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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Printable Version

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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Owein Walker - 10-10-2021

(10-10-2021, 07:21 PM)John1 Wrote: "And deep down I know that you know that I believe that somewhere in the vicinity of Tring or at least somewhere in the Chilterns is the best candidate." sighs and shakes head in deep disappointment, sounds like a latinista trying to outgun a geographer again..... just so sad...... Wink
"How do you imagine that Paulinus got his army to Anglesey" I hadn't given it much thought until now, instead assuming they ran a boat ferry service across the rather challenging Menai Straights. But now you ask maybe it would make sense to do a big boat invasion from the Dee, landing somewhere more sympathetic like Red Wharf Bay. Naval logistics are not my thing but maybe a sudden big fleet landing into a secure anchorage would be better than an observable shuttle across challenging tides. The shuttle could then come into play as a resupply strategy if needed, depends on the size of the fleet and the round trip timing to proto-Deva

Paulinus "setting sail from Mona" to Deva (50 miles, 9 hours at 5 knots) makes more narrative sense in a journey of that length than merely hopping on a ferry for a couple of hundred metres.

PS it is Church Stowe you know..... xxxxx

I think you mean Aberffraw on Anglesey which was a major port until the 1300s, populated by the Romans since AD70 and has an earlier camp in the hills above the town.

With all this chat about Roman logistics nobody is answering the question of how Paulinus would prepare the battlefield, being several days ahead of Boudicca.

Also thanks to Steve Kaye for providing the appropriate archaeology reports on Longthorpe and Silchester before it got carried away.

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-10-2021

No not Aberffraw, I am thinking the honking big bay on the east side of the island a bit like this:

   

"how Paulinus would prepare the battlefield" I feel I have but you are free to question this.

Yeah Steve's great, thanks Steve.....

nb I think more than 3 ships would have been involved, it's just a graphic.... sorry.....

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-10-2021

(10-10-2021, 07:21 PM)John1 Wrote: maybe it would make sense to do a big boat invasion from the Dee, landing somewhere more sympathetic like Red Wharf Bay.

Tacitus, Annals 14.29: "He therefore prepared to attack the island of Mona which had a powerful population and was a refuge for fugitives. He built flat-bottomed vessels to cope with the shallows, and uncertain depths of the sea. Thus the infantry crossed, while the cavalry followed by fording, or, where the water was deep, swam by the side of their horses."

So it looks like he did indeed ferry his troops at the narrowest point, where the cavalry could swim their horses across. These 'flat bottomed vessels' would not be much use in the open sea, I shouldn't think.

Love the graphic tho.

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-10-2021

Well the evening wasn't entirely wasted then.... much.....

Narrowest point being the "Swellies" (such a cool name) still sounds dodgy, I am going to go a bit further north on the sand flats of Lavan Sands/Beaumaris with easier currents, easier egress and swim-able distances;

   

And the big boys cruising in on proper ships, then hot footing it by speed yacht back up the Dee when the world famous and still credible Cavalry Dash was needed Wink

Still not sure you can write off the flat bottomed boats from a longer crossing than the shortest, they brought the boats and their flat bottoms in from somewhere.....

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-10-2021

(10-10-2021, 07:21 PM)John1 Wrote: "How do you imagine that Paulinus got his army to Anglesey" I hadn't given it much thought until now, instead assuming they ran a boat ferry service across the rather challenging Menai Straights. But now you ask maybe it would make sense to do a big boat invasion from the Dee, landing somewhere more sympathetic like Red Wharf Bay. Naval logistics are not my thing but maybe a sudden big fleet landing into a secure anchorage would be better than an observable shuttle across challenging tides. The shuttle could then come into play as a resupply strategy if needed, depends on the size of the fleet and the round trip timing to proto-Deva

The Latinista strikes again.  Tacitus, Ann. 14.29:  'He prepared accordingly to attack the island of Mona . . . and, in view of the shallow and variable channel, constructed a flotilla of boats with flat bottoms.  By this method the infantry crossed; the cavalry, who followed, did so by fording or, in deeper water, by swimming at the side of their horses.' (Loeb translation)

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-10-2021

Kapow.... the Latinista sticks it to the Ross...... 

"in view of the shallow and variable channel" the narrow point being a deep channel with a fixed line is ruled out, shifting the focus to the shifting, shallow channels of the Lavan Flats, nice one...... for a latinista..... xxxx

the Swellies, neither shallow nor variable (as it pertains to a swimming horse) 

   

but here are the Lavan Flats from Beaumaris, pretty and swimmable isn't it;

   

ps I'm only here for Northamptonshire ridges not Welsh bathymetrics...... did I mention the Battle was at Church Stowe? (maybe)

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-10-2021

(10-10-2021, 09:14 PM)John1 Wrote: Kapow.... the Latinista sticks it to the Ross......

Pah - I remain unstuck! (and unroasted, as per your previous version...)


(10-10-2021, 09:14 PM)John1 Wrote: I'm only here for Northamptonshire ridges...

Ah yes. But knowing your love of rectilinear ditched enclosures, what do you make of these?:

   

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-10-2021

Got any lidar on it? https://www.lidarfinder.com/

looks a bit like a valley to the north and a bit of levelling out but hard to tell, guessing it's another Chiltern red herring?

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-10-2021

(10-10-2021, 09:45 PM)John1 Wrote: Got any lidar on it? https://www.lidarfinder.com/

Nothing coming up. Nothing marked on the OS either, which is odd - definitely looks manmade, with parallel lines of regular ditches. Lots of iron age activity in the vicinity, but this place is just a blank...

   

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-10-2021

God, this thread moves fast at times. Sorry, Nathan. You were posting as I was preparing to post.

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-11-2021

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: How do you imagine that Paulinus got his army to Anglesey, with all those thousands of men and mules and wagons?

I dont need to imagine, we have T* telling us how they went ashore under P and later under Agricola. There is no mention of wagons or mules going to Angelsey. Wagons is an asumption of yours that reduces movement rate even further.
T* in view of the shallow and variable channel, constructed a flotilla of boats with flat bottoms. By this method the infantry crossed; the cavalry, who followed, did so by fording or, in deeper water, by swimming at the side of their horses.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: The revolt began while Paulinus was on Anglesey. Unless you believe that a Roman commander would undertake a full-scale campaign involving a sea crossing in winter, or some time in early spring, that puts the revolt in summer. Since he had just concluded his operations when he heard about what was happening, late summer is most likely.
Only if you push everything into a single year and ignore T account thats he is detailing 2 years events. P could just have easily moved over most of a campaign season building roads, to launch an attack on Angelsey ending the year there, only for the Iceni to rise
in next years spring time when they know of the events and have lost their control of their own lands.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I've made the point repeatedly that the main crop was sown in the autumn in this period (quoting Varro and Pliny). Your single spring emmer crop was prehistoric - by the 1st C AD southeastern Britain was using the same agricultural calendar as the rest of northwest Europe.
Repeating mistakes and refusing to accept your ignorant, is indeed what you have done, it however does not change reality, which is your wrong to say so and wrong to say i say so and wrong to say Pliny and Varro say so and wrong to say Butser says so as they all say emmer, as do authors writing to inform people who want to know what cereals crops were grown and when, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yhldKEL2viQC&pg=PA50&lpg=PA50&dq=varro+emmer+wheat&source=bl&ots=J3ueOwE5g3&sig=ACfU3U2YF4U9B9lEzDlM_NOL5ECOMw3aGg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjwmqHJ0MLzAhVNTcAKHTwUCjoQ6AF6BAgWEAM#v=onepage&q=varro%20emmer%20wheat&f=false


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Slower than Orbis's estimate, and slower than our sources indicate, as I said. But let's move on..
No your timeline is faster, you have 37 days, from london to Rome to Rhine and back to channel, Orbis at the theoretical 250 courier speed comes out at 42 or 44 depending if its fastest or shortest route.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Optimal is the important word here. Marshall (pp.24-27) also claims that legionaries carried 80lbs on the march, as did US troops landed at Normandy, French troops in the Crimea carried 72lbs, British redcoats 80lbs, etc. The number and variety of calculations of how much soldiers could or should carry throughout history is so great as to indicate no definite rule.

No, the FM contains Regulations, based on data.https://watermark.silverchair.com/milmed.169.1.45.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAtMwggLPBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLAMIICvAIBADCCArUGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMZoRK6H5kXSFZFL4uAgEQgIIChopighSZQQp77BZCJA0EJQ6Naiqv2DJBEFPr2rwnFh_7Gptqc0o9pVjyOh3v-1ZQyX4TmjEehzMh3Gd2h5lGZSGPqgwrtAqJV0471spnR_mF1vWmvuzoVMQn0l_c39BVtQyRuMSWJHeOBLBXOM6G7jEPCYwWVQ1wY6_ASApMiFANMyrhZokp2ZyfbU4uvQsJhqrXQ-c-h4YkLKdREd-buuYFjKiYGuHcEoQwbDDptQKWSv5kvE5fw44LcSG4bZ72QraoS9vNS8HfpDmBvkRH9MjMlHDJ9UhuvffI2PyLxaFbZVvj76cbZVzdKcU7zquoutQ11Oxs5Z2P1ybI7tuY1TLAgDAxDx303wkqKNVRWE2ddJpqy76f8uzIwBrC_NZIzDMIyAHt4rNqU-TgVbnv3OVlruETagnKTPtJ_uWOORqvUksdt4WZxlVSPp4Jl7Lli01oLn8wnb7DbOsBQGpXXh5teMmBoS7T-cd7OaayoGLvgOPPiy-b0e_de3LlhxWCEr5KfykxowZXP2xA_ZPSfrL7mOdujw1JkaAj8DVQMtHxJfzovMJZ-726tpKhwnlA7wIIliKbXlrCNDjOZsY8wLWmK8slzNuDRbZBXkfbRlRB2hmK1mVCPkTjCk7f186Xv66LSRLgwf5WH-DhZE5OOfDqQI3hhzNga2iFYuXB811LxbwIx6uvbnetR7Dal0PVwCPJQsgiCGIdBjqMP8wsz0CRL7p26ObsX-Uly1ItUf_iuu73ybnNaiShmdE-MaSV-CkZMFvkEkE0jiEukOH5ms2Qw9xXDDt9N79YX8rCWvAaFX5flNthZKY2wi-v-BIpxnodVLMI3hZgmBWNcbVZ5VcuqhI0-lw gives the outcomes from load bearing rates, US D day was for a 3 day period. France in Crimea, did carry 72 lbs, because, the entire French stock of bread and biscuits had been destroyed by fire at Varna in August 1854 along with the mobile bread ovens. Maréchal Saint-Arnaud only had stores of biscuits for ten days During the autumn and winter of 1854, French regiments lost between forty and fifty men per week from starvation and exposure, an unsustainable level of attrition, and averaged 10 mpd carrying the entire French stores of 10 days with them. UK did have 80lbs on their backs, here's is one example of why, Camden campaign was fought over ground, "was by nature barren, abounding with sandy plains, intersected by swamps, and very thinly inhabited," so they had to take with them what they wanted as it was not possible to live of the land due to pop levels being to low, and gates wanted the element of surprise from attacking through an unexpected direction a 19 day campaign saw them March 9mpd and then attack.

Battle of the Alama, 6 days to march 26 miles to attack, so 4/5 mpd.

Roman roads cuts both ways, if a Roman force can use the road to go 18mpd, then an Iceni chariot force moving at 20mph, can put 4000 fighting men down a Roman road in the same space and time, small Iceni forces can use the Roman road network to advantage.

German panning for war was predicated on resting 1 day in seven for both men and horses which were still essential to logistical supply and Divisional movement, there training manual otoh, was to get men fit enough to achieve these operational plans, just as Roman training for legions was to get them fit, to days armies basic training ( Uk adding extra week couple of decades back as the general pop got fatter and less fit) is to transition you towards what the Army wants you to become.


MARCH SPEEDS. (1) The average speeds of division marches in miles per hour are as follows:
By day Infantry division . . . . . 3
(2) The average speeds of march columns in miles per hour are as follows:
Infantry (long marches) . . . . . 3
Infantry (short marches) . . . . . 4
c. MARCH DISTANCES. The infantry division normally can march about 20 miles in a day; under adverse weather or road conditions the rate of march may fall to 10 miles a day.

German Schlieffen War Planing.https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491685.pdf

The First Army under Gen Kluck, which would serve as the famous IVerwasserung' or far right-wing army in Schlieffen's wheeling movement, was the most significant, because the 1st Army was projected to travel nearly 400 miles in the forty-two day swing below Paris, creating the encirclement Schlieffen planned for.

So (400/420) 10 mpd.


Marcks planning document for Barborossa, again 1 day in 7 is a rest day, the reason by now that 6 of 7 days can be used to march is that motorisation of the supply services allows it, in teh age of muscle no one could bring enough in on wagons and mules to allows 6 days a week movement rates.

1. Time Phasing. The most favorable season for the campaign was from mid-May to mid-October. After a mild winter, it might be possible to start as early as the beginning of May. It was anticipated that all units needed for the initial operations would be assembled before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of an unexpected outbreak of fighting, the forces scheduled to be assembled in the Army Group North area would need approximately 10 days to arrive in their designated areas and those in the south 9 days. During the initial phase of the German offensive the Russians would probably fight delaying actions over distances of up to 250 miles, until they reached their prepared positions. The German infantry divisions would take three weeks to cover this distance. The panzer divisions would have to advance so rapidly and penetrate so deeply that the Russians would be unable to man a continuous defense line. The issue of the entire campaign would depend on the success of the armored thrusts. The struggle for the forest areas and river courses would dominate the second phase. Since the depth of this zone was 60-120 miles, it would take 2-4 weeks to cross it. At this stage the German forces would either achieve a decisive breakthrough or destroy the previously shattered Russian forces individually. During the third phase Moscow and Leningrad would have to be seized and the drive into the eastern Ukraine initiated. The distances to be covered were 250 and 200 miles respectively. Whether this phase could be executed immediately after the second would depend upon the condition of the railroads, the serviceability of the track-laying and wheeled vehicles, and the degree of success hitherto achieved. If the Russians were beaten, a few armored or motorized divisions would suffice to keep them off balance, and to seize Moscow and Leningrad and thrust deep into the eastern Ukraine. This would require one or two weeks if sufficient tanks and motor vehicles were available. If, however, the bulk of the Red Army was still capable of offering organized resistance, the start of the third phase would have to be delayed until sufficient supplies were brought up to support the continuation of the offensive. In this case it might be 3-6 weeks, depend ing on the time needed for the supply buildup. The fourth and last phase of the offensive would see the Germans pursuing the Russians to the Don, the Volga, and the Severnaya Dvina. The distances to be covered were 250 miles in the south and up to 500 in the center and north. After the Germans had captured Kharkov, Moscow, and Leningrad, the Soviet command would have lost control over its forces but complete occupation of the territory acquired during this phase would be neither possible nor necessary. Motorized forces and rail-transported infantry would be responsible for this operation. The time needed for this phase was estimated at 2-4 weeks. The total time required to attain the designated objective would therefore vary between a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 17 weeks. In the event that the Soviet government did not collapse or make peace, the offensive might have to be continued to the Ural Mountains. After the destruction of their armed forces and the loss of their most valuable European territories, the Soviets would probably no longer be capable of conducting military operations but could still set up a government in Asia and maintain a state of war for an indefinite period.

Important bits from Marcks coneptual planning are:

1/During the initial phase of the German offensive the Russians would probably fight delaying actions over distances of up to 250 miles, until they reached their prepared positions. The German infantry divisions would take three weeks to cover this distance.

2/The struggle for the forest areas and river courses would dominate the second phase. Since the depth of this zone was 60-120 miles, it would take 2-4 weeks to cross it.

3/During the third phase Moscow and Leningrad would have to be seized and the drive into the eastern Ukraine initiated. The distances to be covered were 250 and 200 miles respectively. In this case it might be 3-6 weeks, depending on the time needed for the supply buildup.

4/The fourth and last phase of the offensive would see the Germans pursuing the Russians to the Don, the Volga, and the Severnaya Dvina. The distances to be covered were 250 miles in the south and up to 500 in the center and north. Motorized forces rail-transported infantry would be responsible for this operation. The time needed for this phase was estimated at 2-4 weeks.

German plans therefore rest on assumptions of marching rates for the Inf at;
1 (250/21) at 12mpd.
2 (60/14 and 120/28) at 4mpd.
3 (200/21) 10mpd.

And mechanized Inf and Panzers at (500/28) 18mpd.

Who needs Panzers when Romans can do 18mpd?.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Training, and campaign location and season, apply too many variables.
Only to those who are innumerate. Training is to get you ready to become fit fit enough to perform what planners then plan for you to achieve.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Vegetius (1.19) says that Roman soldiers were trained to carry a load of 60 Roman pounds (43lbs, or 20kg) on the regular march, in addition to their arms and armor - 'cruelly laden', as Virgil has it. He has already told us (1.9) that the regular march was 20 miles (18 modern miles).
No he does not.
"Recruits should very frequently be made to carry a burden of up to 60 lb.(4 Note 4 note 4 converts that to 43 imp lbs) and route-march at the military step, since on arduous campaigns they have necessarily to carry their rations together with their arms."

he goes on to tell us 3 of these are done a month in the 4 months initial training period.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: With the cooking equipment, entrenching tools, stakes and tent carried on the contubernium mule, most of the individual soldier's load would comprise rations. 14 days ration at 2.5lbs per day would total 35lbs, well within Vegetius's load limit. We know that Roman soldiers could routinely carry more than fourteen days (Cicero), seventeen days (Historia Aug, Ammianus) or greater (Caesar, Livy) amounts of personal rations on the march.

Why miss of the 3 days ration carried that precedes that list?. Who is caring the 40lbs tent? its not a part of the training kit, and on its own weighs 40lbs, so that 5lbs more to each mans weight because you went without mules. Who carries the medical supplies?, what weight does personnel equipment have or is that gone as well?, who carries the corn grinders that onlay a mule can carry?, so you cant even use the grain.....why are you still ignorantly using 17 days when the document says its a 20 day load carried for 3 days?.

First you already moved the goal post to claim they had it on their backs and were moving without mules, now you rely on V for the 43 lbs kit ( different age with different kit weights) training weight, to say actually lets put another 35lbs on top of that and forgot V training route does not include water, so thats another 10lbs, or 16lbs if you wantb to avoid it completely and replace all water lost in the march, making in the field the march weight 88lbs to 96lbs plus a tent taking you over 100lbs, using your figures of kit not used in the 1 cent AD, and is still twice what he trained with at a min.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Even so, with arms and armor too each soldier would start out carrying something around 80lb (36kg). But this load would decrease steadily with every passing day, as they consumed their rations. I have already cited Junkelmann's experiment showing that relatively untrained men can carry 43-46kg on lengthy marches.

No you have done away with the mules and had them cross country for 60 miles to get to a road, then on to london, total 250 miles in 14 days, there is the international 4 Day Nijmegen March that attracts the world mil and others to do 4 25mile marches with 10kg rucks, 10% cant finish the 4 day event on average, and it has killed people trying it. Yes the load goes down as you consume it, but the water intake goes up due to the doubling of weight carried, so now you need to carry more water, so your worse of not better off.
(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: It comes down to whether you choose to believe the sources and the studies that have been done on them, or not.

[REMOVED BY MOD]

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Ah, the return of the totally and thoroughly debunked cavalry dash theory! [Image: smile.png]
Not at all, its your timeline that he goes to london, as he has to do so as its the only place to eplenish his supplies he has consumed to get there, its your timeline and loss of logistical supply that make him go there, only to leave again with supplies to do anything else.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I wondered if something like that might lie at the root of your thinking.

Three questions: if Suetonius Paulinus knew, as you suggest, that 'he cant get back to london and defend it, there is simply not enough time', why would he ride all the way down to London, in person, at enormous risk to himself and his command? Why would he, as Tacitus says, have wondered 'whether he should choose it as a seat of war' if he knew his troops could never reach it? And how could the refugees from London possibly have kept up with him if he was traveling at speed, on horseback?

Since none of that is anything to do with your timeline and logistics i leave that alone.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Spelt had been introduced to Britain long before, so this 'new administrative policy of Rome' is solely your own invention. And nobody would try using a horse to pull a plough until the middle ages - oxen were the draft animals, and oxen pulled the wagons that the Iceni brought to the final battle, so any ideas of rapid dashing fleets of chariots should be considered purely imaginary too!
Nope, spelt is not found in the Rhine which provided london with its grain, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 Graham Webster says on the grain burnt in in London, "it was mainly emmer" Iceni did not use the manorial open field 3 field system requiring heavy oxen, and if the horses are not in the fields then they are still pulling chariots. Farro is what tehyn romans called emmer, and was the grain of choice in the legions for a thousand years.
(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: As for wine - Dio has Boudica claim that the terrible Romans drink unmixed wine, rather than diluting it like civilized people. But we should probably take his ideas on life in Britain as seriously as his claim that the Iceni made their bread out of grass...

University of warrick:
Before AD 60, the Iceni seem to have lived relatively prosperously. However, unlike their neighbors*, they believed that imported wine and other goods undermined traditional values. Their reluctance to have any such dealings must have increased the culture-shock inflicted by the Roman occupation.

* For instance, the Trinovantes, (the tribe neighboring Boudica's people,
the Iceni) had been importing amphorae of wine, olive oil and grape syrup, and fish sauce from
Spain.
(10-10-2021, 11:36 AM)John1 Wrote: It will be a lot easier and less fractious if you simply accept the site was Church Stowe and then reverse engineer the campaign from there. Deep down y'all know that's the truth Wink

https://www.academia.edu/1280170/Battle_Church_Stowe_CP1

A compelling argument. Big Grin
(10-07-2021, 11:18 AM)Renatus Wrote: You make a good point.  David Breeze make a similar point at the Roman Army School at Durham a few years ago.  I don't remember how the question arose but recall that he took the Jewish revolt as an example.  In our case, there would seem to be a tension between Cerialis' characteristic urge for action and Suetonius' natural caution.  However, with the fate of the colony at stake, it is possible that even Suetonius would regard it necessary to follow traditional Roman practice.  I can see a message being sent along the lines of, ' You try to nip it in the bud.  I won't be far behind you.'  It may be that, although Tacitus criticised his temeritas , Cerialis avoided censure because he did exactly what was expected of him.

See also https://www.academia.edu/5365731/No_quarter_to_the_Guerrilla_Roman_terror_tactics_and_the_conquest_of_Wales

and https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1166&context=curej

(10-10-2021, 08:19 PM)Owein Walker Wrote: With all this chat about Roman logistics nobody is answering the question of how Paulinus would prepare the battlefield, being several days ahead of Boudicca.
Depends if he was being chased and had to do so due to logistical and time pressure, or if he wanted to be in the way of where he knew the Iceni wanted to go.

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-11-2021

(10-11-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: I dont need to imagine, we have T* telling us how they went ashore under P and later under Agricola

Obviously i was asking how he got to Anglesey from Wroxeter, since we were discussing roads. As I am sure you know.


(10-11-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: your wrong to say so and wrong to say i say so and wrong to say Pliny and Varro say so

I literally quoted these authors, with exact references, saying that crops were sown in the autumn.

You have provided no quotes, only vague references which do not say what you think they say. Your idea about the 'four month fallow period', for example, apparently comes from Pliny's discussion about planting spring beans.


(10-11-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: Orbis at the theoretical 250 courier speed comes out at 42 or 44 depending if its fastest or shortest route.

Orbis gives 9.9 days for a courier London to Rome, 8 days Rome to Cologne, 18.5 days march Cologne to London. 36.4 days total.

At this point I have no idea what you are going on about - whether anyone else has or not, I expect we will only bore everyone further by continuing this discussion.


(10-11-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: No you have done away with the mules and had them cross country for 60 miles to get to a road

Did you not notice the mule I mentioned in the paragraph you quoted?


(10-11-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: Not at all, its your timeline that he goes to london... Since none of that is anything to do with your timeline and logistics i leave that alone

Ha, no - it's not so easy I'm afraid.

Tacitus (not my timeline) tells us that Suetonius Paulinus marched to London. He describes what he did when he got to London, and that he was considering fighting a battle there, then he tells us how and why he left.

Any notion of logistics that makes it impossible for Paulinus to reach London from Anglesey must therefore be ruled out of our considerations. And this, you see, is why I keep asking you to try and work it out for yourself. If you do, and realise the impossibility of what you are proposing, you will swiftly see that your logistical calculations are giving you the wrong answers.



(10-11-2021, 05:34 PM)Owein Walker Wrote: have you visited the site and looked at the topography and Is there a defile??... Vespasian's camps before, he was big in the Chilterns ?

I haven't - just found it on Google Maps. It is close to something that could fall into the all-too-elastic definition of a 'defile' though [Image: smile.png]

I hadn't heard of any known camps in the Chilterns. Which ones were you thinking of?

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-12-2021

(10-11-2021, 05:34 PM)Owein Walker Wrote: I am certain Suetonius used his time well and prepared his position, and he had built ditches throughout his career, so it would be folly not to. Remember he chose the site and the timing, he knew how many days ahead of the enemy he was by speed alone.

Ok so he had the freedom to chose to fight or run away because he manouverd faster and had a head start and could keep ahead of pursuit, so he was not chased to ground but chose to fight when other options existed, where does the logistics support to give that option come from?.

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - John1 - 10-12-2021

The Mona campaign began with an advance from the militarized zone of the Avon/Nene (Upex) line. A familiar, partially fortified, well connected and supplied position.

Following Mona the Roman force moved south along the line of Watling Street to a point within this militarised zone, but not so far south that their east flank was exposed to the Iceni homelands. Their logistic/supply base here was well supplied by river and road, and at a central point to permit a pre-determined muster of the IV and remnants of the IX.

All that was needed in this area was a ridge top position overlooking a closed valley with a choke point at it's entrance, no easy access from the rear and a perched water table...... We call this place.... Church Stowe..... I'll get my coat [Image: wink.png]

RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-12-2021

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Obviously i was asking how he got to Anglesey from Wroxeter, since we were discussing roads. As I am sure you know.
I already laid this out earlier.
He has to build the roads to get to around Chester from Wroxeter, c120miles through allied lands, from there he lacks roads and heads across N wales rugged hills for 60/70 miles through hostile lands to the narrow channel to cross over, here he stops and spends c5 days to cut trees, manufacture enough flat bottom craft to assault Angelsey with. So, perhaps you can tell me if 5 days is enough manhours to constuct a fleet of ships for your 20k army then, as i did not do so for that size of force?.Caeser gave orders for c600 new flat bottomed barges to be built over winter, so 200 a month, how many are you thinking are needed for your 20k? if Caeser need 600 for 27K.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I literally quoted these authors, with exact references, saying that crops were sown in the autumn.

I have quoted the same authors, here i all add modern work* on when spelt necame a principle crop, in the flavian period following annexation of client states post the iceni revolt. Trinovates burnt Colchester, colchester grain is both emmer and spelt, emmer in rural and spelt in roman villas, Colchester used Roman land management rules as well as traditional. In any event its how much grain and when/if its sown that counts.


*APPLEBAUM

"There is some archaeological evidence for assigning this work to the Flavian period, and the unit of measurement used may have been a Belgic one, possibly reflecting an adjustment of native rights with those of new settlers. Our acquaintance with Romano-British crops has been much increased by the work of Messrs Helbaek and Jessen: the identified grains are triticum vulgate, triticum sativum, barley, oats, great millet (one isolated find), triticum turgidum and compactum, spelt, possibly emmer, and rye. Spelt is now a principal crop, and the oat, previously grown but probably not as a cultivated plant, is well established: it is found preponderantly in the north, where its spread is likely to have been encouraged by the introduction of Roman cavalry."

Iceni were still using celtic field system, when Rome annexed them the Emp now owned and ordererd the admistration all their land, manu Cæsaris. So the Emperor agent enacted the policies set by the Emperor through his agent the proculator of the province. These policies are to insure the land users deliver their dues, vectigalia, to the proculator. Romans replaced celtic field systems with their own ideas of land ownership, awarding a set jugertha of land to be worked and taxed, its tempting to think T knows how many Iceni and Trinovantes there were involved in the revolt from tax records based on vectigalia/census records, without which you cant how much you can get from the number of people being taxed.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: You have provided no quotes, only vague references which do not say what you think they say. Your idea about the 'four month fallow period', for example, apparently comes from Pliny's discussion about planting spring beans..

Incorrect i have have provided the quotes, and the Butser data from following the seperate ways to grow the crops listed, here again you directly contadict the author pliny, who wrote "There is another rotation again—when the ground has been cropped with spelt,383 it should lie fallow the four winter months"* spelt has a 4 month fallow period. As i explained many times, its the lack of manure, solved by adopting manure in the crop cycle.

*http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.02.0137%3Abook%3D18&force=y

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Orbis gives 9.9 days for a courier London to Rome, 8 days Rome to Cologne, 18.5 days march Cologne to London. 36.4 days total.

Coverd this already, you have the same man riding 24 hours a day every day for 37 days, which is not how the courier sytem worked. It worked that the same man rode at the most 150 mpd, so 14 days to get to Rome, 14 to get to the Rhine, and thats as fast as a human on a horse can get there, 44 days maybe 42 depending on route taken.

"Caesar’s letter carriers reached Rome from the coast of Britain in 27 days" using the same system, https://histos.org/documents/2017AA01RaaflaubRamsey.pdf

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Did you not notice the mule I mentioned in the paragraph you quoted?

The ones that you claimed were not needed when you started, and now you need them have re appeared, yes i noticed that.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Ha, no - it's not so easy I'm afraid.

Actually it is.

There are 7 principle* recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London, S Kaye, everyone else has him go to recon with a small mounted element.
Barry Horne
Grahame Appleby
John Pegg
Sullivan & Kinsella Clifton
John Waite
Graham Webster

Its a mathmatical certainty, that how easy it is, you have to get to london to be resupplied there or run out of supplies in your timeline.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Tacitus (not my timeline) tells us that Suetonius Paulinus marched to London. He describes what he did when he got to London, and that he was considering fighting a battle there, then he tells us how and why he left.

None of which includes any dates or distances, you provided those, and its they that dont work.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Any notion of logistics that makes it impossible for Paulinus to reach London from Anglesey must therefore be ruled out of our considerations.

Not at all, its your timeline that can be rulled out as being implausable due to the logistic grounds its based on. You have a 14 day period of 250 miles movement, inc going through hostile land at start a cross hill and valleys, and finish going througha province in revolt.

(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: And this, you see, is why I keep asking you to try and work it out for yourself.

I have done your maths for you to show you how wrong your explantion is, you have given Roman a 4 to one movement ratio to the iceni, and advatage that has no parrllel in any other conflict of the ancient world and twice that of authors who looked at this conflict on top of giving the romans an operational range that is beyond human capacity to fullfill.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: If you do, and realise the impossibility of what you are proposing, you will swiftly see that your logistical calculations are giving you the wrong answers.

What i have done is provide a range of examples of actual miles a day achieved in campaigns, these are historical reality checks to yopur number values, here ill add others, what you find is your timeline has no parrellel in miles moved in 14 days, leaving aside the fact that the 7 days before are spent fighting and building a fleet.

Waterloo campaign, French cross at Charleroi on the 15th and fight Waterloo on the 18th, 10mpd to get there.

Gettysburg campaign https://www.amazon.co.uk/Gettysburg-Campaign-Study-Command/dp/0684845695ANV in thee columns peels away from camps around Fredericksburg June 1 and marches seperatly into PA, the lead column marches 225 miles by 28th, the others follow behind so move less distance, on 28th Lee concentrates ANV at Gettysburg, adding 40m more miles to lead Corps movement. 9 mpd.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Paulinus, in my projected timeline, only needs to move fast for fourteen days; a single expediti march, on established roads and lines of supply, to confront an emergency.
Once he learned of the Iceni revolt, he would have supplied an expeditio force of c.6-7000 men with marching rations for 14-17 days, drawing from the supplies remaining for his campaign force.
Except he is moving far to fast, and carrying twice what he has been trained to carry, expediti means "lightly equipped", ie fighting kit only no rations or baggage as explained by Caeser, and again by livy,expediti means no impedimentia, ie no rations no army train, this is how the army moved in the expectation of combat, the other kind of movement with rations/army train, is the "heavily equipped" and is the normal march mode not in the presecene of the enemy.


(10-07-2021, 06:19 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: "will correspond to the speed of a standard march or iustum iter known from Caesar Bell Civ 3.76, defined as a normal route-march on good roads in good weather between camps, leaving time to build the camp and curare corpora and leave in time the next day".

The longest forced march Caeser records is a 7 day one, which he did once, to a distance of c175 miles. He averaged 16 mpd. P in your time line is 18mpd on average, and 252 miles, max effort. "If so, a rest day would normally have been scheduled after every fourth or fifth day of marching."https://histos.org/documents/2017AA01RaaflaubRamsey.pdf If we give Caeser he same problem, he says, nope cant do it.


https://histos.org/documents/2017AA01RaaflaubRamsey.pdf
"Polybius and Livy provide information about extreme feats of Roman armies in the Punic Wars.44 We are here less interested in what an army could accomplish in great emergencies than in average marching speeds and distances. We note, however, that the maximum distance achievable over several days seems to have been 60 R mi (55.5 mi or 89 km) but only if the soldiers carried no baggage whatsoever and at the risk of total exhaustion."

We have his march rates down pretty good, what we do not have his his legions carrying 100lbs and marching 14 days back to back, but that dont exist in any military history elswhere either.

Information gathered from Caesar’s own text. Caesar uses the expression ‘a day’s normal march’ to describe a distance of c. 16 R mi (15 mi or 24 km) covered inroughly five hours.15 Hirtius refers to ‘normal daily marches’, but without specifying their length.16 In 57, Caesar covered the distance between Vesontio (Besançon) and the Matrona (Marne, perhaps at modern Epernay) in 15 days.17 The average daily distance covered was 20 km (c. 12.4 mi) if Caesar made no pause, 21 km (13 mi) with one rest day, 23 km (14.3 mi) with two.18 Distances covered in a day’s march increased substantially if Caesar was in a hurry. For instance, also in 57, he traversed the distance from the site of the battle at the Axona (Aisne, near Berry-au-Bac) to Noviodunum (near Soissons)—c. 50 km,augmented by 25 per cent = 62.5 km (39 mi)—in a forced march and attacked the town directly from the march but failed to take it.19 In the late fall of 54, having received a message about the predicament of Quintus Cicero’s winter camp that was under siege by the Nervii and their allies,20 Caesar sent a mounted messenger around the eleventh hour (in winter between 3 and 4 p.m.) from Samarobriva (Amiens) to his quaestor Marcus Crassus, whose camp was 25 R mi (23 mi or 37 km) away, ordering him to
leave his camp, even in the middle of the night, and come to Samarobriva as quickly as possible. Crassus received the message early enough to leave presumably not too long after midnight. His advance party informed Caesar of his impending arrival around the third hour (c. 9:30 am).21 Crassus thus covered the distance with a fully encumbered legion (including its baggage train) in a night march of 8–9 hours, traveling at a speed of slightly more than 3 R mi (2.7 mi or 4.4 km) per hour. Setting out immediately (at the third hour) and hurrying to bring aid to Cicero’s embattled camp, Caesar covered 20 R mi (18.5 mi or c. 30 km) on that same day.22 Had he been able to leave earlier, he probably would have added another 10 R mi.
In June of 52, Caesar left his camp at Gergovia early in the morning with lightly equipped legions, covered 25 R mi before engaging in a peaceful confrontation with Aeduan rebels, let his army sleep three hours early in the night, and marched back to Gergovia, reaching his camp before sunrise.23 Thus legions that were unencumbered (legiones expeditae) and clearly in a great hurry were able to cover 50 R mi (46.25 mi or 74 km) in 24 hours, with a break ofonly 3–4 hours.
In May 58, while occasionally battling mountain tribes that tried to blockhis path, Caesar marched with five legions in seven days from Ocelum at the entrance of the road across the Mt. Genèvre Pass to the territory of the Vocontii24—an estimated distance of 195 km (122 mi). Caesar’s army thus covered 28km (17.5 mi) per day, even in the mountains and against sporadic opposition,although most likely only with pack animals, no wagons.