take the 14th Legion along the Via Devana, rendezvous with Cerialis and the 9th, and march together to the relief of the colony.  On learning of the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis, he diverted down Ermine Street to London, which would take him through at least the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes, thus justifying Tacitus' comment.

We now come to the question of 'delay'.  I have commented above as to why he would not wish to allow the rebels to gather more support.  We can add that there is no question of his having waited until the following year to confront the rebels.  Had he done so, he would certainly have had more than 10,000 men at the final battle.  In fact, he would probably have had his whole army.  There is no criticism to be read into Tacitus use of the word 'delay' (cunctationem).  If anything, he makes a virtue of necessity.  Suetonius' only reason for delay was to allow his reinforcements to join him but they were taking too long.  He was running short of food (Dio) and he was probably receiving reports from his scouts and possibly also from friendly locals that the enemy was increasing in numbers day by day.  He consequently decided that he had no choice but to offer battle.

As to the location of the battle site, I have suggested that it might have been in the area of Tring.  I base this upon the assumption that, although Suetonius might have considered St. Albans as a suitable rallying point for his troops, when he learned that the rebels were advancing up Watling Street towards him, he withdrew westwards along Akeman Street, which moved him nearer to his reinforcements and provided them with a number of routes by which to reach him.  However, he could not proceed too far west, as he needed to remain reasonably close to the rebels, in order to monitor their movements and react accordingly.  As the rebels themselves probably also advanced along Akeman Street, he might have had to withdraw further.  I would, therefore, place the battle on the line of Akeman Street or near to it, in the vicinity of Tring or to the west of it but not as far west as Alchester, which apparently shows no signs of the sort of damage that might be expected had the rebels reached that far and sacked it.

I'm sorry you seem to have no concept of the position of London. The standard Roman response when attacked was to get behind a secure wall. London did not have a secure wall, so Suetonius would attempt to find a secure line of defence and the Thames offered a line that could be easily secured by a very small number of troops.

That is also the same thing the ninth Legion did when its infantry was destroyed, like Suetonius, it immediately retreated behind a secure defence, which in its case was the encampment.

Moreover, Suetonius had the friendly pro-roman Belgae tribes in the SE, who being Gaulish invaders, were seen just as much as unwelcome invaders as the Romans. There is no doubt the Gaulish elite would side with Suetonius and as such he not only had a secure line of defence, but he was guaranteed auxiliaries and supplies.

Moreover, no sane General abandons their supply line and marches off into the north. Instead, the standard Roman tactic was to secure their supply lines, to prepare for war and to advance when they, and not the enemy, were ready.

What you and everyone else proposing the mad dash up the M1/6 is saying, is the Suetonius abandoned his main supply route, headed away from his main source of auxiliaries, heads toward the area where the Ninth legion were destroyed and cuts himself off in the north.

"As the majority of his army was in the north, that is the direction in which he had to go. "  ... why? It he wasn't mad, he wasn't playing Rome Total war. He was an actual Roman general who needed a secure base from which to wage war (which is what we are told he wanted). That secure base is the SE of England. If instead, he heads north, the entire SE gets overrun, Suetonius ends up cut off in the North unable to move, unable to get supplies, unable to get auxiliaries because he is surrounded by hostile forces ... basically he is in a perfect sandwich between the Welsh Iceni and Belgae, who, with Suetonius cut off from his supply lines, will have absolutely no problem wiping him out. IT IS TOTAL MADNESS!

"Tacitus' comment that Suetonius marched to London through the midst of the enemy" ...

so you suppose, that knowing the country is infested with the enemy, knowing that London cannot be held, knowing that the Thames cannot be crossed except at a very few and difficult fords, except the bridge at London, that Suetonius didn't do the very obvious thing of moving to the other side of the Thames and cutting down the bridge, but instead ... having alerted the enemy to his presence by going to London ... he then decides to go back toward his troops ... when any sane general knows that Boudica will almost be expecting that and almost certainly be waiting in Ambush. That is totally dumb!!!

Even if you suppose that Suetonius did return north ... he would have still crossed south over the Thames, cut down the bridge, left a few troops to stop any advance across the Thames, and then headed west, keeping the Thames between himself and boudica and only once well west of Goring, would he then start heading north to meet his own troops heading south on the far side of the country.

It simply defies all logic and common sense for him to return up Watling street.