10-07-2010, 02:49 AM
Unfortunately I couldn't go this September Paul, but I am keeping my hopes up, I have made a commitment to myself to go there sometime before next summer. We will talk about that.
Now concerning chariot warfare, I can't but agree with all of you guys, that chariots as used during the Classical and Hellenistic years in the east had largely disappointing results. From Cunaxa to Magnesia and all the way down to Mithridates, they did not manage to claim victory over an organized and well drilled army. Yet, I thought we were talking about Cunaxa and Thymbara in particular and whether Xenophon contradicts himself rather than discussing chariot warfare in general.
So, regarding this issue alone, I have to say, that although no historian, statesman or military man who ever wrote anything can be viewed upon as having no biases at all, being overly critical of them, especially in matters that do not really matter, is not really helpful. Xenophon has no reason whatsoever to minimize Greek losses at Cunaxa or present the Persians as a cowardly mob. Of course he considers his hoplites far superior to the Persian infantry but spends book after book explaining how they had to adapt in order to make it safe through Asia. I do not think that he lies considering the Persian chariot attack as he has experienced it nor that he made up the battle at Thymbara in order to captivate his readers' imagination. My opinion is that he describes chariot warfare as he has experienced it and (at Thymbara) as he has been told by a Persian source. I really do not know whether Abradatas really existed or whether he really made this glorious charge but his heroic sacrifice is something that would be celebrated (whether it be reality or fiction) by any nation and as a tale/account is what I would only expect from a Persian source of heroic times. What I pointed out though is the fact that staying in the chariot was considered a task for heroes and this explains why countering chariots was relatively easy for those armies who could keep their ground some 100 or 50 yards before the "impact". Even at Thymbara (fiction or not), their use was a failure, since they did not actually break nor even really disorder the Egyptians. On the other hand we should not believe that the Persians or any other nation that used scythed chariots did so out of some whim. They have to have played an important role against enemies less able than the Roman legionaries or the Greek hoplites or sarissoforoi. I suspect that against cavalry based armies and levy infantry they would be valuable but unfortunately these are not the battles we usually study or have information about.
Regarding Xenophon's views regarding light infantry I would not call him biased against them. He keeps stressing their value throughout his Anabasis and even degrades himself to act as one to lead his men onwards.
As for the "kamikazee" parallel, of course I only used it to describe the proud death of Abradatas. What was evidently expected was for the driver to jump off at a certain "safe" distance, which hardly can be called a "kamikazee" tactic, it would more resemble the hurling of a missile... What is very interesting as an idea is the possibility that light troops decreased even more the effectiveness of the chariots because their crew would have to jump off at a larger distance. Having no psiloi in front of the phalanx would allow the crew to leave the chariot at 50 yards, having a swarm of light troops in front of the chariots' target would make the crew jump off at a greater distance, maybe even 200 yards allowing for more time for the unmanned chariots to change their course, lessen their speed etc.
Regarding the "charge" of the chariots into an infantry line, you all know that I am a strong supporter of the theory that has cavalry, and as such chariotry, not blindly galloping into a dense infantry line. But, as is the case with cavalry charges, chariot charges are also difficult to morally withstand and as such somewhere along the line there would be a real possibility that some bodies of men would mentally collapse and route. If cavalry has this effect even on experienced men, imagine a chariot pulled by 4 horses with spikes and scythes protruding and rotating... There would be no point in risking your men keeping their positions when you could easily order then to open lanes so that the uncontrolled horses could gallop, trot or even walk through... On the other hand, IF you could find a number of Japanese charioteers, gaps would not be as effective because they would drive their chariots so that the scythes on the sides would cut through the side files as they would gallop through. In this case you would try to keep ranks so that the horses would stop before collision or come at very low speeds. BUT, maybe some of your men would find it a good idea to run for their lives... In this case, some chariots would be able to penetrate the line and do exactly as Xenophon describes at Thymbara.
Finally, as far as the historicity of Cyropedia is concerned, I am familiar with the theory that has the whole account be a fictitious narrative, but I am not persuaded by it. I agree that Xenophon included imaginary details like certain dialogs, even some facts, that he idolized the character of Cyrus, but I have no reason to believe that the whole story is just a historical novel written to serve as an allegory. I do not dispute the allegorical power of the Cyropedia, but to my opinion, history leaves enough space for allegories and morals. I also do not dispute the account of the battle at Thymbara. I think it is based on historical accounts Xenophon researched, even though he has certainly "embellished" it in some parts. Herodot's account of the battle of Marathon contains many more fictitious elements and still we use his work as reference to the history of th period, even though he too has his biases.
Now concerning chariot warfare, I can't but agree with all of you guys, that chariots as used during the Classical and Hellenistic years in the east had largely disappointing results. From Cunaxa to Magnesia and all the way down to Mithridates, they did not manage to claim victory over an organized and well drilled army. Yet, I thought we were talking about Cunaxa and Thymbara in particular and whether Xenophon contradicts himself rather than discussing chariot warfare in general.
So, regarding this issue alone, I have to say, that although no historian, statesman or military man who ever wrote anything can be viewed upon as having no biases at all, being overly critical of them, especially in matters that do not really matter, is not really helpful. Xenophon has no reason whatsoever to minimize Greek losses at Cunaxa or present the Persians as a cowardly mob. Of course he considers his hoplites far superior to the Persian infantry but spends book after book explaining how they had to adapt in order to make it safe through Asia. I do not think that he lies considering the Persian chariot attack as he has experienced it nor that he made up the battle at Thymbara in order to captivate his readers' imagination. My opinion is that he describes chariot warfare as he has experienced it and (at Thymbara) as he has been told by a Persian source. I really do not know whether Abradatas really existed or whether he really made this glorious charge but his heroic sacrifice is something that would be celebrated (whether it be reality or fiction) by any nation and as a tale/account is what I would only expect from a Persian source of heroic times. What I pointed out though is the fact that staying in the chariot was considered a task for heroes and this explains why countering chariots was relatively easy for those armies who could keep their ground some 100 or 50 yards before the "impact". Even at Thymbara (fiction or not), their use was a failure, since they did not actually break nor even really disorder the Egyptians. On the other hand we should not believe that the Persians or any other nation that used scythed chariots did so out of some whim. They have to have played an important role against enemies less able than the Roman legionaries or the Greek hoplites or sarissoforoi. I suspect that against cavalry based armies and levy infantry they would be valuable but unfortunately these are not the battles we usually study or have information about.
Regarding Xenophon's views regarding light infantry I would not call him biased against them. He keeps stressing their value throughout his Anabasis and even degrades himself to act as one to lead his men onwards.
As for the "kamikazee" parallel, of course I only used it to describe the proud death of Abradatas. What was evidently expected was for the driver to jump off at a certain "safe" distance, which hardly can be called a "kamikazee" tactic, it would more resemble the hurling of a missile... What is very interesting as an idea is the possibility that light troops decreased even more the effectiveness of the chariots because their crew would have to jump off at a larger distance. Having no psiloi in front of the phalanx would allow the crew to leave the chariot at 50 yards, having a swarm of light troops in front of the chariots' target would make the crew jump off at a greater distance, maybe even 200 yards allowing for more time for the unmanned chariots to change their course, lessen their speed etc.
Regarding the "charge" of the chariots into an infantry line, you all know that I am a strong supporter of the theory that has cavalry, and as such chariotry, not blindly galloping into a dense infantry line. But, as is the case with cavalry charges, chariot charges are also difficult to morally withstand and as such somewhere along the line there would be a real possibility that some bodies of men would mentally collapse and route. If cavalry has this effect even on experienced men, imagine a chariot pulled by 4 horses with spikes and scythes protruding and rotating... There would be no point in risking your men keeping their positions when you could easily order then to open lanes so that the uncontrolled horses could gallop, trot or even walk through... On the other hand, IF you could find a number of Japanese charioteers, gaps would not be as effective because they would drive their chariots so that the scythes on the sides would cut through the side files as they would gallop through. In this case you would try to keep ranks so that the horses would stop before collision or come at very low speeds. BUT, maybe some of your men would find it a good idea to run for their lives... In this case, some chariots would be able to penetrate the line and do exactly as Xenophon describes at Thymbara.
Finally, as far as the historicity of Cyropedia is concerned, I am familiar with the theory that has the whole account be a fictitious narrative, but I am not persuaded by it. I agree that Xenophon included imaginary details like certain dialogs, even some facts, that he idolized the character of Cyrus, but I have no reason to believe that the whole story is just a historical novel written to serve as an allegory. I do not dispute the allegorical power of the Cyropedia, but to my opinion, history leaves enough space for allegories and morals. I also do not dispute the account of the battle at Thymbara. I think it is based on historical accounts Xenophon researched, even though he has certainly "embellished" it in some parts. Herodot's account of the battle of Marathon contains many more fictitious elements and still we use his work as reference to the history of th period, even though he too has his biases.
