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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 02-14-2023
(02-14-2023, 07:15 AM)Sean Manning Wrote:(02-13-2023, 12:54 PM)Renatus Wrote: This reflects my own reservations. On a point of detail, the figure of 120,000 comes from Dio and represents Boudica's army at the start of the revolt. According to him, this had expanded to 230,000 by the time of the final battle.The number 120,000 is also an Assyrian, biblical, Greek, and Roman topos for 'a vast army' ( some terrifying numbers )
Is there a precedent for 230,000 being used to denote an exceptionally large army or is that simply Dio's way of indicating that the number at the final battle was nearly twice that at the beginning of the revolt, whatever that may actually have been?
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Sean Manning - 02-14-2023
(02-14-2023, 11:41 AM)Renatus Wrote:I have not done a comprehensive study of Greek and Roman numbers for barbarian armies but I would not put it past Dio's sources (or the full unepitomized text of Dio? not sure of the state of book 62) thinking "I wrote about how Boudicca's army was defeated here but got reinforcements there, so lets say twice as big less one myriad."(02-14-2023, 07:15 AM)Sean Manning Wrote:(02-13-2023, 12:54 PM)Renatus Wrote: This reflects my own reservations. On a point of detail, the figure of 120,000 comes from Dio and represents Boudica's army at the start of the revolt. According to him, this had expanded to 230,000 by the time of the final battle.The number 120,000 is also an Assyrian, biblical, Greek, and Roman topos for 'a vast army' ( some terrifying numbers )
Is there a precedent for 230,000 being used to denote an exceptionally large army or is that simply Dio's way of indicating that the number at the final battle was nearly twice that at the beginning of the revolt, whatever that may actually have been?
People often want to believe that ancient numbers for barbarian armies were based on counting something, but I think often they were based on other famous numbers (eg. Herodotus' number for Xerxes' fleet is based on a dubious interpretation of a line in Aeschylus' Persai which is based on the Catalogue of Ships in the Iliad). When someone says they have a thousand and one things to do, nobody today thinks they counted 1,001 tasks. When we hear a number, we normally sanity check it by comparing other numbers we have heard of. We rarely do our own count because that is a lot of work if its possible at all (Dio did not have a time machine to go back to 61 CE, dress up like a Briton, and count them!) The numbers which educated Greeks or Romans would think of when they heard a number for a barbarian army were not very trustworthy. When we have multiple sources they usually give wildly different numbers, and they can't have all been right.
For the footnoted nuanced version see Armed Force in the Teispid-Achaemenid Empire §6.6.1 or “The Armies of the Teispids and Achaemenids: The Armies of an Ancient World Empire”
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Sean Manning - 02-15-2023
It strikes me that 230,000 is on the close order of modern estimates of the total young adult male population of Britain in the first century CE! (Including slaves and paupers and Romans and hermits in the backwoods). Its 23% of a million people. But that only matters if you see it as an empirical claim, if you see it as a number which relates to other stories about barbarian armies its kind of middling, bigger than the numbers in Caesar, smaller than the numbers in Herodotus.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 02-15-2023
(02-15-2023, 12:18 AM)Sean Manning Wrote: It strikes me that 230,000 is on the close order of modern estimates of the total young adult male population of Britain in the first century CE!
I wonder if the '70,000 citizens and allies' apparently killed at London and Colchester (14.33), and the 'little less than 80,000 Britons' reportedly slain at the final battle (14.37) also represent significant numbers? The first number is probably far in excess of the total citizen population of the province; the second is also highly unlikely. Could there be a connection between them?
(02-09-2023, 02:56 PM)dadlamassu Wrote: The presence of the womenfolk “wives” is interesting as this was not a migration … or was it?
I don't think there's any mystery to this. Tacitus says the Britons were "so fierce in spirit that they actually brought with them, to witness the victory, their wives riding in wagons" - so it's an example of their barbarian overconfidence!
But he later provides a more convincing reason for their presence: the Iceni and others had neglected to sow crops, "people of every age having turned to war." However we interpret this line, it suggests that that the Britons expected to be away from home for some time. Anyone left behind would not be able to feed or defend themselves. So, naturally, the warriors took their wives - and by extension their whole families - along with them when they went on campaign.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 02-15-2023
Nathan wrote: I wonder if the '70,000 citizens and allies' apparently killed at London and Colchester (14.33), and the 'little less than 80,000 Britons' reportedly slain at the final battle (14.37) also represent significant numbers? The first number is probably far in excess of the total citizen population of the province; the second is also highly unlikely. Could there be a connection between them?
Well, if you multiply 80,000 by 2 and add 70,000 you get 230,000.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Sean Manning - 02-15-2023
(02-15-2023, 10:12 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote:Valerius Maximus 9.2.4 ext. 3 has Mithridates order the massacre of 80,000 Romans in Asia (Plutarch, Sulla 24.4, says 150,000)(02-15-2023, 12:18 AM)Sean Manning Wrote: It strikes me that 230,000 is on the close order of modern estimates of the total young adult male population of Britain in the first century CE!
I wonder if the '70,000 citizens and allies' apparently killed at London and Colchester (14.33), and the 'little less than 80,000 Britons' reportedly slain at the final battle (14.37) also represent significant numbers? The first number is probably far in excess of the total citizen population of the province; the second is also highly unlikely. Could there be a connection between them?
Greek and Roman historians could absolutely use counts (surely Caesar had access to the daily strength of his own legions) and absolutely perform arithmetic on counts to estimate things (Herodotus and Thucydides and Polybius all walk readers through such calculations) but I think this is a good alternative way to think about numbers for barbarian armies.
Xenophon's account of Leuctra (Xen. Hellenica 6.4.9) complains that the Peloponesian peltasts and cavalry attacked too soon and the merchants and the baggage carriers were not able to leave the Boeotian army so it looked bigger than it really was. So its not just a trope that it was hard to estimate the size of an army with lots of hangers-on.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 02-18-2023
Fascinating and refreshing read Alan, thanks.
I find myself agreeing with your points, almost across the board. I would like to extend the debate a little based on your conclusions.
I am hoping to illustrate this observation a little:
"I see the battle somewhere around the western side of Iceni territory possibly not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?)"
I am a fan of Keith Briggs' map site on the basis that it hones in on the relationship between Roman roads and terrain. I have utilised his map here to illustrate the battlefield search corridor you conclude with above.
Keith's maps can be found here:
https://keithbriggs.info/Roman_road_maps.html
V= Verulamium (your southern limit)
A = Ancaster (a reasonable proxy for Lindum, for map image reasons)
CS = Church Stowe (because I am completely and utterly biased about this debate)
Red N/S line = approximate western boundary of Iceni Trinovanti
The tribal boundaries currently mapped have always seemed a little odd to me. The Iceni Northern boundary is traditionally shown along the Nene. I have truncated this just east of Water Newton. My own personal view is that the Western boundaries of the Iceni and Trinovanti are more likely to run to the Cambridge, Godmanchester, Water Newton line, and I see no reason that, to the North, they would stop short of the Welland's course through the Fens.
During his talk to the Battlefields Trust (4th March 2023) prof Will Bowden presented the Iceni territory as encompassing all of the present counties of Norfolk, Suffolk and Cambridgeshire. I know it's a bit messy using contemporary boundaries, but he did.... and that puts the closest Iceni territory only 30 miles from the Church Stowe candidate battle site....
The map delimits the search area very well and emphasises, at least to me, the significance of the "Midlands Massif" and it's proximity to the Iceni's northern and western borders. The Valleys incised into this massif are distinct but the vast majority lead to SW/NE trending ridges, ridges whose tops and flanks provide firm footings for transportation routes, routes that were fairly obviously paralleled by the meandering courses of the Ouse, Nene and Welland. Routes that connected the Iceni deep into the Midland core of Britannia.
I think the definition of "defile" is clear and the target site has to lie between two areas of relatively higher ground, the incised valleys provide many such defiles but very few that are secured by isolated topography, most being connected by easily traversable ridge top routes. However Tacitus makes this isolation a function of long lost vegetation (which I assume to be dense wet woodland) rather than the topographic advantage CS leads with.
Taking your observations, combined with Upex's theory of the Nene frontier and the potential jumping off line/depot for the Mona campaign along the line of what became Watling Street does give me encouragement for the Church Stowe case.
Once again thanks for the food for though Alan.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 02-19-2023
Alan, can you expand on this a little?
"Paulinus probably set off by the fastest means (ship?) to Wroxeter and issued his orders to assemble the army and march on the Iceni."
Paulinus "sailing" from Mona has always seemed a little odd, if it was merely a ferry to the mainland it hardly warrants a mention. However sailing to Wroxeter, on the surface of it, looks more unlikely. I am wondering if I am missing something about river navigation and the status of Wroxeter in 60AD, can you enlighten me?
Do you think Wroxeter was the forward base for the advance on Mona? I've never really considered this logistics route, instead anticipating a supply line from the South East rather than South West. In part because from the SE the Iceni would be acutely aware of Roman Troop numbers and logistics, timing their campaign to match the Roman absence. This would be in contrast to a SW logistic route which would have been far over the Iceni horizons. The reality is likely to have been a combination of both I suspect. Gaffney has the Fort dated 57-90AD so the dates are good and the size of the one under the civilian settlement appears big enough to set a campaign from.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229765455_Wroxeter_Hinterland_Project_and_geophysical_survey_at_Wroxeter
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 02-19-2023
(02-19-2023, 02:14 PM)John1 Wrote: Paulinus "sailing" from Mona has always seemed a little odd
I'm sure we've discussed this already. It comes from Dio, who probably had no clear idea of Britain's geography - he knew Mona was an island, so assumed that Paulinus would have to 'take ship' back to the mainland. No more 'sailing' required!
Chester was not yet established as a port, and Tacitus says that Paulinus had no build his own landing barges, so there was no 'Classis Britannica' operating in the Irish Sea.
(02-19-2023, 02:14 PM)John1 Wrote: Do you think Wroxeter was the forward base for the advance on Mona? I've never really considered this logistics route
Have you never? I think most people have assumed that it was. It seems the most obvious, as the closest (indeed only) legionary fortress in the area of operations, and the presumed dates of occupation would fit the period of the Flavian conquest of north Wales pretty closely. It would be extremely strange, I think, if Wroxeter were not Paulinus's base.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 02-20-2023
Sorry been out of the loop for over a week due to helpng a recently bereaved friend sort through the paperwork and online processes. Husband (we were undergraduates together 50 odd years ago and our kids grew up together) died suddenly and had done almost everything online but no password notebook.
Anyway, thanks for continuing the discussion. I used "ship?" with the question mark because I am aware of how important waterways were for logistics in other campaigns but could not find anything definitive about the use of the navy in this campaign though Dio does imply it. If planning a major amphibious operation then it seems logical that a general would want warships present to protect the flanks of the invasion force from the threat of tribal ships while the infantry were at their most vulnerable. Or are we saying that the druids and their supporting army had no ships to threaten the landing force or get themselves back and forward to the mainland?
That he built landing craft does not preclude the use of warships and transports it rather increases the likelihood from both operational and logistic points of view.
More later when I have a bit more time.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 02-24-2023
This is a long answer. But let me say that I am not proposing this as the only course of action only a possible one of many. I was not trying to fit the war to Tacitus or Dio but to consider from first principles several courses of action and selected one that seemed likely to give roughly the resut that Tacitus and Dio describe.
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
There is a difficulty in creating a timeline because warfare seldom runs along a linear path. Events are frequently concurrent or nearly so. I know it is nice to have a sequence but, from experience, this is seldom the case.
1) Paulinus assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. Triggered by the first report which would probably be the Iceni Revolt and his first objective would be to march there to suppress it.
2a) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and contain them in their forts. 2b) The Iceni start to muster the levy and any disaffected elements from other tribes.
2c) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
3a) Paulinus, with his field army, marches to St. Albans (a reasonable forward base from which to deal with the Iceni.
3b) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so. (A possible pincer movement?)
3c) The Trinovantes and any disaffected elements are now marching on London. Suetonius arrives in London. Why does he go to London? – Possibly to see if he can defend it but it means leaving St Albans undefended to be destroyed. I found this action difficult to rationalise unless London was a muster point for 2nd Legion and supporting troops from Cogidubnus.
3d) The Iceni muster is now almost complete, disaffected elements absorbed, captured Roman weapons and equipment distributed and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th and St Albans. 3e) Paulinus marches north again to contest this or has decided to decapitate the insurrection.
4) Paulinus arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica. Trinovantes are occupied in an orgy of violence and destruction and follow a few days later.
5) Paulinus can no longer delay as he may be caught in a pincer move himself. The Iceni are defeated somewhere.
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
I see Cerialis marching south into Iceni lands whether to relieve the trapped force, to the Iceni capital or direct to Colchester (if he knew it was besieged) the distances are not great in any case. My military mind would say that his initial thrust was the same as Paulinus – to tackle the Iceni revolt. When he set off he may not have known that the Trinovantes were in revolt or that Colchester was threatened. At some stage he may have altered his plan and/or route. He may indeed have been ordered to muster his forces, though I would think St Albans more likely than London but as he was impetuous, he possibly decided to put the Iceni down with what he had ready. Tacitus and his father-in-law may be doing a bit of spin doctoring to protect a friend, colleague, fellow senator?
I also considered what the Iceni would do – something often forgotten when we rely only on one side’s version. They knew that the nearest potent military threat was the 9th Legion. If the revolt was to be successful (by whatever means they judge success) then the 9th had to be neutralised or eliminated. This may be done by outright defeat or by blocking their movement. The “besieging” may be done exactly as Tacitus says by guerrilla warfare occupying the survivors and pinning them in place.
Simultaneously, the Trinovantes taking advantage of the disturbance up north, decided to settle a few scores as well and rebelled. From Tacitus is appears that they were better prepared with their psychological warfare (or is this spin doctoring too?).
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
As above, I see the Iceni conducting a guerrilla campaign against the 9th Legion north of the Wash and maybe as far west as St Albans. This would also make sense by providing the hostile ground that Paulinus had to traverse. Whether or not the revolt was in any way planned with the Trinovantes it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army.
I also think that both the Iceni and Trinovantes gathered in disaffected elements from other tribes.
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
I consider that both the Trinovantes and the Iceni employed guerrilla warfare (so does Tacitus). I have the Iceni fighting in the traditional British way that has been effective in the past – guerrilla warfare. As Tacitus says, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence." On the other had the Trinovantes act a bit differently by forming an army and tackling unwalled (lightly defended) towns – Colchester and London at least. Archaeology provides a fort nearby Colchester but I could not find a reference to its presence at the time or its destruction.
The Trinovantes may well have turned north in pursuit of Paulinus. Even if they did not, the threat was there and Paulinus would have to fight before the two forces joined.
If we follow the majority view, the Iceni have mustered and then left their territory undefended and marched south to help/incite the Trinovantes to take Colchester and also defeat Cerialis. They then marched on London. Paulinus meanwhile marched from Anglesey to London and then marched back north to give battle against the combined Iceni and Trinovantes who were following his army. Or if Paulinus went in another direction (west or south) someone else appears to have tied up the 9th preventing them linking up with Paulinus and may also be the force that sacked St Albans but who were they?
I also considered this: the Iceni leave their territory undefended and leave scorched earth behind them anticipating the Roman reaction. They march south to help/incite the Trinovantes take Colchester. They then march on to London. Paulinus meanwhile marches from Anglesey to London and marches back north without the 2nd Legion (why because going west makes more sense - unless to call in the 9th or other reinforcements and also reach his chosen ground?). The combined Iceni and Trinovantes now march north after him and sack St Albans in passing perhaps hoping to pin Paulinus in the scorched Iceni territory hence his lack of food and the later famine. But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
I don’t know which Latin word Tacitus uses for ”tribe” or if it had more than one meaning. In any case I see no reason why the Iceni or any other tribe fought in a single mass The Iceni may have disaffected elements of several tribes. I would assess that they fought in some sort of tribal tactical groups, each under its own chief. It is also likely that each tribe divided the cavalry and infantry and may even have sub-divided them (cf Caesar’s description in referring to an engagement with the British cavalry he calls it an 'unusual combat' in which their tactical style demonstrated a level of command and control which implied a high level of training, discipline and tactical competence. “There was also the fact that they never fought in close formation, but rather in small groups with large spaces between: they had squadrons posted at intervals and each group took over from another in turn, so that fresh troops could take the place of those who were tired out.”
From this we may deduce that the Gallic cavalry tactics were quite different to those employed by the British and that Boudica went from “tribal group” to “tribal group” (“tribes” to the Romans listening to the tale). After all modern commentators often call every armoured vehicle a “tank” whether it is a tank, armoured personnel carrier, self-propelled gun, armoured car etc.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
The figures I use are from Dio and Tacitus. Neither make much sense to me given the final outcome of the battle. With odds of 5 or 6:1 against the Romans I can understand a Roman victory but 10:1 or more is pushing it. Even with modern weapons and artillery support odds of 10:1 Ancient Britons would be a “sporty” day and at 20:1 definitely on the “dodgy” side. Think about the population figures the 230,000 strong army is a huge proportion of the entire population (estimated) at the time. The tribal and Roman deaths quoted by Tacitus would have seriously depleted the population of England.
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
That is precisely why the Iceni stay in their lands to defend it from the approaching field army to their west and the 9th Legion to the north. Why in your estimation did they leave the reduced 9th Legion and also abandon their land that “they own and control” (the Romans have not captured it militarily yet) and leaving the population undefended against any retribution from Paulinus? Or did virtually every Iceni tribesperson pack their worldly goods onto their wagons to march south through the Trinovantes land, west to London and thence to wherever Paulinus is ready to fight?
The immediate threat to the Trinovantes was likely to be Cogibubnus and maybe the Catuvellauni hence the drive on London to secure the Thames boundary. I drew a map of deployments leaning heavily on Webster. It shows that the Iceni and Trinovantes were surrounded on two sides (north and west) by Roman forces and the “Romanised” Catuvelaulni, to the south by Cogidubnus and to east by the sea.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
The Combat Estimate does not make decisions. It presents Options to the commander for consideration. There must have been a reason to go to London instead of taking on the Iceni in their homeland, a reason not to draw in the remnants of the 9th Legion and so many more factors. I could not fathom out why he went to London unless to get something – supplies, reinforcements, intelligence or something else?
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Yes, Paulinus would very probably have considered all of this. The actual zone of military control lies in a diagonal band west and north of London. Paulinus is well aware that a field battle is the best option but needs to fight it on his own terms at a place and time of his own choosing. He has the option of choosing which way to march but we do not know which way he went nor the factors that he considered most important in deciding. If he cannot get sufficient reinforcements to tackle the combined Iceni and Trinovantes he needs to deal with them separately.
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
Agreed. It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation. However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy. Paulinus obviously had a plan in mind and I hope his autobiography turns up some day.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
No. It is a method of organising thoughts and then presenting options to the commander by his staff (the commander usually does a Combat Estimate too). It presents a framework that has remained in use under different names (when I first learned it the name was Combat Apprecation) at least as far back as the 18th Century. It was probably done throughout history by various commanders. The outcome of a Combat Estimate is the selection of a Course of Action which leads to a plan for the operation. The plan then changes to suit the circumstances as the enemy will probably have their own Combat Appreciation and plan (however informal) which is designed to combat your one. And so it goes on. The forces involved are assessed as they are be they Roman Legions, Greek Phalanx, Napoleonic Corps, Zulu Impis, Mongol Hordes. Also included are the relative weaponry, rates of movement, style of fighting, doctrine, logistics, leadership etc. of both sides.
As is said “no plan survives first contact with the enemy” but if the Combat Estimate was done well then it contains alternative courses of action that can then be selected or modified. In this one I stopped after looking at 9 courses of action for Paulinus.
An aside: I have difficulty visualising the battlefield. The tribal forces were largely made up of light infantry who are the least likely battlefield troops to be stopped by difficult ground. To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult. I was left visualising something like a Highland Glen or a steep valley in Welsh mountains. I am not familiar enough with the terrain of mid-England to make a tactical decision. But could the defile not be between hills but large water obstacles? These would certainly impede tactical movement and often feature on one or both flanks in classical battles.
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might b
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 02-27-2023
(02-24-2023, 04:26 PM)dadlamassu Wrote: I have difficulty visualising the battlefield.
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might
This might help
![[Image: wink.png]](https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/images/icons/wink.png){kind=icon}
(02-24-2023, 04:26 PM)dadlamassu Wrote: But could the defile not be between hills but large water obstacles?
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might b
I would think not. The word always seems to refer to a gap, valley, street, throat or narrow constricted area. Since, as you say, southeast England is short on gorges and glens, we're probably looking for a relatively shallow pass or valley with slopes just pronounced enough to funnel the British advance towards the centre of the Roman line - assuming the Britons are less likely to charge up hills, especially when Roman cavalry are occupying the heights above them.
(02-24-2023, 04:26 PM)dadlamassu Wrote: I could not fathom out why he went to London unless to get something
The more I read into this the more I fely that Tacitus and Dio were writing stories as Hollywood might say “based on real events”. And we know how accurate that might b
As we discussed above, London was certainly the second largest and possibly by AD60 the largest Roman settlement in Britain, with a large population of vulnerable Roman citizens. It was likely the seat of the procurator and had his officium and all his official files and records (including tax records). It was also the entrepot for the Gallic trade, its wharfs the quickest route to the continent, and its warehouses full of imported grain that Paulinus needed to supply his men and Boudica needed to supply hers. Bearing all that in mind, I would say it was a critical military objective. As soon as Paulinus withdrew from London his communication link with Gaul, and therefore with Rome, would be effectively broken.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steve Kaye - 03-02-2023
Hello Allan,
Once again, thanks for putting forward a different perspective on this revolt. For my part, it is refreshing to have to think again about the strategy and tactics deployed by both sides and, more importantly, the mind-set of Suetonius and Boudica.
In your 'Aside' you write of difficulty visualising the battlefield. You write, "To impede the movement and deployment the terrain must have been extremely difficult ", hence your mention of Highland Glens. Given that most think the battle was somewhere in southern England then, to state the obvious, such defiles are not available - at least not ones that are c. 1 km wide between the rising flanks. The idea of the bounding flanks being the result of water bodies is unusual, unique even, however, like most people who take an interest in the battle and certainly all translators, I think Tacitus is describing a topographic depression. He does not mention water courses in relation to the battle-site but takes time to tell us that there was, arguably a less important, wood to the rear; I think he would have mentioned large water bodies flanking the battlefield.
When modelling and searching for likely battle-sites (see URL link below) I defined a 'defile' as a topographic depression of at least 15 m depth and a slope of at least 5 degrees (other parameters were also used). I take the view that a gradient is beneficial to a fighting force if it is up-slope from their combatants, especially in an age with limited ranged weapons. And, the Roman auxiliary on the flanks (with gradients nearly always greater than the defile bottom) are lightly armoured compared to the legionaries, better trained, equipped and experience than the rebel light infantry and also have the direct support of the Roman/aux. cavalry, i.e. the rebel infantry would - probably - be stopped by the Roman force on the slope above them even when the adverse gradient is low.
Furthermore, most would agree that Suetonius was probably at his chosen battle-site for some days waiting for the rebels (the main reason why he must have chosen a site with sufficient water for his force) which reminds me of his activity at one of the battles of Bedriacum (Cremona?) during the Year of the Four Emperors when Tacitus (Histories Book 2, 25) writes, "Suetonius Paulinus did not at once give his infantry the signal to engage, for he was naturally inclined to delay, and a man who preferred cautious and well-reasoned plans to chance success. So he kept issuing orders to fill up the ditches, clear the fields, and extend the line, thinking that it was soon enough to begin to conquer when they had made provision against defeat." Might Suetonius have earlier prepared his ground before Boudica engaged and, in doing so, further protected his flanking forces?
All told I think the battle-site did not need to be robust, instead, moderate defile gradients but with steeper flanks coupled to prepared defences and disciplined etc. warriors would be sufficient to hold light infantry. Once the initial rebel charge fails to break the legionary line then the effective combat numbers are equivalent, with the majority of the rebels being redundant, entrapped by their own mass. The legionaries push and kill; the auxiliaries and cavalry enclose; the wagons in the rear create an effect similar to the Carthaginian cavalry at Cannae - hence the large number of reported dead, many of whom would probably suffocated in the crush.
There is another aspect to this which you have touched upon - Suetonius probably did lure Boudica into a tactical trap by making his position tempting to the rebels, i.e. he probably did not choose a site that appeared impregnable.
I could write a lot about all these factors but most I've covered in an earlier essay (2015 [strewth, 8 years ago]) available on academia.edu ...
https://www.academia.edu/11015820/Finding_the_site_of_Boudicas_last_battle_multi_attribute_analysis_of_sites_identified_by_template_matching
It is long but you could probably skip the first half describing the template matching exercise and read the final half which covers options, strategy etc. It does cover your modelled direction of march for Suetonius, i.e. north east from London, and does find, echoing your comments, that Tacitus' description of the battle-site was poorly reflected in the terrain which resulted in no top 100 battle-sites in this area. Indeed, there were none east of Watling Street. But then again, my modelling might be missing an element or just wrong.
Moving on to your other comments.
You write that the presented course of action following the Combat Estimate methodology was one of many and that it roughly gave the result that Tacitus and Dio describe. That comment, and others within your reply {2441}, give me the impression that you might be treating Dio and Tacitus as equals regarding veracity. My bias is to ignore Dio's account because I think he is more a playwright or entertainer; his text seems manicured to be light on facts but heavy on theatre, especially the kind to titillate a Roman public. This is probably most evident when he writes that Suetonius at the final battle split his force into three, independent bodies and then gave lengthy speeches to all three. As we know, Tacitus has one Roman line which runs across a topographic depression, flank to flank; this is a far more conventional, sensible, prudent, etc. arrangement that presumably Agricola [or written Roman reports that we don't have] would have confirmed. In ignoring Dio I am left with Tacitus' numbers regarding the combatants - c.10k armed men and 80,000 dead rebels, meaning there might have been c.100k rebel people. Furthermore, I take a slightly pedantic stance, i.e. I take his numbers as roughly correct. But, if you take both authors numbers in combination then you do get some impressive figures, hence the possibility of 230,000 rebels at the final battle.
Why am I banging on about this? Because I'm still trying to understand how the Combat Estimate causes the Iceni (Boudica) to remain roughly in their homeland besieging the 9th legion in their forts, and for Suetonius to leave London and march towards the Iceni. I wonder if that figure of 230,000 rebels at the final battle, and your assessment that odds of > 10.1 against the Romans would lead to defeat, caused you to think at the beginning of the exercise that you had to avoid the Combat Estimate providing such a scenario - hence, the Iceni passivity and Suetonius marching to engage them, or, to put it another way, the Combat Estimate had to keep separate the Trinovantes and the Iceni if the final battle was to produce the outcome described by Tacitus.
Elsewhere you write, "it makes military sense to occupy the 9th and keep it out of the battle using minimal guerrilla forces while mustering the main force of the levy to face the return of the field army" with which I partially agree. By this stage, however, the 9th is no longer a field unit and can be simply watched - I don't think it is a significant threat to the Iceni. Meanwhile, Suetonius is marching to London and in my view his field army is the prime target for both the Iceni and Trinovantes.
"But is this giving too much strategic credit to Boudica?" I suspect that we don't give the British tribal leaders enough credit for strategic thinking. After all, they recognised that the Roman invasion force in 43 AD had to be met by the combined tribes and so fought, and lost, the two-day battle on the Medway. That event effectively confirmed the early stage conquest of SE England. Surely Boudica et al. were equally capable of concluding that they had to destroy Suetonius' field army if they were to survive, especially so as their combined forces gave them much better odds against Suetonius than the Britons against Aulus Plautius in 43 AD - probably! As I've written in the document linked above (apologies for repeating this text; it comes from the section entitled, 'Was strategy governed by relative strengths and weaknesses?'), "logic may have dictated to Boudica that, of the two options, returning [or staying in, as in your scenario] home carried a certain death sentence while the second, pursuing Suetonius out of London and doing battle with his field-army, offered a chance of victory and life. Surely she would have chosen life?"
You write, "Why are we fixated on the destruction of the Field army in a battle as the tribal main option? It is the least likely course for the tribes to win as it plays to the Roman strengths. Their history shows that standing and fighting, as you rightly point out, did not work but guerrilla warfare under Caratacus and others almost did." The problem with this argument is that the Roman strengths are not significantly diminished by rebel guerrilla warfare, meaning that the Roman field army can still proceed wherever it wishes. Eventually the Romans arrive en masse in your homeland and conquer either by battle/siege or simply robust occupation. In those circumstances various rebel actors can continue guerrilla warfare but it is a pointless endeavour, as it was for Caratacus, Hereward the Wake and so on.
I think the rebel leaders knew this; knew that remaining passive in their homeland (Iceni) and not combining with other forces (Trinovantes etc.) and destroying Suetonius in battle would eventually result in their re-conquest (probably the year after the uprising). This strategic necessity was granted an unexpected opportunity when, by the time Suetonius leaves London, the 9th had been destroyed and the 2nd had not materialised in London (or St. Albans - btw, why do you prefer this town over London as a Roman rendezvous point?) Suetonius would also have recognised the change in fortunes, his lack of mass now the 9th and 2nd were no longer available to him. Surely his only initial option when in London was to evade the rebels, not march towards them?
Back to the London civilians again: you write, "It all depends on how much is spin doctoring and the definition of “civilians who could keep up”. Tacitus may be talking about veterans and armed men rather than our concept of civilians. May I suggest that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense? If he did take the unarmed civilian men, women and children then the logical place to go is a fortified town, a well-stocked fortress or a port of evacuation." I agree with some of this, especially when you write that if Suetonius did take civilians then he didn't initially march to battle but instead to a fortress, town or port, Cogidubnus' area of control ... or any direction from London which out-paced and out-distanced the rebels. However, I do think Tacitus does mean citizens (as in non-combatants). In his text he is acknowledging that the abandonment of London is deeply regrettable, shameful and castes Suetonius (and his family) badly. Tacitus tries to convince the reader that Suetonius had to abandon London to save the province and he may have mentioned the escorting of civilians as another device to provide 'cover' for Suetonius. For a variety of reasons I think some citizens were escorted but chief among them is my bias that neither Tacitus nor Agricola were given to lying or, to be more cynical, would want to be seen to be lying.
I think I can see why you prefer the civilians to be "veterans and armed men" because they would be more acquiescent in marching towards the Iceni and the battle-site. It is an imaginative twist to use to support your scenario but I don't think many will support that.
Still writing of civilians, "However, Tacitus says that they did march with the army and then there was the battle. Hence, they marched towards or were caught by the enemy." We are not told that the civilians were at the battle or anything about them after the account of them leaving London. They may have only marched with Suetonius for a couple of days before he passed them on (somehow). Maybe they did reach the battle-site but Suetonius screened their passage to safety by, 'having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front his'. I admit to a little fanciful speculation. The point is that Tacitus tells us nothing of their fate beyond leaving London with Suetonius, who, I imagine, would want to get rid of them as quickly as possible. Of course, and to repeat the point, initially marching away from the rebels keeps the civilians save until they can be sent on to the western military zone or Cogidubnus' care.
I tentatively suggest that your doubts about the civilians has led to you writing, "that the whole London episode may be fiction as it makes little military sense", which suggests that you are acknowledging that Suetonius marching towards the Iceni with civilians would not happen, it making no military sense, hence your questioning of Tacitus' account of the London episode. To put it another way: your scenario requires a very unlikely outcome (including the civilians marching to the Iceni and battle); this you recognise and to circumvent that result you cast doubt on Tacitus' London account. I don't buy that, but I do like the twist. In fact I'm smiling as I write.
I must draw this response to an end before I inflict further words and ideas (most already in that essay referenced above) on the readers of this thread.
I do hope you can find time to write the more detailed document, maybe include some of the other scenarios/outcomes of the combat Estimate.
Regards, Steve Kaye
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 03-02-2023
Thanks Steve, enlightening.
Since then I met with former army colleagues for a social evening and, of course, we swopped stories and chatted about our common interest in military history. Two of them were skilled horsemen and also served in the mounted branch of the army. I mentioned our little "project" and the deployment given by Tacitus. The traditional one of Heavy Infantry in centre, light(er) on their flanks and cavalry further out. We discussed the description of the ground and the "defile" with the cavalry possibly being posted uphill and was told something like:
Have you ever ridden a horse going downhill at speed? Unless the gradient is pretty gentle, you'll need to slow the animal down, or you'll risk a fatal tumble. That's bad enough if you're riding solo, but a few flailing falls in the middle of a formation moving downhill at speed to contact would be disastrous. The position of the riders (giving point with blades, or swords raised at least) would also be completely counterproductive to the momentum of a charge, as it would place entirely too much forward weight on the mount as it moves downhill, and massively increase the chances of multiple falls. Even more so with no stirrups and a shield on my left arm.
He could see the cavalry traversing the slope into combat but not descending. I need to think more about this.
I do not equate Tacitus and Dio or the accuracy of their description of the battle. Though both sound "Hollywood", Tacitus has a ring of truth to it and I can see him at dinner with the aging father in law. The food, goblets and suchlike being moved to illustrate the battle and tactics - probably dozens of times (and several other battles) until he knew it by heart. Dio's description of splitting into three "divisions" sounds wrong and the milling battle but the confused nature of a close quarters battle has a degree of realism, the description that the three groups of surrounded Romans finally managed not only to fight their way out but completely destroy the enemy army again does not ring true but is possible. Sadly, I do not consider either to give an accurate picture. Tacitus' casualty rates are unlikely but possible if the whole pursuit is included.
I do concur that Paulinus was very probably in position for some time before the battle. If it was a modern battle we would indeed prepare it with interlocking fields of fire, obstacles and minefields. Translating this back to the first century that might be a low rampart or ditch to break the enemy charge in front of the infantry. Perhaps Lilia were dug to force the charging enemy inwards or break the charge but these equally would impede any counter attack so not convinced of this. I would also expect the light artillery to be positioned on the slopes or on mounds to give a wide field of fire. I am sure I have seen raised mounds for this purpose (Trimontium?)
I have 30+ pages of notes and several combat estimates to organise and will do so. No idea how long it will take.
I am learning so much from this!
Thanks to everyone.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 03-07-2023
Hi Alan,
your key, and most significant, phrase in determining the likely geographic range of the campaign is, in my opinion:
"I see the battle somewhere around the western side of Iceni territory possibly not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?)"
It seems to me that with this fundamental statement you may be negating the western candidate sites (Mancetter, Ogbourne, Bicester) and other more distant sites (Virginia Water and all sites South of the Thames). I happen to align with this interpretation of your conclusion and see Watling Street as probably the westernmost likely extent of the campaign, others obviously won't. If in your write up you can expand on your conclusion I think the debate would benefit.
All - I went to the Battlefields Trust study day.
Two surprises:
1, Martyn Tagg was unable to attend/present, therefore I am no closer to understanding his Bicester candidacy/evidence base.
2, Martyn was substituted by Richard Scholefield who nominated a new site, the valley bottom at Little Brickhill, with the British approaching the Roman lines from the high ground to the South.
It's worth noting that Prof. Will Bowden, the Iceni specialist from Nottingham Uni, defined Iceni territory as being co-terminus with the combined county boundaries of Cambridgeshire, Suffolk and Norfolk. This seemed a further west than I was anticipating, putting the Iceni homeland as far west as the outskirts of Thrapston on the Nene..