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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 01-30-2023
(01-30-2023, 12:02 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: However, we will surely not agree on this, so we should probably let others move on without further debate!
I agree. However, I have to say that, reluctant as I am to believe that anything we do not understand must be due to a mistake on the part of the historian, I am even more reluctant to accept that it is a result of deliberate fraud.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steve Kaye - 02-03-2023
Roman Roads Research Association zoom talk ...
'Boudica, street grids, and the changing face of Caistor Roman town', by Prof. Will Bowden, booking on Eventbrite (23 February 2023, 7.30pm).
Free to all - book at Eventbrite
Regards, Steve Kaye
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 02-03-2023
Well I have finished the first draft. All 5,500 (exactly) words of it. Is it possible to publish it as a single post here or do I need to split it?
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 02-03-2023
(02-03-2023, 02:41 PM)dadlamassu Wrote: Well I have finished the first draft. All 5,500 (exactly) words of it. Is it possible to publish it as a single post here or do I need to split it?
It might be worth popping it up on Academia.edu that's where Steve and I tend to put up stuff for review and info, easy and free option.... also far easier to find and look at than this thread.....
J
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 02-07-2023
In his latest timeline, Nathan has Suetonius Paulinus' full report reaching Rome in the April of the year after the outbreak and defeat of the uprising, thus leading Tacitus to place the revolt in that year. Referring to the 'full report' gives rise to the suggestion that there might have been at least one interim report. The obvious occasion for such a report would be after Paulinus had arrived in London and assessed the situation. Indeed, it could be argued that it would have been remiss of him not to make a report at that time. We may speculate on the contents of such a report: that there had been a revolt and the colony had been destroyed; that he intended to defeat the revolt with the troops that he had but the 9th Legion had been severely mauled and would need to be brought up to establishment, and that he would need additional auxiliaries to police the disaffected tribes after the revolt had been suppressed. He would also have reported that the procurator had absconded and a replacement would have to be sent. This has a bearing upon the timing of events in the aftermath of the revolt, particularly the arrival of the additional troops and of Classicianus and his report upon Paulinus' campaign of reprisals.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 02-07-2023
(02-07-2023, 01:17 PM)Renatus Wrote: He would also have reported that the procurator had absconded and a replacement would have to be sent.
Although of course Decianus would probably already have sent his own report explaining his actions. I've suggested before that either the procurator's report or that of Suetonius from London could have spurred the emperor and his ministers into action - most recently here.
The mention of the 'full report' is my assumption that Tacitus would have been working from some kind of official statement or summary of what had happened, or a detailed account of events drafted by Suetonius following the final battle and the pacification of the immediate area of London, rather than from letters and rescripts produced while the fighting was in progress, which may have been rather more partial in their coverage and presented less of a clear picture - but we cannot know that.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Theoderic - 02-08-2023
(02-03-2023, 11:49 AM)Steve Kaye Wrote: Roman Roads Research Association zoom talk ...
'Boudica, street grids, and the changing face of Caistor Roman town', by Prof. Will Bowden, booking on Eventbrite (23 February 2023, 7.30pm).
Free to all - book at Eventbrite
Regards, Steve Kaye
The Roman Roads Research Association lectures are interesting and excellent.
in the last lecture the findings of Margary and the Viattores regarding the Camlett Way between St Albans and Silchester has been accepted as a definitive Roman Road (which as these 2 towns were established early makes sense for a number of reasons) but it also adds other intriguing possibilities of a different battle site than any that have been identified to date.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 02-08-2023
You can't do that Deryk !!!! Whats the site and who is promoting it !!!!
I recall you mentioned the Camlet Way and Marten, Shalbourne and Ogbourne on here a year or two ago (July 2020- just checked)
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Theoderic - 02-08-2023
John wrote:
You can't do that Deryk !!!! Whats the site and who is promoting it !!!!
Hi John
My apologies, I think I may have misled you.
I was merely pointing out that the Camlet Way now appears to be officially recognised as an established Roman Road whereas there has previously some debate over its viability between the two towns.
As this is now the case it seems to me that it opens up a new set of sites and perhaps brings into the equation "Shalbourne", Steve's "Ogbourne Site" or even the "Mildenhall Site" (Cunetio) in the west. Could it answer the burning at Silchester that has not been explained?
There are also a number of other sites en route as it were..
Maybe around Siclhester which was the epicentre of Roman Troops dispositions in the South West with Alchester, Dorchester on Thames, Cirencester and Chichester (with its safe port), all within a 3 day march and Gloucester within a 4 day march and also within a 3 day march from St Albans , into friendly territory.
Perhaps it is worth a look.
Just a thought.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 02-09-2023
This is presented using the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology. This is because I am more familiar with it and also that I do not know how the Roman Army of the First Century AD conducted staff work. The seven questions of the Comat Estimate seem to be fairly timeless and at least form a basis for covering the situation in order to present options to the commander. I suspect that a similar process took place at the consilium held by Suetonius Paulinus before embarking on the campaign. This is a summary though a more academic paper with references and reasoning may follow later on Academia as suggested.
What do I think happened based on this assessment?
I think Suetonius Paulinus chose to attack the Iceni at first to put down the revolt and secure the Province. He had to do so in order to mask the Roman blunders in the complete mishandling of the annexation. Fortunately for him he had a scapegoat in Decimius Catus. Later his plan changed to the counterstroke option.
Paulinus probably set off by the fastest means (ship?) to Wroxeter and issued his orders to assemble the army and march on the Iceni. Unfortunately, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Meanwhile, the Iceni resist and perhaps chase off, kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory. They know that severe retribution will follow very soon and so they move with their best household troops against the closest Romans – the 9th Legion. Cerialis marches to meet them with a vexillation thinking he is going to suppress the rebellion and maybe rescue the trapped Roman delegation. His forces are ambushed in a forest or forced to fight on unsuitable ground (marsh?) and the infantry are wiped out. The Iceni then besiege the rest of the 9th Legion and attached auxiliaries in its forts and camps. Or, perhaps, Cerialis sends out his cavalry on raids forcing the Iceni to block him. Thus, though the Iceni gain a significant success, the weapons and equipment of the slain Roman infantry they also lose a significant number of their best warriors. This effectively delays the Iceni doing much more than muster the levy while containing the 9th Legion in its forts.
News of the (exaggerated?) success against Cerialis spreads and the Trinovantes put their plan into motion. Part of this is the psychological warfare of omens, hysteria etc. that Tacitus mentions. I think that a significant number of veterans at Colchester want to build fortifications but are refused and suspecting what is about to happen they evacuate to London with their families – hence the later request to Catus for support. Anyway, the Trinovantes plan takes several days in preparation and assembling forces before they attack Colchester.
The Iceni and Trinovantes may well be dealing with seaborne raids by the Fleet on their coastal towns and villages. I do not see an important and mobile asset like the fleet being allowed to stand idle.
Now the mystery of the 2nd Legions lost command. I think it possible that the Legate was tasked with securing King Cogidubnus’ support. The request would be accompanied by inducements. The thrust would be that the 2nd Legion is on its way to London and they would need the King’s support in the form of his warriors. However, once they departed with their escort, the tribes to the west became restive and the Praefectus Castrorum had to suppress them before marching on London through their hostile areas.
The Field Army, meanwhile, sets off from Angelsey resupplies, absorbs reinforcements. It now hears of the defeat of Cerialis. Paulinus continues to London because he needs the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus’ warriors. He passes through St Albans. Maybe he hears from some veterans from Colchester of the evacuation caused by the refusal of the town officials to allow the building of defences? The inhabitants of St Albans have time to evacuate and many do. He forced marches on to London (a long day’s march). On arrival the 2nd Legion is nowhere to be seen but he finds the veterans from Colchester and Cogidubnus and his men. He also hears of the destruction and slaughter at Colchester. Without the Roman infantry of the 2nd Legion and its auxiliaries he realises that he cannot hold and win at London. Urban warfare then, as now, incurs heavy casualties and is particularly difficult.
The Trinovantes are close in on London. Cogidubnus agrees to offer protection to any of the Londoners who want to move south of the Thames. He also agrees to block the Thames crossings and provide some of his warriors, particularly cavalry, to Paulinus for the field army. London largely empties of civilians. However, a number do stay and Tacitus and Dio both describe their fate.
Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again. At some time he probably assessed a number of possible battle sites. This is not as daft as it sounds because I have sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, found myself tactically assessing ground especially when preparing for promotion exams! Near his chosen battle site he now reduces his cavalry screen and allows the enemy scouts close enough to “find” the army. He now has Boudica, the figurehead, and her army in his sights for the counterstroke. Now in his favoured position, he rests and feeds his troops well using up supplies but this, he knows, is all or nothing. He deploys in the traditional way. Perhaps concealing a good proportion in the woods to emerge on command. In this way he entices the Iceni into the killing ground.
The position I would be looking for if we assume the “defile” means hills is as described but I would add looking for an Iceni approach with insufficient water for all the people and animals to drink their fill. Perhaps with a substantial water source behind the Roman line as a further inducement for a frontal assault. This way he reduces the efficiency of the Iceni cavalry and the staying power of the infantry. Especially if he can keep them shouting, cheering and drumming up fervour for a time on, ideally, a hot day. On the other hand if the “defile” is in fact created by one or more water features (lakes or rivers) then that may move the battlefield east towards or into Iceni territory.
His army I believe to be stronger than that given by Tacitus and Dio because in typical Roman way they ignore the contribution made by “most loyal” Cogidubnus to the “massed cavalry on the wings”. In the same way I believe that the combatant element of the Iceni warrior host was very much smaller than Tacitus’ 120,000 because there were “more women than men” present in the speech attributed to Suetonius Paulinus. At a rough estimate I would put the combined forces of Suetonius Paulinus and Cogidubnus at nearer 15,000 and that of Boudica at 60,000 to 75,000 warriors.
As for the battle itself the Romans deploy as described by Tacitus and any available slingers, archers and artillery interspersed or behind and the massed cavalry may have Cogidubnus’ warriors on the extreme flanks. The force is probably drawn up in at least two maybe three lines.
The Iceni would likely be in tribal groups with the best warriors at the front and the least well-armed and armoured behind. The Iceni cavalry are mentioned as being in groups and the commanders, including Boudica, mounted in chariots.
The opening phase would include the speeches beloved of the chroniclers, druids reciting tales and issuing blessings while hurling curses at the Romans. All this building the war fervour of the host by chanting, singing, blowing carnyx horns and suchlike. There was probably some skirmishing between light troops and cavalry.
The tribes advance picks up speed across the plain. As they approach the Roman line, Paulinus’ reserves may be brought out from the woods (or simply stand up). As the rush proceeds up the slope it is compacted as the flanks are drawn in by the defile. On the flanks the cavalry engage and as they wheel, charge and counter charge in a swirling melee they compress the Iceni infantry even more. In the infantry battle the Romans hold and then counterattack pushing the enemy backwards down the slope towards their wagons and womenfolk where the main slaughter takes place. The cavalry, including Cogidubnus’ warriors pursue and complete the rout.
So what about Dio’s 230,000 or so rebels? I consider that he may be about correct if we have:
• An Iceni host in the St Albans/9th Legion area of now 80,000 warriors having suffered losses to Cerialis, 10,000 masking the frontier forts to prevent the 9th Legion attacking its flank and rear and maybe detachments dealing with coastal raids by the fleet.
• A Trinovantes host which engaged the Romans at Colchester and is now plundering the London area. Perhaps about 120,000 warriors.
• Smaller hosts of Silures, Durotriges and Dumnonii totalling about 20,000 occupying the attention of the 2nd and 20th Legions.
From what Suetonius Paulinus is reported to have done I suggest he may have been dealing with several threats simultaneously (as above). He decided to cut off the head of the revolt first (Boudica and her warlike Iceni – the “seat of war” he was seeking?) before switching to the Trinovantes who seemed to be mainly concerned exacting bloody revenge, indulging in torture and rape, destruction and plundering everything. Therefore, I see the battle somewhere around the western side of Iceni territory possibly not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged.
The presence of the womenfolk “wives” is interesting as this was not a migration … or was it? Had the dispossessed Iceni expecting slaughter and destruction decided to move out of the Roman Zone into another area to avoid the anticipated severe Roman retribution – perhaps north to the Parisi or the Brigantes or beyond? Perhaps this explains the need to break through the 9th Legion or defeat Paulinus in a field battle instead of their traditional guerrilla warfare. This may explain why there were so many wives and so much impedimenta with the army.
I leave that thought with you.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steve Kaye - 02-09-2023
Hello Alan,
This is just a holding note to say thank you. Excellent and thought provoking reasoning which will require careful, probably long, replies. Mine will come later.
We definitely have a different viewpoint on a number of issues. Thanks for that.
Regards, Steve Kaye
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 02-09-2023
Hi Steve,
Look forward to your thoughts - your work on terrain analysis was most useful. I had a different view as well to start with and I am perfectly aware that the scanty and contradictory information can be interpreted in many other ways (just look at this thread). My application of the Combat Estimate must be largely conjecture as to what the commanders on both sides knew and wanted to achieve. The really interesting part was trying to identify the Iceni and Trinovantes aims at each decision point.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steve Kaye - 02-12-2023
Hello Allan,
Thanks again for supplying this military perspective on the Boudican campaign. I would like to make it clear that I have enjoyed thinking of the summary provided and I do appreciate the effort involved. Thank you again.
I expect some of the following questions and points might be answered in the larger paper I hope you do make available.
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
1) Suetonius assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. You don't say what news triggered this event but I assume it to be because the Iceni, "kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory ", i.e. the Iceni revolt.
2) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and besiege them in their forts.
3) The Iceni start to muster the levy.
4) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
5) Meanwhile Suetonius, with his field army, marches to London via St. Albans.
6) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so.
7) Suetonius arrives in London.
8) Only the Trinovantes are now marching on London.
9) The Iceni muster is now complete and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th. Suetonius marches north again to contest this (the counterstroke?)
10) Suetonius arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica.
11) The Iceni are defeated somewhere "not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged ".
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their territory, or borders, while the Trinovantes aggressively prosecute the revolt? Surely combined aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
Now for some other points.
a) The summary says that Tacitus writes that Boudica had 120,000 at the final battle but I cannot find such a figure. There is only mention of 80,000 dead rebels.
b) The summary has the Roman force at the battle, "drawn up in at least two maybe three lines". This may be problematic. Given 5,000 legionaries (a common supposition), and each occupying a line width of c. 1 m, then the Roman line in the defile would be 2.5 to 1.66 km long. Those are long and thin lines for facing a charging horde because there are probably insufficient men in the rear ranks using their shields to brace those in front - the line may be breached on the first, massed charge. This issue is important because it helps define the size or width of the defile and could/has been used to search for likely battle sites.
c) The idea that the 'wives' etc. were at the final battle because the Iceni were, or had been, thinking of migrating is interesting. My assumption has been that the wagons and carts etc. were to support the many warriors with provisions because the horde's ability to sustain itself by scavenging would be quite limited. Plus, if the Iceni were intent on migration then they had an opportunity after the 9th was driven back to its forts - the way was then open to the north where they probably would still have starved because I don't expect the locals would have food reserves sufficient to feed themselves and their new guests. But, maybe the Iceni were intent on migration and conquest, thinking they could more easily defeat another tribe rather than the Romans - but then why besiege the 9th? In conclusion, I'm sceptical.
This seems a good point to stop scribbling.
Regards, Steve Kaye
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 02-13-2023
This reflects my own reservations. On a point of detail, the figure of 120,000 comes from Dio and represents Boudica's army at the start of the revolt. According to him, this had expanded to 230,000 by the time of the final battle.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Sean Manning - 02-14-2023
(02-13-2023, 12:54 PM)Renatus Wrote: This reflects my own reservations. On a point of detail, the figure of 120,000 comes from Dio and represents Boudica's army at the start of the revolt. According to him, this had expanded to 230,000 by the time of the final battle.The number 120,000 is also an Assyrian, biblical, Greek, and Roman topos for 'a vast army' ( some terrifying numbers )