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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 09-04-2022
(09-04-2022, 08:39 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: St Albans would perhaps make a rather better 'base of operations' anyway, as it was at the junction of two supply roads, marginally closer to his approaching reinforcements from Wroxeter, and closer to the high ground of the Chilterns.
You have made the point that sedes bello can have two meanings and, although I hold with the Michael Grant interpretation so far as London is concerned, I accept that the other meaning could well apply to other locations. Suetonius would have needed a rallying point for his reinforcements and, if any one wanted to call that a sedes bello, I would not necessarily quarrel with that. Having said that, it need not be a fixed headquarters. The headquarters of a campaigning army would be wherever the commander was at the time.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 09-04-2022
I have been following this thread off and on for a while and do not claim to remember all that I have read. Nor do I claim an in depth knowledge of the original sources or Latin. My Latin is largely schoolboy Latin learned in the 1960s. That said I am a retired professional army officer of over 40 years experience including senior staff appointments.
So I may I offer a possible sequence based on what Suetonius MIGHT have done as expeditionary force commander?
While completing the destruction of the Druids on Mona intelligence arrives that the Iceni have risen and are massacring any Romans and Roman sympathisers that they find. In the likelihood that this revolt will spread if not contained he decides to march as soon as possible on the enemy. Now “as soon as possible” means finishing any mopping up and gathering sufficient supplies for a rapid campaign. He decides he needs to know more and leaves his second in command to follow with the main body while sending messengers to Legio XX Valeria Victrix, Legio II Augusta, Legio VIIII Hispana to send a vexillation each of Legionaries and their Auxiliary units to concentrate at a useful (central?) position possibly to the north and/or west of St Albans (maybe Ratae for example?) He also sends messengers there to have the local commander amass supplies of wagons, pack animals, food, fodder, weapons etc. SIDE NOTE – He may have chosen St Albans and that may have made it a very attractive target for the Britons as the supplies were gathered in or some other position on the way to join with Legio II Augusta. If there was to a "Seat of War" that is not the theatre of operations I would suggest that it would be this location.
Suetonius rides out with a proportion of the cavalry and possibly some light infantry maybe a maximum of 1,000 to 1,500 men in total. He does not take all his cavalry as that would blind his main body advancing into possibly hostile territory. He sends out his reconnaissance troops (exploratores) in small parties backed by a few turmae of cavalry. At this stage he is moving fast with supplies on pack horses and more picked up as he goes. It is likely that the first indications of enemy activity will be some distance away and heralded by refugees and/or the smoke of burning properties.
As he approaches he receives intelligence that Legio VIIII Hispana has been trounced and driven back with significant casualties and that Legio II Augusta is not marching north. He continues to move south probably passing near or through raided settlements. I doubt he stopped to rescue survivors but merely questioned them and sent them on their way.
When he reaches London he realises that he cannot, with the forces available, defend it. Boudica is also probably aware of his presence and he becomes a High Value Target. Killing him or capturing him would be a major success. He probably realises this too and he starts to draw the enemy by a circuitous route west then north trailing his small fast moving force as a target to give his army time to assemble. Whether or not he crosses the Thames would depend on the tactical situation as he knows that crossing the river with an army will take longer than he would with his smaller force. (I take the point that the sources do not mention him going to St Albans mainly because it is already within the area where the enemy are likely to to be active).
By this stage the Tribal Main Forces are carrying booty and have spent time looting so are probably moving at best about the same pace as he is but probably slower. He then detaches any civilian refugees that followed him from London (sends them south?) possibly a callous act to distract pursuit and then heads north to his pre-selected muster point. In addition he may have sent messengers ahead for the army to move to meet him, again to some chosen position. There he meets with his Legio XIV Gemina, a vexilation of Legio XX Valeria Victrix and their Auxiliaries with the supply train assembled at the initial rendezvous. All the while his reconnaissance troops have kept in touch with the Boudica's army so he has a good idea where it is and its strength. He prepares his, now rested, troops and advances to contact.
The Britons advance on him and the two sides meet at some, as yet undiscovered, battle site.
I hope that this is useful and fits with what we have been discussing. I realise that it does not necessarily help with finding the battlefield. However, I felt that some input of military thought and possible strategy may help.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 09-04-2022
Thanks, a sound interpretation of a good manoeuvre which is too easily written off as a "Cavalry Dash".
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 09-04-2022
(09-04-2022, 05:18 PM)John1 Wrote: too easily written off as a "Cavalry Dash".
Yeah, not that easily, as people are still supporting it 60 years after Dudley & Webster invented it!
Alan's plan seems pretty good otherwise, but even with the addition of light infantry I don't see a famously cautious commander like Suetonius Paulinus heading off hundreds of miles through hostile territory on a recce mission. No chance he would risk making himself a 'High Value Target'! And, as I've said several times before, he would not have considered fighting a battle in London if he only had a small force of cavalry and light troops with him.
But we know Roman troops could cover ground fast when required, and P 'saved the province with rapid movement' - so surely there's no problem adding a few thousand legionary infantry to his force...?
It does often feel like we haven't really moved anywhere in this debate since 2010 though.
![[Image: shocked.png]](https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/images/icons/shocked.png){kind=icon}
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 09-04-2022
"as people are still supporting it 60 years after Dudley & Webster invented it!" as with Mancetter .... least likely most often referenced... Well I've enjoyed the last 10 (mostly), learned a lot and refined my position.... long may it continue..... I'll be a bit sorry if any site gets proven now.....
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 09-05-2022
My post was about what might have happened if Suetonius did make a "cavalry dash". I amnot sure how old and fit he was. It is not my preferred option for his conduct of the campaign. I did say "possibly some light infantry" as light infantry can march longer than the cavalry whose mounts need cared for and fed (several hours grazing if not taking a supply column). I outline my preferred option below which based as much on my (modern) military thought.
The problem I have with taking a "few thousand legionaries" is that his entire force is only a "few thousand legionaries". From what I have read here and elsewhere he only has one reinforced legion (5-6,000 legionaries with probably the same number of auxiliaries). Which after a campaign is hardly likely to be at full strength even with increments from other legions. I do not see a cautious general (or any competent general) splitting his meagre forces in the face of the enemy and advancing in two small columns. Remember what happened to the few thousand legionaries of Legio VIIII Hispana when they tried the same over roughly the same ground. The VIIII was a garrison Legion and had detachments in several forts and locations. Thus the forces sent would be less than half a Legion. I read somewhere that after the war 2,000 reinforcements arrived for the Legions and with some (most) of these the VIIII was brought up to a reasonable strength.
I have a gut feeling (nothing more) that Suetonius did not leave his army and if there was a "cavalry dash" it was a mission assigned to a younger, fitter and more expendable Tribune. My own opinion is that he marched south with his entire force. His main supplies lay nearby having been amassed for the Mona campaign. Also I recall that his legions at Mona had refused to obey orders and stood rooted to the ground, terrified by the Britons, until he appealed to them. So leaving the troops would be disastrous to their morale if he left them.
Tacitus says something like “Suetonius, however, with wonderful resolution, marched amidst a hostile population to Londinium”. To me this implies that he marched with his entire force (less detachments guarding forts and supplies in the military rear zone) and did not gallop or rush ahead. What happened once he abandoned London is open for discussion (as in this thread). I would put forward that his troops were tired after their speedy march south harassed by the hostile tribes, their morale reduced by the massacres, the defeat of Legio VIIII and the disobedience of Legio II. I am not clear whether St Albans was destroyed before or after his army passed in either event this would also have had an effect on the troops as would leaving London. Also the apparent defeat of the Romans would probably see any open support ebbing away.
I don't see him moving east or north into hostile country with tired and demoralised troops. South is possible though I do see him sending senior officers west to assume command of the recalcitrant Legio II. So going west seems to me logical as any reinforcement from Legio II and its auxiliaries would be most welcome. The rebels have to follow if they are to avoid ultimate defeat. However, the longer they are in the field the less sustainable is their logistics and the planting/harvest at home. Going west takes him through "friendly" or at least less hostile ground and towards a known strong if insubordinate garrison.
It makes sense to me but I have the benefit of (partial) hindsight and I offer it as a possibility, nothing more.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 08:01 AM)dadlamassu Wrote: if there was a "cavalry dash" it was a mission assigned to a younger, fitter and more expendable Tribune. My own opinion is that he marched south with his entire force.
Yes, I agree with most of that.
The army for the Anglesey campaign would have comprised several legions and many auxiliaries, though, and I think Suetonius would have wanted to leave the majority of them to hold the territory he had captured (albeit he had to give up his conquests eventually!).
My guess would be that he marched south with an expeditionary force of the maximum size he could muster quickly and that he knew he could keep supplied on a rapid march. A single legion at campaign strength (c.4000 men) plus a couple of cavalry alae and maybe a couple of aux cohorts, perhaps - c.5-6K men?
Suetonius would have expected to meet up with Cerialis's detachment (perhaps 3-4K?) on the road, and probably estimated that their combined forces would be enough to crush the revolt. As it happened, Cerialis marched on ahead and was routed, and the rebellion proved to be much bigger that Suetonius had anticipated.
(09-05-2022, 08:01 AM)dadlamassu Wrote: going west seems to me logical as any reinforcement from Legio II and its auxiliaries would be most welcome.
Reinforcements from Usk (Legio XX) or Exeter (Legio II) would both have had to pass through Cirencester on the Fosseway. From there they could swing south-east via Silchester to London or north-east via the fort at Alchester to St Albans. So either Silchester or St Albans would make a good rendezvous point.
St Albans, though, is closer to the larger reinforcement group coming down from Wales, and is on the line of communication route from Wroxeter. It's also closer to upland terrain in the Chilterns that matches the battle site Tacitus describes. Tacitus mentions St Albans and does not mention Silchester.
For those three reasons, I continue to find St Albans, and the 'north west route', a more likely option.
![[Image: smile.png]](https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/images/icons/smile.png){kind=icon}
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - dadlamassu - 09-05-2022
I can go with a composite force strength of about 5-6k troops being pretty much what he had available immediately. Going north from London through hostile land that he has just marched through no doubt taking casualties as he goes does not seem a logical route to me unless the Britons are sacking London giving him a few days of relatively light opposition for manoeuvre. So he would need to distance himself from London perhaps west for some distance then north. Unfortunately I don't have a period map of Roman roads here to see available routes. Though he may have been able to march cross country as we are not talking huge distances.
I am at our seaside caravan with a weak internet connection via mobile phone and away from my books.
Anyway - fascinating stuff, thanks!
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 09-05-2022
Alan,
I agree with your general assessment that there was no 'cavalry dash' and that Suetonius marched south with a substantial force. There are, however, some points upon which which I disagree. You are probably familiar with my arguments, having followed this thread, but I will reiterate them anyway with some additions.
I do not think that the force that Suetonius took south represents his whole campaigning army. I believe that, knowing that he was attacking an island of major religious significance and expecting substantial opposition, as well as being a cautious general, he invaded North Wales in force, taking the 2nd, 14th and 20th Legions with the intention of countering opposition by sheer intimidation. The veterans of those legions, those of 16 years' service who were not expected to fight unless themselves threatened, remained guarding their legionary fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum. When he learned of the threat to Colchester, he detached one legion, the 14th, and perhaps some auxiliaries, intending to rendezvous with Cerialis and the 9th Legion and go together to the relief of the colony or, if Cerialis had felt obliged to tackle the revolt on his own, at least to back him up. This would take him along Watling Street to its junction with the Via Devana, along that to its junction with Ermine Street and thence to Colchester. On hearing of the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis, he carried on down Ermine Street but, instead of branching off towards the ruined colony, continued on to London. This took him through the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes and these are the 'hostes' referred to by Tacitus. Going to London down Watling Street would have taken him through the territory of the Catuvellauni, who we have concluded, were not hostile to Rome.
In London, he made an appreciation and, considering that Cerialis' part-legion had evidently been completely overwhelmed, concluded that his single legion was insufficient to confront the enemy and defend London and, therefore, decided to abandon the town. I have suggested that he had gone northwards up Watling Street to Verulamium, where he could leave the civilians accompanying him and gather reinforcements to take on the rebels. He needed every man he could get and it is likely that, before leaving London, he had sent messengers to the 2nd and 20th Legions in North Wales and, quite probably, the 9th in Lincoln who, if not demoralised by the loss of those lost under Cerialis, would very likely have been thirsting to avenge their fallen comrades. These he ordered to assemble at Verulamium. Messengers were also sent to the fortresses of the 2nd, 14th and 20th Legions calling on the veterans to join him. The praefecti castrorum of the 14th and 20th complied, but that of the 2nd, for his own reasons, did not. The veterans of the 20th are mentioned by Tacitus but those of the 14th are not because they had been absorbed into their parent legion. I believe that, with the rebels advancing towards him up Watling Street, he withdrew westwards along Akeman Street to the vicinity of Tring. In the event, the 2nd, 9th and 20th could not reach him in time and he felt compelled to offer battle with the troops that he had. Fortunately, being the careful general that he was, he had reconnoitered a site for the battle which suited his numbers but denied the rebels the advantage of their numerical superiority.
EDIT: Once again, I have been overtaken by other posts
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 11:13 AM)dadlamassu Wrote: Going north from London through hostile land that he has just marched through... I don't have a period map of Roman roads...
One good idea - which Michael came up with - is that Suetonius would originally have led his men towards Colchester, as that's where he believed the revolt to be. Only when he arrived at the vicinity of Godmanchester (Durovigitum) did he learn that Cerialis had been defeated. He then rerouted his march due south down Ermine Street through the margins of rebel territory to London. So going to St Albans would not be backtracking, but instead shortening his supply and communication lines while remaining in scouting range of the enemy.
Alternatively, I could see him resting his troops at St Albans after a direct march south, perhaps, and pushing on the last 21 miles to London with a light vanguard - perhaps to meet with Decianus Catus, if he didn't know he'd already fled, or to assess the possibilities of fighting a battle there once his full column arrived. That would not take him too far from his command, I would say.
Here's a map showing the fully developed Roman road network. Most of the central routes would probably be there c.AD60; the roads on the Welsh frontiers and East Anglia would not, and probably the smaller roads in the southwest and elsewhere would not yet have been constructed.
(source: https://imperium.ahlfeldt.se/)
(09-05-2022, 11:57 AM)Renatus Wrote: EDIT: Once again, I have been overtaken by other posts
EDIT EDIT - this time you have overtaken me, Michael!
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 09-05-2022
Michael wrote:
The veterans of those legions, those of 16 years' service who were not expected to fight unless themselves threatened, remained guarding their legionary fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum.
I see leaving all the veterans of 16 years service to guard legionary fortress as robbing the army of experienced men who could have a positive influence on new recruits, while on campaign. Allow me share my research. Taking Livy as an example, in his account of the years 200 BC to 168 BC, there is a wealth of detail relating to army replacements. All these replacement numbers are for time served soldiers, which are termed ‘veterans’ during the republic. The important factor is all those replacement numbers (when correctly rounded), equally divide into the number of centuries in the army, that they are being sent to, for example a consular army. This works out that the replacement are for men in each century, as each century is made up of an equal number of men undertaking a particular campaign, so a century consists of an equal number of raw recruits, seasoned troops and veterans. Appian makes the statement that around 142 BC, all those that had served 6 years were being replaced.
For the principate, when 16 years service was required, this translates to an 80 man century consisting of:
0 to 4 years service - 20 men
4 to 8 years service - 20 men
8 to 12 years service - 20 men
12 to 16 years service - 20 men
When the 80 man century is broken into 10 contubernium each of 8 men, each contubernium is allocated the following:
0 to 4 years service - 2 men
4 to 8 years service - 2 men
8 to 12 years service - 2 men
12 to 16 years service - 2 men
This gives a even spread of men and there are always two veterans (12 to 16 years), to help and watch over the others. When the military service was extended to 20 years, this translates to:
0 to 5 years service - 20 men
5 to 10 years service - 20 men
10 to 15 years service - 20 men
15 to 20 years service - 20 men
Contubernium
0 to 5 years service - 2 men
5 to 10 years service - 2 men
10 to 15 years service - 2 men
15 to 20 years service - 2 men
I have not found this system has changed. In fact there are references to the Roman replacing time expired veterans going back to around 460 BC or earlier (from the top of my head). The only difference is the size of the century has changed. Overtime.
The Crackpot
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 12:06 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:(09-05-2022, 11:57 AM)Renatus Wrote: EDIT: Once again, I have been overtaken by other posts
EDIT EDIT - this time you have overtaken me, Michael!
They were only playing leapfrog.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 12:06 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Alternatively, I could see him resting his troops at St Albans after a direct march south, perhaps, and pushing on the last 21 miles to London with a light vanguard - perhaps to meet with Decianus Catus, if he didn't know he'd already fled, or to assess the possibilities of fighting a battle there once his full column arrived. That would not take him too far from his command, I would say.
Unfortunately, I do not see that explaining 'medios inter hostes'.
(09-05-2022, 12:58 PM)Steven James Wrote:I see leaving all the veterans of 16 years service to guard legionary fortress as robbing the army of experienced men who could have a positive influence on new recruits, while on campaign. Allow me share my research.
Your breakdown would seem to work administratively but the situation on campaign could be different. If there were men in the unit who were not expected to do anything unless it came under attack, for most, if not all, of the time they would be just dead wood. Those with 12 to 15 years' service would still have much to teach new recruits. I don't think that an extra five years would make much difference. Moreover, if a legion moved out of its fortress temporarily, someone would surely have to be left to look after it and who better than those no longer needed for active service.
Turning to Tacitus' account, we are told of the presence at the final battle of only one complete legion and the veterans of another. We are told also of another legion apparently commanded inexplicably by its praefectus castrorum, the third in command, with the legionary legate and tribunus laticlavius nowhere to be seen. I have put forward what I believe to be a reasonably satisfactory explanation of this conundrum. There may be other scenarios that work equally as well or better but I would like to see them and consider whether they might cause me to revise my opinion.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 04:28 PM)Renatus Wrote: Unfortunately, I do not see that explaining 'medios inter hostes'.
That's true. Although I don't think we can entirely discount the old idea of some kind of rebel activity in the Midland area (perhaps the Iceni pushing west after defeating Cerialis, rather than moving directly on London?). However, the Ermine Street route seems more plausible.
Although even then Suetonius is passing through the margins of the enemy district rather than the middle of it, strictly speaking - but unless we see him detouring through Norfolk and Suffolk there isn't a completely satisfactory answer to who and where the hostes might have been.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Owein Walker - 09-05-2022
(09-05-2022, 07:57 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote:(09-05-2022, 04:28 PM)Renatus Wrote: Unfortunately, I do not see that explaining 'medios inter hostes'.
That's true. Although I don't think we can entirely discount the old idea of some kind of rebel activity in the Midland area (perhaps the Iceni pushing west after defeating Cerialis, rather than moving directly on London?). However, the Ermine Street route seems more plausible.
Although even then he's passing through the margins of the enemy district rather than the middle of it, strictly speaking - but unless we see him detouring through Norfolk and Suffolk there isn't a completely satisfactory answer to who and where the hostes might have been.
I think I have missed something .
Is the general opinion that ALL the Catuvellauni were pro Roman? I have to say I am going to take some convincing.
Here i have tried to add a link to a report.....
Iron age Hillforts survey(Northamptonshire)-CLASP See section 2.1
But its too large.
Part of it discusses the relations between the Catuvellauni and its neighbours, including the Trinovantes in the east that makes interesting reading.
Theres also a section on Wootton Hill type enclosures in Corieltavi/Coritani territory that overlooked the Catuvellauni facing south and south east.It needs to be noted that since this report excavations have shown a period of Roman ditch improvements dated to about 50 AD.(Why)
A separate issue is the position of lunt fort ,so far north and beyond the Catuvellauni.Once again ,why?
To me the answer is simple,the Catuvellauni could not be trusted.