\"A War like no other\"; by Victor Davis Hanson

[PMBardunias]

The film Idiocracy is simply a forward looking documentary of what America will eventually become.

I thought we were already there. There is a move afoot to do away with the electoral college in the USA. This would make the large urban centers of only a few states arbiters of elections. The result would be the type of race to the bottom demagoguery that ruined Athens. (see, I am trying to include at least one comparison to ancient Greece in each post to justify the thread's continuance)

[Paralus]

Spartan opinion was often divided and thought this could be complex, based on age groups, etc., it often seems to have devolved along "party" lines lnked to the two royal houses. This is not suprising since they Kings were ready-made demagouges, in fact this was their greatest power.

That's true as far as there can be ascertained real divisions of policy between the two houses. More obvious are the use of "friends" or partisans within other states to further policy ambitions - a tool often used by Agesilaos to further his aims.

Practicalities after the Peloponnesian War saw Sparta inherit what had been Athens' mantle. Whilst there were those who saw such a role as inconsistent with what had been Spartan policy pre-war (and which should continue) - look to its backyard and maintain its stranglehold on the Peloponnese - they were readily over run by the rivers of silver and the opportunities presented by the "new order" (Lysander comes to mind). This new order fit an interventionist, expansionist king like a glove and Agesilaos proffered his hand with near unseemly alacrity.

Other major differences, though not necessarilly devolving upon the royal houses, were attitudes to the price for hegemony - Persian money and the Asian Greeks. Whilst Antalcidas represented what might be called the "political realists", Agesilaos presented as a Callicratidas made king. Indeed Agesilaos' step-brother, Teleutias, appears to be his mouth piece when he claims "for what greater gladness can there be than to have to flatter no one in the world, Greek or barbarian, for the sake of pay..." (Xen. Hell. 5.1.17).

Xenophon, partisan of Agiselaos, I think downplays the domestic opposition, but at times it shows through. That these "rumors", the fact behind which must at least be a reduced ardor for the foolish anti-theban policies of Agiselaos, would drive a King into a battle that proved disaterous rather than allow his portrayal as "soft" by the opposition, smacks of L. B. Johnson's escalation of the war in Viet Nam for similar reasons.

Xenophon allows the "opposition" to show through when it suits. Thus he paints Antalcidas as Agesilaos' adversary; especially as Xenophon well knew it was Antalcidas who supped the poisoned chalice of Persian support for Sparta. The Spartans' actions with respect to Thebes show that Agesilaos seems to have had his "way" more often than not: actions speak louder than Xenophon's silences or words. That said, I do not think the division over Thebes was that great a gulf between the houses. Agesilaos was interventionist first second and last; his co-king was far more "alliance" and diplomatically minded rather than "pro-Theban". Cleombrotus, the wine-swilling loser of Leuctra in Xenophon, gets terrible press. The two are better summed up by Polybius (9.23.7):

When the Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all that King Cleombrotus did was done in the spirit of friendly alliance, but it was the reverse with Agesilaus...

The works read by Polybius - and lost to us - evidently painted a picture somewhat different to Xenophon's.

[PMBardunias]

Agesilaos was interventionist first second and last; his co-king was far more "alliance" and diplomatically minded rather than "pro-Theban".

For Agesilaos it was "with us or against us" to the point of the alienation of allies, while Cleombrotus sought the moral cover of unity in what amounts to crippling inertia or downright appeasement. This seems a very current debate to an American. :wink:

[Paullus Scipio]

Agesilaos was interventionist first second and last; his co-king was far more "alliance" and diplomatically minded rather than "pro-Theban".

For Agesilaos it was "with us or against us" to the point of the alienation of allies, while Cleombrotus sought the moral cover of unity in what amounts to crippling inertia or downright appeasement. This seems a very current debate to an American. :wink:

That seems a trifle simplistic....and certainly 'appeasement' seems to strong a word. No Spartan King could afford to appear thus, even if his views were 'doveish' to others 'hawkish' ( bearing in mind that such terms are invariably relative).....


It seems to me that you two gentlemen are more in agreement than otherwise, and to add to the harmony, I would broadly agree with your respective expressed views too.... D

On the subject of 'idiocracy', the onward success of the "Marching Morons" has been a stock sci-fi theme for years........
And a satire on our so-called democracy is also a popular subject. Take out the electoral wards that invariably go for one party or the other and which cancel each other out, take out those who don't vote, or whose votes don't count because they live in a 'safe' seat for some party or another, add in the fact that your choice usually comes down to picking between 'tweedledum' and 'tweedledee', and very few people actually have any say in who governs us.....in a typical sci-fi satire it often comes down to "the voter" whose choice is then statistically extrapolated to decide the election.......

Our modern 'democracies' are a far cry from rounding up the citizens in Athens 'agora' with a wet red-painted rope to debate a subject .....

[Old Husker]

I very much agree with Paralus that the U.S. has for the most part been pulled into its current role as hegemon of the western world from a preferred isolationist stance. This is, I think, a common thread that runs throughout American history and something that happened to the Spartans, especially with regard to the Peloponnesian War. However, I think that there have been at least three periods where aggressive policy from within the country led us into foreign adventures.

The first period of home-grown aggression was in the early 19th century, when we were full of ourselves during expansion across the North American continent. At that time, we sparked the Mexican-American War to lay claim to remaining bits of territory that completed what would become the lower 48 states of the continental U.S. The American Civil War knocked us back into isolationist mode shortly thereafter.

The second period of native aggression came around the turn of the 19th century, when 'jingoistic' politicians and newspapers instigated the Spanish-American War to gain the U.S. its first overseas empire. This time, it seems to have been the resulting insurrection against American occupation of the Philippines that, even though that uprising was finally squashed, soured us for a time on such adventures, turning former advocates of aggression like Theodore Roosevelt into much more reasoning and peaceful men. After that, we pretty much restricted our aggressions to the support of corporate enterprises in Latin America until pulled reluctantly into World Wars I/II and the following Cold War series of proxy conflicts with the Soviet Union.

The last period of naked aggression came at the end of the 20th century when the Neocon political faction in the U.S. gained brief control of the presidency and used the 9/11 attacks as an excuse to launch the Iraq War, which they saw as the opening round for a string of easy conquests in the Middle East (Iraq, Syria and, finally, Iran). These operations were planned to secure valuable petroleum resources by establishng military dominance in the region while at the same time aiding key regional ally Israel. Effective failure of the opening venture in Iraq (no longer viable as a staging area for an attack on Iran in that the country is now dominated by allies of various stripes to the current Iranian regime) now seems to have joined economic decline and the continuing quagmire in Afganistan to bring a practical end to this last period of aggression. As a result, though a few folks are still around advocating an assault on Iran, the vast majority of Americans seem to be turning isolationist again, having a primary focus on fixing the worst ills afflicting their homeland (though there's little concensus on just how to accomplish this monumental task).

Thus, in the end, I don't so much despair the current situation so much as accept it as a natural turn of events both typical of world powers in general and American history in particular. I wonder if there were some in Sparta that felt the same after the sad end of their Theban adventures?

[Paullus Scipio]

Fred/Old Husker wrote:
"I very much agree with Paralus that the U.S. has for the most part been pulled into its current role as hegemon of the western world from a preferred isolationist stance. This is, I think, a common thread that runs throughout American history and something that happened to the Spartans, especially with regard to the Peloponnesian War. However, I think that there have been at least three periods where aggressive policy from within the country led us into foreign adventures."

Hhhh....mmm...mmm, I think this statement has a particularly insular "spin" on it? ....especially in light of the rest of the post !

Put another way, it could also be said the U.S. was born as an aggressive state ( expansion against indigenous peoples began before Independence), and continued as an aggressive, expansionist state (wars against indigenous peoples, wars against neighbours such as Mexico and Canada) and continued to acquire territory by any means possible......there was a brief interlude for the U.S Civil War ( apart from continued expansion at the expense of indigenous peoples - which wars ran almost to the end of the 19C.). There then followed the rapid 'conquest of the west',then there were wars pursuant to the aggressive 'Monroe doctrine' ( only the U.S. has the right to intervene in all the Americas), the blatant aggression of the Spanish Wars to acquire Cuba, the Philippines etc.
By the 20 C the U.S. took it's place as a major world power thanks to immigration and industrialisation ( an astonishing accomplishment for what began as a small colony/nation little over 100 years before), played a major part in WW1 well prior to actually committing troops in 1917, all but dictated the peace thereafter, became World's sole leading power, played the dominant part in WW II ( or round two of the great European War, if you prefer), and certainly has been involved in conflict/military intervention of some sort almost every year since.....

If the U.S. had a temple of Janus , like Rome, whose doors were shut to signify peace, I fancy they would be as infrequently closed as those of Rome, for it is hard to find a year since Independence when U.S. military forces weren't involved somewhere or another....

I'm afraid it is possible to put forward a point of view that "Isolationism" has only ever been a sop to those in the U.S. opposed to aggressive expansionism - a velvet glove to hide the iron fist, almost, or an illusion to conceal the reality....the U.S. is arguably the most successful aggressive state since the Roman Empire, and way ahead of an insular state like Sparta...:wink: :grin: :lol:

[PMBardunias]

I'm afraid it is possible to put forward a point of view that "Isolationism" has only ever been a sop to those in the U.S. opposed to aggressive expansionism

The "isolation" was from the european powers and their many entanglements. Isolationism is not anti-war, in fact the whole point was to isolate us from the europeans in order to facilitate our "manifest destiny" to conquer and rule our side of the globe. In this we were much like the faction of Spartans that wished to be left alone to govern the Lakonia and Messenia and be the "first state" to the rest of Greece.

These operations were planned to secure valuable petroleum resources by establishng military dominance in the region while at the same time aiding key regional ally Israel.

I'm less jaded, or more naive, than Fred, but I believe the situation was a bit more subtle. It was not on Israel's behalf that we went to war, though they surely might have had a goal of ousting Saddam, but in support of the Saudi Royals. Those who attacked us clearly stated their primary grievance was with our military acting as "mercenary" guards for the Saudis since the first Gulf War. In fact so many of the terrorists were themselves Saudis that there is a character of civil war to the strike. Securing oil was of course the ultimate goal, places, like Ruwanda, that don't have needed oil, don't warrant our attention it seems. It is the Saudi-Iranian struggle that we are in the middle of.

In this I am reminded of the struggle between Corcyra and Corinth and how Sparta became embroiled in what was a colony/parent struggle. But the true conflict was between Corinth and Athens who like the Saudis and Iran battled for control of resources. Sparta in order to keep her position as number one Greek polis had to intervene on behalf of it ally.

[Old Husker]

I feel that Paul is close to properly defining my views on isolationism. My earlier posting regarding the history of American aggression was aimed at foreign/international adventures and not at aggression nearer to home by those of European descent against Native Americans in the course of expansion across North America. The latter is probably closer to the long running hostilities between the Spartans and their Helot subjects than to the conflicts between Sparta and other city states. Similary, I supose that one could compare American intervention elsewhere in the Americas to Spartan intervention in the Peloponnese (though I think American actions were usually more 'economic' than 'security' related). This leaves actual 'foreign' wars to be defined as overseas for the Americans and outside of the Peloponnese for the Spartans. It would be resistance to these last, more distant campaigns that best fits my view of both American and Spartan 'isolationism.'

I believe that Paul and I are close in thought with regard to oil resources forming the primary goal for launching the Iraq War, though I obviously didn't make the full context of my ideas on that clear. I don't believe that we were focused on Iraqi oil alone. In fact, I see the Iraq campaign as no more than an opening gambit. The real target seems to have been Iran (with Syria a very minor 'side-show' consideration) and not Iraq. Iraq appears to have been meant as little more than a staging area for future anti-Iranian operations. In terms of comparing this approach to events in the Peloponnesian War, setting up bases in Iraq that were far larger than could ever be needed for local military activities (but perfect for launching large scale actions at Iran and, much less importantly, Syria) can be compared to the Athenian campaigns of 425-424 B.C. that set up fortified sites (epiteichismoi)around Sparta to west, east, and south at Pylos, Methana, and Cythera respectively. This strategy badly wounded Sparta and came close to winning the Peloponnesian War outright for Athens. It now seems that it's modern parallel is failing badly for the U.S. for a variety of reasons military, political, and economic.

With regard to the secondary objective of supporting Israel, I don't think that it was ever Saddam Husein from whom we sought to protect the Israelis, but rather Iran. This, of course, ties in with Iraq being a mere starting point for a much wider Middle East military strategy. As for the Saudis, I don't think that Iraq, badly beaten in an earlier war and with a military rendered almost non-functional by a decade of sanctions, was any longer a true threat to them (or to Israel, for whom it had likewise faded away as a real concern, far behind Iran and even somewhat behind Syria).

[Paullus Scipio]

Hhh...mm..mmm....I'm not sure the 'thank you' has quite the same nuances as the old 'laudes' system - it seems a little 'watered down' in that it expresses "thanks" rather than recognition of a good post.

Paul B's post surely adds some good clarification and definition that helps 'focus' this discussion, and his analogies with Sparta have a good resonance, in drawing parallels between 'indigenous populations', with Greece as the world, the Peloponnese as the Americas, and intervention where Sparta/USA's 'particular strategic/economic interests' are concerned. Where the analogy breaks down is that the USA's interest in the Middle East is fundamental to the point of survival, whereas Sparta's interest in the 'battle of resources/economics' between Corinth and Athens was peripheral at best.......

Sparta's intervention was therefore nowhere near to her own interests as the USA's.....

[PMBardunias]

In terms of comparing this approach to events in the Peloponnesian War, setting up bases in Iraq that were far larger than could ever be needed for local military activities (but perfect for launching large scale actions at Iran and, much less importantly, Syria) can be compared to the Athenian campaigns of 425-424 B.C. that set up fortified sites (epiteichismoi)around Sparta to west, east, and south at Pylos, Methana, and Cythera respectively.

I don't believe the plan was ever direct armed US intervention into Iran, so I would propose a better analogy would be the creation of Megalopolis by Thebes as a focal point and example for the rallying of elements hostile to Sparta within the peloponesse. A pro-American, democratic Iraq would have been quite an effective "fetter" to Iranian interests and probably resulted in internal revolt- all of the Iranians I know hate their leaders, yet would fight for them if invaded. Just like the Arcadians, Mantinea for example, turned out to be trouble for the Thebans, we shall not see the Iraq they wanted to create any time soon. The special little evil hidden away in this strategy is that if it worked and a pro-west democracy was installed, Iraq would have become the "Poland" of the middle east, a battle ground for generations.

[PMBardunias]

Where the analogy breaks down is that the USA's interest in the Middle East is fundamental to the point of survival, whereas Sparta's interest in the 'battle of resources/economics' between Corinth and Athens was peripheral at best.......

It is interesting that the "currency" the Spartans were protecting was simply "face" and prestige. So much of their leadership of greece was smoke and mirrors based on the concept that they were the polis of last resort in matters such as this, that they could not fail to perform that function.

We on the other hand seem to have become oblivious to the value of displays, real or fake, of national virtue. Our reception of the Chinese leader the past few days should be sufficient evidence of this, but I'll leave it at that.

[Old Husker]

I think that the Spartans' decision to join Corinth's lead in declaring war on Athens in 431 B.C. was probably just as strategically important to them as that to secure oil resources was in 2003 to the Americans. Sparta had no navy and, despite the undoubted superiority of its hoplites, had a very modestly sized army relative to the extents of both its home territory and region of hegemonic control. Thus, it could sustain its position only through manpower and naval resources drawn from what we call today the 'Peloponnesian League' (known in its own time more accurately as 'Sparta and it's friends'). Corinth was by far the most important League ally, being the wealthiest state, having the second most powerful army (behind only Sparta's itself), and possessed of the largest fleet (trailing only those of Athens and Corcyra). With Corinth's cooperation vital to maintaing the League and Sparta's security, it's not surprising then that the Corinthian 'tail' could wag the Spartan 'dog' in instigating a war with Athens.

As for the 'Megalopolis model' for Iraq, this falls short for me due to the massive American military base build-up that began the very day Bagdad fell. This activity ultimately established two absolutely giant airbases (the first just north of Bagdad facing nearby Iraq and the second farther north facing nearby Syria, both coupled with similarly oversized bases for land forces) that could have no earthly function with regard to internal Iraqi operations. These were clearly geared to large-scale strategic activities over the closest borders rather than the much smaller tactical operations actually required within Iraq itself. I do believe, however, that the Megalopolis model was one that neocon hawks within and without the administration sold to the American people as cover for their real, much more militant program. Given that any truly democratic Iraq would inevitably be controlled by Shites closely aligned with Iran, this was always a fantasy-based sop to those of a less warlike nature. As it turned out, the real plan of planting a puppet government under pro-American leadership in Bagdad that would allow the U.S. a free hand to use those bases as it pleased quickly sank despite several slap-dash attempts to keep it afloat. Forced by military and political realities in the field and public pressure at home to accept a truly democratic, pro-Iranian Shite take-over of the Iraqi government, the original plot fell apart entirely, leaving the U.S. to muddle its way home in some manner that would save as much face as possible (an activity still in progress).

I think that there is a very good analog for the U.S. attempt at occupying Iraq to be found in the failed attempt of Sparta to control Athens in the immediate aftermath of the Peloponnesian War (late 404-403 B.C.). This called for small Spartan forces backed by mercenaries (the Blackwater etc. of that day) and a sympathetic minority among Athenians (like unto U.S. trained Iraqi forces) to prop up a pro-Spartan puppet government. A resistance movement quickly grew, which couldn't be stamped out despite an attempt to alter the puppet government into a slightly more inclusive form. Sparta's attempt to cope with this situation as it spun out of control into a full blown civil war within the city was hindered by aid to the rebels from Thebes (a role that Iran would play in our modern parallel) and refusal of key allies like Corinth to participate in backing the occupation (much like Germany, France, and others would do to the U.S. in Iraq). In the end, the Spartans cobbled together a 'coalition of the willing' and launched a huge 'surge' of troops into Athens to put down the uprising. However, this campaign proved more a case of propaganda for political consumption at home than a real military solution on the ground (again, much as per the U.S. 'surge,' which was much, much smaller and far less earnest or effective than even the Spartan effort). In the end, despite winning a modest battlefield victory against the insurrection, the Spartans, whose casualties might have actually exceeeded those of the beaten side in that action, negotiated their way out of the occupation. The resolution settled upon left Athens under a limited democracy that included both pro and anti-Spartan factions, this arrangement saved Spartan face, at least in the short run, but rapidly gave rise to a fuller democracy under the much larger anti-Spartan majority that would again go to war against Sparta within just a few years.

[Paullus Scipio]

Plus ca change, mais plus ca meme chose......eh?

One had better hope your analogy does not hold too closely, Fred - for that would imply a Shi-ite Iraq closely aligned with Iran.....quite the opposite of U.S. intentions, just as the revived Democracy in Athens after 400 BC was the opposite of Spartan intentions.....

[Anonymous]

I do believe, however, that the Megalopolis model was one that neocon hawks within and without the administration sold to the American people as cover for their real, much more militant program.

Santayana would be proud of us. We seem to have a glut of parallels. I think my reluctance to accept plans for a boots on the ground invasion of Iran stems from the fact that my biggest problem with Rummy & co., beyond entering a war with insufficient political backing at home, was their "vision" of fighting a cheap war. The shortcomings of this ranged from allowing the majority of still-armed foes to simply melt into the populance to the inability to seal off borders. It was criminally naive.

For yet another parallel we may think of the way Sparta attempted stretch her man power by using jumped-up helots and non-citizens- even as Harmosts. You already mentioned the reliance on ever more untrustworthy allies who had a growing perception of bearing the brunt of battle.

[Paullus Scipio]

I think that the Spartans' decision to join Corinth's lead in declaring war on Athens in 431 B.C. was probably just as strategically important to them as that to secure oil resources was in 2003 to the Americans. Sparta had no navy and, despite the undoubted superiority of its hoplites, had a very modestly sized army relative to the extents of both its home territory and region of hegemonic control. Thus, it could sustain its position only through manpower and naval resources drawn from what we call today the 'Peloponnesian League' (known in its own time more accurately as 'Sparta and it's friends'). Corinth was by far the most important League ally, being the wealthiest state, having the second most powerful army (behind only Sparta's itself), and possessed of the largest fleet (trailing only those of Athens and Corcyra). With Corinth's cooperation vital to maintaing the League and Sparta's security, it's not surprising then that the Corinthian 'tail' could wag the Spartan 'dog' in instigating a war with Athens.

Here, I think I would disagree. Oil, for America, is a survival issue......Sparta's interests and hegemony of the Peloponnese had no need of a navy - Sparta had no trade or maritime supply lines to protect. It certainly did not need Corinth's navy to maintain her position, nor do I believe Corinth's co-operation to be 'vital'.

In this instance, I think Paul B. has struck closer to the mark.....
"It is interesting that the "currency" the Spartans were protecting was simply "face" and prestige. So much of their leadership of greece was smoke and mirrors based on the concept that they were the polis of last resort in matters such as this, that they could not fail to perform that function."