Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Owein Walker]

Hate to fulfil the "doubting" label but I "doubt" this approach is going to get much quality collaboration. You might want to re-think your engagement strategies.

I've recently come across some quite appalling behaviour from academics who literally refused to even acknowledge an email after I left some things for them. Fortunately, they were just rocks of no particular value (which they asked for) ... but they had asked for them, before I got them ... so very strange behaviour. I have found that this year in particularly academics are behaving very strangely and not even responding to very polite emails just looking for people with an interest in niche subjects.

Based on my own experience, I would wait till next year in the hope that things improve ... or maybe they'll all be on strike!

I think hell will freeze over before things improve, but it's not just academics, look to our leadership for inspiration. Good luck!

One point I now realize is that history doesn't belong to everyone like I thought, it actually belongs to the finder.
Until it is shared, the finder can keep it all to himself.It's not like metal detecting where there are rules of expected behaviour, No,it really just belongs to the finder who can keep it hidden or just bide his time. It is the Archaeologist who needs funding or the historian looking for his next book who has a need for publicity, not the finder.

[John1]

"I have found that this year in particularly academics are behaving very strangely and not even responding to very polite emails just looking for people with an interest in niche subjects." 

Full disclosure.... I am an academic in another subject area. In the good days I was happy with a 20% return rate on speculative enquiries, now it seems slightly better. I did have some patronising, bordering on the offensive, responses in the past but mostly zero response, n.b. some have been extremely positive. From inside the bubble things are very pressured in academia right now and have been throughout covid. Academics are currently in the marking phase which is significantly extended now with lots of late submissions so maybe August there will be more room to respond, but then you are deep into recovery, field work and planning. Most are facing permanent internal management pressure on a level never seen including respected departments being taken down for no good reason.

Just a little plea, don't judge them/us too harshly at the moment.

[Owein Walker]

"I have found that this year in particularly academics are behaving very strangely and not even responding to very polite emails just looking for people with an interest in niche subjects." 

Full disclosure.... I am an academic in another subject area. In the good days I was happy with a 20% return rate on speculative enquiries, now it seems slightly better. I did have some patronising, bordering on the offensive, responses in the past but mostly zero response, n.b. some have been extremely positive. From inside the bubble things are very pressured in academia right now and have been throughout covid. Academics are currently in the marking phase which is significantly extended now with lots of late submissions so maybe August there will be more room to respond, but then you are deep into recovery, field work and planning. Most are facing permanent internal management pressure on a level never seen including respected departments being taken down for no good reason.

Just a little plea, don't judge them/us too harshly at the moment.

Unfortunately as soon as money, ego and reputation are involved the worst of human behaviour is often seen, that's my opinion.  Having had 30 years experience in construction, I can honestly say there are some very good archaeologists and a few bad apples that ruin it for the others, just like any other group of people.

[MonsGraupius]

Unfortunately as soon as money, ego and reputation are involved the worst of human behaviour is often seen, that's my opinion.  Having had 30 years experience in construction, I can honestly say there are some very good archaeologists and a few bad apples that ruin it for the others, just like any other group of people.

Like many of us, academics have good intentions, but they are appalling at communication with the public (quite ironic) and the result is what we the public see is often quite appalling. They took the information, did what they thought was right with it ... but they never tell the people who gave the information what they've done with it, so it appears to have gone into a black hole, or worse to have been "stolen".

I live in Scotland, where it is a lot worse, because the SNP don't want people to know about our Roman heritage (not good to admit we were part of the Roman empire like England)or indeed the real history of Scotland (it's all fake Celtic rubbish and victimhood history) ... so it is a lot worse here. Very little funding for any serious Roman archaeology and no funding for serious archaeology that would challenge the fairytale narrative of the SNP.

[John1]

Bucklesbury/Bloomberg tablets apparently cast some light on recovery from the revolt in 62AD   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhm-n09PGEI&t=132s

[Nathan Ross]

cast some light on recovery from the revolt in 62AD   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhm-n09PGEI&t=132s

Thanks - that's actually a very nice little video (albeit a bit 'corporate'!). We've discussed the tablets themselves a couple of times, I think, mainly due to the date thing.

I still don't see why a trader coming to London in October AD62 means the place must have been destroyed over two years before, though - a wooden town can presumably get up and running within a few months...

Anyway, since the last time we discussed this I've become more or less convinced that the revolt probably did happen in late AD60, with most of the fighting happening in October or November, but it was only in early 61 that the full report reached Rome and the imperial authorities took action (which is why Tacitus describes it all under that consular year).

[MonsGraupius]

cast some light on recovery from the revolt in 62AD   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lhm-n09PGEI&t=132s

Thanks - that's actually a very nice little video (albeit a bit 'corporate'!). We've discussed the tablets themselves a couple of times, I think, mainly due to the date thing.

I still don't see why a trader coming to London in October AD62 means the place must have been destroyed over two years before, though - a wooden town can presumably get up and running within a few months...

Anyway, since the last time we discussed this I've become more or less convinced that the revolt probably did happen in late AD60, with most of the fighting happening in October or November, but it was only in early 61 that the full report reached Rome and the imperial authorities took action (which is why Tacitus describes it all under that consular year).

Every time I look at the account, I am struck by the fact that Suetonius decided to abandon London, because it was not suitable as a seat for a campaign and instead he marched off to safety with all those who could walk. No one in his position would ever march north through enemy territory with a column of civilians who can only just walk. it is one of the daftest things ever.

There is nothing at all about him heading north to St.Albans, that just did not happen. Instead, he clearly headed to safety and the only way to do that from London is to head over the Thames, because the Thames was a de facto defensive wall.

That is where he does set up his "seat" for a campaign. That might have been somewhere Calleva. From where he could secure all the crossing points of the Thames at least as far as goring on Thames, and then the hills and upper Thames valley create an effective defensive line across to Cirencester.

This means his Welsh troops headed down the west - keeping well away from the Iceni and toward Gloucester and thence Cirencester, from where they then secured the London-Thames-Calleva-Cirencester line.

Then, as is the habit of the Romans, Suetonius carefully prepares for the next campaign. He was in no hurry as tacitus clearly indicates: "he prepared to abandon delay" - which sounds like a mild rebuke, for delaying far too long (in the view of Tacitus).

So, eventually, probably months later, maybe even the next year, when Suetonius had prepared for his campaign: "Suetonius had already the fourteenth legion, with a detachment of the twentieth and auxiliaries from the nearest stations, altogether some ten thousand armed men, when he prepared to abandon delay and contest a pitched battle."

At this point there are two scenarios. The first is that Suetonius advances in order to draw Boudica into battle. If so, the most likely crossing point of the Thames, based on historical crossings and its closeness to Calleva, would be Wallingford. Heading from there toward the Iceni, and given the topology of the battle description, this indicates the armies came to blows somewhere in the Chilterns. The second scenario is that Tacitus is being a little economical with the truth, and rather than Suetonius taking the initiative, that the Iceni crossed the Thames to do battle. The most likely place for the Iceni to cross would be around Oxford, because here the Thames is easily crossable, and whereas higher upstream the Thames becomes a boggy morass and crossing further south would be too close to the Romans at Calleva. The Iceni would then have headed south on the west side of the Thames and Tacitus would have come out from Calleva to meet them. This time the topology of the battle site and line of attack suggests a battle on the Berkshire Downs.

[Renatus]

This assessment seems to be based on three misconceptions: first, that in abandoning London Suetonius was seeking safety; secondly, that going north would take him into hostile territory; thirdly, that any 'delay' was likely to be a long one.

Suetonius would clearly have liked to have saved London but, if he was to do so, he would have had to concentrate his troops there and most of his army was in North Wales.  He realised that he did not have sufficient troops (probably little more than the 14th Legion) to hold off the enemy until the rest of the army could join him and he saw from the experience of Cerialis and the 9th Legion the folly of trying to engage the rebels with inadequate forces.  Consequently, he decided to abandon the town.  However, this was not to seek safety but to gather reinforcements and that with the minimum of delay.  The longer the delay, the more chance the rebels had to capitalize upon their successes and encourage other tribes to join them.

As the majority of his army was in the north, that is the direction in which he had to go.  There were few reinforcements to be found in the south-west.  The 2nd Legion, if it was based at Exeter at the time, was almost certainly with the campaigning army in Wales, with its base fortress manned only by its veterans, those with 16 years' service, under the command of its praefectus castrorum.  He was prepared to allow civilians to accompany him but only if they could keep pace with him and did not impede his military objectives.  If he could get them to safety, that was a bonus but it was not his prime purpose.

Going north from London would take him into the territory of the Catuvellauni.  Their tribal capital was Verulamium and that had been made a municipium.  The inference to be drawn from this is that the tribe was pro-Roman and that probably accounts also for what the town later suffered at the hands of the rebels.  Consequently, Suetonius would not have been entering hostile territory to go there and the town might be expected to provide a safe haven for the civilians.  It is true that Tacitus does not mention Suetonius going to St. Albans but he does not mention him going to Calleva or anywhere else either, so that is a non-point.

Tacitus' comment that Suetonius marched to London through the midst of the enemy evidently does not involve his travelling down Watling Street.  We have discussed this before but Tacitus' comment relates to his response to the news that Camulodunum was under threat.  We have postulated that his intention was to take the 14th Legion along the Via Devana, rendezvous with Cerialis and the 9th, and march together to the relief of the colony.  On learning of the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis, he diverted down Ermine Street to London, which would take him through at least the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes, thus justifying Tacitus' comment.

We now come to the question of 'delay'.  I have commented above as to why he would not wish to allow the rebels to gather more support.  We can add that there is no question of his having waited until the following year to confront the rebels.  Had he done so, he would certainly have had more than 10,000 men at the final battle.  In fact, he would probably have had his whole army.  There is no criticism to be read into Tacitus use of the word 'delay' (cunctationem).  If anything, he makes a virtue of necessity.  Suetonius' only reason for delay was to allow his reinforcements to join him but they were taking too long.  He was running short of food (Dio) and he was probably receiving reports from his scouts and possibly also from friendly locals that the enemy was increasing in numbers day by day.  He consequently decided that he had no choice but to offer battle.

As to the location of the battle site, I have suggested that it might have been in the area of Tring.  I base this upon the assumption that, although Suetonius might have considered St. Albans as a suitable rallying point for his troops, when he learned that the rebels were advancing up Watling Street towards him, he withdrew westwards along Akeman Street, which moved him nearer to his reinforcements and provided them with a number of routes by which to reach him.  However, he could not proceed too far west, as he needed to remain reasonably close to the rebels, in order to monitor their movements and react accordingly.  As the rebels themselves probably also advanced along Akeman Street, he might have had to withdraw further.  I would, therefore, place the battle on the line of Akeman Street or near to it, in the vicinity of Tring or to the west of it but not as far west as Alchester, which apparently shows no signs of the sort of damage that might be expected had the rebels reached that far and sacked it.

[Theoderic]

Renatus wrote:

There were few reinforcements to be found in the south-west.  The 2nd Legion, if it was based at Exeter at the time, was almost certainly with the campaigning army in Wales, with its base fortress manned only by its veterans, those with 16 years' service, under the command of its praefectus castrorum.

Firstly this is an excellent summation and one that I wholeheartedly support. 

Having spent some time analysing the Tring area and having visited, I have moved my preferred site to Pitstone Hill rather than Dancers End based on the topography. 

It seems logical that Seutonius would rely on the topography to trap the Brythons rather than the off-chance that the wagons would surround the battlefield to block escape and there are very few sites that come even close to the description. Pitstone Hill is one such and the area is also known for its springs as a water supply. 

I also think that the comment that much of the Second Legion were with Seutonius at Anglesey, makes sense as Renatus notes and that the South West was just left with an "occupational policing army" as he states, similarly to the situation with the rest of Southern and Eastern Britain. 

The Ninth were in the East North East guarding the North, the Fourteeenth with Seutonius, much of the Second with Seutonius  and the Twentieth in Wales. 
  
Roman intelligence appears to have underestimated the underlying tensions caused by repression and as the inhabitants would perceive it as wholesale theft of their land, that only needed a spark to ignite a country wide rebellion of a resentful people that that was lightly policed according to Tacitus.

Boudica was that spark.

[Renatus]

Firstly this is an excellent summation and one that I wholeheartedly support. 

Thank you, Deryk.  That's kind of you.

I have been promising myself for years that I would suss out the suggested sites in the Tring area but something has always intervened.  I will add Pitstone to the itinerary.  However, I had better get on with it before I become too old and decrepit to do it.

I am not sure about the idea of Suetonius wanting to trap the rebels.  Roman commanders were enjoined to leave the enemy a 'golden bridge' by which to flee the battlefield, as a trapped enemy has little alternative but to turn and fight.  The wagons no doubt impeded their escape, contributed to, as Nathan has suggested, by the fighters trying to get to their families and save them, impeding each other further in the process.  However, this was not entrapment, simply that it made it more difficult for them to get away rapidly and, consequently, exposed them to being cut down by the pursuing Romans.

[Steven James]

Michael, like Deryk, I also agree that you have made a superb and so far the best summation of the campaign.  Since this posting has began, you and Nathan have not been rigid about your interpretations, but have been open to other influences, which is the sign of a good historian.

Steven

[Renatus]

Michael, like Deryk, I also agree that you have made a superb and so far the best summation of the campaign.  Since this posting has began, you and Nathan have not been rigid about your interpretations, but have been open to other influences, which is the sign of a good historian.

Steven

Thank you, Steven.  That is much appreciated.

[MonsGraupius]

This assessment seems to be based on three misconceptions: first, that in abandoning London Suetonius was seeking safety; secondly, that going north would take him into hostile territory; thirdly, that any 'delay' was likely to be a long one.

Suetonius would clearly have liked to have saved London but, if he was to do so, he would have had to concentrate his troops there and most of his army was in North Wales.  He realised that he did not have sufficient troops (probably little more than the 14th Legion) to hold off the enemy until the rest of the army could join him and he saw from the experience of Cerialis and the 9th Legion the folly of trying to engage the rebels with inadequate forces.  Consequently, he decided to abandon the town.  However, this was not to seek safety but to gather reinforcements and that with the minimum of delay.  The longer the delay, the more chance the rebels had to capitalize upon their successes and encourage other tribes to join them.

As the majority of his army was in the north, that is the direction in which he had to go.  There were few reinforcements to be found in the south-west.  The 2nd Legion, if it was based at Exeter at the time, was almost certainly with the campaigning army in Wales, with its base fortress manned only by its veterans, those with 16 years' service, under the command of its praefectus castrorum.  He was prepared to allow civilians to accompany him but only if they could keep pace with him and did not impede his military objectives.  If he could get them to safety, that was a bonus but it was not his prime purpose.

Going north from London would take him into the territory of the Catuvellauni.  Their tribal capital was Verulamium and that had been made a municipium.  The inference to be drawn from this is that the tribe was pro-Roman and that probably accounts also for what the town later suffered at the hands of the rebels.  Consequently, Suetonius would not have been entering hostile territory to go there and the town might be expected to provide a safe haven for the civilians.  It is true that Tacitus does not mention Suetonius going to St. Albans but he does not mention him going to Calleva or anywhere else either, so that is a non-point.

Tacitus' comment that Suetonius marched to London through the midst of the enemy evidently does not involve his travelling down Watling Street.  We have discussed this before but Tacitus' comment relates to his response to the news that Camulodunum was under threat.  We have postulated that his intention was to take the 14th Legion along the Via Devana, rendezvous with Cerialis and the 9th, and march together to the relief of the colony.  On learning of the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis, he diverted down Ermine Street to London, which would take him through at least the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes, thus justifying Tacitus' comment.

We now come to the question of 'delay'.  I have commented above as to why he would not wish to allow the rebels to gather more support.  We can add that there is no question of his having waited until the following year to confront the rebels.  Had he done so, he would certainly have had more than 10,000 men at the final battle.  In fact, he would probably have had his whole army.  There is no criticism to be read into Tacitus use of the word 'delay' (cunctationem).  If anything, he makes a virtue of necessity.  Suetonius' only reason for delay was to allow his reinforcements to join him but they were taking too long.  He was running short of food (Dio) and he was probably receiving reports from his scouts and possibly also from friendly locals that the enemy was increasing in numbers day by day.  He consequently decided that he had no choice but to offer battle.

As to the location of the battle site, I have suggested that it might have been in the area of Tring.  I base this upon the assumption that, although Suetonius might have considered St. Albans as a suitable rallying point for his troops, when he learned that the rebels were advancing up Watling Street towards him, he withdrew westwards along Akeman Street, which moved him nearer to his reinforcements and provided them with a number of routes by which to reach him.  However, he could not proceed too far west, as he needed to remain reasonably close to the rebels, in order to monitor their movements and react accordingly.  As the rebels themselves probably also advanced along Akeman Street, he might have had to withdraw further.  I would, therefore, place the battle on the line of Akeman Street or near to it, in the vicinity of Tring or to the west of it but not as far west as Alchester, which apparently shows no signs of the sort of damage that might be expected had the rebels reached that far and sacked it.

I'm sorry you seem to have no concept of the position of London. The standard Roman response when attacked was to get behind a secure wall. London did not have a secure wall, so Suetonius would attempt to find a secure line of defence and the Thames offered a line that could be easily secured by a very small number of troops.

That is also the same thing the ninth Legion did when its infantry was destroyed, like Suetonius, it immediately retreated behind a secure defence, which in its case was the encampment.

Moreover, Suetonius had the friendly pro-roman Belgae tribes in the SE, who being Gaulish invaders, were seen just as much as unwelcome invaders as the Romans. There is no doubt the Gaulish elite would side with Suetonius and as such he not only had a secure line of defence, but he was guaranteed auxiliaries and supplies.

Moreover, no sane General abandons their supply line and marches off into the north. Instead, the standard Roman tactic was to secure their supply lines, to prepare for war and to advance when they, and not the enemy, were ready.

What you and everyone else proposing the mad dash up the M1/6 is saying, is the Suetonius abandoned his main supply route, headed away from his main source of auxiliaries, heads toward the area where the Ninth legion were destroyed and cuts himself off in the north.

"As the majority of his army was in the north, that is the direction in which he had to go. "  ... why? It he wasn't mad, he wasn't playing Rome Total war. He was an actual Roman general who needed a secure base from which to wage war (which is what we are told he wanted). That secure base is the SE of England. If instead, he heads north, the entire SE gets overrun, Suetonius ends up cut off in the North unable to move, unable to get supplies, unable to get auxiliaries because he is surrounded by hostile forces ... basically he is in a perfect sandwich between the Welsh Iceni and Belgae, who, with Suetonius cut off from his supply lines, will have absolutely no problem wiping him out. IT IS TOTAL MADNESS!

"Tacitus' comment that Suetonius marched to London through the midst of the enemy" ...

so you suppose, that knowing the country is infested with the enemy, knowing that London cannot be held, knowing that the Thames cannot be crossed except at a very few and difficult fords, except the bridge at London, that Suetonius didn't do the very obvious thing of moving to the other side of the Thames and cutting down the bridge, but instead ... having alerted the enemy to his presence by going to London ... he then decides to go back toward his troops ... when any sane general knows that Boudica will almost be expecting that and almost certainly be waiting in Ambush. That is totally dumb!!!

Even if you suppose that Suetonius did return north ... he would have still crossed south over the Thames, cut down the bridge, left a few troops to stop any advance across the Thames, and then headed west, keeping the Thames between himself and boudica and only once well west of Goring, would he then start heading north to meet his own troops heading south on the far side of the country.

It simply defies all logic and common sense for him to return up Watling street.

[Nathan Ross]

The standard Roman response when attacked was to get behind a secure wall.

That would be the standard response when defeated. Paulinus had yet to be attacked.

the Thames offered a line that could be easily secured by a very small number of troops.

There were multiple fords of the Thames in the vicinity of London, from Cliffe in Kent up to Lambeth and Brentford, and all were well known to the Britons. Holding the river as a defensive line would have required a large army broken up into many small detachments.

no sane General abandons their supply line

Indeed he does not. And as many of us have said, Paulinus's supply lines led north and west, towards his legion fortresses at Usk and Exeter, his campaign base at Wroxeter and the rest of his army in north Wales.

That secure base is the SE of England.

There were no Roman fortresses in south east England. There were very few troops either. Unless Paulinus was intending to evacuate his army and flee to Gaul the only effect of going that way would be to surrender the province to the enemy and lose all contact with his main army and supplies.

he is in a perfect sandwich between the Welsh Iceni and Belgae... IT IS TOTAL MADNESS!

The Welsh who?

And weren't the Belgae Roman allies a minute ago?

any sane general knows that Boudica will almost be expecting that and almost certainly be waiting in Ambush. That is totally dumb!!!

But the sane general also has scouts to determine the position and movements of the enemy, who he knows are moving slower than he is, and who he also knows cannot leap fifty miles across country to fall unexpectedly upon his line of march!

[Renatus]

What the MonsGraupius hypothesis fails to recognise is that the established Roman response to a revolt was not to retire behind a line of defence but to march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum.  Any course such as that proposed would have been seen as a sign of weakness and serve only to encourage the rebels.  We know from Suetonius' reprisals after the revolt had been put down that there were tribes that had not joined the rebels but had been wavering in their loyalty.  Had Boudica been seen to be in the ascendancy and Suetonius cowering in the south-west (as it would have been portrayed), these tribes would almost certainly have joined her.  Suetonius would have been acutely aware that, in that event, there was a danger that the whole area north of the Thames would be lost to Rome and that, if the Welsh tribes joined in, as they were likely to do, his army in North Wales would have been cut off and he would have been completely isolated.  Hence the necessity of placing himself in a position to call the army down to reinforce him as quickly as possible, while still being able to monitor the actions of the enemy.

Anyone who has taken the trouble to read through this thread (something of a task, I must admit) will know that neither I nor anyone else here has proposed 'the mad dash up the M1/6'.  The furthest north anyone has suggested is the site at Church Stowe favoured by John.  I have suggested a strategic withdrawal of 25 miles to St Albans and then a further withdrawal of 16 miles west along Akeman Street to Tring.  If a further withdrawal yet were necessary, I have suggested that it could have been less than 25 miles in the direction of Alchester.  By no stretch of the imagination can this be characterised as a 'mad dash up the M1/6'.