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Ancient army numbers - Printable Version

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Re: Ancient army numbers - Gaius Julius Caesar - 02-16-2012

Robert, these are all the thing I have alluded to and others have pointed out quite clearly, to me, that they could have, they were capable of doing, and they did.
The hard evidence?
The canal still exists as a landmark.
Their accounts state they did.
The archaological evidence shows the Acropolis was torched,
as the sources state, and rebuilt by Pericles, as the sources state.
How did they do that?
As pointed out, how did the Egyptians manage to build the pyramids,
thousands of years before this puny military expedition?
Underestimating the abilities of the ancients is to give to much
credence to the vanity of the modern mind, which seems to think it is superior
to everything that has preceded it. (by minutes, in some cases :wink: )
I think there is good evidence to give them some respect, even if we cannot prove the minute details.
And actually, 40,000 men do not take up too great a space...
They were not living in estates, they were on campaign.

Sorry I cannot give this the time it deserves, but there is too much that has dissappeared,
to dismiss the abilities of the past out of hand.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Robert Vermaat - 02-16-2012

Hi Nikos,
Quote: Above I saw someone comparing Napoleontian armies to Persian implying the former were any vastly more advanced in logistic terms. Well that is far from being the case. The truth is (and ask any 19th warfare specialist) that the fastest moving land-based infantry western European army in 18th-19th century prior to the advent of railroad was that of Marlborough who mastered a very satisfying 25km per day.
You missed the point about Napoleon. It’s not the speed of the advance that’s being compared here, but the logistics. Your points about the road network are well-taken, which is why I think that comparing Napoleon’s Russian invasion to Xerxes in Greece.
Quote:what is more funny is that in terms of warfare ancient armies would simply slaughter with particular ease the Napoleontian armies given that they only had to outrun the 150m distance (1 minute), lose by bullets say a 25-30% of their force and then enjoy the party slaughtering the totality of the opposing Napoleontian force in 4-5 minutes
Totally OT of course, but you’re dead wrong. There would have been artillery first, a constant rate of fire and fearsome cavalry which could keep their distance and still use firearms. I mean – how on earth do you suppose that colonial armies conquered all those natives (Moghuls, Mamluks, Chinese, not to mention all African, Asian and American tribes) if ALL they had to do was run towards those silly men with guns???? Confusedhock: Confusedhock: Confusedhock:
Quote:but of course here our interest is logistics. So no, there is nothing particularly more evolved to logistics of Napoleontian era than that of the classical era - and one would note the absence of instant messaging via fire-signaling stations in mountains across Europe which was the case in Greece (and I guess most probably in Persia).
Nothing except the way society was organized by the early 19th c. Or how horse-drawn transport had evolved. Or agriculture (needed for supplies in enemy territory).
Quote:If Napoleon could get more than 500,000 men to travel to cold Moscow, Persians could send 3 times that number during summertime in Greece. A 400,000 minimum fighting force backed by 2-3 times this numbers in overall logistics (i.e. not just accompagning logistics but local-support logistics) should be seen as something very casual even if extraordinary in frequency and impressive to everyone. All it took was to have the financial support and the means and Persians had plenty of both, 10 times more than Napoleon.
Again you missed the point. Napoleon couldn’t. His failing logistics meant he lost more than 50% of his 600.000 strong army before he even reached Moscow. Which is exactly the point where we must ask how on earth Xerxes 9with a lot less means) would have been able to organise such a feat.
Quote:As for the feasibility of supply lines - the mere paradigm of relatively small ships at 50tn carrying wheat whose every kilo more than suffices to cover the needs of 2 men for a day mean that it would suffice 1 ship arrival per day to bring in the daily allowance for 100,000 soldiers. Just 1 small ship per day!!!
Pure theory. WHERE would it land? Did the captain use his iPhone to call the high command :wink: and ask where these troops were? Nice if there had been prearranged points, but the army could hardly wait for that ship and sit still if it was delayed – and how would a captain locate the army on the move?


Re: Ancient army numbers - Robert Vermaat - 02-16-2012

Quote:Underestimating the abilities of the ancients is to give to much credence to the vanity of the modern mind, which seems to think it is superior to everything that has preceded it. (by minutes, in some cases :wink: )
I think ther is good evidence to give them some respect, even if we cannot prove the minute details.
And actually, 40,000 men do not take up too great a space...
They were not living in estates, they were on campaign.
Byron, read my post will you?
I never underestimated anything. I was discussing the supposed possibility for a Persian army of a million (or more) to invade Greece.
The Persians did invade Greece, but they were eventually beaten. Their army was not immense. I see no problem with an army of 40.000. I see no problem for a 100.000 even.But for those immense numbers, I see no evidence, no charters, no reports.
I guess we are both more on the same line than you think.

The pyramids? A great enterprise. Built by normal labourers, over years and years. Wink


Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

Quote:The Persians did invade Greece, but they were eventually beaten. Their army was not immense. I see no problem with an army of 40.000. I see no problem for a 100.000 even.But for those immense numbers, I see no evidence, no charters, no reports.
I guess we are both more on the same line than you think. Wink

Actually reports are all we have. According to the evidence it is more problematic to assume an army of 100,000 men than one of 1,000,000. I guess we should be looking for evidence that the army was indeed smaller... Anyways, this is what we are debating. If the possibility existed, then we have to somehow establish some rule of probability. We are not talking evidence here or else we would be forced to accept the words of the ancients lacking other evidence. It is our understanding of the problems that such an expedition would face if it was so huge in size that makes us disregard the evidence and make theories of our own. Even I cut down Herodot's numbers by a huge 80%!


Re: Ancient army numbers - Gaius Julius Caesar - 02-16-2012

Robert, I did read your post... :wink:

Any counter argument is only theory as well, nothing more.
And yes i do see the agreements of our thought on some aspects. Smile


Re: Ancient army numbers - Darth_Roach - 02-16-2012

It is extremely unlikely that they had a million men, simply because there is absolutely no reason to bring a force 20 times larger than a huge army by the day's measures. Not for invading a bunch of disunited city states. Let's be serious here - no one believes sources saying that Christians defeated hundreds of thousands of muslims at every juncture. No one believes Ottoman propaganda about slaughtering 100 thousand Serbs at Varna.

If sources were true, we can learn only one thing: the only way to win a battle is to be outnumbered.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

Quote:Hi Nikos]
Pure theory. WHERE would it land? Did the captain use his iPhone to call the high command :wink: and ask where these troops were? Nice if there had been prearranged points, but the army could hardly wait for that ship and sit still if it was delayed – and how would a captain locate the army on the move?

You have raised a lot of valid questions Rob. This one is, in my opinion, the most important of all. I wouldn't see that as a problem. The cargo-fleet would easily find the army. First of all, the cargo-fleet would not seek for the army but for the war-fleet. This would be very hard to miss, since it was huge on its own and patrols would have been dispatched in a radius. Also, part of the army would march alongside the sailing fleet to secure its anchoring, Not much, maybe 10,000 horse and light infantry, who would keep continuous contact between the land columns and the war-fleet. Finding other columns behind, if one accepts my proposal on that, would be as easy to find. Other signals would also be made. Fire signals, patrols with certain banners etc. I think that this would not be a significant problem. Plus, the troops would have some days rations on them anyways, in case something (like the occasional bad weather) caused problems.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Darth_Roach - 02-16-2012

Quote:
Robert Vermaat post=306988 Wrote:Hi Nikos]
Pure theory. WHERE would it land? Did the captain use his iPhone to call the high command :wink: and ask where these troops were? Nice if there had been prearranged points, but the army could hardly wait for that ship and sit still if it was delayed – and how would a captain locate the army on the move?

You have raised a lot of valid questions Rob. This one is, in my opinion, the most important of all. I wouldn't see that as a problem. The cargo-fleet would easily find the army. First of all, the cargo-fleet would not seek for the army but for the war-fleet. This would be very hard to miss, since it was huge on its own and patrols would have been dispatched in a radius. Also, part of the army would march alongside the sailing fleet to secure its anchoring, Not much, maybe 10,000 horse and light infantry, who would keep continuous contact between the land columns and the war-fleet. Finding other columns behind, if one accepts my proposal on that, would be as easy to find. Other signals would also be made. Fire signals, patrols with certain banners etc. I think that this would not be a significant problem. Plus, the troops would have some days rations on them anyways, in case something (like the occasional bad weather) caused problems.

10 thousand is not much? It's nearly the equivalent of a Greek city state's army. Fleets need supplying as well, btw, and they need to be built in the first place as well. Finally, I don't recall the Persians being supplied by sea.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

Quote:It is extremely unlikely that they had a million men, simply because there is absolutely no reason to bring a force 20 times larger than a huge army by the day's measures. Not for invading a bunch of disunited city states.

.. I guess you are right.. It seems that what they did bring was eventually enough. If only some Greeks had united against the common threat then maybe they would have warded the danger off... Now, that you mention it, 50,000 sounds enough.

...Come oooooon!!! "a bunch of disunited city states"????


Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

Quote:10 thousand is not much? It's nearly the equivalent of a Greek city state's army.

... light infantry and cavalry?? ok. And how many city states were there in this little corner of Europe called Greece? Plus, the "not much" part had to do with the assumed sixe of the rest of the Persian army... Of course they would send a sizable force, else it would only be asking for trouble...


Re: Ancient army numbers - Gaius Julius Caesar - 02-16-2012

Quote:
Gaius Julius Caesar post=306967 Wrote:Macedon does however explain quite clearly how it would be feasible for the army to have been quite large, and the Persians capable of raising it and supplying it.
Indeed he does! But to me that's also where it ends - in pure theory.
Of course it could be possible, humanly speaking, if you had the time, the power, the means.
But that is my point in all this (and of Roach also, I suspect) is the lack of hard evidence. I mean, no-one takes Herodotus literally here, but if we follow this through, what do we have?

Robert, the King of Kings was able to command the entire resources of the Empire. He had the time and the means.Preparation:

An operation of this size must have taken years to prepare. The logistics of it all must have been staggering. I mean, look at what was done before Normandy 1944! And that with only a tribal-based feudalist iron Age society, the pace with which such plans could have been implemented must have been a good deal slower than what the Allies needed – and that was months and months.

It is documented that it was years in the planning. In fact was it not 10 years between Marathon and Thermopolae?

Next, where do you put all those men? And how do you control all of them?
Suppose the larger part of the army would assemble in one or two spots, perhaps more, and march in separate columns towards Europe (I keep thinking of Napoleon’s and Hitler’s invasions of Russia) to keep a grip on them. But even in 3 or 4 groups, the strain on the countryside (friendly countryside) must have been enormous.
So do we have any indication where this could have taken place? Camps for hundreds of thousands of men?

They were assembling in the lands which lead up to the Hellespont I imagine, Sardis possilby being the command center?

The same goes for the fleets, which would have been essential for transport and supplies while the army was in Greece – I think everybody will agree with me that supply lines over land would have been to long and would have needed too much transport to even contemplate them as feasible.
Where would these fleets assemble? Or would we have to think of a great number of smaller fleets, each commanded separately?

Why not? The harbours of the western coast would only accomodate so many ships each.
There are many ports and beaches where fleets can muster.


For both land and sea forces, the same problem would occur: how do you control them? Persia was a feudalist state, I doubt very much that they would have been able to control each army and fleet from a central point, and I just do not see how an operation like this could have relied on commanders operating independently.

How was any pre-modern empire controlled?
Infrastructure

So I suppose that this was prepared in advance, by setting up storage facilities for food, water (especially water!), complete with live animals and their fodder.
Where are these facilities? There must have been dozens and dozens, each very large, for all the grain, non-perishable food, water, fodder and containment pens for the large herds of animals.

This is where many later armies failed. They could not get the supplies to the troops, even when organized far better than Xerxes. So how could he have managed where they all failed?

He was as successful as all of them, no more. But, his enemy was not of a size tha tthe ywere able to immdiately persure his withdrawing armies.

Is there any evidence for storage facilities where the fleets could have picked up their loads? I mean, this was so huge (and see my point on command) that it’s almost impossible to expect each city, island and region to act independently as a supply base.

Invasion



Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

Quote:Finally, I don't recall the Persians being supplied by sea.

And where exactly do you remember the Persians being supplied from? Is it a question you are making or just a remark? Herodot does indeed make clear that the Persians were supplied from the sea and this we mentioned many posts above.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Macedon - 02-16-2012

One last thing.. We cannot make comparisons between Napoleon's expedition and this of Xerxes for many reasons. Xerxes was fortunate enough that :

1. There was a direct sea route that he could use to bring supplies from his supply centers

2. The distances are vastly different. You cannot compare a march from Sardis to Athens to one from Paris (or even Warsaw) to Moscow... you just cannot.

3. The Persian Empire had many more resources, much more manpower and certainly much more control over its vassals and armies (yes I understand that this is debatable, it is my personal opinion and even without it, the other arguments are still more important).

4. The timetable of the expedition was very shorter.

5. Moscow was landbound. If his goal was Petersburg things would be much easier.

So, would it really be such a huge problem for Napoleon's France to invade Belgium with 1 million men, or Holland through an allied Belgium, especially if Great Britain did not control the sea?

See how Xerxes never deviated from his course? He did not even try to go to Epirus or Acarnania. Just Thermopylae and then Athens... A mere 200 km in "enemy territory". And then one sea battle and he was back.


Re: Ancient army numbers - Nikanor - 02-16-2012

Hi Robert,

If you find difficult to believe that more than half a million Persians were moving around supported by many other, then I guess you actually deny the fact that Napoleon with more than half a million men invaded Russia and nearly ended up wrecking it before he wrecked totally his men and himself. Because by no means early 19th century land-based French warfare logistics were superior to land-based Persian warfare logistics. In fact they were inferior on most account and even inferior in military tactics and efficiency - any Napoleontian army would fail in front of an ancient army.

I really cannot find in which point you stuck.

Quote:Preparation:
"An operation of this size must have taken years to prepare. The logistics of it all must have been staggering. I mean, look at what was done before Normandy 1944! And that with only a tribal-based feudalist iron Age society,"


Napoleon lived in iron age too. Proper steel was first created in mid-1850s. Steel-like iron existed since at least 1300 B.C. through coal-folding techniques but was of course hyper-expensive. The logistics technology on land was identical: feet and animals. Food stocks should present the same amount of logistical headache for similar issues but then we should mention that much of Middle Eastern cuisine like pittas and bulgurs eaten in the region since prehistory (bulgur is chopped pre-heated wheat not to be confused with cous-cous, perhaps the first known "industrialised" instant meal) can be stored for longer periods than the average French bread or other meat/vegetables based cuisine not at all suitable for military campaigns. Based on that not only French had bigger logistics needs but also their soldiers ate what they would probably consider as depressive food while Persians were largely eating their everyday stuff.

Now if we state that French
- had no possibility of being supplied by ships
- no instant messaging with their own bordeline
- rudimentary post-office services only recently established
- were facing cold Russian winters into an enemy land with not a lot of local friends
- did cover enormous distances into enemy territory

while Persians
- had the luxury of ship supplies (Ukrainian and Egyptian wheat-paradises 5-6 days boat, of course they would have successive wharehouses in allied cities thus provisions would simple come "Monday morning asked, Tuesday evening arrived...". 1 small ship sufficed to bring 1 days wheat for 100,000 men. Do the maths.
- Persians had instant messaging facilities even into conaquered areas of Greece (and I have no need to guess they would not had used that all the way to Persepolis).
- Persians had developed road network from Middle East all along till Minor Asian coastline and had a long established post-office
- Persians had actual borders with their enemy Greeks, they did not travel to the other end of the continent
- Persians had lots of friends among local Greeks too thus not so much in hurry to loot to survive as French were.

So how long did it take Napoleon to plan his campaign to Russia? Persians had 10 years but my moderate guess is that anything more than 1 year of intense preparations was superficial. Persians did not have to re-invent the wheel, their Empire had already everything in place, they did not need to set up lots of things other than setting up a general plan on their maps.


Quote:Next, where do you put all those men? And how do you control all of them?

Do you imply that Napoleon was any better in controlling his men than Xerxes? Based on what?

Quote:But even in 3 or 4 groups, the strain on the countryside (friendly countryside) must have been enormous.

Not necessarily. Wheat from Black Sea and Egypt via completion by mid-stations in Minor Asia and Thrace, plus buying a 10% of local produce and bringing it using merely 100-150 ships going back and forth sufficed. Do the maths. They were an Enormous Empire with lots of tentacles. They could mobilise many channels of provisions and while they would indeed tax the local allies they would not have to starve them, unlike Napoleon had to do!


Quote:So do we have any indication where this could have taken place? Camps for hundreds of thousands of men?

Why do we have indications for Napoleon's camps that were set less than 200 yeas ago to have for Persian camps of more than 2000 years ago?


Quote:I think everybody will agree with me that supply lines over land would have been to long and would have needed too much transport to even contemplate them as feasible.

By all means, ships was the fastest way. Persian armies moved coastally for the most of it. Military ships followed in precise parallel protecting back the supply lines. They had even cut the Chalkidiki peninsula 3rd to avoid the danger of being caught at open sea which may point out to a coastal-Thrace-Black-Sea origin of much of their foodstocks (I
just hypothetise in this...).


Quote:Where would these fleets assemble? Or would we have to think of a great number of smaller fleets, each commanded separately?

Contrary to sail-based ships Oared-based ships could assemble in very cramped space, so cramped that actually people could put a bridge and pass from one ship to another. Oared ships were very much more manageable than sail-ships that need space to operate.


Quote:For both land and sea forces, the same problem would occur: how do you control them?

Money, and propaganda (serve the gretest leader of humanity, hope of getting rich, and then do not underestimate the pleasures of looting and raping - a constant motive for all invading armies). Same things that worked for Napoleon. Do you think French fought any national enemy in Russia? Of course not. What did Britons, Basques and Gascons have to do there? France was only a nascent 2-3 decades nation.


Quote:Persia was a feudalist state, I doubt very much that they would have been able to control each army and fleet from a central point, and I just do not see how an operation like this could have relied on commanders operating independently.

You are losing yourself in words. Rome was also a feudalist state in the sense that the real governance of the regions was for the most up to local oligarchies. Roman envoys and governors did little else than to supervise and flatter the local oligarchies and vice versa. 2nd most powerful man in the Empire in 100 AD was Herodes, descendant of the very oligarchs that ruled during Athenian... democracy.


Quote:Infrastructure
So I suppose that this was prepared in advance, by setting up storage facilities for food, water (especially water!), complete with live animals and their fodder.
Where are these facilities?

Out there, along with the rest of the remains of the 99,9999% of the ancient world waiting for someone to excavate and write an essay about it.


Quote:This is where many later armies failed. They could not get the supplies to the troops, even when organized far better than Xerxes. So how could he have managed where they all failed?

Frankly speaking, Persians had a much better army than most of later armies including the totality of all gunpowder armies till apparition of machine guns which would actualyl fell easy pray on all accounts - even tactical - to any of the Persian, Greek, Roman, Eastern Roman and Mongol armies.


Quote:Is there any evidence for storage facilities where the fleets could have picked up their loads? I mean, this was so huge (and see my point on command) that it’s almost impossible to expect each city, island and region to act independently as a supply base.

1 ship per day for 100,000 men, ok huge but alright but how to find remains of 1 ship arriving near coastline and men unloading it in small boats and onto land? Wharehouses existed near station-towns. This were simple buildings most often not built anti-seismically like some high-end expensive temples were, thus certainly destroyed in the first earthquake (in Greece you have 1 major per 10 years!).


Quote:Invasion
Next stop: Greece. Where did they put their supplies when in enemy territory?

The question is where French put their supplies? Cos Persian had the luxury to be supplied on a daily basis wherever they wanted!


Quote:How did the ships know where to head, as it would be impossible to communicate the advance of the troops to the fleets, apart from with a delay of days at best and probably weeks? The troops would have to starve or take all from the enemy.

A quite lengthy... fire email (!) would arrive at... Sardis in 1 hour. At Persepolis in 2-3 hours. French did not have such in Russia did they? A fire-message would arrive from Olympus to Byzantium in minutes. 50 ships feeding 100,000 men for 2 months could arrive in 3 days. Piece of cake you could do it if you had the money. Persians had the money!


Quote:Essentially, the army would have been able to gather enough supplies from the enemy, in case the fleets did not come through (storms, enemy action, logistical mistakes being quite to be expected).

By all means. But as it was, it was even feasible to cope well even only using own supplies!


Quote:Concluding, it’s these practical problems that to me make this theory impossible to put into practice.

Napoleon's effort in Russia was unfeasible but he tried it. The Persian campaign was a much more organised affair by a much more organised state that was the Persian Empire which was sensibly attacking its direct western neighbour. The failure of that campaign (for Persian propaganda partial-failure as they declared that their pseudo-reason was to punish Athens and Eretria!) came unexpectedly on those rare historical outcomes that do not arrive as often as people believe.


Nikos

PS: Sorry it got lengthy


Re: Ancient army numbers - Ghostmojo - 02-17-2012

Quote:
Ghostmojo post=306980 Wrote:Whilst lacking the specific details you point out Tom, I'm pretty sure they would have set up supply bases at regular intervals. Nominally, or actually, controlling territory right up to the Thessalian borders - this shouldn't have been too difficult.

Playing the devil's advocate, I would disagree here. I think that establishing supply bases in Europe would be very risky business for the Persians. There is no chance they would trust their "allies" with garrisoning and keeping the huge amounts of provisions stockpiled. Such an action would attract attacks and raids by the numerous hostile tribes and the willingness of the allies to put up resistance would be questionable...

It would be risky if they were left unattended, but they wouldn't have been. The supply bases would/could have been provisioned along the 'just-in-time' basis as the army approached. The army would be strung out along a very lengthy trail. The bases would have been provisioned accordingly, as and when, I guess. I don't think you would provision months ahead - the supplies wouldn't last that long. Several days perhaps - a week or two at the outside. We are talking the summer months after all.

I'm inclined towards around 100,000 - perhaps 150,000 men. Herodotos and other Greeks were bound to exaggerate the figures to make their success all the more remarkable. The mention of millions is clearly out of the question. That size of army 150K - plus (or including?) the defecting Greeks - would have been sufficient. Troops to garrison key strategic places along the route and troops to fight - and then troops to remain behind as occupying forces.

Mardonios wintered the bulk of the land forces in Thessaly after Xerxes buggered off back to Asia. Of that figure how many came back with him into Boiotia and Attika? The 300K figure for Plataia seems massive for a field army of that period; especially if we are to believe H that most of these were slaughtered.