Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Renatus]

Renatus wrote:

Quite, and he was also impervious to all entreaties not to abandon London, although there were, of course, sound strategic grounds for him to leave. I suspect that those allowed to accompany him were those thought wealthy or influential enough to assist in the reconstruction of the province after the suppression of the revolt. Even so, there would probably have been conditions attached, predominantly that they would be able to keep up with the column and not slow it down in any way. This would probably mean that they would have to have had their own horses or horse-drawn transport and to have provided their own foodstuffs.

I think that the Romans would have had plenty of people to re construct the Province. The rich would have had information so would have gone either on the ships or by horse.

Horse drawn transport would have slowed down an escaping army if they were indeed running away. If however they were doing an organised withdrawal and had a fair amount of time SP could have taken most types of refugees.

Tacitus says “and receiving into his army all who would go with him”, not the rich or well mounted. The three exceptions were “Those who were chained to the spot by the weakness of their sex, or the infirmity of age, or the attractions of the place”, were cut off by the enemy.”

I will revise what I said:

I suspect that those allowed to accompany him were those thought wealthy and influential enough and those with the strength and skills necessary to assist in the reconstruction of the province and its structures after the suppression of the revolt. Even so, there would probably have been conditions attached, predominantly that they would be able to keep up with the column and not slow it down in any way. This would probably mean that those sufficiently wealthy would have had their own horses or horse-drawn transport and those on foot would have needed to have had the stamina to keep pace with the soldiery. The column would not have slowed down for those who could not keep up.

As to your specific comments:

Although the Romans may have had plenty of people to reconstruct the province, I fail to see why this should preclude Paulinus from taking with him those from London with similar abilities.

Horse-drawn transport need not have slowed the column down; it depends upon the type of transport. Light carts, for instance, would not have been a problem. I would expect Paulinus to have had mules, so anything capable of keeping pace with the mules would have been all right.

Be careful with translations. Tacitus does not say that Paulinus received “all” who wanted to go with him. A literal translation is ‘those accompanying he accepted in part of the column’ (comitantes in partem agminis acciperet). This is less inclusive than Church and Brodribb would have it. Nor are the three exceptions exhaustive; what about the sick, for instance? The Loeb translation is ‘he . . . embodied in the column those capable of accompanying the march.’

It was not the point of settling back to await retribution but take into account what the Romans normally did. Of course the Ninth did exactly that and SP would have also done so had the rest of his troops turned up.

I thought that we had covered this. The Ninth was going to the relief of Colchester, not attacking the homelands. Likewise, had Paulinus had the troops, he would have gone for the rebels’ army first and devastated their homelands afterwards, as he did after the final battle.

Perhaps St Albans was destroyed on the way to London by the Iceni.

That assumes that the Iceni came down Watling Street, which I doubt that they did.

If what you infer is correct it is more likely that Postumus was well aware of the situation with Paulinus (he had enough messages) and felt that he was in a better position with access to a port (Topsham) than he would have been inland.

I hope that I misunderstand you! You seem to be suggesting that Postumus, though well aware of Paulinus’ perilous position, refused to go to his aid but remained at his base to secure an escape route for himself and his legion. This changes what could conceivably be characterized as an honourable misjudgement into an act of mutinous cowardice.